Cybersecurity threats have escalated in South Africa, highlighting vulnerabilities across government, industry, and national infrastructure. This paper is a position article that synthesises and critiques literature and institutional practices to propose optimal, actionable approaches for cybersecurity education in a South African military context. This paper aims to identify optimal approaches for cybersecurity education in South Africa, with focused recommendations for the Faculty of Military Science and other higher education institutions. A position paper methodology synthesises recent literature, policy documents, and the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) curricular framework, evaluating educational models, student profiles, industry engagement, and active learning tools relevant to the South African context. Effective cybersecurity education requires multidisciplinary curricula, integration of technical and social science perspectives, practical exercises (like CTF and cyber ranges), and strong collaboration with industry and government. Student profiles should emphasise both technical acumen and soft skills. South African needs are best addressed by mapping local competencies to international frameworks while contextualising to national security priorities. Curricula must be updated to reflect multidisciplinary competencies, provide practical training, align with international standards, and foster industry/government partnerships to build resilience and professional capacity in South Africa’s cybersecurity workforce.

Examining the preparedness of the South African Intelligence Community (SAIC) to address asymmetric threats becomes a matter of national importance given the proximity of international terrorist organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria to SA and the detrimental impact of organized crime, particularly state capture, on the country's government and state-owned enterprises. The research was based on a relativist ontological assumption with a qualitative approach to the search through published literature, legislation, policy, reports, and media releases for relevant descriptions of the current state of SA security threats and its IC-more specifically, the State Security Agency. The study concluded that the SAIC is unlikely to be capable of neutralizing evolving domestic and international asymmetric threats due to chronic incapacity caused by overbureaucracy, state capture, politicization, and corruption (among other ills). This is a contribution to the ongoing introspection in SA about developing a functional and professional state security apparatus that effectively contributes to the ethos of "freedom from want and freedom from fear."

This article critically reflects on the methodological, ethical, and practical challenges of researching drone deployments in African conflict zones. Drawing on insights from the recently published volume, Drones in the African Battlespaces, it explores how secrecy, fragmented data, geopolitical entanglements, and physical risk complicate empirical research in these settings. The proliferation of drones, used by states, foreign powers, rebels, and contractors, blurs the line between domestic and international conflict and demands interdisciplinary approaches. Researchers must navigate opaque operational environments, verify contested information, and manage the risks of fieldwork and digital surveillance. Ethical dilemmas are intensified by the dual-use nature of drones and the difficulty of attributing civilian harm. The article advocates for reflexive, multi-method research strategies that account for the epistemic and normative constraints of studying drone warfare in Africa. These reflections are intended to equip researchers with a more reflexive, multi-method toolkit for studying drone warfare under conditions of secrecy, data fragmentation, and physical risk, and to clarify the epistemic limits of what can responsibly be claimed about such operations. By thematising these constraints, the article advances methodological debates in conflict research and offers a conceptual map for scholars designing empirically grounded studies of drone warfare in Africa.

Covert action remains a critical element of modern intelligence operations and an important instrument of state power in security competition. Rooted in secrecy and plausible deniability, it featured prominently in Cold War struggles for influence. This research examines the conceptualization, scope, and methodologies of covert action within intelligence studies, with specific attention to its theoretical, legal, ethical, and strategic dimensions. Using a literature review and a case study of Operation Jungle, a British MI6 effort to erode Soviet control in the Baltic region, the study analyzes how operational variables shape outcomes. Although Operation Jungle yielded useful maritime electronic intelligence, it fundamentally represents an unsuccessful attempt to transition from clandestine collection to sustained covert influence. Drawing upon declassified primary sources, this research concludes that long-term Soviet counterintelligence penetration was the defining cause of the operation's failure, rendering any doctrinal or planning shortcomings secondary to the systemic compromise of operational security. The enduring significance of covert action in the intelligence cycle is underscored, as well as how adversarial counterintelligence and flawed strategic assumptions generate a persistent gap between doctrine and implementation.

This study seeks to explore the negative impacts of armed banditry in North-west (NW) Nigeria from a national security standpoint. The qualitative research design was used in the study to examine pertinent discourses with respect to armed banditry in the NW region and Nigeria’s national security. The paper adopts the theory of functionalism given that it provides a framework for all the stakeholders in a whole-of-society approach to collaborate and interact as a functional structure in addressing the menace of armed banditry. The study identified socio-economic impediments as a major underlying factor that trigger armed banditry attacks. The paper argues that armed banditry has affected educational development in the NW region and disrupted economic activities with huge consequences on Nigeria’s national security. The study found that weak local government administration, prevalence of porous borders, criminal justice impediments, and inter-agency rivalry were major challenges affecting the efforts of the government in addressing the menace of armed banditry. The paper proffered some strategies to curb the spate of armed banditry in the NW region. These included increasing investment in human security, effective border management, and streamlining the roles of security and law enforcement agencies amongst others.

