In social settings, emotion expressions can be a response to events befalling others. Expressed emotions are empathic when they are congruent (i.e. happiness for a positive event [happy-for-ness]; sadness for a negative event [sympathy]), and counter-empathic when they are incongruent with the event valence (i.e. happiness for a negative event [schadenfreude]; sadness for a positive event [glückschmerz]). In five studies, we assessed the evaluative consequences - perceived appropriateness of the emotion expression (Study 1), perceived morality, warmth, and competence of expressers (Studies 2 and 3), and the behavioural implications - inferred prosociality and willingness to interact with the expresser (Studies 4 and 5). Across studies, empathic expressions elicited more positive reactions than counter-empathic expressions. In addition, the studies revealed some differences within these categories. For counter-empathic expressions, schadenfreude generally elicited more negative evaluations and inferences than glückschmerz. For empathic expressions, happy-for-ness was in some cases evaluated more positively than sympathy, though this pattern was less consistent across studies. The findings also provided mixed evidence regarding the moderating roles of event magnitude and participant gender. The findings are discussed in terms of the social functional approach of emotions.

People differ in their tendency to be grateful, and this affects interpersonal dynamics. Previous research found that individuals with high (versus low) levels of dispositional gratitude exhibited more prosocial behaviors. In this study we demonstrate that dispositional gratitude may also be associated with negative responses toward others. Specifically, we examined the link between dispositional gratitude and condemnations of various moral transgressions. Given that moral norms might be culture-specific, we recruited participants from the U.S., the UK, and China (N = 593 in total) to test potential cultural moderators. Results showed that the higher people scored on dispositional gratitude, the more morally wrong they evaluated transgressions to be, and the more punishment they thought that transgressors deserved. The associations were robust across moral domains, countries, and perceived levels of societal tightness. These findings underscore the pervasive and differentiated impact of dispositional gratitude in interpersonal relations, as it may not only increase prosocial behavior but also intensify negative responses to others who violate moral norms.

Humans increasingly collaborate with Artificial Intelligence (AI), raising critical questions about responsibility attribution for task outcomes: when a collaboration succeeds or fails should the human be held responsible or AI? Prior research in non-AI settings has indicated that the responsibility attribution may differ depending on the task outcome (success vs. failure), the attribution targets (self vs. others), and on power (high vs. low). The current experimental study extends this line of inquiry to human-disembodied AI collaborative tasks (i.e., computer algorithms), investigating how these factors shape attribution patterns. The results indicate that, when collaborating with AI, participants with a low sense of power are more likely to accept responsibility for successful task outcomes relative to failures, whereas those with a high sense of power do not exhibit this self-serving bias. Furthermore, when observing others collaborate with AI, participants, regardless of their sense of power, attributed responsibility for both successes and failures to these others rather than AI. The implications for the field of human-AI interaction are discussed.

The field of ostracism research is witnessing a growing interest in understanding ostracism - being excluded and ignored - as a lived experience outside of the laboratory context. How do researchers draw valid causal conclusions about naturally occurring experiences of ostracism without relying on experimental designs? In this article, we draw on insights from the well-established causal inference framework to emphasize a critical step for strengthening causal rigor: stating the causal estimand. Using an intuitive example, we illustrate what a causal estimand is, how to define it, and why it matters. With this article, we encourage readers to think clearly about causal estimands before conducting any data analysis. This conceptual step holds the potential for enhancing the rigor and precision of research studying ostracism as a naturally occurring phenomenon.

Decisions with consequences for self and/or others do not always match the respective preferences. Following cognitive dissonance theory, one option to deal with such mismatches is to change one’s attitudes post-decision. Inducing a different focus on self or others, perceived power may moderate how and when this happens. We indeed found that high power induced more attitude change after mismatches with one’s own preferences, whereas low power led to more attitude change after mismatches with others’ preferences. Study 1 (N = 129) showed this effect in an interpersonal setting; Study 2 (N = 127) revealed a similar pattern in a group context. Study 3 (N = 184) offered an explanation by including self-affirmation of either warmth or competence values.

We tested the association between financial scarcity (i.e., the experience of lacking needed monetary resources) and feelings of societal exclusion using longitudinal data from a large probability sample of the Dutch population. We report preregistered analyses of two time points (almost two years apart) and exploratory robustness checks of seven time points (spanning four years). As hypothesized, results of a Cross-Lagged Panel Model indicated that financial scarcity was associated with increased feelings of societal exclusion over time and vice versa, feelings of societal exclusion were associated with increased financial scarcity over time. In addition, results showed that financial scarcity was associated with perceived lack of social participation, perceived stigmatization, and weaker social networks. These factors did not mediate the association between financial scarcity and feelings of societal exclusion. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for the temporal dynamics of financial scarcity and feelings of societal exclusion.

