We study the psychological costs of financial constraints and their economic consequences. Using a representative survey of U.S. households, we document the prevalence of financial stress in U.S. households and a strong relationship between financial stress and measures of financial constraints. We incorporate financial stress into an otherwise standard dynamic model of consumption and labor supply. We emphasize two key results. First, a psychology-based theory of poverty traps requires two equally important components: financial stress itself and naivete about financial stress. Specifically, sophisticates save enough to escape high-stress states, because they understand that doing so alleviates the economic consequences of financial stress. On the other hand, naifs dis-save, fall into a poverty trap, and incur high welfare losses. Second, the financial stress channel can reverse the counterfactual negative wealth effect on labor supply because relieving stress frees up cognitive resources for productive work. Financial stress also has macroeconomic implications on wealth inequality and fiscal multipliers.

Using high-frequency responses of oil futures prices to prominent oil market news, we estimate the effects of oil supply news shocks when systematic monetary policy is switched off by the zero lower bound (ZLB) and when it is not (normal periods) in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that negative oil supply news shocks are less contractionary (and even expansionary) at the ZLB compared to normal periods. Inflation expectations increase during both periods, while the short nominal interest rates remain constant at the ZLB, pointing to the importance of monetary policy for oil shock propagation.

We study the effects of central bank balance sheet policies—namely, quantitative easing and foreign exchange interventions—in a model where people form expectations through an iterative level-k thinking process. We emphasize two main theoretical results. First, under a broad set of conditions, central bank interventions are effective under level-k thinking, while they are neutral in the rational expectations equilibrium. Second, when preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion, asset purchases increase aggregate output if they target assets with pro-cyclical returns but reduce it if asset returns are counter-cyclical. Finally, we empirically show that forecast errors about future asset prices are predictable by balance sheet interventions, a property that differentiates our channel from popular alternatives, such as portfolio-balance and signaling channels.

We document a new fact: in U.S., European and Japanese surveys, households do not expect deflation, even in environments where persistent deflation is a strong possibility. This fact stands in contrast to the standard macroeconomic models with rational expectations. We extend a standard New Keynesian model with a zero-lower bound on inflation expectations. Unconventional monetary policies, such as forward guidance, are weaker. In liquidity traps, the government spending output multiplier is finite, and adverse aggregate supply shocks are not expansionary. The possibility of confidence-driven liquidity traps is attenuated.

The creation and destruction margins of employment (job flows) can be used to measure the employment effects of disruptions to firm credit. Using a firm dynamics model, we establish that a tightening of credit to firms reduces employment primarily by reducing gross job creation, exhibiting stronger effects at new, young, and middle-sized firms. The firm credit channel accounts for, at most, 18%, of the decline in US employment in the Great Recession. Using MSA-level job flows data, we show that the job flows response to identified credit shocks is consistent with our model's predictions. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Historic levels of public debt and conditions of r < g for advanced economies have prompted a reassessment of debt sustainability. Using a continuous-time model in which the debt-to-GDP ratio is stochastic and r < g on average, we find that theoretical condi-tions for sustainability are not closely tied to common metrics of sustainability: the level of debt or whether r < g. However, when the primary surplus is bounded, a state-dependent threshold level of public debt determines sustainability. Secular stagnation factors like slow population growth, low productivity growth, or higher output risk carry differing implica-tions for debt sustainability. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

We use the narrative approach to identify tax changes unrelated to current economic conditions and estimate the effects of these changes on macroeconomic variables during and outside of the zero lower bound period in Japan. We find little difference in the output responses across the two periods. However, the responses of aggregate consumption, investment, and imports are significantly different in the two periods within the first few quarters.

We study the effects of risky assets purchases financed by issuance of riskless debt by the government (quantitative easing) in a model with nominal frictions but without rational expectations. We use the concept of reflective equilibrium that converges to the rational expectations equilibrium in the limit. This equilibrium notion rationalizes the idea that it is difficult to change expectations about economic outcomes even if it is easy to shift expectations about the policy. Without additional assumptions about non-pecuniary demand for safe assets or segmentation of assets markets, we find that in the reflective equilibrium quantitative easing policy increases the price of risky assets and stimulates output, while it is neutral in the rational expectations equilibrium.

We provide new estimates of the importance of growth-rate shocks and uncertainty shocks for developed countries. The shocks we estimate are large and correspond to well-known macroeconomic episodes such as the Great Moderation and the productivity slowdown. We compare our results to earlier estimates of "long-run risks" and assess the implications for asset pricing. Our estimates yield greater return predictability and a more volatile price-dividend ratio. In addition, we can explain a substantial fraction of cross-country variation in the equity premium.. An advantage of our approach, based on macroeconomic data alone, is that the parameter estimates cannot be viewed as backward engineered to fit asset pricing data. We provide intuition for our results using the recently developed framework of shock-exposure and shock-price elasticities. (JEL E21, E32, E44, G12, G35)

Using a rich dataset on government spending forecasts in Japan, we provide new evidence on the effects of unexpected changes in government spending when the nominal interest rate is near the zero lower bound (ZLB). The on-impact output multiplier is 1.5 in the ZLB period and 0.6 outside of it. We estimate that government spending shocks increase both private consumption and investment during the ZLB period, but crowd them out in the normal period. There is evidence that expected inflation increases more in the ZLB period than in the normal period. (JEL E21, E22, E23, E31, E43, E52, E62)

I solve for optimal macroprudential and monetary policies for members of a currency union in an open economy model with nominal price rigidities, demand for safe as- sets, and collateral constraints. Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank, which sets a common interest rate. Macroprudential policy is set at a country level through the choice of reserve requirements. I emphasize two main results. First, with asymmetric countries and sticky prices, the optimal macroprudential policy has a country-specific stabilization role beyond optimal regulation of financial sectors. This result holds even if optimal fiscal transfers are allowed among the union members. Second, there is a role for global coordination of country-specific macroprudential policies. This is true even when countries have no monopoly power over prices of internationally traded goods or assets. These results build the case for coordinated macroprudential policies that go beyond achieving financial stability objectives.

