Beginning in the 1840s many states passed laws mandating the compulsory education of children and regulating the work of women and children although these were far from universal by 1880. In this paper, we focus on the impact of hours laws, especially those for women. Scholars have raised serious questions about the effectiveness of these laws because of doubts about enforcement mechanisms and whether or not the laws were binding. Moreover, it has been questioned as to whether these laws were simply passed as part of rent-seeking behavior by those not covered by the laws, in particular, adult men. In response, many of the laws covering adult women have now been rolled back. One state, Massachusetts, however, did pass an effective law in 1874 that resulted in the (successful) prosecution of at least one politically powerful corporation. Here, we investigate the impact of these laws using establishment level data for 1880. The historical record is consistent with rent-seeking by men but not for the purpose of disadvantaging women. The historical record is consistent with rent-seeking by men but not for the purpose of disadvantaging women. Rather, men pressed the case for women and children to secure benefits that they were apparently unable to achieve on their own. This was possible because, at the time, women and children were complements to male labor rather than substitutes. We find that there were systematic variations in hours from industry to industry, between city and countryside and regionally and that violations of the laws was not uncommon. Larger firms such as those in urban areas or those employing large numbers of the affected group were, however, more likely to be in compliance, particularly in Massachusetts. The evidence for Massachusetts also suggests, albeit very weakly, that the magnitude and certainty of penalties for violating the law may have been a major factor determining compliance with the law.

Using a newly developed geographic information system transportation database, we study the impact of gaining access to rail transportation on changes in population density and the rate of urbanization between 1850 and 1860 in the American Midwest. Differences-in-differences and instrumental variable analysis of a balanced panel of 278 counties reveals only a small positive effect of rail access on population density but a large positive impact on urbanization as measured by the fraction of people living in incorporated areas of 2,500 or more. Our estimates imply that one-half or more of the growth in urbanization in the Midwest in the late antebellum period may be attributable to the spread of the rail network.

The big push theory claims that publicly coordinated investment can break the cycle of poverty by helping developing economies overcome deficiencies in private incentives that prevent firms from adopting modern production techniques and achieving scale economies. Despite a flurry of research, however, scholars have offered scarce few real-world episodes that seem to fit the theoretical model. We argue that the postwar performance of the American South, which followed large public capital investments during the Great Depression and World War II, is such an application. Both econometric analysis and a contemporary survey of firms strongly support the notion that big-push dynamics were at work.

For more than three decades, scholars have examined the grossly unequal state- level per capita distribution of New Deal spending. Why did small population rural states such as Nevada, Montana, and Wyoming receive up to six times as many federal dollars per capita as densely populated states such as Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York? Empirical studies employing economic and political variables have had mixed results in explaining this distribution. What past studies neglect is that a large proportion of New Deal dollars went towards the creation ofpublic goods, which had spillover effects particularly upon those who lived in close proximity to these projects. This paper suggests that the state-level distribution of per capita expenditures during the 1930s is consistent with what would be expected to follow from an economically efficient allocation ofpublic goods.

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Since 1969 more than a dozen studies have explored the grossly unequal state-level distribution of New Deal spending. Why did small population rural states such as Nevada, Montana, and Wyoming receive up to six times as many federal dollars per capita as densely populated states such as Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York? Empirical studies employing economic and political variables have had mixed results in explaining this distribution. What past studies neglect is that a large proportion of New Deal dollars went towards the creation of public goods, which had spillover effects particularly upon those who lived in close proximity to these projects. This note suggests that the state-level distribution of per capita expenditures during the 1930s is consistent with what would be expected to follow from an economically efficient allocation of public goods.

We use establishment-level data from the 1850–1880 censuses of manufacturing to study the relationships among establishment size, steam power use, and labor productivity. Large establishments, measured here by employment, were much more likely to use steam power than smaller establishments. By 1880, slightly more than half of all manufacturing workers were employed in establishments using steam power, compared with 17 percent in 1850 and we show that, after controlling for various establishment characteristics, steam-powered establishments had higher labor productivity than establishments using other sources of power. Moreover, this productivity differential was increasing in establishment size.

We use establishment level data from the 1850-80 censuses of manufacturing to study the correlates of the use of steam power and the impact of steam power on labor productivity growth in nineteenth century American manufacturing. A key result is that establishment size mattered: large establishments, as measured by employment, were much more likely to use steam power than smaller establishments. Controlling for firm size, location, industry, and other establishment characteristics, steam powered establishments had higher labor productivity than establishments using hand or animal power, or water power. We also find that the impact of steam on labor productivity was increasing in establishment size. The diffusion of steam power was an important factor behind the growth of labor productivity, accounting for 22 to 41 percent of that growth between 1850 and 1880, depending on establishment size.

