This study investigates researcher variability in computational reproduction, an activity for which it is least expected. Eighty-five independent teams attempted numerical replication of results from an original study of policy preferences and immigration. Reproduction teams were randomly grouped into a ‘transparent group’ receiving original study and code or ‘opaque group’ receiving only a method and results description and no code. The transparent group mostly verified original results (95.7% same sign and p-value cutoff), while the opaque group had less success (89.3%). Second-decimal place exact numerical reproductions were less common (76.9 and 48.1%). Qualitative investigation of the workflows revealed many causes of error, including mistakes and procedural variations. When curating mistakes, we still find that only the transparent group was reliably successful. Our findings imply a need for transparency, but also more. Institutional checks and less subjective difficulty for researchers ‘doing reproduction’ would help, implying a need for better training. We also urge increased awareness of complexity in the research process and in ‘push button’ replications.

This paper investigates the intergenerational effect of communication barriers on child health at birth. We study refugees in Switzerland who come from French- or Italian-speaking countries and who, upon arrival, are randomly allocated to different cantons in which either German, French, or Italian is the dominant language. Children born to mothers who were exogenously allocated to a region whose dominant language matches their origin language are, on average, 72 grams (or 2.2 percent) heavier. Further analyses suggest that this effect is likely driven by information about health-related behavior and services. Coethnic networks, however, can partly compensate for communication barriers. (JEL I12, J13, J15, J16, Z13)

Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely Copy URL Copy DOI

In many regions of the world, liberal politics is on the retreat. This development is usually explained with reference to inherently political phenomena. We propose an alternative explanation, linking democratic backsliding to deep-reaching demographic change caused by mass emigration. We argue that because migrants tend to be more politically liberal, their departure, if quantitatively significant, can hurt liberal democracy. Empirically, we focus on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Since 2004, the region has lost about 9 percent of its population due to migration to Western Europe. Drawing on data from 430,000 individuals and a panel analysis, we show that CEE migrants systematically hold more liberal values than non-migrants, and that their exit went along with a deterioration of democracy in their home countries. Further analyses show that the mechanism we describe generalizes to various other world regions. Mass emigration may pose a challenge to democratic development in migrant-sending countries around the globe.

We leverage plausibly exogenous variation in regional exposure to corruption to provide causal estimates of the impact of local political corruption on terrorist activity for a sample of 175 countries between 1970 and 2018. We find that higher levels of corruption lead to more terrorism. This result is robust to a variety of empirical modifications, including various ways in which we probe the validity of our instrumental variables approach. We also show that corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods and undermines counter-terrorism capacity. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with predictions from a game-theoretical representation of terrorism, according to which corruption makes terrorism relatively more attractive compared to peaceful contestation, while also decreasing the costs of organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks.

Experiments on ethnic or racial discrimination often use names to signal originin market situations under the assumption that non-ethnic name signals do notsystematically affect the outcome. Using survey data, we demonstrate significantvariation in perceived trustworthiness and professionalism of names within origins.Linking this to a large-scale name-matched field experiment, we show thatthe variation in name perception predicts discriminatory behavior: Prospectivetenants in Switzerland with names exogenously rated as less trustworthy or lessprofessional receive fewer invitations to an apartment viewing. These marketrelevantcharacteristics explain, to a large extent, group differences in measureddiscrimination. Ethnic minority names that score high on either trustworthinessor professionalism are not discriminated against, while names scoring low on theseare discriminated against (relative to the majority name). In line with intergroupcontact theory, we also show that, regardless of their origin, more common namesface less discrimination. Our results reveal that discriminatory behavior is muchmore nuanced than a simple in-group/out-group dichotomy would suggest.

We ask how human behavior changes when racial discrimination is costly and when choices are risky. By asking N = 4,944 participants in Germany to form a soccer team in a series of online experiments, we measure decision-making in an accessible way. Higher costs of discrimination can reduce disparities, but we show that these costs can also trigger implicit racial bias: participants who received an additional financial incentive to select more skilled soccer players outperformed nonincentivized participants and differentiated less based on skin color. However, when confronted with risky choices in a lottery, incentivized participants are more likely to gamble to avoid players with a darker skin color. That is, racial (minority) markers alter the risk preferences of people when their decisions carry costly consequences. This implicit racial bias may partly explain why members of visible minority groups are regularly discriminated against in real-world competitive markets.

