This chapter offers for clinicians, supervisors, and supervisees an opportunity to review the level of competence in clinical practice. The cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) model is a structured model that can be applied with idiosyncratic flexibility. The CBT skills are divided into eight categories: assessment; interviewing; structuring; change directed interventions; overcoming resistance; evaluation; self-reflection; intervention planning. A pass for the assessment component is defined as: competent use of existing assessment tools and monitoring forms, designing idiosyncratic ones for specific situations, combined with the ability to translate historical and assessment data in a cognitive behavioural framework leading to a case formulation. For a client entering therapy with a complaint of depression, the therapist should use tools to measure frequency, intensity, and duration of the depressive symptoms. Competence …

This paper describes a study designed to investigate the efficacy of two traditional classical conditioning procedures in generating evaluative conditioning (EC) in the picture–picture paradigm in human participants. Differential EC was found using both simultaneous and trace conditioning procedures. In addition, the use of a block–subblock (BSB) nonpaired control condition and full counterbalancing of conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus (CS–UCS) pairings across participants indicated that the observed EC effects were the result of associative learning. Examination of whether successful conditioning could take place with or without conscious awareness of CS–UCS contingencies was inconclusive. The results provide evidence for EC as an associative process and also provide some insight into the possible conditioning parameters that might successfully generate EC.

The present paper describes the results of a study investigating the relationship between measures of disgust and measures of hypochondriasis and health anxiety. The results indicated that (1) there were highly significant correlations between measures of trait disgust and disgust sensitivity and measures of hypochondriasis and health anxiety, (2) the relationship between disgust sensitivity measures and hypochondriasis and health anxiety were still significant even when levels of trait anxiety were controlled for, but (3) controlled comparisons revealed that the measures of disgust also predicted scores on measures of disgust-irrelevant control psychopathologies (claustrophobia and height phobia)--even after trait anxiety had been partialled out. In addition, the series of multiple regressions carried out clearly indicated that trait anxiety and disgust sensitivity appear to be independent constructs each of which have relationships with anxious psychopathologies over and above the effect of the other. The discussion explores the nature of the possible relationships between disgust, hypochondriasis and health anxiety, and also looks at the implications for disgust psychopathology research of using controlled comparisons which indicate the existence of significant relationships between measures of disgust and anxious psychopathologies that, a priori, would be considered to be disgust irrelevant.

This article reports the results of 2 experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis on the role of inflated responsibility in perseverative checking. Through the use of an analog checking task in both experiments, the authors showed that perseveration, as indicated by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by a combination of the level of inflated responsibility and the valency of mood at the outset of checking. In particular, inflated responsibility significantly facilitated checking perseveration only in the context of a negative mood and was not a sufficient condition for checking perseveration to occur. These effects of the various configurations of inflated responsibility and mood valency are predicted by the mood-as-input hypothesis.

This paper reports the results of three studies using mood induction procedures (MIPs) designed to investigate the relationship between anxiety and disgust. Study 1 used guided imagery vignettes (i.e., asking participants to imagine themselves in a series of described situations) and music (Mayer, Allen, & Beauregard, 1995). Study 2 used video clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995). Study 3 used autobiographical recall and music (Blagden & Craske, 1996). In order to be as sure as possible that target moods were being induced, and that manipulation checks provided good evidence of mood induction, Studies 1 and 2 measured six moods (anxiety, sadness, happiness, anger, disgust, and contempt) on visual analogue scales. In addition, Study 3 included two further mood measures: a 30-adjective rating scale measuring 10 emotions, the Differential Emotion Scale (DES; Izard, 1972) and a free label questionnaire, allowing participants to record how they feel without any prior imposed structure. Results from all three studies demonstrated that induced anxiety will produce increases in reported disgust, but there was no evidence for an effect of induced disgust on reported anxiety. These findings were independent of the type of MIP (guided imagery vignette and music, video clips, and autobiographical recall and music), and the type of dependent mood measure used (visual analogue scale, differential emotion scale or a free label questionnaire). The findings have important implications for the putative role of disgust in anxious psychopathologies, and suggest that if disgust does have a causal influence in some anxious psychopathologies, this influence is not mediated simply by experienced disgust facilitating experienced anxiety.

