The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of attention in the work of Nicolas Malebranche and to suggest an explanation for its ambivalent status concentrated in the phrase "natural prayer". The goal is therefore to understand the relationship between the theology and the Malebranchist method and to determine the consequences generated by the definition of the idea as an external object that moves towards the mind. The mobility of the idea and the epistemological guarantee offered by the divine Word thus describe a phenomenological space that exposes occasionalism to a strong internal tension.

The aim of this article is to reassess Guerric's retraction (i.e. the changes he made to the thesis of the vision of God between Quaestio I and Quaestio III) and to provide some considerations that could, perhaps, contribute to a better understanding of how the condemnations of 1241 forced an author to abruptly contradict his own teaching. We want to shed new light on the difficult repositioning of theologians writing before and after the 1241 moment, who were obliged to openly overturn not only what they had upheld, but also many of the patristic authorities who defended the invisibility of the divine essence.

Une rétractation qui ne convainc pas

The purpose of this article is to highlight Challe's criticism of the Malebranchist conception of God. Directly aiming the subordination of the divine omnipotence (Puissance) to the divine wisdom (Sagesse), which Malebranche supports in order to build his theodicy, Challe's reply surprises with its metaphysical acuity and the use of some innovative strategies, namely the metaphysical foundation of divine justice as the third (and independent) divine attribute and the use of some Cartesian formulas which were rejected by almost all Cartesiens.

The seventeenth century can be characterized as a century in which we witness the "twilight of the Mystics" (Louis Cognet) or as a century when the doctrinaire controversies over the grace and the "correct" interpretation of St. Augustine generated a revitalization of Patristic sources. This revitalization was not done without provoking famous controversies where Augustine was used as a yardstick of theological orthodoxy, at the expense of the others Church Fathers. The purpose of this article is to expose the arguments used in one of these controversies and to underline the extent to which "augustinism" had become, in the seventeenth century, a very rigid position.

The purpose of this article is to show that the way Malebranche calls on the Augustinian heritage does not limit itself to a plain respectful reception, so as many exegetes think, quite to the contrary: in the Xth Elucidation, where he engage a violent polemic against Descartes, the French Oratorian shows himself very "Augustinian", invoking the Augustinian theory of the illumination in order to criticize the Cartesian thesis of the creation of eternal truths; in other writings, he diverts an Augustinian principle (nulla natura interposita), intending to prove that the knowledge of idea is immediate. This strategy raises many philosophical and theological risks, denounced by the Index Commission of Rome.

The second rule of Descartes' "provisional moral code" stressed the obligation of mastering oneself rather than fortune. Of Stoic inspiration (The Manual of Epictetus), the Cartesian rule carefully delimitates what is and what is not in man's power. In addition, the rule calls for the distinction expressed in the fourth Metaphysical Meditation between the intellect and the will and for the necessity to temper the will's natural tendency to overcome its inherent borders. In the Preface of his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes views philosophy as a form of therapy that can treat illnesses of the mind, just as medicine treats illnesses of the body. Philosophy is thus charged with leading us to the "true health of the mind," by cultivating a " true and sound judgment". This Cartesian moral code that seems to provide a minimal balance between concrete action and man's will is violently criticized by Blaise Pascal in the Conversation with Mr. de Sacy, where the principles of Stoic morality are called " principles of a diabolic pride [that] lead him to other errors". The provisional moral code is discredited by Pascal because, in his opinion, human will cannot be limited - as Descartes thought - because it is infinite: " Self-will will never be satisfied, though it should have command of all it would". (C) 2016 Published by Future Academy www.FutureAcademy.org.uk

The goal of this article is of analyze the concept of occasional cause of grace which appears in the Treatise of nature and grace and Which constitutes the central element of Malebranche's theodicy. Far from being a circumstantial concept that Malebranche accidentally uses, this is a central one, because it explains the ineffectiveness of grace and the way in which Christ acts as Saviour. However, this concept generates some serious theological issues, which were quickly noticed and criticized by Malebranche's adversaries. The hypothesis of this article is that the action of occasional cause of grace cannot be fully understood without assuming the occasionalist theory of ideas and the concept of attention.

The period between 1670 and 1740 is considered a time of "crisis of Christian rationalism" (A. McKenna) or a time of "skepticism" (V.Cousin), since the Christian apologetics, trapped between Protestantism and the Rationalism, are gradually reduced to a row of inefficient and traditional "proofs" for the existence and kindness of God. In 1680, Nicolas Malebranche publishes the Treatise on Nature and Grace, following to explain the way in which God granted His grace to all mankind. In order to fight the skeptical thesis according to which God takes not directly part in this world, Malebranche refers the action of God to the concept of "general/divine will". If such a theory is useful at a certain metaphysical level in explaining the presence of the evil in the world (God does not create but allows the evil), it raises some anthropological issues, especially concerning the nature of the human free will. If anything in the world emerges as a direct consequence of God's "general will", how can be conceived a real free human will? The theory of God's general will generates an unexpected anthropological consequence (the dissolution of the human free will) that Malebranche tries to hide it by inventing the concept of "inclination of the will": God does not interfere (by causation) with the human will, but He influences it (by inclination). Is it philosophically defensible? The aim of the article is to analyze some philosophical and methodological difficulties related to the new Malebranchist concept of "inclination of human will" in order to prove that the passage from the occasionalist theory of general will to an inquiry about the human will is quite problematic.

The goal of this text is to analyze the concept of divine glory and to put it in relation to the thought of Malebranche on the Incarnation of Christ. Far from being a concept without ambiguities, the divine glory announces a scotist filiation in Malebranche’s thought, which remains to be examined in order to determine the Oratorian’s loyalty to Duns Scotus. This text does not offer himself to close the argument but to sketch out some hypotheses.

The goal of this article is to analyze a metaphysical and theological argument between Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche about the relationship between the eternal truths and God. We try to see whether the criticism that Malebranche expresses in the Elucidations succeeds in demolishing the Cartesian theory of eternal truths that emerges in the Letters from 1630 to Mersenne or if Malebranche, in 1678, were not already disqualified by the arguments that Descartes had supported in those letters.

This article aims to highlight the strategies that Nicolas Malebranche uses in order to subvert the patristic interpretation of the Scripture and to impose a hermeneutical neutralization of the patristic tradition. I refer to the general problem of the relationship between reason and faith and to the particular problem of the rationality of the divine action in the theology of Incarnation. The main question to which Malebranche has tried to answer is if we can interpret the Christian theology in order to “deduce” the norms of the divine action. However, this interpretation leads Malebranche into conflict with his direct rival (Antoine Arnauld) and with other indirect opponents (some Church Fathers).

Review of: Jakub Čapek, Action et situation. Le sens du possible entre phénoménologie et herméneutique, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York : Georg Olms Verlag, 2010, 252 p.