Members of ethnic and racial minorities across North America and Europe continue to face discrimination, for instance, when applying for jobs or seeking housing. Such unequal treatment can occur because societies categorize people into groups along social, cultural, or ethnic and racial lines that seemingly rationalize differential treatment. Research suggests that it may take generations for such differences to decline, if they change at all. Here, we show that a single gesture by international soccer players at the World Cup 2018 - followed by an extensive public debate - led to a measurable and lasting decline in discrimination. Immediately after the galvanizing event, invitation rates to view apartments increased by 6 percentage points for the migrant group represented by the players, while responses to the native population did not change noticeably. We demonstrate that anti-immigrant behaviour can disband rapidly when the public receives messages challenging the nature of ethnic and racial categories while sharing a common cause.

We investigate whether the threat of recruitment by rebel groups spurs domestic and international migration. The existing literature on wartime displacement has largely focused on potential victims of violence. We argue that alongside potential victims, we should expect to see the out-migration of individuals who are attractive to the rebels as potential recruits. To test this hypothesis, we draw on original survey data collected in the context of the MFDC insurgency in southern Senegal. Causal identification stems from instrumenting recruitment threat with the density of the local forest canopy cover. Analyzing data from 3,200 respondents and over 24,000 family members, we show that individuals who fit the recruitment profiles of rebel groups are more likely to leave and be sent away by their families. Our paper contributes micro-evidence for a mechanism linking violent conflict to migration, which so far has received scant attention, and provides a deeper understanding of the composition of refugee flows.

Immigrants and other minorities are underrepresented in politics in most Western democracies. We argue that strategically acting party gatekeepers who update their nomination strategies based on voter behavior contribute to this representation gap. Drawing on unique panel data from Swiss local elections, we find that candidates with a “foreign‐sounding” name systematically receive not only fewer votes but are also fielded on less promising list positions compared to native candidates. We track candidates across elections and show that this inequality is driven by voter discrimination in previous elections. Our study carries relevance for research on minority candidates by linking different stages in the electoral process and showing how parties indirectly discriminate due to their use of candidate‐performance information. It also bears practical implications, pointing to avenues how parties can break the cycle of discrimination in the electoral process.

Each year, several thousand migrants from sub-Saharan Africa lose their lives attempting to reach Europe’s southern shores. Social scientists and policymakers have puzzled over the question of why so many people are willing to take this extremely high risk of dying. Drawing on panel data from over 10,000 individuals collected over the course of 1 year in The Gambia—a country with one of the highest emigration rates in the world—we show that consulting a local healer for spiritual protection predicts migration outcomes. Furthermore, we find that spiritual practices are strongly associated with a decreased perception of one's own risk of dying on the migration journey. Our findings demonstrate the relevance of ideational factors in explaining risky migration choices, and point to spiritual leaders as important interlocutors for migration policy makers.

When crises hit, social theory predicts increased hostility toward immigrants. We exploit the Covid-19 pandemic as a unique exogenous crisis and examine whether discrimination increased in its wake. Repeating a field experiment in the Swiss housing market in 2018 and 2020, we find no evidence of increased discrimination against the most important immigrant groups in Switzerland. Contrarily, when uncertainty dominates the market, proprietors appear to change their selection behavior by substituting signals of ethnicity for other markers of solvency and reliability and, consequently, invitation rates for immigrants increase relative to native house-hunters. We conclude that crises do not necessarily increase discriminatory behavior in market situations.

Whether or not immigration negatively affects the labor market outcomes of natives is an ongoing debate. One challenge for empirical evidence is the simultaneity of supply- and demand-side effects. To isolate the demand side, we focus on refugees in Germany who are exogenously allocated to districts and excluded from the labor market. We leverage quasi-random variation in the local refugee share as an instrument to show that an influx of 1000 asylum-seekers creates almost 300 jobs in a district, on average. This effect is mainly driven by a demand for additional (female) labor in service, public administration and social work. The results are robust to various sensitivity checks and an alternative difference-in-differences identification strategy. Moreover, we show that employment effects largely offset the financial burden on the public. Quantifying the demand side of immigration adds to our understanding of local labor market dynamics in an increasingly mobile world.

