Letting someone else know that you value their presence, characteristics, effort or activities is central to building and maintaining human relationships. We investigated whether deliberate memory display is an effective means to convey such value. We examined these questions in the context of a simulated job interview (Experiments 1, 2 and 3, total N = 404) and a simulated ‘ice breaker’ exercise between new acquaintances (Experiment 4, total N = 156). Across experiments, results consistently indicated that memory display was not only an effective method of conveying value, but that memory display made other efforts to convey value more effective. Moreover, without external prompting, participants underutilized memory display despite its efficacy. These findings document the efficacy of memory display in the deliberate communication of value and suggest that deliberate memory display might be an underutilized strategic asset in the management of human relationships.

The current work examined whether being forgotten or remembered by a boss or a coworker affects employee's interpersonal closeness to that person and, in turn, affective organizational commitment (AOC). A first correlational study examined these possibilities in an employed student (1a) and general employed (1b) samples. Perceived memory by both bosses and coworkers was a significant predictor of closeness to the boss or coworker and, in turn, of AOC. The indirect effect of perceived memory on AOC was stronger for boss memory than coworker memory, but only when memory ratings were supported by specific examples of memory. Study 2 provided additional support for the direction of effects posited in Study 1 using vignettes depicting memory and forgetting in the workplace. Overall, these findings suggest that perceptions of boss and coworker memory have an effect on employee's AOC through interpersonal closeness, and that this indirect effect is stronger for boss memory.

Culture has been identified as a factor influencing the way people communicate and behave. Though often imperceptible by its members, cross-cultural interactions can lead to misunderstandings and conflicts. Despite ex-military and civilian trained pilots frequently flying together, there has been a lack of research describing each professional sub-culture. The current study aims to bridge that gap by exploring how professional culture interacts in the cockpit and how it affects pilots’ safety behaviours. The study used in-depth semi-structured interviews with 15 participants (14 helicopter pilots) to collect data on effects of professional culture. The data were analysed using conventional content analysis. Content analysis indicated five separate categories relevant to perceptions of professional culture. The findings indicate that pilots acknowledge the cultural differences present between themselves and others, and that culture can have an effect on their and other’s safety behaviours. The participants suggested that various sub-culture types can have impact on flight safety through their effects on communication and the way people interact, but not through technical skills of flying the aircraft. The differences between military and civilian training and flying were discussed in depth. This research highlights the various ways in which culture affects pilots’ safety behaviours and interactions with one another. It also provides an in-depth look at the way pilots perceive and experience cross-cultural interactions in the cockpit.

The current study examined the predictive utility of emotional valence (i.e., positive and negative emotions) on weight loss intentions and behaviors, beyond theory of planned behavior constructs (i.e., attitude, subjective norm, and perceived control), among a community sample of people who were overweight (BMI > 25 kg/m2). Participants were recruited for a longitudinal study via an online panel. They completed a baseline survey (N = 732) and a follow-up survey 6 months later (N = 526), both administered online. The surveys included measures of attitude, subjective norms, perceived control, positive and negative emotions regarding one’s current weight, intentions to engage in weight loss behaviors (time 1), and having engaged in weight loss behaviors in the past 6 months (time 2). Emotion explained additional variance in weight loss intentions (range ΔR2 = 0.03–0.10, all ps < 0.01) and behaviors (range ΔR2 = 0.01–0.02, all ps < 0.05) beyond theory of planned behavior constructs. Negative emotions mainly predicted the intake of unhealthy food and seeking social support, whereas positive emotions predicted physical activity (intention and behavior). These results suggested that the differential relations might be based on whether the strategy is approach or avoidance oriented. Based on these findings, comprehensive models of weight loss behaviors should consider emotion, and the valence of such emotion, regarding current weight. Level IV, multiple time series without intervention.

Our memories contain a wealth of social information-including details of past interactions, facts about others, and others' identities. Yet, human memory is imperfect, and we often find ourselves unable to recall such information in social interactions. Conversely, people routinely find themselves on the receiving end of others' memory failures; that is, people sometimes find themselves forgotten. Despite the apparent pervasiveness of such experiences, modern science possesses no explanatory framework for understanding the psychological impact of being forgotten in part or in whole. Here, we propose that evidence of memory in social interactions is a powerful signal of the subjective importance attached to an object of memory and that interpretation of such signals has important consequences for interpersonal relationships. We further proposed that attributional explanations for forgetting and that the closeness of the relationship between the people involved in forgetting might moderate the impact of being forgotten. We tested this framework in four studies examining the experience of being forgotten in daily life (Study 1), in experimentally controlled firsthand encounters (Study 2), and in third party perceptions of forgetting (Studies 3 and 4). Results converged to support our proposed framework as well as the moderating role of attribution. Surprisingly, we found no evidence supporting the moderating role of initial relationships closeness. These results advance a systematic model of an understudied but important phenomenon and suggest rich and varied avenues of additional exploration.

