It is often asserted that religion is changing rather than declining and that the usual indicators give a misleading impression of growing secularity. The evidence presented here suggests that on the contrary, social measures like affiliation and attendance may understate the weakening of personal religiosity. The apparent persistence of belief in God conceals erosion in its substance, strength, salience, and stability. The levels of religiosity and spirituality among the religiously unaffiliated are declining, notwithstanding the rapid expansion in their numbers. Moreover, belief has not just diminished among Americans who no longer belong to religious organizations: it is fading from one generation to the next among people who continue to belong. Americans are becoming less confident in the existence of God, less persuaded that God is active and judgmental, less inclined to see God as important, and less likely to express consistent conviction. Contrary to claims that apparent secularization masks enduring (if unorthodox) invisible religion, implicit religion, diffused religion, lived religion, and so on, the evidence shows that continuing religious involvement disguises waning religiosity. The research is based on six waves of the Baylor Religion Survey (2005-2021) in conjunction with the General Social Survey (1972-2022).

This article presents the Dataset of Integrated Measures of Religion (DIM-R), explains how it was constructed, and outlines its potential for helping to address long-standing research questions in the social scientific study of religion. DIM-R integrates four variables often used to measure religious commitment: self-declared religiosity, religious attendance, prayer, and affiliation/denominational affiliation. These variables are harmonized in four repeated cross-sectional international surveys: European Social Survey, International Social Survey Programme, European Values Study and World Values Survey. Harmonization enables cross-country and over-time comparisons in religiosity leveraging multiple data sources. Unlike the variables in the original datasets, which have different scaling and response options, DIM-R transforms them to a consistent categorization and scaling. The DIM-R dataset can assist social scientists of religion by reducing the data cleaning burden associated with integrating multiple datasets, and by increasing the statistical weight of observations across countries, time, and cohorts. To validate the DIM-R dataset, we present the exact harmonization process and examine the reliability and consistency of our analytic subset of the combined data using linear mixed models.

In western societies, secularization in the sense of declining individual religiosity is mainly caused by cohort replacement. Every cohort is somewhat less religious than its predecessor, indicating that religious transmission is incomplete. The puzzle is just what causes this incomplete transmission and whether there is one or a restricted number of factors that mainly explain the process. Our aim in this article is to establish, describe, and explain this lack of religious transmission in West Germany, comparing parents' and children's level of church attendance and their determinants over time. We use a data set of more than 8,000 parent-child pairs across four cohorts from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and test whether indicators measuring parent attributes, family relations, or parental context influence the attendance gap. As expected, we find a substantial parent-child attendance gap. However, we do not find factors that mainly explain the process. Only family disruption and the percentage of nones in the state slightly increase the attendance gap, but effect sizes are small. Our surprising result is that secularization happens largely independently of attributes of the parents and their immediate surroundings. We discuss how this finding may give credibility to new theories of secular transition and present an agenda for future research on religious transmission.

We define two types of religious polarization and investigate the extent to which they are present across European countries, based on data from the 2008 to 2017 European Values Study and hierarchical linear modeling. The first type is polarization by religiosity, with declines in the middle ground between the actively religious and the nonreligious as secularization reaches an advanced stage. The second type is issue polarization, with the religious and secular taking different positions on a range of socio-political values, including social conservatism and ethnic nationalism. We find limited evidence of bimodality in the distribution of religiosity. We find more evidence, however, of issue polarization between the religious and secular in Europe, especially in social conservatism. Religious polarization should thus be understood as a multidimensional concept where one dimension may be more prevalent than others in society.

Binary logistic regression is one of the most widely used statistical tools. The method uses odds, log odds, and odds ratios, which are difficult to understand and interpret. Understanding of logistic regression tends to fall down in one of three ways: (1) Many students and researchers come to believe that an odds ratio translates directly into relative probabilities. (2) Alternatively, they learn that coefficients tell us whether the variables make the outcome more or less likely, without knowing how to interpret changes in the odds. (3) They may be instructed in how to calculate predicted probabilities, but the additional steps are too complicated for them to follow. Our key aim is to highlight and correct the common mistake of confusing differences in odds with relative risks. Simply reporting the odds ratio is unhelpful, however, so we describe an easy method of estimating probabilities for both binary and continuous variables.

Secularization theory has often been criticized for not being able to explain counterexamples. However, secularization theorists argue that transitory religious resurgences are expected to occur even in modernizing conditions. The aim of this article is to identify mechanisms that can explain the temporary upswing of religion against the backdrop of long-term modernization. We classify the mechanisms under five broad headings: crisis, reaction, transition, state intervention, and composition. Historical examples are provided to illustrate these mechanisms. The mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can be understood within the framework of rational action.

In the 1960s, it was taken for granted that modernization eroded religion. In the 1980s, this consensus was challenged by the rational choice, supply-side, or market model proposed by Rodney Stark and associates. In particular, they argued that the UK was hardly less religious then than it had been in 1880. Clive Field’s compendium of statistical data allows us to test Stark’s approach to the religiosity of the UK. We follow this with data on Europe and the USA. While we may still argue over some of the precise levers, there is now so much evidence in favor of the secularization approach that we regard it as vindicated.

