The IMF has acknowledged that climate change and other environmental and social factors issues should be incorporated into its analytical work and the surveillance, financial, and advisory services that it provides member countries. However, the IMF’s current approach to these issues hinders its ability to accurately and equitably assess the nature, diversity, scope, and magnitude of these issues. In this article, we argue that the IMF can draw on existing international and transnational law to develop operational policies and procedures that more effectively address financial, economic, environmental, and social (FEES) factors.

The New Development Bank (NDB) launched its first project in Africa on April 13, 2016, and on August 17, 2017, the Bank opened its Africa Regional Centre (ARC) in Johannesburg, South Africa. This article assesses the NDB's presence in Africa. It addresses the following questions: what role is the NDB playing in Africa? What is the ARC and why was its created? How well have the NDB and the ARC been performing? Have they delivered on their intended purpose? If the NDB or the ARC have not performed as well as hoped, or expected, what has stood in their way? We assess the NDB and the ARC within the context of the general experience of some of the projects that the NDB has been financing in Africa and determine whether there are lessons that can help the NDB as it expands further into the continent. The main policy recommendation is that the ARC be strengthened in ways that enhance the NDB's transparency and make it a truly new type of multilateral development bank.

This article explores the contributions that law can make to the development of a holistic approach to sovereign debt sustainability. We focus on debt sustainability assessments (DSAs) conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are linked to the IMF’s surveillance and lending functions, and determine whether it is necessary to restructure the debt of a country in debt distress and the timing, process, and terms of such a debt restructuring. While the precise causes of each country’s debt situation are unique, all countries are grappling with the rising costs and growing risks posed by climate change and other environmental and social factors. We suggest that the IMF’s current treatment of these environmental and social factors is opaque, unpredictable, and hard for the citizens of affected countries and other outsiders to understand. It also obscures the true burden that debt obligations impose on a sovereign and the country’s residents, and, thus, the amount of debt relief that it may need in order to achieve a sustainable debt position. To address these shortcomings, we identify financial, economic, environmental, and social (FEES) factors that we contend should be incorporated in the design of the frameworks governing DSAs and the operating principles and practices of the IMF through which DSAs are conducted. We argue that the IMF should draw on various hard and soft sources of international and transnational law to develop a FEES-based approach to sovereign debt sustainability that is more consistent, predictable, and legitimate than the current approach.

The current arrangements through which African sovereigns raise and manage the external finance for sustainable and inclusive development in their countries are functioning sub-optimally. This troubling situation suggests that Africa needs a new approach to managing its sovereign debt and to restructuring the debt when servicing it becomes too burdensome. This paper argues that Africa is currently facing five challenges in regard to its sovereign debt and that addressing them requires a new conceptual framework that facilitates reaching an Optimal Outcome. This is defined as an outcome that, taking into account the circumstances in which the sovereign debtor and its creditors are negotiating their transaction and their respective rights, obligations and responsibilities, offers each of them the best possible mix of economic, financial, environmental, social, human rights and governance benefits.To make this case, the paper will focus on the case of sovereign debt restructurings. These transactions most clearly demonstrate the complexities and the challenges involved in reaching an Optimal Outcome in sovereign debt transactions. The paper is divided into 3 sections. The first section focuses on the five challenges that African countries are facing in managing and, when necessary, restructuring their sovereign debts. The second proposes eight principles, the DOVE (Debts of Vulnerable Economies) Fund Principles, that together offer a new conceptual framework for negotiating and drafting both new and restructured sovereign debt agreements. This new framework will help the sovereign and its creditors reach an Optimal Outcome. The third section draws some conclusions.

The paper proposes a new approache to managing distressed African sovereign bonds denominated in foreign currency and governed by foreign law. It argues that the stakeholders in such debtIn should seek to disrupt inter-creditor dynamics and create incentives for bondholders to be more open to innovative ways of delivering debt relief. One way to change these inter-creditor dynamics is a DOVE (Debts of Vulnerable Economies) Fund. This fund would be established by public, private, and civil society stakeholders to invest in marketable foreign currency debt issued by African countries. By its mandate, the Fund would commit to participate in debt restructuring negotiations based on a set of guiding principles clearly articulated ex ante and grounded in applicable international standards. The guiding principles would be designed to ensure that the debt restructuring process is transparent and fair to all stakeholders, and that its outcomes promote socially and environmentally inclusive development in the debtor country.

