PurposeThis study aims to examine the implications of short-term and long-term reputation change because of government agency responses to firm product defects. Design/methodology/approachThis study's findings have important implications for both scholars and practitioners. From a scholarly perspective, the authors create a more fine-grained examination of reputation that may be used to assess various performance dimensions. From a practice perspective, managers must realize that reputation can be one of an organization's most important resources as it meets each of the valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable criteria associated with those resources capable of providing sustainable competitive advantage. FindingsAnalysis of 17,879 product recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers in the US suggests that firms with higher long-term reputations are more likely to face regulator sanctions when a reputation-damaging event happens. On the other hand, firms with higher short-term reputations are less likely to face sanctions in such circumstances. Finally, firms whose short-term reputation exceeds their long-term reputation are less likely to be sanctioned by regulators when reputation-damaging events occur. Research limitations/implicationsThere are several limitations that should be addressed. First, as our reputation measure is based on government investigations of potential defects, vehicles that have never been inspected are not included in the sample. Although this number is likely extremely low, omitting vehicles that have never been inspected leaves out some high-reputation firms from the sample. In addition, the study relies on a single-firm stakeholder that is capable of punitive actions. Practical implicationsFrom a practical perspective, this study's findings encourage managers to think about the temporal aspects associated with firm reputation, and to realize that stakeholders may react differently when their expectations are not met depending on an organization's relative long- and short-term reputations. From a theoretic perspective, the primary contribution of this study is to illustrate how long-term and short-term changes in reputation can provide mixed signals to firm stakeholders regarding future performance. Originality/valueThis study explores the temporal aspects of firm reputation by examining how government sanctions vary depending on firms' long-term (10 years) and short-term (1 year) reputation. The findings of this study contribute to current reputation research by illustrating the variation in government responses to product defects as a function of short-term and long-term reputation. In doing so, the important role of the timing of firm performance is considered.

PurposeThis study examines how firm product reputation functions as an internal and external expectations-setting mechanism shaping firm and external stakeholder behavior.Design/methodology/approachLongitudinal analysis of 17,879 recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers operating in the United States between 1967 and 2016.FindingsApplying the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) and signaling theory, this study's findings suggest that product safety reputation creates variability in the likelihood of both voluntary and government-ordered recalls.Research limitations/implicationsPerformance expectations set by past product performance influence managerial decision-making such that products with a higher reputation for quality are more likely to be voluntarily recalled than are their less reputable counterparts. Similarly, regulators are more likely to order the recall of higher reputation products, suggesting that past product performance also influences enforcement behavior. Finally, the scope and severity of product defects are shown to interact with product reputation to influence the likelihood of government-ordered recall.Practical implicationsFirms and firm stakeholders make distinct decisions based on performance variations within firm product portfolios.Social implicationsOverall firm reputation is important, but there are distinct dynamics that result in product performance variability within firm product portfolios that have important implications on issues such as product safety recalls.Originality/valueThis study's findings reveal that as an internal signal, managers' expectations of product performance can change their behavior following product safety defects. Specifically, voluntary product recalls are more likely for higher-reputation products than those with lower reputations for product safety. This suggests that firm behavior regarding product safety recalls is not consistent within their own product lines. Externally, this study's findings suggest that product reputation also influences relationships with key stakeholders. Product reputation for quality was shown to be associated with an increased likelihood of government sanctions. Regulators will also be more likely to initiate punitive sanctions against higher-reputation products as the severity and scope of safety defects increase. Under such circumstances, higher-reputation products are more likely to face government sanctions than lower-reputation products. Hence, government regulatory behavior is subject to influence from performance signals such as product reputation.

Succession in family firms is an extremely difficult and complex event in which advisors are often involved or sought. Advisors, especially business consultants, frequently play an important role in shaping and guiding such complex strategic processes. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether and to what extent the involvement of advisors, especially business consultants, in family firm succession impact the outcome of succession planning processes, such as the choice of the next chief executive officer (CEO). We explore whether family-owner socioemotional wealth, measured through their level of commitment to the firm, influences the preference for a family CEO versus a nonfamily CEO and acceptance of the advisor role in the succession planning process. We test the research questions on a sample of family firms located in the United States.

Purpose The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation. Design/methodology/approach Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012. Findings Examining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation. Originality/value This result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations.