Information and networks have long been hypothesized to be crucial elements of the formation of emi-gration intentions. Returnees are a prime source of information about life as a migrant. In this study, we contribute to an emerging literature on the influence of returnees on the formation of migration decisions using representative geolocated data from 5,000 respondents and more than 47,000 family members and relatives from Senegal and The Gambia, two countries with high emigration rates in the past. We demon-strate that the presence of return migrants in a respondent's vicinity is exogenously conditional on the current number of emigrants. This allows us to circumvent the endogeneity of personal networks and to estimate the effect of returnees on individual emigration intentions. Migration intentions are substan-tially lower when emigrants who returned from Europe are present in the area. This does not apply to returnees from another African country. Further analyses reveal that migrants who returned from another African country improve the economic situation of families, while non-family returnees from Europe have no lasting economic impact but instead salter people's negative perceptions of migration. We infer that exposure to returnees depresses emigration plans because potential migrants become more aware of the risks of the migration journey and the stigma attached to returning unsuccessfully.(c) 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

We leverage the British Brexit referendum decision to leave the European Union, to demonstrate how changes in uncertainty about a country's future socio-political condition can impact migratory behaviour. Using official bilateral migration statistics, we report an excess increase in migration from the UK to the EU of approximately 16% post-referendum, compared to movements between the remaining EU countries over the same period. In addition, we analyse in-depth interviews conducted with UK migrants in Germany to show that uncertainty about future bilateral relations, a negative economic outlook, and perceptions of negative social consequences in the UK have been by far the most dominant drivers of migration in the post-referendum period. We further corroborate the effect of changes in uncertainty on migration-related behaviour with exceptional spikes in naturalisations, indicating that UK citizens living in other EU member states are actively taking decisions to mitigate the negative impact that Brexit is having on their livelihoods.

This study explores how researchers' analytical choices affect the reliability of scientific findings. Most discussions of reliability problems in science focus on systematic biases. We broaden the lens to emphasize the idiosyncrasy of conscious and unconscious decisions that researchers make during data analysis. We coordinated 161 researchers in 73 research teams and observed their research decisions as they used the same data to independently test the same prominent social science hypothesis: that greater immigration reduces support for social policies among the public. In this typical case of social science research, research teams reported both widely diverging numerical findings and substantive conclusions despite identical start conditions. Researchers' expertise, prior beliefs, and expectations barely predict the wide variation in research outcomes. More than 95% of the total variance in numerical results remains unexplained even after qualitative coding of all identifiable decisions in each team's workflow. This reveals a universe of uncertainty that remains hidden when considering a single study in isolation. The idiosyncratic nature of how researchers' results and conclusions varied is a previously underappreciated explanation for why many scientific hypotheses remain contested. These results call for greater epistemic humility and clarity in reporting scientific findings.

The speed of the economic downturn in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic has been exceptional, causing mass layoffs—in Germany up to 30% of the workforce in some industries. Economic rationale suggests that the decision on which workers are fired should depend on productivity-related individual factors. However, from hiring situations we know that discrimination—i.e., decisions driven by characteristics unrelated to productivity—is widespread in Western labor markets. Drawing on representative survey data on forced layoffs and short-time work collected in Germany between April and December 2020, this study highlights that discrimination against immigrants is also present in firing situations. The analysis shows that employees with a migration background are significantly more likely to lose their job than native workers when otherwise healthy firms are unexpectedly forced to let go of part of their workforce, while firms make more efforts to substitute firing with short-time working schemes for their native workers. Adjusting for detailed job-related characteristics shows that the findings are unlikely to be driven by systematic differences in productivity between migrants and natives. Moreover, using industry-specific variation in the extent of the economic downturn, I demonstrate that layoff probabilities hardly differ across the less affected industries, but that the gap between migrants and natives increases with the magnitude of the shock. In the hardest-hit industries, job loss probability among migrants is three times higher than among natives. This confirms the hypothesis that firing discrimination puts additional pressure on the immigrant workforce in times of crisis.

Do arms imports fuel terrorism? Despite the high human, economic and political toll associated with terrorism, the effect of a country's arms trade on the propensity to experience terrorist attacks has received scant attention so far. We argue that arms imports affect a country's institutional landscape, increasing grievances due to corruption, exclusion and human rights violations; these grievances, in turn, incite terrorism. We leverage plausibly exogenous variation in global arms trade patterns as an instrument to provide causal evidence of a significant positive effect of arms imports on terrorist activity for 179 countries between 1992 and 2018. We also show that arms imports indeed increase corruption and political exclusion, which may explain why arms imports ultimately encourage terrorist activity. Finally, the adverse effect of arms imports on terrorism is strongest among countries characterized by low levels of fiscal capacity and high levels of political inequality and authoritarianism.