This chapter, prepared for a study being undertake by the South African Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation and the Government Technical Advisory Centre, explores how the South African government has used its engagement with global and regional organisations, forums and other external actors in the economic, security and health areas to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. It gives a brief overview of the pandemic’s impact on the country’s international economic relations and then reviews South Africa’s engagement with the rest of the world. This is followed by a discussion of its interactions with its key international interlocutors during the pandemic and the outcome of these interactions. The final section draws five conclusions, which are still preliminary and will be refined based on stakeholder consultations and feedback from readers: 1. South Africa has made effective use of its international relations in dealing with the pandemic. 2. It was able to benefit from its international relations during the pandemic because it has invested time in building and sustaining these relations and building credibility with its interlocutors over a number of years. 3. A country’s credibility and effectiveness in international affairs are enhanced if it takes a strategic and realistic approach to foreign policymaking and implementation. 4. It is important for the country to have a clear strategy for communicating with all domestic and international stakeholders about government’s international actions. Much of the groundwork for international relations takes place behind the scenes and is not obvious to either domestic stakeholders or international audiences; the risk of misinterpretation is therefore not insignificant. 5. South Africa should have a means for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of its international relations strategy.

SUMMARY The priorities ofAfrican governments regarding the extractive industry tend to focus on economic interests leading them to provide a conducive environment for investments by private entities. Furthermore, reforms in the industry are inclined to promote these priorities with less consideration for adequate protection for affected people and their environment, including protection from resulting social and environmental impacts. The result in economies endowed with mineral resources is that resources are poorly managed and the outcomes of exploitation of mineral resources are environmental degradation, loss of lives, displacement, conflicts between companies and mining communities, protests against mining projects, and human rights violations. These problems in the long run slow down development and forestall its benefits because of poor regard for the concerns of affected people by the government and companies. Filling the gaps in extractive policies, particularly in the area of protection of communities and their environment affected by activities of the extractive industry, is essential to tackle the environmental and social outcomes of mining activities. In this article the legal and institutional framework regulating the mining industry in selected jurisdictions in Africa is examined to determine the extent to which they respond to the problems arising from the development of mineral resources, particularly the human rights violations caused by the adverse impacts of mining. Some lessons are drawn for the benefit of other countries. The article argues that some of these mining policies poorly encourage effective protection of affected communities, particularly human rights, in mining developments. The article proposes that mineral legal regimes need to be strengthened for the effective protection of affected people and their environment. Key words: mining industry; mineral resources; mining; mining policies; human rights

The IMF responded forcefully to the end of the par value system in 1971 by amending its Articles of Agreement and changing the scope of its interactions with its member states to better help them manage the challenges of a market based international monetary system. In addition to focusing on monetary policy and balance of payments in its engagements with its member states, the IMF began to raise any economic issue that it though could affect the member’s exchange rate or balance of payments. Consequently, the IMF has become more of a macro-economic development financing institution than a specialized monetary institution. Today, the IMF is again facing the need to change. It must help its member states address the macro-economic impacts of such complex issues as climate change, public health, inequality and discrimination. In addition, it must respond to the challenge that central banks and financial markets are posing to its role as the lead actor in global financial governance. This paper argues that responding to these challenges requires the IMF to reform its own governance arrangements. In order to make this case, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part describes the evolution in the IMF role in global economic governance. The second part discusses why the current governance arrangements are no longer fit for purpose. The final part will recommend some governance reforms that the IMF should undertake to remedy this situation. Given space limitations, the paper focuses on those reforms that the IMF can implement in the short term on its own and that do not require specific actions by its member states.

The formal arrangements for the governance of international monetary and financial crises have remained reasonably stable over the past 40 years, but the identity of the leading actors, has changed. Over this period, the role of the largest central banks – first and foremost, the US Federal Reserve (Fed), currently the most important central bank due to the international role of the US dollar, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BoE), the People’s Bank of China, and the Bank of Japan – has increased substantially. Unlike the situation with other global governance actors, there are no obviously applicable international standards to guide central bank conduct. This policy brief discusses the implications of this development and recommends standards that should be used to guide central banks in their global governance activities.

This chapter is the introductory chapter in a book on how both state and non-state actors and their lawyers use hard and soft international law in advocating for social change. Both non-state and state actors understand that, sometimes working together and sometimes apart, they can use international forums and a variety of international instruments to drive social change. For example, some corporations and industry associations advocate for international standards to support a globalized market for their products or goods. Networks of national regulatory authorities collaborate to develop international standards for dealing with common problems that they cannot effectively regulate at a domestic level. These standards harmonize their approach, fill gaps, or overcome perceived weaknesses in national regulatory frameworks. Similarly, advocacy groups may participate in international forums to promote their view of the appropriate standard applicable to, for example, public health, environmental protection, or the rights of workers, children, or people with disabilities. These efforts can catalyze governments to adopt higher international standards, whether or not expressed in treaties, strengthen domestic regulations, identify minimum safeguards as a floor for activities, or take actions to demonstrate proof of concept for higher standards. This reality challenges both state and non-state actors and their legal advisors to think strategically about how they can use international forums, their relations with other international actors including states, and either hard or soft international law most effectively to advance their interests or normative priorities which may include reaching the agreements needed to preserve the status quo. The purpose of this book is to help these actors and their legal advisers assess how they can use hard and soft international law to identify and pursue their opportunities on the international stage.

