In his essay, Aaron Schutz contrasts Dewey's approach to education with that of child-centered educators of the 1920s and 1960s, whom he calls "personalists" (presumably so they are not too easily dismissed).The contrast is analyzed by considering different attitudes toward "games" versus "play," adopted by Dewey and the personalists, respectively, where games have predefined goals and rules, and play has emergent goals and rules (if any).This contrast is vivified by George Dennison's comparison of boys playing Little League baseball and children engaging in a ball game spontaneously with friends.In Schutz's analysis, the advocates of child-centered education of the 1920s, as well as the "free" or "alternative" schools of the 1960s, have a different approach to education than critics, such as John Dewey.In particular, Dewey is viewed as favoring education through participation in games, while personalists favor education by participation in play.In emphasizing education through "games" with preset rules, Dewey is seen as preparing children for work, bureaucratic life, and formal democracy, while personalists, in emphasizing "play," are seen as socializing for personal enjoyment, emergent community, and informal democracy.Dewey's criticism of child-centeredness is turned on its head, making him too adult-centered.Schutz has written elsewhere about personalists, such as Margaret Naumberg and Caroline Pratt, and one can sympathize with his concern that their work not be summarily "erased" by Dewey's criticism.Nevertheless, for those familiar with Dewey, something seems to have gone quite wrong here.Dewey consistently opposed traditional adult-centered education, alienating work, and merely formal conceptions of democracy.Dewey was arguing primarily against dualistic, either/or thinking, such as adult-centered versus child-centered, work versus play, external versus internal control.His attitude was not the polar opposite of either child-centeredness or adult-centeredness, but critical of

In "The Use and Abuse of the History of Educational Philosophy," Avi Mintz suggests that philosophy of education's identity issues might be addressed by paying greater attention to its history. 1 To support this idea, he notes that history has received little attention, citing evidence that most articles in the field do not mention a "great thinker," and even fewer a pre-twentieth century one.He also criticizes the idea that greater practical relevance would resolve the field's issues, because this would distort it by serving extrinsic rather than intrinsic interests.In this vein, he argues against the "history + implications" approach, which may seem historical but, as it is driven by present relevance, is likely to distort the work of the "great thinker" being considered.Mintz concludes that paying more attention to history would bring a number of benefits.It would: reveal limitations of present thought; help avoid reinventing the wheel; provide a common vocabulary; suggest internal criteria of goodness; make disciplinary expertise clearer; teach students to wrestle with good arguments; and contribute to understanding vital human problems.

One of the very great services a journal can perform is to provide collegial feedback to authors. We are especially fortunate for the quality of reviews done and frequently receive plaudits from authors who appreciate the detailed critique of their work. We pass these along when we can. We believe that this service to individuals and to the journal is also a service in the field. This listing is our way of publicly acknowledging our reviewers’ contributions. To all our reviewers from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, thank you.

This chapter opens the Handbook, and provides a reflective, philosophical discussion intended to inform the educational psychology emerging today. To gain perspective on current theory and research in the field it is helpful to consider some of the basic ways that human nature and conduct are conceived. Since the most basic images of human nature and conduct often have earlier historical origins as parts of larger visions of mind and nature that were first articulated by philosophers, perspective on present and emerging thought can often be gained by considering it in the context of earlier ways of thinking.

Aspects of Adam Smith's thought are introduced to help evaluate Weinstein's reconsideration. Where Newton sought universal principles to explain planetary movement, Smith sought universal principles to explain human conduct. His theory of moral sentiments considered the role of sympathetic responses to others, and the resulting desire to harmonize responses in differing relationships, as a motive for moral thinking and conduct. His theory of reasoning explored the roles of pleasure, surprise, and wonder in sequential phases of thinking. Weinstein finds the pluralism and emotional sensitivity of Smith's approach appealing, as do I. However, Weinstein seems too quick to reject logic and replace it with rhetorical narrative, and to view imagination and emotion as "true." Clearer and more consistent use of key concepts would also be helpful.

In “Whatever Happened to Dewey and James? Discourse, Power, and Subjectivity in the Age of Standardization,” Matthew T. Lewis argues that the contemporary standardization and accountability movement fosters forms of discourse that create passive and dependent subjects. In contrast, a Jamesean or Deweyan approach, now largely forgotten in the rush to standardize and compete, would support forms of discourse more likely to foster active, expressive, participatory subjects.

