Journal AWWAVolume 115, Issue 9 p. 68-70 Water Quality Matters Microbes and the Water Industry: What to Expect by 2050 Bina Nayak, Corresponding Author Bina Nayak [email protected] Search for more papers by this authorHunter Adams, Hunter AdamsSearch for more papers by this authorDhritikshama Roy, Dhritikshama RoySearch for more papers by this authorVicente Gomez-Alvarez, Vicente Gomez-AlvarezSearch for more papers by this authorDan Kroll, Dan KrollSearch for more papers by this authorEmily Garner, Emily GarnerSearch for more papers by this author Bina Nayak, Corresponding Author Bina Nayak [email protected] Search for more papers by this authorHunter Adams, Hunter AdamsSearch for more papers by this authorDhritikshama Roy, Dhritikshama RoySearch for more papers by this authorVicente Gomez-Alvarez, Vicente Gomez-AlvarezSearch for more papers by this authorDan Kroll, Dan KrollSearch for more papers by this authorEmily Garner, Emily GarnerSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/awwa.2183Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume115, Issue9November 2023Pages 68-70 RelatedInformation

It's common sense to monitor and control for factors that can influence water and wastewater infrastructure longevity. Fortunately, there are a variety of lab and field methods available to help extend the useful life of infrastructure assets.

Our water supplies are at risk from accidental and intentional contamination. An all-hazards approach to securing our water supplies is required to protect us from unknown and unexpected events. To detect, understand, and respond to such events, a water safety plan approach is warranted. Monitoring is a key component of any water safety plan and requires a different type of monitoring than has traditionally been carried out. This chapter explores the threat to our water and some of the technologies that are available to help guard against these threats.

Water quality is often tested in the field to meet federal, state, and local requirements as well as for process control and emergency response. Using established guidelines can improve field analysis results.

The water and wastewater industries face many challenges in providing safe drinking water, sanitary services and environmental protection to the public. The dynamic nature of our water systems along with new regulations, emerging contaminants and increasing environmental concerns combined with the constant pressure to reduce operating costs and conserve energy make the development of sensors for the water industry a field ripe with opportunity. As with all areas of opportunity, to be successful in developing sensors for the water industry there are hurdles to overcome and pitfalls to be avoided. Harsh environmental conditions in wastewater sensor deployment scenarios are a given, but, the severe conditions commonly encountered in drinking water applications are often not addressed with the diligence that they merit. Factors such as debris in the pipes, turbidity, fluctuating pH, various types and levels of disinfectants and other water treatment chemicals; fluctuating redox conditions and variable conductivity are just a few of the complicating elements that can hamper sensor development. Once a sensor has been developed the last hurdle has been by no means cleared. The water industry is a notoriously reactionary group. The barriers to change are extremely large and adoption curves for new technologies tend to be extremely slow. One of the chief factors in these slow adoption rates is the glacial pace of regulatory acceptance of new methods. Even for measurements not taken for reporting purposes, the industry tends to favor methods that have EPA or other regulatory body approval. Unfortunately, this approval process can take several years (2 to 3 years for drinking water and up to 7 years for wastewater applications). There are several industry initiatives sponsored by groups, such as the Water Environment Federation, that are attempting to speed up the innovation curve in the water industry but these groups are just beginning to act and it is unknown if they will meet with success. In this presentation, the above constraints will be discussed, as well as others, which are commonly encountered in the research and development cycle for sensors tailored to the water industry. Examples of obstacles encountered in a recent development project initiated for the use of nano-fibers in sensors for the water industry will be utilized to illustrate various points. A thorough knowledge of the technological pitfalls to be avoided as well as an understanding of the market and regulatory forces that can come into play in this market arena will lead to the development of robust sensors that serve the industry and help to ensure developers of a reasonable return on investment.