This book seeks to understand the context in which South African foreign policy makers will operate in the 2020s and to offer some suggestions on what they can do to function most effectively within this context. In the introductory chapter, we posed six questions regarding South Africa’s foreign policy in the 2020s that we invited readers to think about as they read this book. This concluding chapter draws some general lessons from the specific findings and recommendations of the various contributions to this volume that are relevant to answering these questions. In addition, it makes some general recommendations that are relevant to the making and conduct of South African foreign policy in the 2020s. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides some historical background, focusing on the factors that have shaped South Africa’s foreign policy. It also discusses the factors that are likely to continue shaping it in the 2020s. The second section discusses the lessons learned from the various chapters in this book. The third section proposes a possible strategy for the country’s foreign policy in the 2020s. The final section provides some recommendations.

The purpose of economic reforms is to change the structure and overall direction of an economy. They therefore will affect the amount and allocation of resources available to a country. This means that the reforms will also affect the human rights situation in the country. This requires impact assessments of each reform option before it is implemented.

Globalization has made it more difficult for national financial sector regulators to effectively regulate their country's financial sectors. It has pushed them to collaborate on formulating international financial regulatory standards that would help them each meet their responsibility to oversee their country's financial sectors. Given that these regulators did not have the authority to negotiate binding international agreements, they developed non-binding international standards. Globalization has also resulted in civil society groups becoming concerned that financial institutions were funding projects around the world that had significant negative social and environmental impacts and that states appeared unable or unwilling to control these activities. They responded to this regulatory gap by developing soft international financial responsibility standards that clarified, inter alia, the social, human rights, and environmental responsibilities of financial institutions. These international financial regulatory standards and international financial responsibility standards offer useful insights into the factors affecting the efficacy of soft international law as a vehicle for promoting change. After describing these standards, this chapter draws some lessons about the use of soft international law in promoting change.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part answers the seven questions posed in about the nature and relationship between hard and soft international law. It also includes a review of the lessons learned from the case studies about the seven questions. The second part is a discussion of some issues that arise from this review. The third part is a conclusion.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of the Federal Reserve as a leading actor in global economic governance. As a creature of U.S. domestic law with an international presence and operational independence, the Fed wields authority without a well-defined international legal status, international legal standards to guide its conduct, or accountability to those around the world affected by its decisions. This Essay explores three conceptual approaches that could be used to develop norms, standards, and principles to address this gap.

This chapter is the introductory chapter to a volume that seeks to identify some of the lessons that can be learned from a review of South Africa’s international relations over the last quarter century and makes suggestions on how South Africa could respond to the international challenges it is likely to face over the next decade. It is by no means comprehensive, but it is intended to contribute to a conversation about how the country can derive maximum advantage from its international engagements in a multipolar, highly volatile, interdependent and complex world. Some of the policy relevant questions that the subsequent chapters will explore include: • How should South Africa define its national interest and what role should this play in determining South Africa’s foreign policy priorities? • What role should South Africa’s international economic diplomacy play in dealing with the domestic challenges of inequality, unemployment, poverty and promoting sustainable development? • What are the optimal institutional arrangements for developing and implementing an effective South African foreign policy? • On what issues on the global governance agenda, should South Africa seek a leading role? • What lessons can Pretoria learn from its peace and security agenda over the last quarter century? • How can DIRCO engage most effectively with non-state actors in implementing South Africa’s foreign policy imperatives? This introductory chapter raises some of the key issues, relevant to answering these questions, that are discussed in the contributions to this volume and places them in context. In order to do this the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section describes South Africa’s efforts to define its national interest. The next section discusses South Africa’s soft power. The third section considers whether South Africa should be considered a middle or a regional power and how that determines its behavior in the international realm. This is followed by a discussion of South Africa in the context of Africa. The fifth section focuses on possible South African responses to the challenges it will face in its international relations during the next decade. The final section provides an overview of the chapters in this volume.

This blog discusses the Mozambique Constitutional Council decision in Case No:05/CC/2019, holding that the loans made by Credit Suisse and VBT to three Mozambiquan entities were null and void because they were unconstitutional and incurred in violation of the country’s budget law. The basis for the decision was that, although these loans were obligations of the state, they have not been presented to and approved by Parliament as required by the applicable statutes. It draws four lessons for lawyers concerned about the negotiation and management of African sovereign debt.

More than 25 years ago the multilateral development banks (MDBs) began establishing independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs), such as the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, to address concerns about MDB accountability to those communities and groups who were harmed by their decisions and actions. This essay argues that these mechanisms need updating. In the interests of promoting new and creative thinking about these mechanisms, it makes an ambitious two-part proposal designed to improve the efficacy of the IAMs, while also respecting the sovereignty of their member states and protecting an appropriate level of immunity for the MDBs. First, the MDBs should jointly create a super- IAM that can receive requests for investigations from people who allege that they have been harmed by the failure of any MDB to comply with its own policies and procedures. Second, the MDB stakeholders should create an independent fund, financed by contributions from individuals, corporations, foundations, states and international organizations, that can provide support to communities and individuals who the super-IAM found were harmed by a non-compliant MDB-funded project.