This article examines some of the most important metaphors and analogies that epistemologists have used to discuss the structure and validity of knowledge. After reviewing foundational, coherentist, and other metaphors for knowledge, we discuss the metaphilosophical significance of the prevalence of such metaphors. We argue that they support a view of philosophy as akin to science rather than poetry or rhetoric.

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Finally, I cannot forebear from exposing some prejudices, which I keep hoping in vain a voice sympathetic to "Continental Philosophy" might soften. Heidegger is listed 11 times in the index. These are, actually, not so much references as ritual invocations, for nowhere does any actual idea of Heidegger's do any work: each invocation is either bare, or else linked to a platitude or obfuscation. Example: on p. 112 the question, "Am I the kind of being I ought to be or really want to be?" is described as "Heideggerian." Really? Did we need Heidegger to think of asking that? Too much Heidegger in the diet of all concerned is perhaps also responsible for the collective inability of author, editor, copy editors, dissertation supervisor, and committee members to filter out grammatical nonsense. I honestly puzzled over several sentences before giving up. The prize goes to this one:

RésuméCet article examine les différences entre deuxparadigmes dominants en éthique: 1) la théorie du contrat, qui est fondationnelle et anhistorique, et 2) l'approche néo-aristotélicienne, qui s'enracine dans les phénomènes de l'expérience éthique ordinaire. Le premier paradigme est exemplifié par Jan Narveson, le second par Charles Taylor. Le présent article voudrait à la fois jeter quelque lumière sur ces divergences théoriques et soutenir l'approche de Taylor contre les tenants de la théorie du contrat. Je tiens que les theories procédurales du juste dependent en réalite d'une conception sous-jacente du bien; que nous ne devrions pas accepter une éthique des libertés (ni aucune autre éthique) sur la seule base d'un argument contractualiste abstrait; et que la théorie du contrat est incapable de mettre en lumière les veritables sources morales de l'éthique des libertés.

Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 299-324 Hume and Nietzsche: Naturalists, Ethicists, Anti-Christians CRAIG BEAM Hume and Nietzsche have a remarkable number of things in common. Most notably, both can be characterized as philosophers of human nature. They share a turn of mind that is naturalistic, skeptical, and anti-metaphysical. As is well-known, both are critics of religion. However, this point of affinity goes deeper than many would suspect. Hume and Nietzsche both mount radical moral critiques of the Christian religious tradition, which make use of many of the same arguments. The moral bases of these critiques are also quite similar. Both vehemently maintain that Christian theology and morality are not conducive to human flourishing. Hume rejects such elements of Christian morality as the "monkish virtues" not only because they are not useful and agreeable, but (like Nietzsche) because they stand in the way of pride and greatness of mind. Even when it comes to the issue of benevolence, Hume and Nietzsche are much less far apart than is generally acknowledged. Both try in their own ways to strip virtue of its "dismal dress." Remarkably little has been written about these resemblances, largely because Hume and Nietzsche have been appropriated by radically different philosophical traditions. Nietzsche has been read as a precursor of such Continental movements as existentialism and postmodernism, while Hume has been claimed as a precursor by Anglo-American analysts and logical positivists. There is little to be gained in comparing an analytic or positivist "Hume" with a Heideggerian or post-structuralist "Nietzsche," for they exist in alien intellectual universes. However, once we can get beyond these conventional interpretations, a number of interesting affinities emerge.1 Craig Beam is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3Gl, Canada. Email: cabeam@artshh.watstar.uwaterloo.ca 300 Craig Beam Philosophers of Human Nature Probably the most basic affinity between Hume and Nietzsche is their skeptical attitude towards metaphysics and their focus on human nature. Much recent Hume scholarship has moved towards such an understanding of Hume, and away from the sort of analytic reading which Nicholas Capaldi has called "the canonic misreading of Hume."2 For instance, Annette Baier argues that the conclusion of Book I of the Treatise is the key to Hume's thought.3 It shows how solitary, foundationalist intellectualism comes to grief, replacing it with a reformed philosophy that is tempered by the "gross earthy mixture" of common life, and that hopes only to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination. (T 272) The central focus of this new mode of philosophy is human nature. Hume thought that by turning philosophy away from metaphysical speculations and towards human beings he was giving philosophy a revolutionary new turn: "Human Nature is the only science of man; and yet has been hitherto the most neglected" (T 272). This "science of man" (which is the theme of the "Introduction" to the Treatise) is a humanistic study which gathers its "experiments " from a "cautious observation of human life" (T xix). The true laboratory of this science is history:'1 These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms concerning them. (EHU 83-84) When we return to Nietzsche with such an image of Hume in mind, we find a surprising resemblance. Nietzsche is well-known as a critic of metaphysics, but what is less widely recognized, his thought is centred on human nature or philosophical anthropology. As Richard Schacht has observed: it is above all upon 'man'—upon human nature, human life, and human possibility—that his attention focuses. His interest in other matters and the extensiveness of his treatment of them are for the most part almost directly proportional...