The traditional theory of mind views it as a metaphysical entity (the soul). This entitative conception was revised by modern cognitive theory viewing it as a function in the head. The shift to a functional view of mind eliminates many difficulties with the entitative approach but elements of the latter persist in locating mind inside the head or brain. This creates many problems including inability to account for the collective creation of artifacts that no individual participant fully understands. Greeno attempts to deal with these issues by shifting a functional, symbol processing approach from the individual to the group level. This analysis focuses primarily on the interaction of external problem representations (knowledge) and participant status or authority (control). The resulting approach offers something new to theories of group problem-solving or learning but ignores individual learning and, in treating authority statically, does not live up to Greeno’s initial goal of synthesizing cognitive and socio-linguistic theory.

Francis Schrag suggests that opposing philosophies are more like differing attitudes than conflicting propositions.Since opposing attitudes do not conflict with regard to truth we are free to learn from a variety of them, even when they pull in different directions.John Dewey and Michael Oakeshott's views differ in this way, he suggests, Dewey being committed emotionally to eliminating deadening boundaries and Oakeshott to sustaining important divisions.We can learn from both of orientations, without concern for their truth or falsity, since they are good for different purposes.In the end, however, we are likely to find one or the other more acceptable because it fits our own purposes and temperaments.

An essay review ofThe Philosophy of Education(Mead, G. H. G. J. J. Biesta & D. Tröhler, Eds. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008)

In Moderating the Debate: Rationality and the Promise of American Education, Michael Feuer raises concerns about the consequences of basing educational policy on the model of rational choice drawn from economics. Policy making would be better and more realistic, he suggests, if it were based on a newer procedural model drawn from cognitive science. In this essay Eric Bredo builds on Feuer's analysis by offering a more systematic critique of the traditional model of rationality that Feuer criticizes, a more critical evaluation of the procedural model that he favors, and a recommendation that the situational model he does not consider may have some benefits over both. This analysis shows that the traditional model presupposes an actor that cannot learn or develop. While the actor in the procedural model can learn, Bredo contends that it cannot develop, that is, it cannot outgrow its initial assumptions and values. Only the situational model allows for learning and development, important in a model to be used in the field of education. Bredo also considers in his analysis the social-relational assumptions built into the traditional, procedural, and situational models and the likely ethical consequences of acting on them.

Howe's (2009) critique of positivistic tendencies in the education research community is valuable and pertinent. His analysis is nonetheless one-sided, finding fault with one side of current divisions alone. In an effort to retain the good points of his analysis, the author first summarizes Howe's argument, interpreting it as a critique of hasty and dogmatic reductionism. He then considers parallel problems arising from hasty and dogmatic holism that Howe does not address. Following this discussion, a third, temporal approach is suggested in which analytic and synthetic perspectives are used to suggest and modify one another in a cycle, rather than being taken as fixed stances. Adopting this approach could help reduce the dogmatism evident in the methodology wars, although struggles for advantage would clearly remain.

One source of tension within and between modem nation states derives from conflict between individual and cultural rights. Modem democracies have been built on ideas of individual liberty whose extensions to the rights of culturally distinctive groups to survival and acceptance can create normative and political conflict. Such tensions raise questions about the role of the state, the underlying theory legitimising liberal states, and the social aims of education. Philosophical aspects of such conflicts are explored in Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg's excellent volume, Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities. The philosophical issues hinge on how individuals and groups are conceived, as well as how liberty and loyalty are understood. Most of the essays address these concepts in pragmatic rather than essentialist ways, suggesting that how these issues are conceived is itself an important part of the problem, or its resolution. I conclude by suggesting that all of these doctrines are faiths, the problem being to create conditions so that they, or their elements, can be accepted or rejected reasonably in the light of their social consequences.

The attempt to reform education using performance-based accountability may eventually be applied to teacher education. If so, it poses a potential challenge to those in social foundations as well as to other teacher-educators. Among other things, it requires that we think clearly about our mission and the kinds of effects we would like to have. Some difficulties involved in responding to this challenge are outlined in the following. A conception of the mission of social foundations that makes it easier to develop a coherent response is suggested. Central to the analysis is the notion that social foundations is dedicated to fostering adaptive reconceptualization of educational activity all the way down.

Normative confusion in education often stimulates 3 responses, appeal to: (a) top-down standards, (b) traditional communal norms, or (c) laissez-faire individualism. Strangely neglected is a collaborative approach, the attempt to consult with others and negotiate in an inclusive, fair, and open manner. Neglect of collaboration is undoubtedly due to loss of faith but perhaps also to loss of imagination, even in Social Foundations, which is startling given its origins. Modern and postmodern thought are briefly considered with regard to their collaborative implications and contrasted with a pragmatic or transactional approach. Some suggestions for making Social Foundations more collaborative in outlook are offered in conclusion.