Some social categories are almost always identifiable in face-to-face interaction (e.g., race and gender). Information about many other category memberships (e.g., religion, sexual orientation) can be uncertain, however. This work explores the influence of uncertainty about category information on face recognition. Current accounts of intergroup bias in face recognition (specifically, the feature selection model and categorization-individuation model) are extended to predict that uncertainty about category information would undermine later recognition of another person. Experiment 1 provided an initial test of this hypothesis by comparing recognition of faces for which category membership was uncertain to recognition of faces belonging to certain ingroup and outgroup members. Experiment 2 used a different comparison group (a threatening outgroup) in order to rule out two alternative interpretations of Experiment 1. Finally, Experiment 3 manipulated category uncertainty without direct reference to outgroup membership in order to address the possibility that uncertain group memberships might be redefined as an entitative outgroup. Across experiments, results converged to indicate that uncertainty about category information undermined face recognition. These results buttress current accounts of facial recognition bias by successfully extending them to a new domain, extend theoretical treatments of motivation as an antecedent variable in face recognition, apply a boundary condition to the influence of threatening stimuli on bias in face recognition, call into question recent findings about the cognitive system's treatment of uncategorized individuals, and identify uncertainty as a determinant of person perception.

Students' achievement heavily depends on who they learn with and from in school. We investigate how the habitual tendency to compare and strategic social comparison motivation influence who students seek to learn with. Specifically, we propose that a predisposition to habitual social comparison (i.e., high Social Comparison Orientation) overrides learners' strategic social comparison motivation. In two studies, we measured students' Social Comparison Orientation and strategic social comparison motivation in the context of a coming cooperative learning task. We then assessed the influence of habitual tendencies and strategic social comparison motivation on students' choice of learning partner for an upcoming learning task. Across both studies, we found that only participants who were not predisposed to habitual social comparison benefited from strategic social comparison motivation. This finding joins a growing body of work documenting the importance and impact of habitual social comparison in the context of knowledge exchange between peers.

Providing learners with awareness of a learning partner's knowledge supports knowledge exchange. However, such knowledge awareness enables social comparison. Because people strive for positive self-evaluation, we propose that less knowledgeable learners who rely on social comparisons for self-evaluation will be motivated to increase their engagement in response to awareness of a more knowledgeable learning partner's knowledge. We tested our hypothesis in two experiments in which we staged a cooperative learning task, assessed participants' predisposition to social comparison, manipulated participants' awareness of learning partner knowledge, and observed the consequences for participants' engagement and learning outcomes. In both experiments, knowledge awareness helped learners match their explanation requests to a learning partner's superior knowledge. At the same time, less knowledgeable learners motivated to engage in social comparisons showed better learning engagement and learning outcomes as a result of knowledge awareness. Understanding and managing this interaction of knowledge awareness and social comparisons has the potential to improve peer-to-peer knowledge exchange.

Two studies examined an unexplored motivational determinant of facial emotion recognition: observer regulatory focus. It was predicted that a promotion focus would enhance facial emotion recognition relative to a prevention focus because the attentional strategies associated with promotion focus enhance performance on well-learned or innate tasks - such as facial emotion recognition. In Study 1, a promotion or a prevention focus was experimentally induced and better facial emotion recognition was observed in a promotion focus compared to a prevention focus. In Study 2, individual differences in chronic regulatory focus were assessed and attention allocation was measured using eye tracking during the facial emotion recognition task. Results indicated that the positive relation between a promotion focus and facial emotion recognition is mediated by shorter fixation duration on the face which reflects a pattern of attention allocation matched to the eager strategy in a promotion focus (i.e., striving to make hits). A prevention focus did not have an impact neither on perceptual processing nor on facial emotion recognition. Taken together, these findings demonstrate important mechanisms and consequences of observer motivational orientation for facial emotion recognition.

Proprioceptive information can supplement visual information in the comprehension of ambiguous perspective images. The importance of proprioceptive information in unambiguous perspective image comprehension is untested, however. We explored the role of proprioception in perspective image comprehension using three experiments in which participants took or imagined taking an upward- or downward-oriented posture and then made judgments about images viewed from below or viewed from above. Participants were faster and more accurate in their judgments when their actual or simulated posture was consistent with the posture implied by the perspective of the image they were judging. These results support a role for proprioception in the comprehension of unambiguous perspective images as well as ambiguous perspective images.

Being aware of someone else's existing knowledge is a prerequisite to effectively adapting an explanation to that person's learning needs. However, such knowledge awareness introduces the potential for motivated self-evaluation based on relative knowledge, that is, for social comparison. Because favorable social comparisons are actively defended, we propose that knowledge awareness might undermine information sharing in explanation when social comparison motives are active. We tested this hypothesis in a series of experiments in which participants provided explanations to an ostensible learning partner with or without knowledge awareness. Both dispositionally and situationally motivated social comparison interacted with knowledge awareness to reduce information sharing in explanation. Intriguingly, knowledge awareness uniformly facilitated adaptation of the information that was shared to address partner knowledge deficit. These results illustrate a tension in the components of effective explanation. At the same time that knowledge awareness effectively coordinates explanation content, it can lead to knowledge hoarding by knowledgeable explainers who are motivated to rely on knowledge differences between the self and the explanation recipient for self-evaluation.

