Governments, concerned to limit the opportunities for criticism of their activities, have long sought to regulate freedom of expression, and in particular the freedom of the media, either through systems of licensing or the use of the criminal law, and sometimes by a mixture of both. Traditional justifications for limiting freedom of expression fell foul of Enlightenment thinking, and suspicion of governments' motives for doing so has continued to fuel arguments for freedom of expression and demands that it should be guaranteed by law. In recent times, however, doubts have been expressed in certain quarters about disregarding the traditional justifications for control, particularly because the wide dissemination of disinformation is seen by many as threatening democracy. Nonetheless, if it is decided that some form of control is required, the question of what form this should take remains open, which is why the philosophical arguments considered in this chapter remain relevant today.

While agreeing with Seana Shiffrin that any free speech theory must depend on assumptions about our need for free thinking, I am sceptical about her claim that her thinker-based approach provides the best explanation for freedom of speech. Her argument has some similarities with Mill’s argument from truth and with self-development theories, though it improves on the latter. But the thinker-based approach does not show why political discourse, broadly construed, is protected more strongly in all jurisdictions than gossip and sexually explicit speech. Nor does it explain why the ‘mass’ speech of corporations and the mailings of political parties and charities are fully protected by provisions such as the First Amendment. My article concludes with some reflections on the relationship of abstract political theory such as Shiffrin’s to constitutional law; abstract theory must inevitably make some compromises if it is fully to explain constitutional jurisprudence.

This stimulating book has a broad historical scope. Its 25 chapters cover censorship from the suppression in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of translations of the Bible to the removal of boo...

In Jeremy Waldron's book, The Harm in Hate Speech, it is not always clear whether he argues that hate speech causes harm or whether it constitutes harm. This article considers this uncertainty, concluding that the best understanding of Waldron's argument is that hate speech tends to cause harm - a weak form of the consequentialist case for its proscription. His argument is not advanced by his apparent reliance on speech-act theory.

This article introduces the most significant steps taken towards the introduction of freedom of discussion in the UK and compares them with debates on freedom of the press and freedom of expression in the rest of Europe. Taking as a starting point John Stuart Mill’s and Albert Dicey’s nineteenth-century deliberations on freedom of discussion and freedom of the press, this article examines debates around the extent to which English law should guarantee or restrict the press’s or the individual’s ability to spread new ideas.

teaching media law. Its particular strengths lie in the clarity of the exposition, the structured framework that each chapter provides to help the reader understand the specific issues raised, and the comprehensive map it provides of the field. As noted, Oster addresses technical issues in a systematic fashion and encourages active engagement by students through problem solving and discussion of controversial cases. The book can be used to introduce fundamental human rights and economic law principles and as an initial commentary on substantive areas of law of particular relevance for the mass media. The comparative element, with reference to examples drawn from domestic law, will be of interest to international students and serves to emphasise the interconnected nature of domestic and international law. Although much of the book is, by design, descriptive, and some fields, such as film or the cultural considerations championed by UNESCO, receive little attention, Oster provides an extensive reference section, detailing academic commentaries at the end, enabling students to carry out independent research and develop further their understanding of specific areas. The book also includes a useful table of cases, treaties, reports and other documentary resources at the start. European and International Media Law fills a clear gap in the market by offering a stimulating and wide-ranging textbook on international media law. It is highly recommended.

Two recent decisions of Warby J have upheld the defence of public interest privilege to libel actions: the first on the common law principles established in Reynolds v Times Newspapers, the second on the basis of the provision in the Defamation Act 2013 which replaced Reynolds. Though neither decision resolves every question about the scope of the defence, both of them show a high regard for the concerns of defendants who raise this defence in libel cases.

We investigate the effect of a reduction of anonymity on consumers' purchase decisions (whether to buy, and if so how much to pay) at an online music store with Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW)-like pricing and in an Internet experiment mimicking the real world situation. Revealing the customer's name, e-mail, and payment to the artist (seller) led to insignificantly higher payments, although it drastically reduced the number of customers purchasing. Overall, the regime led to a revenue loss of 25%. In the online experiment, revenue drops by 35%. These results suggest that the positive effect of reduced anonymity, previously established for donation or public goods contexts, does not extend to a consumption environment. Instead, the substantial opt-out of customers is likely to be motivated by concerns about privacy.

The ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test has been applied in two recent cases, Re JR38’s Application for Judicial Review and Weller v Associated Newspapers. Both cases were brought by children, to whom it is hard to apply the test. This note argues that the ‘reasonable expectation’ test is generally problematic and could be discarded.