The labor market recovery since the end of the Great Recession has been characterized by a marked decline in labor market turnover. In this paper, we provide evidence that the housing crisis and financial nature of the Great Recession account for this decline in job flows. We exploit MSA-level variation in job flows and housing prices to show that a decline in housing prices diminishes job creation and lagged job destruction. Moreover, we document differences across firm size and age categories, with middle-sized firms (20-99 employees) and new and young firms (firms less than 5 years of age) most sensitive to a decline in house prices. We propose a quantitative model of firm dynamics with collateral constraints, calibrating the model to match the distribution of employment by firm size and age. Financial shocks in our firm dynamics model depresses job creation and job destruction and replicates the empirical pattern of the sensitivity of job flows across firm age and size categories.

The slow recovery of the US labor market and the observed shift in the Beveridge curve has prompted speculation that sector-specic shocks are responsible for the current recession. We document a signicant correlation between shifts in the US Beveridge curve in postwar data and periods of elevated sectoral shocks relying on a factor analysis of sectoral employment to derive our sectoral shock index. We provide conditions under which sector-specic shocks in a multisector model augmented with labor market search generate outward shifts in the Beveridge curve and raise the natural rate of unemployment. Consistent with empirical evidence, our model also generates cyclical movements in aggregate matching function eciency and mismatch across sectors. We calibrate a two-sector version of our model and demonstrate that a negative shock to construction employment calibrated to match employment shares can fully account for the outward shift in the Beveridge curve. We augment our standard multisector model with nancial frictions to demonstrate that nancial shocks or a binding zero lower bound can act like sectoral productivity shocks, generating a shift in the Beveridge curve that may be counteracted by expansionary monetary policy.

Essays on Macroeconomics and International Finance Dmitriy Sergeyev This thesis addresses three topics in Macroeconomics and International Finance. Chapter 1 studies welfare implications of international financial integration in the presence of bank funding risks. Unregulated issuance of safe short-term liabilities by financial intermediaries leads to excessive reliance on this form of financing, which increases losses associated with financial crises. First, I show that integration increases the severity of potential financial crises in the countries that receive capital inflows. As a result, integration may reduce welfare for these countries. Second, I show that if macroprudential regulation of the banking sector is chosen by each country in an uncoordinated way, the outcome can be Pareto inefficient so that there is a role for global coordination of such policies. This effect arises because the macroprudential regulation that limits the overissuance of safe liabilities changes the international interest rate. The regulation may have an additional benefit from manipulating the interest rate. Third, the desire to manipulate the interest rate when regulating the local banking sector creates incentives to use two regulatory tools: macroprudential regulation of the banking sector and capital controls. Chapter 2, written jointly with Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson, quantifies the importance of long-run risks—persistent shocks to growth rates and uncertainty—in a panel of long-term aggregate consumption data for developed countries. We identify sizable and highly persistent world growth-rate shocks as well as less persistent country-specific growth rate shocks. The world growth-rate shocks capture the productivity speed-up and slow-down many countries experienced in the second half of the 20th century. We also identify large and persistent world shocks to uncertainty. Our world uncertainty process captures the large but uneven rise and fall of volatility that occurred over the course of the 20th century. We find that negative shocks to growth rates are correlated with shocks that increase uncertainty. Our estimates based on macroeconomic data alone line up well with earlier calibrations of the long-run risks model designed to match asset pricing data. We document how these dynamics, combined with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, help explain a number of asset pricing puzzles. Chapter 3, written jointly with Neil R. Mehrotra, investigates the relationship between sector-specific shocks, shifts in the Beveridge curve, and changes in the natural rate of unemployment. We document a significant correlation between shifts in the US Beveridge curve in postwar data and periods of elevated sectoral shocks relying on a factor analysis of sectoral employment to derive our sectoral shock index. We provide conditions under which sectorspecific shocks in a multisector model augmented with labor market search generate outward shifts in the Beveridge curve and raise the natural rate of unemployment. Consistent with empirical evidence, our model also generates cyclical movements in aggregate matching function efficiency and mismatch across sectors. We calibrate a two-sector version of our model and demonstrate that a negative shock to construction employment calibrated to match employment shares can fully account for the outward shift in the Beveridge curve. We augment our standard multisector model with financial frictions to demonstrate that financial shocks or a binding zero lower bound can act like sectoral productivity shocks, generating a shift in the Beveridge curve that may be counteracted by expansionary monetary policy.

The American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics focuses on studies of aggregate fluctuations and growth, and the role of policy in that context. Such studies often borrow from and interact with research in other fields, such as monetary theory, industrial organization, finance, labor economics, political economy, public finance, international economics, and development economics. To the extent that they make a contribution to macroeconomics, papers in these fields are also welcome. We facilitate the exchange of ideas through our online discussion forum.

The slow recovery of the US labor market and the observed shift in the Beveridge curve has prompted speculation that sector-specic shocks may be responsible for the current recession. We document a signicant correlation between shifts in the US Beveridge curve in postwar data and periods of elevated sectoral shocks, relying on a factor analysis of sectoral employment to derive our sectoral shock index. Our index is distinct from the celebrated Lilien (1982) measure of employment dispersion, uncorrelated with various measures of the business cycle, and elevated in the current recession. We show that sector-specic shocks in a multisector model augmented