We investigated the potential for cross-group recognition bias, the reliable tendency for perceivers to better recognize people who share their ethnic or social groups than people who do not share their ethnic or social groups, with diverse non-face representations of digital identity. We compared German participants' memory for people they believed to be German or French when those people were identified using non-face pictorial representations of identity (Studies 1 and 2) and verbal written representations of identity (Study 3) taken from the World Wide Web. Participants better recognized ingroup targets than outgroup targets regardless of type of identity representation. These results generalize cross-group recognition bias to an important new domain as well as to a new class of stimuli and suggest that process explanations of cross-group recognition bias that are domain specific to faces do not provide a comprehensive account of the bias.

Three studies integrated crossed-categorization and discrete emotion approaches to prejudice and prejudice reduction. Study 1 made salient crossed-categorization using naturally occurring groups and examined the ability of emotions to account for prejudiced evaluations. Study 2 constructed novel crossed-categorizations in the laboratory to examine the role of appraisal-based emotions in evaluations of crossed-categories. Study 3 crossed gender and sexual orientation, for which elicited discrete emotions predict different evaluative responses than do shared and unshared group memberships alone. In all three studies, discrete emotions were able to account for the effects of crossed-categorization on evaluative measures of prejudice and revealed emotional paths to prejudice reduction which would be obscured by the evaluative measures alone. In Study 3, a discrete emotions approach better predicted evaluations than did shared and unshared group membership alone. These results converge to highlight the importance of discrete emotions in understanding the evaluative implications of crossed-categorization, especially for prejudice reduction.

A commitment framework based on Moreland and Levine's theory of socialization in groups (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982, 2000) is applied to the previously neglected problem of group exit. Specifically, an ex-member's desire to rejoin a former group is predicted from two factors: (1) the ex-member's commitment to his or her former group; and (2) the ex-member's perception of his or her former group's commitment to him or her. This framework is tested using both recollections of real-life experiences and experimentally constructed groups. Results suggest that an ex-member's desire to rejoin a former group is determined most proximally by the ex-member's commitment to the former group, but that the ex-member's commitment can be affected by perceptions of the former group's commitment. These results suggest that Moreland and Levine's framework provides a viable theory-based starting point for more extensive study of group exit.

We investigated the relationship between evaluative intergroup bias and biased errors in intergroup face recognition after crossed-categorization (the combination of two social categories in defining a target of perception). Although evaluative bias and recognition bias often operate in parallel, we draw on two previously unconnected literatures to predict a divergence between these two processes after crossed-categorization. We tested this hypothesis by assessing participants’ evaluations of and recognition of targets who shared two ingroups with participants, targets who shared only one ingroup with participants, and targets who shared neither ingroup. Consistent with predictions, targets’ shared and unshared group memberships combined additively to affect evaluation, but targets who shared two ingroup memberships were better recognized than all other category combinations. These results document the relationship between evaluative bias and recognition bias after crossed-categorization and indicate that crossed-categorization affects evaluative bias and recognition bias in different ways.

Drawing on Intergroup Emotions Theory [Mackie, D. M., Maitner, A. T., & Smith, E. R. (in press). Intergroup emotions theory. In T.D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination, New York: Erlbaum.], we propose that a perceiver’s emotional reactions toward other social groups can change in response to situationally induced shifts in self-categorization. American students were led to self-categorize as Americans or as students and reported their anger and respect towards Muslims and police. Results indicated that in reaction to Muslims, participants felt more anger and less respect when categorized as Americans than when categorized as students. In reaction to police, participants felt less anger and more respect when categorized as Americans than when categorized as students. These results support and extend IET, and suggest that in addition to prejudice reduction interventions that focus on recategorization of the target, perceiver recategorization of the self is a viable means of changing emotional reactions to social targets.

Intergroup emotions theory seeks to understand and improve intergroup relations by focusing on the emotions engendered by belonging to, and by deriving identity from, a social group (processes called self-categorization and identification). Intergroup emotions are shaped by the very different ways in which members of different groups see group-relevant objects and events. These emotions come, with time and repetition, to be part and parcel of group membership itself. Once evoked, specific intergroup emotions direct and regulate specific intergroup behaviors. This approach has implications for theories of emotion as well as of intergroup relations. Because intergroup emotions derive from self-categorization and identification and because they strongly influence intergroup behavior, intergroup emotions theory provides an innovative framework for attempts to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations.

The consequences of holding an entity (i.e., the belief that a group's characteristics are fixed) or incremental (i.e., the belief that a group's characteristics are malleable) implicit theory about groups was examined for stereotyping and perceptions of group entitativity. Two studies showed that implicit theories about groups affect stereotyping by changing perceptions of group entitativity. Study 1 found that entity theorists were more likely to stereotype than incremental theorists and that perception of group entitativity significantly accounted for this relation. In Study 2, implicit theories of groups were manipulated via instruction set and entity theorists stereotyped more and perceived groups as more entitative than incremental theorists. Again, the effect of implicit theory was significantly, although partially, mediated by perceptions of group entitativity. The roles of implicit theories about groups and perceptions of group entitativity are discussed regarding stereotyping.