This paper contributes to a growing body of literature on affective polarization by examining the understudied role of party rhetoric on partisan divides in the electorate. Despite a recent growth of research on affective polarization in multiparty systems, no study tests the effect of negative campaigning on affective polarization outside the US. This paper tests whether negative campaigning between parties during electoral campaigns is associated with higher levels of affective polarization. Combining data from the CSES and an expert survey on party rhetoric, we analyze data from sixteen countries (seventeen elections) and eighty-six parties, and present the first large scale analysis of the effect of party rhetoric on affective polarization. Our results show that affective polarization is larger between parties adopting a negative tone. We also show more specifically that affective polarization is higher for individuals whose party attacks or is attacked by the other party. In addition, we find that the positive association between attacks and affective polarization increases with partisan strength.

Numerous studies investigate how personality traits and individual characteristics influence vote choice. However, the effect of risk attitudes on the proclivity to cast a strategic vote has not been tested yet. This article tests whether the likelihood of defecting from one’s preferred party is influenced by attitudes towards risk. I argue that the utility stemming from expressing a preference by opting for the favored party is a sure thing, whereas the utility stemming from an instrumental choice depends on some probabilities, and consequently that strategic voting is riskier than sincere voting. Using survey data from the United Kingdom and Canada, I find that risk-averse voters are less likely to vote strategically than risk-acceptant ones.

Scholars studying political perceptions find evidence of the presence of projection effects. Yet several questions still need to be explored as to the time frame of the effect and the factors affecting projection. In particular, although the effect of ambiguity on projection has often been assumed and has been tested in a formal model (Jensen, 2009), no empirical evidence supports the idea that ambiguity fosters projection. We analyze an online survey conducted before and after the 2017 UK General Election. In addition to testing for the presence of projection effects on four different policy issues, we show that ambiguity fosters projection. This result suggests that ambiguity is not always necessarily a good strategy for political parties.

The effect of risk attitudes on voting behavior is the subject of increasing attention in the literature. This paper investigates the effect of risk attitudes on the likelihood of voting for a new party in multi-party systems. I argue that voting for a new party entails more uncertainty than voting for an established one; because the policy stance, the electoral success, and the efficiency of the agent–principal relationship are more difficult to predict. Consequently, risk-averse voters should be less likely to vote for a new party than risk-acceptant voters, ceteris paribus . This paper uses the Swiss case, where two new parties appeared on the political scene at the federal level between 2007 and 2011, to evaluate this proposition. The results show that the more risk averse a voter is, the less likely he is to vote for a new party.

The question how voter preferences relate to preferences of representatives under different electoral rules has attracted scholarly attention for some time. Although theoretical work suggests that proportional rule leads to more dispersion of representatives than plurality rule, empirical studies of this nexus have not yet reached a consensus. We argue that this is because they are plagued by serious problems as they rely on measures that differ for both sets of actors. We use behavioral data to estimate ideal points of voters and representatives on a common scale by taking advantage of the high frequency of referendums in Switzerland. We find that members of parliament elected in proportional representation systems are more widely dispersed around the median voter. Probing at what stage this difference in dispersion occurs, we also demonstrate this is the voters' doing, as it only applies to candidates who are elected.

Although the literature on party ambiguity does not lead to a consensus, recent findings suggest that party ambiguity is a good strategy for electoral success. However, the literature on decision processes shows that individuals generally dislike ambiguity. The aim of the present project is to test the effect of party ambiguity on party preferences at the individual level, to see if findings in decision processes still apply. Using election data from eight Western European democracies, I define a measure of party ambiguity at the individual level and find that ambiguity has a negative effect on party preferences. In addition, I find that individuals with a high interest in politics are less likely to like ambiguous parties.

The question how different electoral systems affect the representation of voters in parliaments has been a thorny issue for a considerable time. While some research suggests that first-past-the-posts systems should lead to a closer correspondence between the preferences of the electoral district's median voter and of its representative, other work concludes that in proportional representation (PR) systems, especially with open lists, candidates have an incentive to cultivate a strong personal vote.To study this question we take advantage of two peculiarities of the Swiss political system, namely that in the same chamber of the parliament some members are elected in PR and some in plurality elections and that direct democratic instruments play an important role. The second element, given that for a series of votes in parliament voters have to decide on the same issue, allows us to estimate the policy positions of members of parliament (MPs) and the median voter of each electoral district in the same policy space. We find that MPs elected in plurality elections are on average closer to their respective median voter. In PR districts MPs are much more widely spread around the median voters' preferences. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.