The term enthusiasm is used frequently in both day-to-day language and professional settings. Scientifically, however, enthusiasm is not clearly defined. It is conceptualized and measured in different ways. In the present research, we examined the internal structure of enthusiasm. First, 28 features of enthusiasm were identified (Study 1.1) and rated on their centrality (Study 1.2). Results showed that features indicating joy and motivation were rated as central to the concept of enthusiasm, whereas features indicating restlessness and impatience were rated as less central. The validity of the central features was supported in three follow-up studies. More specifically, we found that the more central features were recalled better (Study 2.1), recognized faster (Study 2.2), and more often mentioned in autobiographical recalls of enthusiasm (Study 2.3). Taken together, the findings indicate that enthusiasm is prototypically structured, and that prototypical enthusiasm is a positive, energetic feeling that is associated with goal orientation and often involves interpersonal contact.

The subjective experience of financial stress has profound implications for well-being, health, cognitive performance, and decision-making. In a sample of Dutch households (N = 1,114), we studied the association of five economic factors - income, saving, debts, income volatility, and employment - with a four-factor measure of financial stress: 1) an appraisal of insufficient financial resources, 2) an appraisal of lack of control over one's financial situation, 3) financial worries and rumination, and 4) a short-term focus. This enabled us to examine the economic factors' relative contributions to predicting5 financial stress. We found that the combination of economic factors predicted financial stress better than income alone. Particularly, buffer savings had a large contribution to predicting financial stress. The number of debts had a smaller relative contribution to predicting financial stress, whereas we did not find support for debt amount as a predictor of financial stress. Employment was negatively associated with financial stress, but only for households with the lowest incomes. We found no support for income volatility predicting financial stress. These results imply that research and policy on financial stress should have a broader scope than income alone and should take a more integrative approach to households' financial situation, considering savings, number of debts, and unemployment.

Research has shown that negotiators sometimes misrepresent their emotions, and communicate a different emotion to opponents than they actually experience. Less is known about how people evaluate such negotiation tactics. Building on person perception literature, we investigated in three preregistered studies (N = 853) how participants evaluate negotiators who deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicate anger or happiness, on the dimensions of morality, sociability, and competence. Study 1 employed a buyer/seller setting, Studies 2 and 3 employed an Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG). In all studies, participants learned a negotiator’s (the target’s) experienced and communicated emotions (anger or happiness), before evaluating the target. Across studies, targets were evaluated lower on morality if they deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicated anger or happiness. Notably, negotiators deceptively communicating anger were evaluated lower on morality and sociability but higher on competence than those deceptively communicating happiness. Studies 2 and 3 investigated behavioral consequences by examining whether in a future negotiation participants chose the target to be their opponent or representative. Results showed that for opponents, participants preferred targets who genuinely communicated happiness (vs. anger), which was associated with their perceived morality or sociability. For representatives, participants not only preferred targets who had genuinely communicated happiness (vs. anger), but also targets who had deceptively communicated anger (vs. happiness), which was associated with their perceived competence. These findings show that when evaluating deceptive (vs. genuine) communication strategies, people distinguish between morality, sociability, and competence. The importance they attach to these dimensions is also contingent on the behavioral decisions they face.

In the current research we investigated how people deal with decisions in which they have to reject others, something that is unavoidably part of many selection procedures. Integrating insights derived from research on social exclusion and dehumanization, we argued that when people need to reject others, they dehumanize them. To study the association between dehumanization and rejecting in a real-life setting, we conducted two field studies, in which we examined the selection process in student houses, where residents can accept some prospective members, but have to reject others. As predicted, our findings showed that when people need to reject targets, they subtly dehumanize them. Moreover, dehumanizing rejected targets was related to lower rejection aversion. This suggests that when people dehumanize those they have to reject, rejection is easier.

Enthusiasm is a relatively under-explored emotion. The current research explores the unique characteristics of enthusiasm by examining its cognitive appraisals (Study 1, N = 300) and response types (Study 2, N = 298) and comparing it with joy and hope. Participants in both studies recalled and rated events where they felt enthusiasm, joy, or hope. Study 1 revealed that enthusiasm occurs in pleasurable, intense situations linked to desired goals. More than joy, it is driven by goal-achievement anticipation. Compared to hope, enthusiasm is associated with more control, less uncertainty, and immediate relevance. Study 2 defines enthusiasm as a positive, energetic state marked by smiling, presence, fulfilment, and thoughts of positive outcomes. Compared to joy, it incites more eagerness, risk willingness, and inclination to join a movement. More than hope, it triggers immediate action without contemplation of negative outcomes. We conclude that enthusiasm is a positive, energetic condition often triggered by pleasurable, intense situations aligning with desired goals. It differs from joy and hope. Enthusiasm drives action when goals are attainable, and risks will likely pay off. Hope emerges when a goal is uncertain and distant. Joy typically follows goal accomplishment and is associated with feelings of connection and a desire to savour the moment.

In this article, we investigate how being socially excluded (vs. included) affects people's distributive fairness judgements and their willingness to cooperate with others in subsequent interactions. For this purpose, we conducted three experiments in which we assessed individual differences in having experienced being socially excluded (Experiment 1, N = 164), and manipulated social exclusion (Experiment 2, N = 120; Experiment 3, N = 492). We studied how this impacted fairness judgements of three different outcome distributions (disadvantageous inequality, advantageous inequality, and equality) both within-participants (Experiments 1 and 2) and between-participants (Experiment 3). To assess behavioural consequences, we then also assessed participants' cooperation in a social dilemma game. Across the three experiments, we consistently found that social exclusion impacted fairness judgements. Compared to inclusion, excluded participants judged disadvantageous inequality as more unfair and advantageous inequality as less unfair. Moreover, compared to socially included participants, socially excluded participants were more willing to cooperate after experiencing advantageous rather than disadvantageous inequality, and feelings of acceptance served as a mediator in these associations.