Journal for the Scientific Study of ReligionVolume 62, Issue 4 p. 913-914 BOOK REVIEW BEYOND DOUBT: THE SECULARIZATION OF SOCIETY. By Isabella Kasselstrand, Phil Zuckerman, and Ryan T. Cragun, New York: New York University Press. 2023. 240 pp. $89 cloth, $30 paperback. DAVID VOAS, DAVID VOAS orcid.org/0000-0003-4094-1369 University College London, London, UKSearch for more papers by this author DAVID VOAS, DAVID VOAS orcid.org/0000-0003-4094-1369 University College London, London, UKSearch for more papers by this author First published: 02 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12883Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume62, Issue4December 2023Pages 913-914 RelatedInformation

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

This article presents a microsimulation that explores age, period, and cohort effects in the decline of religiosity in contemporary societies. The model implements a well-known and previously empirically validated theory of secularization that highlights the role of “fuzzy fidelity,” i.e., the percentage of a population whose religiosity is moderate (Voas 2009). Validation of the model involved comparing its simulation results to shifts in religiosity over 9 waves of the European Social Survey. Simulation experiments suggest that a cohort effect, based on weakened transmission of religiosity as a function of the social environment, appears to be the best explanation for secularization in the societies studied, both for the population as a whole and for the proportions of religious, fuzzy, and secular people.

Social scientists generally take United Nations (UN) population projections as the baseline when considering the potential impact of any changes that could affect fertility, mortality or migration, and the UN typically does projections using the cohort-component method (CCM). The CCM technique is computationally simple and familiar to demographers. However, in order to avoid the exponential expansion of complexity as new dimensions of individual difference are added to projections, and to understand the sensitivity of projections to specific conditions, agent-based microsimulations are a better option. CCMs can mask hidden assumptions that are surfaced by the construction of microsimulations, and varying such assumptions can lead to quite different projections. CCM models are naturally the strongest form of validation for population projection microsimulations but there are many complexities and difficulties associated with matching microsimulation projections and CCM projections. Here, we describe our efforts to tackle these challenges as we validated a microsimulation for Norway by replicating a UN CCM projection. This provides guidance for other simulationists who seek to use CCMs to validate microsimulations. More importantly, it demonstrates the value of microsimulations for surfacing assumptions that frequently lie hidden, and thus unevaluated, within CCM projections.

Introduction COVID-19 has prompted the extensive use of computational models to understand the trajectory of the pandemic. This article surveys the kinds of dynamic simulation models that have been used as decision support tools and to forecast the potential impacts of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). We developed the Values in Viral Dispersion model, which emphasizes the role of human factors and social networks in viral spread and presents scenarios to guide policy responses. Methods An agent-based model of COVID-19 was developed with individual agents able to move between 3 states (susceptible, infectious, or recovered), with each agent placed in 1 of 7 social network types and assigned a propensity to comply with NPIs (quarantine, contact tracing, and physical distancing). A series of policy questions were tested to illustrate the impact of social networks and NPI compliance on viral spread among (1) populations, (2) specific at-risk subgroups, and (3) individual trajectories. Results Simulation outcomes showed large impacts of physical distancing policies on number of infections, with substantial modification by type of social network and level of compliance. In addition, outcomes on metrics that sought to maximize those never infected (or recovered) and minimize infections and deaths showed significantly different epidemic trajectories by social network type and among higher or lower at-risk age cohorts. Conclusions Although dynamic simulation models have important limitations, which are discussed, these decision support tools should be a key resource for navigating the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and can help local and national decision makers determine where, when, and how to invest resources.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

The role of science popularization remains relatively under-explored in research on contemporary public acceptance of evolution. In this study, we analyse national survey data to interrogate the role Britain's best-known celebrity scientists David Attenborough, Brian Cox, Richard Dawkins and Stephen Hawking may have played in changing public views of evolution, as well as the role of two creationists: Ken Ham and Harun Yahya. We investigate how well known these public figures are, what their views of religion are perceived to be and, drawing on social identity theory, whether they exert different effects on attitudinal change to evolution among different religious and non-religious publics. Binary logistic regression analysis shows that among Muslim and Pentecostal Christian publics, those familiar with Dawkins as both a scientist and as someone who holds negative views of religion are more likely to have become less accepting of evolution. Conversely, among non-religious publics, Dawkins was the only celebrity scientist associated with higher odds of becoming more accepting of evolution. We suggest that engaging certain religious audiences with the science of evolutionary biology may be more effective when their religious identities are not threatened.

Parents are crucial agents of religious socialization, but the broader social environment is also influential. A key question is whether parents are more or less influential when their religious beliefs and practices are not shared by people around them. Current thinking on the issue has largely been shaped by Kelley and De Graaf, who argued that parental religious socialization matters most in secular countries. We maintain that that conclusion is mistaken: levels of parental and national religiosity are both important, but their effects are largely independent of each other. Kelley and De Graaf's findings rely on the assumption that religious belief and practice are different expressions of the same underlying phenomenon (religiosity) and vary in the same way across time and space. These measures are not equivalent, however. In relatively religious societies, belief in God is widespread even among those who do not attend services, whereas in societies where religious involvement is low, nonchurchgoers tend to be nonbelievers.