The Science and Culture Series — Nuclear Strategy and Peace TechnologyInternational Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies — 45th Session, pp. 371-387 (2013) No AccessTHE TERRORIST THREAT TO WATER AND TECHNOLOGY’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING SUPPLIESDAN J. KROLLDAN J. KROLLHach Homeland Security Technologies, Loveland, USAhttps://doi.org/10.1142/9789814531788_0030Cited by:2 (Source: Crossref) PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Abstract: The following sections are included: INTRODUCTION WHY ATTACK WATER? HOW SEVERE IS THE THREAT? HISTORY OF ATTACKS ON WATER WHERE DO THE SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES LIE? COMPOUNDS OF CONCERN FOR DRINKING WATER SECURITY MONITORING AS A MEANS OF DETECTING ATTACKS: CONCLUSION REFERENCES FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited By 2Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citation.Security of Water Critical InfrastructureDavid Birkett1 Jan 2020Where is the place of corporate security/safety in the organizational structure of an organization: An approachZoran Pendić, Rajko Pendić, Bojana Jakovljević, Ljiljana Vujotić and Lazar Gajić1 Jan 2019 | Tehnika, Vol. 74, No. 5 Recommended International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies — 45th SessionMetrics History PDF download

The threat of terrorist action targeting water supplies is often overlooked for the more historically obvious threats of an air attack or a dirty bomb. Studies have shown that an attack on water is simple to orchestrate, inexpensive and can result in mass casualties. The twin motivators of the terrorist threat to water along with consumer demands for safe and potable supplies has lead to a sea change in the drinking water industry. From a historical perspective, most monitoring in the distribution system as well as source water has been relegated to the occasional snapshot provided by grab sampling for a few limited parameters or the infrequent regulatory testing required by mandates such as the Total Coliform Rule. New technologies are being deployed to ameliorate the threat from both intentional and accidental water contamination. The threat to water and these new technologies are described as well as needs and requirements for new sensors to improve the monitoring structure.

A system designed to address the problem of distribution system monitoring is described here. The developed system employs an array of common analytical instrumentation, such as pH and chlorine monitors, coupled with advanced interpretive algorithms housed in an event monitor to provide detection/identification-response networks that are capable of enhancing system security and quality. A variety of real world venues and testing protocols were used to verify the efficacy of the system. Deployed systems are shown to demonstrate the capability of learning base line in a rapid timeframe while being capable of detecting and characterizing system anomalies related to security and basic water quality operations. Included are data generated from several real world events including caustic overfeeds, rain events, street work and major line breaks among others. This paper was presented at the 8th Annual Water Distribution Systems Analysis Symposium which was held with the generous support of Awwa Research Foundation (AwwaRF).

Abstract not Available.

On-line monitoring systems typically consist of a means of measuring basic on-line water quality parameters - often coupled with interpretive algorithms for event detection and classification. These systems facilitate an unprecedented view of the basic water quality anywhere in the network. One deficiency in these systems derives from their widespread geographic deployment. Monitoring site access for instrument verification, data acquisition and other housekeeping and emergency response tasks can become daunting when it is understood that a system may be comprised of tens or even hundred of monitoring nodes. This, combined with the expediency of being able to view the network as a whole makes the need for a hierarchical centralized system of command and control a must. The solution described here consists of communication and data handling software that will give utilities a bidirectional monitoring and control system that integrates the data flow from water quality monitoring points strategically located throughout a water supply network. This gives utility personnel the ability to simultaneously view and minimize response time to critical water quality data anomalies from any Internet browser at any location.

In the past, monitoring of operational parameters in the distribution system has been done in a piecemeal and haphazard manner. The distribution system represents the last analytical frontier in the water quality industry. Once the water reaches our aging distribution systems, our knowledge as to its continued integrity is limited by the quality and amount of available data. The development of water security monitoring in the years since 9/11 has the potential to change this paradigm. Since 9/11 numerous communities have installed multi-parameter monitoring stations as early warning systems based on potential water security threats. These continuous on-line systems have recorded large streams of data relevant to water quality in the distribution systems in which they have been deployed. In this study data streams from a number of communities are analyzed for pertinent information as to the health and operation of the distribution system. Changes in water quality are correlated with known causes attributable to day-to-day operational changes and also anomalous events. The data streams show the diversity in what could be termed "normal" operating conditions both within and between different classes and types of systems. This sort of information is critical in understanding and improving the operation of our distribution systems.