Between 1850 and 1880, capital per worker in United States manufacturing increased on average by at least 75 per cent, even after taking account of declining capital goods prices. During this same period, production shifted from small, labour-intensive artisan shops to large capital-intensive factories. Similar changes have occurred in many other countries at the same stage of industrialization. Establishment-level data from the federal censuses of manufacturing, however, reveal that the shift in production in the United States accounts for a modest amount of the increased capital per worker. There, at least, capital deepening seems to have occurred in almost all firms everywhere.

We study the correlates of the monthly establishment wage—the average monthly wage at the establishment level—and changes in wage dispersion between plants using a model of manufacturing developed by Goldin and Katz and data from manuscript censuses of manufacturing. We find that wages were decreasing in establishment size, but increasing in capital intensity and use of steam power. We also find an increase in inequality in the establishment wage between 1850 and 1880. Most of the increase occurred below the median wage and can be attributed, in part, to the growing concentration of employment in large establishments.

Using micro-level data from the 1880 Census of Manufacturing, we estimate the elasticity of annual output with respect to the length of the working day. Holding labor and capital inputs constant and controlling for days of operation per month and months per year, this elasticity was positive but less than one, indicating diminishing returns. We also find diminishing returns to days per month and months per year, but these elasticities were significantly larger. Thus, decreases in daily hours coupled with an offsetting rise in annual days of operation would increase productive efficiency—precisely the kinds of changes then actually taking place.

We use establishment-level data to study capital deepening -increases in the capital-output ratio -in American manufacturing from 1850 to 1880. In nominal terms, the aggregate capitaloutput ratio in our samples rose by 30 percent from 1850 to 1880. Growth in real terms was considerably greater -70 percent -because prices of capital goods declined relative to output prices. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that capital deepening was especially importnat in the larger firms and was positively associated with the diffusion of steam-powered machinery. However, even after accounting for shifts over time in such factors, much of the capital deepening remains to be explained. Although capital deepening implies a fall in the average product of capital it does not necessarily imply that rates of return were declining. However, we find strong evidence that returns did decline. We also show that returns were decreasing in firm size, although the data are not sufficiently informative to tell us why it was so. Jeremy Atack Fred Bateman Department of Economics Department of Economics Box 351819 Terry School of Business Vanderbilt University University of Georgia Nashville, TN 37235 Athens, GA 30602 and NBER fbateman@uga.edu jeremy.atack@vanderbilt.edu Robert A. Margo Department of Economics 412 Calhoun Box 351819 Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37235 and NBER robert.a.margo@vanderbilt.edu

We use establishment-level data to study capital deepening -- increases in the capital-output ratio -- in American manufacturing from 1850 to 1880. In nominal terms, the aggregate capital-output ratio in our samples rose by 30 percent from 1850 to 1880. Growth in real terms was considerably greater -- 70 percent -- because prices of capital goods declined relative to output prices. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that capital deepening was especially importnat in the larger firms and was positively associated with the diffusion of steam-powered machinery. However, even after accounting for shifts over time in such factors, much of the capital deepening remains to be explained. Although capital deepening implies a fall in the average product of capital it does not necessarily imply that rates of return were declining. However, we find strong evidence that returns did decline. We also show that returns were decreasing in firm size, although the data are not sufficiently informative to tell us why it was so.

Establishment-level data are used to study capital deepening - increases in the capital-output ratio - in U.S. manufacturing from 1850 to 1880. In both nominal and real terms, the aggregate capital-output ratio rose substantially over the period. Capital deepening is shown to be especially important in the larger firms and was associated with the diffusion of inanimate power. Although capital deepening implies a declining average product of capital, rates of return were not necessarily falling if capital's share was increasing. However, there is strong evidence that returns did, in fact, decline.

Several studies on the New Deal have found that politicalfactors played a significant role in determining 1930s federalspending. This suggests that federal spending was not capturedby special interest groups and self-interested politiciansrecently, but rather, that it has been affected by thesefactors since the ``era of big government'' began. We examinethe military emergency of the 1940s to determine whetherfederal spending during this crisis was similarly affected bypolitics.

While a multitude of New Deal “relief, recovery, and reform” agencies were created in response to the 1930s economic shock, many of these same agencies were subsumed by the Federal Works Agency and played key national defense roles during the 1940s. We examine the wartime expenditure patterns of these agencies, as well as spending on war supply contracts and war-related industrial facilities, to determine whether Depression-era economic goals were addressed during the Second World War. We find that some specific aspects of the New Deal economic agenda were carried out during the war. Furthermore, wartime spending by the alphabet agencies was significantly correlated with the expenditure patterns of those agencies during the 1930s, suggesting that the transition from economic to military objectives may not have been as pointed as the Roosevelt Administration often asserted.