This chapter begins by discussing what Callwell meant by the term 'small war'. It then provides a survey of his contribution to the literature, before explaining why it matters in the context of nineteenth-century British military thought. It then provides a detailed analysis of what Callwell had to say about small wars, and why it matters. Finally, it explores some of the responses to Callwell's work, both at the time and subsequently.

This chapter focuses on Callwell's role in the inception, conduct and aftermath of the Dardanelles Campaign (1915). Callwell occupied the important position of Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the War Office (1914-15) and therefore played a central role in shaping policy and strategy. He was also a key witness at the Dardanelles Commission (1916-17), an enquiry set up to investigate the causes of the Allied defeat. Finally, Callwell wrote extensively on the campaign, including his book The Dardanelles, published in 1919 as part of his Campaigns and Their Lessons series.

This chapter provides an overview of Callwell’s early life and work. It discusses his schooling, and his first experiences of active service, and his regimental service with the Garrison Artillery. It also examines his time at the Staff College and with the Intelligence Division (ID). It argues that a study of his early career offers an interesting perspective on the workings of the late Victorian army.

This chapter examines Callwell's contribution to the 'naval school' that emerged as a result of increased interest in matters of imperial defence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues that Callwell's work was distinctive, based on his position as a 'khaki-clad maritime theorist', a soldier looking at amphibious warfare from the landsman's perspective. It also explores Callwell's time at the War Office, 1903-7, during which he was a practitioner as well as a theorist of strategy. Finally, it assesses Callwell's literary output during his retirement, especially his writing on the Territorial Army.

Daniel Whittingham presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell (1859–1928). It tells the story of his life, which included service in military intelligence, the South African War, and on the General Staff before and during the First World War. It also presents the first comprehensive analysis of his writing: from his well-known books Small Wars (1896) and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance (1905), to a host of other books and articles that are presented here for the first time. Through a study of Callwell's life and works, this book offers a new perspective on the nature and study of military history, the character of British strategy, and on the army to which he belonged.

This chapter argues that Charles E. Callwell (1859-1928) has been unfairly neglected in the historiography of military thought. He is best known for his book Small Wars, first published in 1896, but this has often been studied in terms of modern counterinsurgency, rather than being placed in its proper context. Callwell ranged widely across most of the burning defence questions of his day, and many of the books and articles that resulted are presented here for the first time. The chapter includes a brief summary account of his life and major works.

"Winston Churchill: at war and thinking of war before 1939." Diplomacy & Statecraft, 30(4), pp. 841–842

In his classic book Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896), the military theorist Charles E. Callwell divided small wars into three broad classes: wars of conquest were fought to expand empires; pacification campaigns were internal, and often followed campaigns of conquest; campaigns to wipe out an insult, avenge a wrong, or overthrow a dangerous enemy, often developed into wars of conquest. While all three categories involved major political considerations, Callwell's text is often criticised for its lack of discussion of politics. However, Callwell recognised that, if the ultimate objective of a campaign was successfully to assimilate a people into the British Empire, then 'military intimidation' was ill adapted to that end. This article will argue that a strategy of 'butcher and bolt' was indeed considered by many commentators, including Callwell, to be the best way to win 'hearts and minds'. This stemmed from a belief in the all-importance of 'moral effect', a recurring theme in small wars literature. However, to view the British approach to colonial small wars as pure and simple brutality, in a 'dark age' before a more enlightened period of 'minimum force', is an oversimplification.