Radiation-induced multiple-cell upsets (MCUs) are events that account for more than 50% of failures on triple modular redundancy (TMR) designs in SRAM field programmable gate array (FPGA). It is important to understand these events and their impact on FPGA designs to develop improved fault mitigation techniques. This article describes an enhanced fault injection (FI) method for SRAM-based FPGAs that injects MCUs within the configuration memory of an FPGA based on MCU information extracted from previous radiation tests. The improved FI technique uncovers 3× more failures than is observable in conventional single-bit FI approaches. The results from several MCU FI experiments also show that injecting MCUs can replicate the failures observed in the radiation beam test and identify new failure mechanisms.
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are susceptible to radiation-induced effects that can affect more than one memory cell. Radiation-induced microsingle event functional interrupts (micro-SEFIs) are one of such events that can upset several bits at a time. These events need to be studied because they can overcome protection from techniques such as triple modular redundancy (TMR) and error correction codes (ECCs). Extracting these events from radiation data helps to understand if specific resources of the FPGA are more vulnerable and the extent of this vulnerability. This article presents a method based on statistics and fault injection to identify micro-SEFIs from beam-test data in the configuration memory and block RAM (BRAM) of SRAM-based FPGAs. The results show the cross section of these events for the configuration RAM (CRAM) and BRAM for three families of Xilinx SRAM FPGAs gathered throughout three neutron tests. This article also contains data from a fault injection campaign to uncover the possible CRAM source bits causing micro-SEFIs in memory look-up tables (LUTs) of Xilinx 7-series and Ultrascale devices.
Triple modular redundancy (TMR) with repair has proven to be an effective strategy for mitigating the effects of single-event upsets within the configuration memory of static random access memory field-programmable gate arrays. Applying TMR to the design successfully reduces the design's neutron cross section by 80x. The effectiveness of TMR, however, is limited by the presence of single bits in the configuration memory which cause more than one TMR domain to fail simultaneously. We present three strategies to mitigate against these failures and improve the effectiveness of TMR: incremental routing, incremental placement, and striping. These techniques were tested using both fault injection and a wide spectrum neutron beam with the best technique offering a 400x reduction to the design's sensitive neutron cross section. An analysis from the radiation test shows that no single bits caused failure and that multicell upsets were the main cause of failure for these mitigation strategies.
This paper presents the TURTLE fault injection platform for inserting faults into SRAM FPGAs. The TURTLE system is designed to gather significant fault injection data to test and validate radiation-induced single-event upset (SEU) mitigation techniques for FPGAs. The TURTLE is a low-cost fault injection platform that emulates upsets within the configuration memory (CRAM) of an FPGA through partial reconfiguration. This work successfully implemented the proposed architecture and performed several successful fault injection campaigns on multiple designs and SEU mitigation techniques. Results in this paper show large amounts of data collected from a fault injection campaign used to validate the PCMF SEU mitigation technique. Over 170 million injections were performed using the TURTLE for this campaign.