PurposeThe current study seeks to contribute to current self-regulation research by first exploring the association between the cost of self-regulation and firm self-regulation. The mediating role of association membership and firm slack is additionally explored.Design/methodology/approachLongitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the USA automobile industry from 1966 to 2012 has several important findings regarding the motivations for firm self-regulation.FindingsThe influence of industry associations and firm absorbed slack both contribute to firm self-regulation.Originality/valueThe current study begins to address the importance of firm characteristics in predicting self-regulation activities. The bulk of existing research has examined self-regulation at the industry level as an activity performed as a result of the adoption of formalized industry sanctioned standards of practice. This research contributes to such work by examining firm proactivity in the absence of such formal standards.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to apply Frank Baum's The Wizard of Oz to illustrate the individual identity issues that can arise as a result of institutional complexity in organizations. Using Baum's text to tell the story of four faculty members seeking the city of Oz, which in our story is a university athletic department, reveals how individuals and organizational units deal with the tensions brought about by institutional complexity. In addition to providing an entertaining, perhaps infuriating account of the typical public university, this essay reveals the importance of understanding individual struggles to deal with organizational pluralism. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the well-established example of the university using Frank Baum's The Wizard of Oz in allegorical form to illustrate the tensions that emerge from organizational units that deal with contradicting external environments as well as the sensemaking and search processes that can emerge for individuals dealing with the identity issues that can result from such tensions. Findings Internal tensions can emerge within organizations when there are contradictions among the various pressures such organizations generate. These tensions have implications on individual identity. Originality/value Individuals (in this case individuals from academic units) risk having their occupational identities compromised by divergent organizational units as these units attempt to legitimate their existence within the organization. The authors illustrate how individuals deal with such risks by engaging in search processes that seek to construct their identities and develop meaning for their actions.

ABSTRACT Soap operas have become a phenomenon in Turkey and have captured a worldwide viewing audience. To analyze the main driving forces behind this success, we apply Michael Porter's “diamond of national advantage model” to develop a concise case study. We find that a considerable amount of the success of the Turkish soap opera industry can be explained by the components of the Porter model. One of the important success indicators is the rising per capita GDP in Turkey, which increases the demand for entertainment products. In addition, the already established film industry provided easy access to inputs for production, such as human and physical capital. Government policies have also contributed to the success of the Turkish soap opera industry domestically and abroad. Also important was the strategic planning of the soap industry which included careful preparation of their product for world viewing audiences by taking into account cultural and language differences. Keywords Porter model, Turkish soap operas, entertainment services, exports, government broadcasting policy

This study builds on prior research investigating the antecedents of firm supererogation. Examining vehicle recalls in the U.S. automobile industry from 1966 to 2010 reveals that surveillance-based government enforcement programs can have widespread industry effects on a specific type of supererogatory action, firm volunteerism. Specifically, increases in government surveillance are associated with firms going beyond what is legally required of them by initiating voluntary product recalls for defects not covered in existing government regulation. Such effects are shown to be unique among surveillance efforts as other government enforcement activities, such as standards-based regulation, are revealed to have a negative association with firm supererogation.

PurposeThis study aims to examine conditions in which firm political market performance is associated with firm efforts to influence regulatory outcomes. Applying measures of political market performance based on firm performance in government enforcement actions and a firm’s ability to obtain favorable political outcomes, the authors make the case that political market performance is a key part of competitive political markets, which is associated with particular types of firm efforts to influence policy.Design/methodology/approachLongitudinal examination of nine automobile manufacturers during National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration crash tests reveals that firm performance in government enforcement activities is associated with greater efforts to cooperate with political suppliers, while declining firm performance in efforts to influence political outcomes is associated with increased firm opposition to political supplier actions.FindingsFirm performance in government enforcement activities is associated with greater efforts to cooperate with political suppliers, while declining firm performance in efforts to influence political outcomes is associated with increased firm opposition to political supplier actions.Research limitations/implicationsPerformance in regulatory enforcement results in increased firm actions to engage regulators in the policy-making process, while performance in obtaining desired policy outcomes is associated with a greater focus on opposition to proposed standards. These results suggest that political demanders can take deliberate actions to either engage or oppose supplier actions based on political market performance.Originality/valueThe primary contribution of this research is to begin to examine the implications of performance dynamics within political markets. Adding the construct of political market performance to the political markets framework reveals that variations in political market performance can be associated with specific types of corporate political activity.

This study applies firm attention theory to explain how factors including regulatory inspection ratings, media coverage of regulatory issues, new regulations, and the political activities of opposing interest groups influence firm participation in regulatory processes. Findings suggest that firm political participation is driven by factors that attract firm attention to political processes as well as by factors that threaten to draw stakeholder attention to political processes and firm operations. These relationships are explored by examining automobile manufacturer participation in National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration rulemaking comment periods.