The concept of utilizing the measurement of multiple bulk parameters to recognize and identify water quality excursions is rapidly gaining ground as the method of choice for on-line water quality monitoring. These monitoring systems may or may not be equipped with event detection software to help in interpreting signals that indicate potential water quality anomalies. All of these monitoring systems rely upon basic water quality monitoring technology and instrumentation to provide the baseline data that is utilized in the determination of water quality excursions. With or without software, all of these systems have some potential to generate false alarms. No one wants to spend all of their resources responding to false or unimportant alarms. It is important for operators to understand that all such early warning systems are inferential in nature. With all inferential systems, certain questions need to be answered in the shortest amount of time possible. Is the alarm real? Is the root cause in the water, the sampling system, or the measurement system? The answer to these questions is crucial to the timely implementation of response procedures. Addressing and eliminating possible sources of error in a systematic and focused manor is the best practice in such situations to quickly arrive at the appropriate answer to these questions. Some of the critical factors to be addressed include operator interpretation of signal patterns (the duration, magnitude and shape of an alarm signal), verification of instrumental readings, knowledge of external factors and other procedures. These concepts can help in interpretation and verification of these signals. Simple rules and procedures including checklists are suggested along with things to consider when alarms happen. Following these simple guidelines, regardless of the type of instrumentation or software being utilized, will help reduce the time and effort expended in responding to alarms of all types.

Both real events and models have proven that drinking water systems are vulnerable to deliberate and/or accidental contamination. Additionally, homeland security initiatives and modeling efforts have determined that it is relatively easy to orchestrate the contamination of potable water supplies. Such contamination can be accomplished with classic and non-traditional chemical agents, toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), and/or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). Subsequent research and testing has developed a proven network for detection and response to these threats. The method uses off-the-shelf, broad-spectrum analytical instruments coupled with advanced interpretive algorithms. The system detects and characterizes any backflow events involving toxic contaminants by employing unique chemical signature (fingerprint) response data. This instrumentation has been certified by the Office of Homeland Security for detecting deliberate and/or accidental contamination of critical water infrastructure. The system involves integration of several mature technologies (sensors, SCADA, dynamic models, and the HACH HST Guardian Blue instrumentation) into a complete, real-time, management system that also can be used to address other water distribution concerns, such as corrosion. This paper summarizes the reasons and results for installing such a distribution-based detection and protection system.

Recent years have seen the arrival of an array of early warning systems for the continuous on‐line detection of anomalies relating to water security and quality. Numerous methodologies and criteria have been suggested to determine the efficacy of these methods in real‐world scenarios. The authors contend that many of these evaluation techniques are deficient in evaluating all of the factors that would be essential in defining a system for deployment for the protection of key installations such as military bases. They suggest specific criteria as a means of comparing various technologies and propose a new method for determining receiver operating characteristic curves. Similar considerations should come into play in the evaluation of systems for civilian uses.

On-line monitoring systems typically consist of a means of measuring basic on-line water quality parameters - often coupled with interpretive algorithms for event detection and classification. These systems facilitate an unprecedented view of the basic water quality anywhere in the network. One deficiency in these systems derives from their widespread geographic deployment. Monitoring site access for instrument verification, data acquisition and other housekeeping and emergency response tasks can become daunting when it is understood that a system may be comprised of tens or even hundred of monitoring nodes. This, combined with the expediency of being able to view the network as a whole makes the need for a hierarchical centralized system of command and control a must. The solution described here consists of communication and data handling software that will give utilities a bi-directional monitoring and control system that integrates the data flow from water quality monitoring points strategically located throughout a water supply network. This gives utility personnel the ability to simultaneously view and minimize response time to critical water quality data anomalies from any Internet browser at any location.