Cybersecurity is a critical concern in contemporary digital environments, especially within the context of complex, interconnected systems. This study presents a systematic review of the complexities and inconsistencies surrounding the use of cyber-related terminology. A two-phased approach. The first part entailed using the PRISMA model to find relevant material, which was analyzed using ATLAS.ti software during the second phase. The analysis reveals ambiguity in cyber-related constructs, such as 'cybersecurity' versus 'cyber security', which impacts the clarity of research, policy development, and organizational practices, including education and training. Additionally, the study identified 'cybersecurity' as a primary security concern, interconnected with secondary and tertiary constructs. These relationships, visualized through ATLAS.ti Sankey diagrams, provide insight into how cyber-related constructs; all interrelated within the broader cyber ecosystem and within the dataset used for the study. This research is interesting and relevant because it clarifies the inconsistent use of cyber-related constructs and thus, each narrative constructed around cyberspace and its security. These taxonomic clarifications are also useful additions to curricula offering education and training in cyber-related subjects. Furthermore, organizations delivering security and/or intelligence services, within the context of cyber-related functional applications, can use such clarification to enhance their education, training materials, and functional environments.

The evolving dynamics of US-China competition in Africa are examined with respect to military presence, soft power, and intelligence. A network-centric approach with sensitivity to cultural understanding is explored for US military intelligence (USMI) on the African continent, i.e., identifying key nodes, link creation, and centrality within the African intelligence network. Challenges and risks are acknowledged. A comprehensive approach is proposed, including private sector involvement, to maximize USMI's impact and resilience in the African environment. Key recommendations pivot on network-centricity in Africa, US-Africa intelligence services collaboration, and strategic partnerships to effectively navigate the complex geopolitical landscape and counter Chinese influence.

Cognitive warfare and counterintelligence are critical elements of Africa's security strategies. This article examines their interplay in the diverse African context and develops the concept of content as a tool used by state and non-state actors in systematic cognitive warfare campaigns to erode public trust in government institutions and societal resilience. Meanwhile, counterintelligence efforts focus from a defensive perspective on mitigating the effects of cognitive warfare and offensively employing similar tactics against threats actors. The cognitive warfare-counterintelligence nexus shapes intelligence collection, disinformation, propaganda and subversive activities, destabilising African societies. Examples from Nigeria, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Egypt, Kenya Zimbabwe and Uganda highlight how these concepts intersect in various contexts, impacting governance, conflict resolution and regional stability. Understanding this interplay is crucial for developing comprehensive strategies to address security threats and safeguard the integrity of African content ecosystems. Strategies should be inclusive of international collaboration, education, intelligence exchange, capacitating national counterintelligence capabilities and secure cyber-related critical infrastructure.

As China expands its influence in Africa through infrastructure development, military presence, and intelligence activities, the US faces growing competition for access and influence on the continent. This article advocates for a network-centric approach to U.S. Military Intelligence (USMI), emphasising the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT), regional expertise, and strategic partnerships with African intelligence services. The article argues that integrating USMI into Africa's intelligence community is essential for maintaining influence and enhancing cooperation, particularly in regions like Djibouti, where foreign military bases from China and the US complicate intelligence operations. Using social network theory, the paper outlines strategies to engage key nodes within African intelligence services, maximising access and information flow. The challenges of mis- or disinformation and intelligence infiltration are addressed, highlighting the need for a whole-of-government approach that includes the private sector. The article concludes by recommending the establishment of joint intelligence centers, increased staff exchanges, and the revitalisation of regional expertise to strengthen US intelligence efforts. These initiatives will help the US maintain its role as a strategic partner in Africa, counter China's influence, and contribute to regional security and stability.

The author explores the context that contributed to the evolution of the South African Intelligence Community (SAIC) from political police to an independent security state during the apartheid, nondemocratic regime (1961-1994). It also assesses the circumstances that led to the demise of authoritarian rule and the reform of the intelligence apparatus. It finds that such factors as the security landscape, changes in leadership, and enabling legislation assisted the SAIC's consolidation of power as political police, morphing it into an independent security state during that period. Subsequently, leadership, liberalization measures, scandals, and inquiries contributed to the demise of the apartheid intelligence apparatus and the slow emergence of a democratically inclined SAIC.

Intelligence collection is an integral part of the intelligence cycle. In fact, some authors declare that it is at the heart of the intelligence discipline. Intelligence collection is typically done by a variety of intelligence collection disciplines and is as old as the Bible. In the past, intelligence collection consisted mainly of human intelligence (HUMINT). However, as technologies evolved, so too did collection methods, and the number of collection disciplines, therefore, increased substantially. Some of these intelligence collection disciplines also underwent some significant modifications because of these technological advances. An example of this is Image Intelligence (IMINT) which was previously seen as a collection discipline on its own. IMINT is nowadays considered a subdiscipline under Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)-the addition of geographical information systems (GIS) in the 1980s is one of the reasons for this change. These and many other changes resulted in many authors not agreeing on the main disciplines (and subdisciplines) in the intelligence collection domain. Furthermore, different organizations may only perform certain intelligence collection tasks and therefore only consider a certain spectrum of the intelligence collection domain. In 2021, the South African National Defence Force started a new degree programme in Defence Intelligence Studies under the auspices of the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. It was, therefore, necessary to first establish what is globally considered the main intelligence collection disciplines and subdisciplines and secondly, which of these must be included when presenting intelligence collection as part of the degree programme in South Africa. The research entailed a two-phased approach, the first part entailed the PRISMA model to find relevant material that was analyzed with ATLAS.ti software during the second phase. The research is interesting since it suggests an expansion of the traditional list of intelligence collection disciplines by adding newer intelligence collection disciplines such as Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) and Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT). These additions can also be applied to other educational institutions offering intelligence studies elsewhere in the world.