Financial stress, defined as the subjective experience of lacking financial resources to cope with demands, has profound implications for well-being, health, cognitive performance, and decision-making. In empirical studies, financial stress is often associated with economic correlates such as low income or debt. Typically, such correlates are considered in isolation, which may result in spurious findings. In the current study, we examined the association of financial stress with five potential correlates in conjunction: income, saving, debts, income volatility, and employment. We used a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 1,114). Results showed that low income, low savings, and unemployment were independently associated with more financial stress. Income moderated the association between savings and unemployment on the one hand and financial stress on the other: low levels of savings and unemployment were associated with more financial stress for low-income households. We found mixed support for debts and no support for income volatility as correlates of financial stress. These results imply that research and policy in the domain of financial stress should have a broader scope than income alone and should take a more integrative approach to households’ financial situation, particularly savings and employment. Future studies should further unravel the causal directions of the associations between households’ economic situation and financial stress. We discuss potential policy interventions to reduce financial stress and improve financial decision-making and well-being.

Social welfare aims to support financially vulnerable households by protecting them from financial shocks and providing them with a basic standard of living. Many eligible households, however, do not take up social welfare. We present the results of in-depth interviews with 31 members of financially vulnerable households in two large Dutch cities about their experiences with welfare. We examined the role that money played in their lives, what inhibited them from taking up social welfare, and how they sought support. For many interviewed households, money was a source of stress. We found that the fear of reclaims and mistrust in government institutions were the main inhibitors for participating in welfare programs. Whereas the experience of shame and stigma were substantial inhibitors for claiming local welfare benefits, they were not for participating in national welfare programs. Both formal and informal help promoted welfare participation, but many participants lacked access to both forms of help. We discuss policies that could decrease the uncertainty associated with benefits receipt and give directions for future research.

Ostracism triggers negative emotions such as sadness, anger, and hurt feelings. Do targets of ostracism truthfully share their emotions with the sources of ostracism? Drawing on past research on social-functional accounts of emotions and interpersonal emotion regulation, we investigated the possibility that targets may misrepresent their emotions (i.e., gaming emotions). We conducted three experiments (N = 1058; two pre-registered) using an online ball-tossing game, in which participants were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized. Consistent with the literature, we found that ostracized individuals were more hurt, sad, and angry than included individuals. However, we found little and inconsistent evidence that ostracized (vs included) individuals misrepresented their emotional reactions to the sources. Further, Bayesian analyses offered more support against misrepresentation of emotions. These findings suggest that targets of ostracism truthfully communicated their social pain to the sources.

Past work suggests that emotion deception in negotiations – communicating a different emotion than experienced – is perceived negatively. We, however, argue that this depends on the type of emotion deception. We compared two emotion deception types – communicating anger while actually being happy, and communicating happiness while being angry – to genuine communications of happiness and anger. In three preregistered experiments ( N = 500), participants played the role of employee or supervisor and negotiated with an opponent about salary raises. After their initial offer, participants learned their opponent’s experienced (happiness vs. anger) and communicated emotion (happiness vs. anger). Then, participants made their final demand and reported perceptions of their opponent’s limits and sacrifice. Results showed that participants perceived opponents who communicated genuine anger as having stricter limits and conceded more to them than to opponents using the other emotion communication types. Moreover, opponents who communicated happiness but experienced anger were perceived as making more of a sacrifice than opponents who communicated anger but experienced happiness. In Experiment 3, we also examined effects of emotion deception on non-negotiated outcomes, by assessing the likelihood to hand the opponent a year-end bonus. Participants were most likely to allocate the bonus to opponents that truthfully communicated happiness. Moreover, participants were more likely to allocate the bonus to opponents who communicated happiness but experienced anger than to opponents who communicated anger but experienced happiness. These findings extend social functional accounts of emotion communication, by showing that effects of emotion deception depend on the type of experienced and/or communicated emotions.

In the present paper, we investigate how people make decisions when bargaining about complementary resources. When the ownership of such resources is fragmented, actors often fail to coordinate on efficient access, leading to an overall loss in social welfare; the tragedy of the anticommons. In a series of three experiments, in which we introduce a newly developed Anticommons Bargaining Game, we show that people tend to treat perfectly complementary resources as if they are non-complementary. Specifically, we demonstrate that both sellers and buyers of such resources used a more-is-better heuristic when determining their prices. That is, sellers who initially owned a larger part of the resource asked a higher price for their resource than sellers with a smaller part, even though only the combination of parts generated value for the buyer. Likewise, buyers offered more money to sellers with a larger part than to sellers with a smaller part. While this heuristic does not necessarily impede coordination, inequality in resources led to unequal monetary outcomes between the two sellers.