The ability to detect and act upon changes in water quality is a critical component in the drive to protect our drinking water supplies from intentional or accidental contamination. The twin motivators of the terrorist threat to water along with consumer demands for safe and potable supplies has lead to a sea change in the drinking water industry. The distribution system represents the last analytical frontier in the water quality industry that has been, to date, overlooked and ignored since the inception of modern drinking water systems. The monitoring of source water and treatment plant processes has progressed to a level at which we can be confident that we are providing good quality water from the plant to the distribution system. Once the water reaches our aging distribution systems, however; our knowledge as to its continued integrity is limited by the quality and amount of available data. From a historical perspective, most monitoring in the distribution system has been relegated to the occasional snapshot provided by grab sampling for a few limited parameters or the infrequent regulatory testing required by mandates such as the Total Coliform Rule. A number of studies conducted since 9/11 have shown that bulk monitoring of basic water quality parameters has the potential to indicate the presence of many harmful agents in water at the levels of interest. (EPA, 2005; Kroll, 2006; Hall et. al., 2007). The realization of the potential of bulk parameter monitoring as a practical tool to detect terrorism related events has lead to the development of a number of sensor packages designed for deployment in the distribution system. Since 9/11, numerous communities have installed multi-parameter monitoring stations in various locations through out their distribution network as early warning systems to detect potential water security threats as well as providing operational data. These continuous on-line systems have recorded large streams of data (at some sites for a number of years) relevant to water quality in the distribution systems in which they have been deployed. These data streams are quite complex and it becomes a Herculean task to differentiate what is normal background noise and fluctuations due to normal everyday events from changes that are indicative of a deviation in water quality deserving further attention. Unless a full-time team of statisticians is to be employed to make sense of this information, the need for computer aided data interpretation becomes obvious. Intelligent algorithms are a necessary adjunct to bulk parameter monitoring if useful decision trees are to be built from this type of monitoring. Intelligent algorithms are necessary to streamline the process of data interpretation. These algorithms should be capable of detecting the subtle changes in bulk parameter readings that are indicative of an incursion into the system without burdening the operators with a constant stream of false or trivial alarms. They should also be capable of differentiating the unique pattern of responses that are elicited by different classes of agent. These differences may be enough to narrow down the cause of events and, possibly, to fingerprint the class of disturbance that caused the event. Over the past several years a number of such algorithms designed for this use have been under development by private industry, government programs, universities and national labs. The question then becomes how to evaluate the effectiveness of these potential early warning system (EWS) solutions. While a number of research studies (McKenna et al, 2006; Umberg, 2008) and programs such as the EPA's ETV program (ETV2005) have attempted to set criteria and means for evaluating such systems, many important functional criteria for such systems have been overlooked in past studies. A number of factors that are mandatory for the success of any such system are outlined below.

The drinking water distribution system is vulnerable to deliberate or accidental back flow events. The large number of agents that could be potential threats and the innumerable access points make this a difficult scenario to defend against. This was clearly stated in a GAO report to Congress that listed the vulnerability of the distribution system to attack as the largest security risk to water supplies. A system designed to address the problem of distribution system monitoring is described here. The developed system employs an array of common analytical instrumentation, such as pH and chlorine monitors, coupled with advanced interpretive algorithms housed in an event monitor to provide detection/identification-response networks that are capable of enhancing system security. A variety of testing protocols were used to verify the efficacy of the system. Data obtained from a Battelle/EPA ETV study and a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) between Hach HST the EPA Office of Research and Development addresses issues such as long-term deployment and ability to detect and characterize contaminants. Information obtained from test loop studies carried out by Hach HST, the US Army Corp of Engineers Research Lab, and the Edgewood Biological and Chemical Command as the result of a 3-way CRADA demonstrate data collected when the system is exposed to actual warfare agents. Numerous deployment sites at both military and civilian locations have demonstrated the systems ability to function in a manner that is conducive to its use not only as a security apparatus, but also as an effective operational too for optimizing conditions in the distribution system. The system is shown to be a practical measure to help detect and characterize backflow and other water quality events.

Since 9/11, numerous communities have installed multi-parameter monitoring stations as early warning systems for potential water security threats. These continuous on-line systems have recorded large streams of data relevant to water quality in the distribution systems. In this study, data streams from a number Of Communities are analyzed for pertinent information as to the health and operation of the distribution system. Changes in water quality are correlated with known causes attributable to day-to-day operational and also anomalous events. Information concerning what if any action was taken to ameliorate the problem will also be linked to the data for the identified events. This sort of information is critical in understanding and improving the operation Of Our distribution systems. We will need to consider databases such as this before we determine the best course of action to ensure our water supplies meet acceptable levels of quality and safety from source to tap.