The prospect of extra-terrestrial (outer space) armed conflict between major powers is a real possibility. As early as 1966, an Outer Space Treaty was signed by over 100 countries in response to such a possibility. In 2019, NATO declared outer space a new potential war zone or military operational domain alongside air, land, sea, and cyberspace. This new war zone is mainly a strategic frontier, exclusively dominated by a few global superpowers. It would be naive to think that global superpowers' wars fought in outer space will not have a detrimental socio-economic effect on non-participating countries. On the contrary, an outer space war will have dire consequences for the developing world, such as South Africa. This article is descriptive and explanatory in nature and analyses the potential risks of a twenty-first-century space war to South Africa's national security. It provides a deeper understanding by contextualising the international legal regulation of the military use of space, the use of force against the architecture of space resources, technological advances in satellite systems and weapons, the current geopolitical tensions between the major superpowers related to space and highlights South Africa's international relations with some of these global superpowers.

Africa is often considered to be a place of conflict, violence, and war; yet, it is surprisingly lacking in professional military capability. How could this deficiency in professional armed forces in Africa be explained? African military capacity is a complex phenomenon that is closely intertwined with the nature of the society it is supposed to protect and the maturity of the economic and political system within which it is embedded. Moreover, it is often the relative absence of external threats along with a focus on internal social and political dynamics that predominantly shapes the nature of African armies. Much can be learned about the institutional nature, operational capabilities, and national focus of African armed forces by examining their developmental pathways and roots in the process of decolonization, as well as understanding the shared purpose or national identity within African countries. As such, the chapter aims to provide an outline of the key drivers that shape the nature and professionalism of contemporary African armed forces.

A summary of counterintelligence threat chokepoints from the perspectives of the United States, Israel, the European Union, Nordic countries, and South Africa are presented. These chokepoints seem to stem from geopolitical competitiveness and manifest as espionage, subversion, terrorism, and covert action in any accessible domain possible. The discussion of threat focus areas has been chosen after consideration of the ontology of such threats, including new security challenges like hybrid threats, grey-zone influences, and some specific threats propagated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The discussion concludes with a brief view on counterintelligence threat enablers, accelerators, and effects. The aim is to provide a comparative view of existing counterintelligence threats, agendas, and threat responses to increase both awareness and resilience.

Misinformation, disinformation and mal information are part of the information disorder construct, dominating the information warfare domain. These are key enablers associated with grey zone operations, and an integral part of current adversaries' and competitors' hybrid warfare tool kit. Disinformation, in combination with influence operations, also plays an important role within the concept of hybrid warfare; both from a threat–and own resilience perspective. This article reflects on these information warfare tools and their application by Russia in the current Russo‐Ukraine war, offering potentially considerable force multipliers in the information domain for the Russian aggressor. Hybrid warfare and associated threats, specifically focusing on aspects of information warfare, disinformation, deception (typically within the context of political activity or warfare so commonly associated with Russian active measures) and as part of an adversary's grey zone operations approach are all discussed raising awareness towards building resilience by means of a comprehensive approach to counter such threats to national security.

Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South Africa is no different. The emergence of satellite imagery had a significant influence on the Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities and, similarly, the emergence of the telegram and later the telephone had and equally significant effect on the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) environment. With communications being revolutionised by mobile technology that include recording, geo-positioning and photography, collection and distribution are ubiquitous. Smart mobile communication technology is also the driver of social media everywhere, at all ages, state, and non-state, non-stop. More recently, Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) has had the same significant influence on the collection of intelligence in general. Globally several examples of the successful exploitation of SOCMINT can be found internationally, it would be surprising if South Africa is not a statistic of this phenomenon yet. Initially, many organisations viewed (and some still do) SOCMINT as an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tool. However, when considering the South African intelligence landscape, the concepts democracy, transparency, and intelligence oversight are calibrating factors to bear in mind. It is also important to consider the influence of the national legislative framework governing the use of SOCMINT in South Africa by state and non-state actors. It then becomes clear that issues such as personal legal right to privacy means that SOCMINT is probably no longer covered by the scope of the OSINT definition and that intelligence organisations collecting social media content and producing SOCMINT should adhere to the legislative framework governing the collection and use of social media content and the production of SOCMINT.