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to apply firm aspiration theory to explore how firms respond to government product ratings.Design/methodology/approach - Longitudinal examination of nine automobile manufacturers during National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration crash tests in the USA.Findings - Firms take specific external actions to influence the political mechanisms that support ranking schemes when product ratings are below those of rivals and when previously highly rated products decline. In addition, firms receiving rankings above those of their competitors are found to be less likely to take such action, even when their overall ratings declined. Similarly, firms seeing improvements in previously low-rated products will take fewer actions aimed at influencing the political mechanisms that support rating schemes.Originality/value - The primary contribution of this research is in establishing when firm product ratings will result in actions to influence external ratings criteria. Previous research has shown that firms respond to organizational ratings by taking action aimed at improving subsequent performance. The current research builds on such work by applying aspiration theory in an effort to predict and explain when and why certain ratings will attract firm attention to the external mechanisms that support such ratings.

We study how reputation, based on specific firm attributes and directed towards specific firm stakeholders, functions as an internal and external expectations-setting mechanism shaping managerial and stakeholder decisions. Applying the behavioral theory of the firm we assert that firm reputation is an essential, continuous and operative organizational goal that affects managers’ decision and stakeholders’ actions towards the firm. We test our assertions by examining 17,879 product recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers in the U.S automobile industry from 1966 to 2010. Consistent with BTF predictions, we find that reputation goals influence managerial decision-making such that firms with a higher reputation for quality are more likely to voluntarily initiate a product recall than their less reputable counterparts. Externally, we find that the likelihood of government sanctions is greater for higher reputation firms as defects increase in severity and scope.

This study examines how reputation predicts variability in firm political responses to government product ratings. Longitudinal examination of nine automobile manufacturers during National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration crash tests reveals several important findings regarding how reputation is associated with firm responses to product ratings. In particular, high reputation firms implement fewer political responses to ratings declines of high-reputation products while implementing more political responses to ratings declines of low-reputation products. Results suggest that reputation at both the product and firm-levels interact to predict how firms respond to reputation-damaging events such as declining product-safety ratings.

This research examines product recalls in the U.S automobile industry from 1966-2010 to explore how surveillance-based enforcement programs contribute to proactive safety compliance. Distinction between regulatory proactivity, proactive firm compliance to established regulatory standards, and normative proactivity, firm compliance to regulatory issues for which no formal regulations exist, is made in order to explore how surveillance is associated with proactive safety compliance. Results show that surveillance activities are more likely to result in normative proactivity than regulatory proactivity. Regulatory surveillance additionally speeds manufacturer response time in notifying customers of defective products. Results suggest that surveillance-based programs are an effective coercive mechanism to encourage firm product safety proactivity.

This study examines how reputation predicts firm responses to product ratings. Longitudinal examination of nine automobile manufacturers during National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) crash tests reveals several important findings regarding how reputation is associated with firm responses to product ratings. In particular, high reputation firms implement fewer political responses to ratings declines of high- reputation products while implementing more political responses to ratings declines of low-reputation products. Results suggest that reputation at both the product and firm-levels interact to predict how firms respond to reputation-damaging events such as declining product-safety ratings.

This research examines the interplay between regulators, media and firms by showing how public bureaucracies maintain institutional control in light of varying degrees of firm compliance and media coverage. Analysis of US National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) automobile crash tests reveals a push-pull process in which increased regulatory activity, sparked by media coverage and firm inspection performance, leads to increased firm participation in regulatory processes, which in turn, decreases regulatory activity. Results additionally illustrate how inspections modify firm political behaviour; particularly when accompanied by media coverage of regulatory issues. The administration of such inspections illustrates the dynamic nature of the relationship between firms and regulators.

The current research explores how surveillance-based regulatory programs contribute to firm self-regulation activities. Examining product recalls in the U.S automobile industry from 1966-2010 reveals several important findings regarding the conditions in which the threat of regulatory surveillance will be associated with firm self-regulation. First, under conditions of government surveillance and when government punitive actions are consistent across regulatory forms, regulatory standard setting is not associated with self-regulation. The absence of regulatory standards, however, is associated with firm self-regulation. Furthermore, the addition of disclosure requirements that include the transmittal of firm performance information to the public will be conducive to firm self-regulation.

Status and reputation have long been recognized as important influences in management research and recently much attention has been paid to defining the two concepts and understanding how they are utilized by organizations. However, few strategic management studies have identified the different methods through which status and reputation are constructed. While reputation has been linked with a history of quality, and status has been identified as an externally assigned measure of social position, empirical studies have been highly idiosyncratic in their identification of the mechanisms used to obtain either construct. This paper attempts to rectify that gap in the literature by identifying two distinct methods used to obtain reputation and status. We argue that certification contests can be used to increase organizational reputation and tournament rituals can be used to increase organizational status. We build theoretical propositions regarding the use of certification contexts and tournament rituals to show how reputation and status are achieved through similar, but distinct, methods and further the research on teasing apart these two important and intertwined concepts.