More than two decades on, the shadow of 9/11 and the Bali bombings continues to linger over Australia and its small Muslim population. We posit this is due to an existential fear of both Islam and Muslims in the Australian imaginary, an imaginary that continues to be cast as Judeo-Christian. This has led to the hyper-securitisation of an entire religious community which has had several effects on the ways Muslims navigate a sense of belonging in and to contemporary Australia. This article analyses interviews with members of two specific and different ethnic groups in different locations in Australia, to explore similarities and differences in their lived experience resulting from this securitised environment. The comparative analysis between Indonesians in Perth and Lebanese in Sydney demonstrates strong mixed cultural identities are common, but finds tensions expressed about how the high levels of securitisation manifest in starkly different and novel ways. While the Lebanese participants are critical of the securitised and challenging socio-political context, the Indonesian participants interpret experiences of hostility and micro-aggressions as not necessarily directed towards all Muslims, but as focused on particular ethnic communities. Our data suggest that one outcome of the securitised environment is that the 'good Muslim' and the 'bad Muslim' distinction has become internalised. Plus de deux d & eacute;cennies apr & egrave;s les attentats du 11 septembre et ceux de Bali, leur ombre continue de planer sur l'Australie et sa petite population musulmane. La peur existentielle de l'islam et des musulmans dans l'imaginaire jud & eacute;o-chr & eacute;tien australien conduit & agrave; une hyper-s & eacute;curisation de la communaut & eacute; chr & eacute;tienne dans son ensemble, ce qui conditionne la mani & egrave;re dont les musulmans n & eacute;gocient leur sentiment d'appartenance & agrave; l'Australie contemporaine. Cet article analyse des entretiens men & eacute;s avec des membres de deux groupes ethniques sp & eacute;cifiques, vivant dans deux r & eacute;gions distinctes d'Australie, afin d'explorer les similitudes et les diff & eacute;rences dans leur exp & eacute;rience v & eacute;cue r & eacute;sultant de cet environnement s & eacute;curis & eacute;. L'analyse comparative entre les Indon & eacute;siens de Perth et les Libanais de Sydney montre qu'un fort m & eacute;lange d'identit & eacute;s culturelles est courant, mais r & eacute;v & egrave;le des tensions exprim & eacute;es & agrave; propos des niveaux & eacute;lev & eacute;s de s & eacute;curisation qui se manifestent de mani & egrave;re tr & egrave;s diff & eacute;rente et nouvelle. Alors que les participants libanais critiquent le contexte sociopolitique s & eacute;curis & eacute; et difficile, les participants indon & eacute;siens interpr & egrave;tent les exp & eacute;riences d'hostilit & eacute; et de micro-agressions comme n'& eacute;tant pas n & eacute;cessairement dirig & eacute;es contre tous les musulmans, mais plut & ocirc;t contre certaines communaut & eacute;s ethniques particuli & egrave;res. Nos donn & eacute;es sugg & egrave;rent que l'un des r & eacute;sultats de l'environnement s & eacute;curis & eacute; est que la distinction entre << bon musulman >> et << mauvais musulman >> est d & eacute;sormais int & eacute;rioris & eacute;e.

The prohibit ion on the latter is problematic, as the f lag contains the Shahada (profession of faith)—one of the five pillars of Islam—and the law will encompass symbols that are ‘likely to be confused’ with the IS flag. As such, the law potentially criminalises the display of a sacred tenet in Islam. Further, as of 2021 there were already 92 federal counter-terrorism laws introduced post-9/11 making Australia’s program more robust than many of its Western counterparts. Further, despite these laws being race-neutral in tone, they have disproportionately targeted Muslim communities.

Over the past two to three decades, there has been a significant shift within the development sector. Previously considered 'taboo', religiously inspired Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) have become increasingly welcomed and involved as partners and collaborators with international financial institutions and leading aid donors. However, while a place has been set at the table this has not been an equitable one. Rather, there is still the expectation that religiously driven organisations will engage with the normative Western secular aid discourse that regards impartiality as sacrosanct. As a result, this has seen those FBOs that have chosen to participate develop hybridised-identities, wherein we argue they have become pseudo-secular in nature. Drawing on the literature, we note this development amongst well-established Christian FBOs, such as World Vision, and extend our analysis to Islamic FBOs, with a case study of Islamic Relief. In doing so, we also argue that the hegemonic nature of the secular 'master narrative' imposed by the Western aid sector represents an instance of 'epistemic violence', and that FBOs should be able speak in their own terms.

Following 9/11 the Australian government instituted an unprecedented raft of counter-terrorism measures, which introduced both preventative mass surveillance and pre-crime offences. We suggest that this development represents part of a broader turn in the West towards a “militant democratic” approach to countering violent extremism that, whilst not directly targeting Muslims in name, does so in practice, and has had negative unintended consequences for Muslim diaspora communities. To support our claim we draw on 23 interviews with Muslim youths in Melbourne. In doing so we utilise Ghassan Hage’s application of misinterpellation to frame our analysis. We found that Muslim Australians are retreating into their ethno-religious identities as a result of a feeling of misrecognition. We also found that a climate of fear and anxiety is leading to self-censorship and that there was a sense of disconnect between the current leadership and Muslim youth, and that as a result government consultation should extend beyond Muslim peak bodies.

In recent years there has been a religious turn in the development sector with the World Bank and national funding agencies in Europe and the US opening the space to Faith Based Organisations (FBOs). However, for some Islamic FBOs, this has not led to a comfortable assertion of their religious identity and mission on the world stage. Rather, in the post 9/11 environment, some Islamic FBOs have opted to develop an 'invisible Islam' wherein they background their religion through secularizing their language with a view to better integrating into the normative aid sector. Drawing on the work of Marie Juul Petersen and reflecting on the author's own fieldwork on the Gulen Movement (GM), this paper will unpack this development. In doing so, it will highlight that the practice by GM is only a semantic exercise to cover its ongoing religious mission on account of continued hostility towards Islamic actors.

In 2008 the then Organisation of the Islamic Conference established its own Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department (ICHAD) as an alternative to the OECD DAC. Subsequently, aid from ICHAD predominantly goes to Muslims. This is most likely because zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and regarded as ibadah (worship), from which non-Muslims are excluded. As such, this paper will examine the theology and ethics of giving in Islam ( zakat and sadaqa ) and explore these aid flows and, and whether there is room for a more inclusive interpretation that can lead to greater integration and co-operation.

In 2010, cracks began to emerge in the tacit alliance between the ruling Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (Justice and Development Party in Turkey, AK Party) and the Gulen Movement (GM) and escalated into an all-out struggle in 2013. Following the failed 15 July coup in 2016, Erdoan sought to eradicate the movement completely, seizing $11 billion in GM assets and purging over 150,000 people from all sectors, public and private. However, Erdoan is aware that victory at home will not defeat the GM, as it operates in around 160 countries. As a result, he has put pressure on many nations to crackdown on the GM and their activities. While this approach has had some success in the Gulf Countries, Africa and South East Asia, it has been largely ineffective in the West, and Australia is no exception. Therefore, this paper will explore the Australian case and look at the factors behind continued local support for the GM. It will argue that the GM has made excellent use of opportunity spaces and structures in both academia and the NGO sector where it has been able to control its own narrative and engage effectively in cultural diplomacy, particularly amongst the political class.