This study aimed to explore cross-sectional and longitudinal associations between pathological worry and fatigue in a working population. In employees with very low or very high fatigue levels, psychometrics of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; measuring pathological worry) and the Checklist Individual Strength (CIS; measuring fatigue) were examined and their cross-sectional and longitudinal associations were explored. Pathological worry and fatigue can be measured as different constructs. However, pathological worry and fatigue were also associated on a cross-sectional level. Pathological worry predicted fatigue level 10 months later, but this association disappeared after adjustment for the cross-sectional association between pathological worry and fatigue. Although they can be measured as different constructs, pathological worry and fatigue seem to be associated. When studying longitudinal relations between pathological worry and fatigue, their cross-sectional association should be taken into account. Pathological worry might not be a risk factor for fatigue per se, but might act more like a mediating factor.

There is now considerable evidence that phobic responding is associated with a bias towards expecting aversive or traumatic outcomes following encounters with the phobic stimulus (e.g. Behavioural Brain Sci. 18 (1995) 289–325; Phobias: A Handbook of Theory, Research and Treatment. Wiley, Chichester, 1997). In terms of conditioning contingencies, this can be described as a bias towards expecting an aversive unconditioned stimulus (UCS) following a phobic conditioned stimulus (CS). The disease-avoidance model of animal fears (Anxiety Res. 4 (1992a) 314; Matchett and Davey, 1991) suggests that common animal fears may be mediated by at least two kinds of selective associations: (1) a bias towards expecting physically harmful consequences associated with predatory animals, and (2) a bias towards expecting disgust or disease-relevant consequences associated with animals that are fear-relevant (FR) but normally physically harmless. The present study investigated this model of selective associations by comparing the UCS expectations elicited by high-predation FR, low-predation FR and safe (fear-irrelevant) animals. The results indicate that high-predation animals are selectively associated with a pain relevant UCS, whilst low-predation animals are selectively associated with a disgust-relevant UCS. Safe animals were not strongly associated with either class of UCS. These findings provide evidence for a possible associative mechanism by which changes in nonspecific levels of disgust sensitivity may directly affect levels of fear to low-predation FR animals.

The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test some predictions from a mood-as-input explanation of catastrophic worrying (Startup & Davey, 2001). In particular, these experiments attempted to identify whether worriers possess characteristics that would contribute to the use of relatively strict ‘as many as can’ closure rules for catastrophising. Experiment 1 demonstrated that high worriers begin a catastrophising task with higher self-reported levels of responsibility towards fully considering all issues involved, than low worriers. Experiment 2 suggested that inflated responsibility has a causal effect on perseveration at the catastrophising task (rather than being a simple non-causal by-product of excessive worrying), and that inflated responsibility exacerbates catastrophising only in conjunction with negative mood. This suggests a relatively complex relationship between responsibility and mood, where there are mood conditions in which high responsibility does not generate greater persistence than low responsibility. These findings are consistent with predictions from a mood-as-input account of catastrophic worrying, and provide evidence for a putative mechanism that mediates the influence of variables such as inflated responsibility on perseveration.

This paper describes two experiments designed to investigate how a current model of task perseveration, the mood-as-input hypothesis, might be applied to activities relevant to compulsive checking. The mood-as-input hypothesis predicts that perseveration at an open-ended task will be determined by a combination of the "stop rules" adopted for the task, and the valency of the mood state in which the task is conducted. Experiment 1 required participants to generate items that should be checked for safety/security if they were leaving their home unattended. Experiment 2 used an analogue recall task, in which participants were asked to recall items from a comprehensive list of items that should be checked if they were to leave their home safe/secure. Both experiments found that perseveration at the tasks was determined by particular configurations of mood and stop rules for the task. Of most relevance to compulsive checking was the fact that facilitated perseveration occurred when participants were asked to undertake the tasks in a negative mood using "as many as can" stop rules. Implications for the factors that develop and maintain compulsive checking are discussed.

The present paper reports the results of two experiments exploring possible changes in the affective ratings of foodstuffs as a result of their pairing with pictures of differing types of female body shapes. Experiment 1 reports the results of a visual evaluative conditioning (EC) experiment in which pictures of foodstuffs (CSs) were paired with pictures of either obese, normal, or thin female body shapes (UCSs). The results suggested that selective EC effects could be obtained when pictures of foods were used as CSs and pictures of different body shapes as UCSs. Specifically, pairing obese body shape UCSs with food CSs resulted in a significant postconditioning negative evaluative shift in those foods. Experiment 2 suggested that the selective conditioning effects found in Experiment 1 could be explained in part by an a priori CS-UCS expectancy bias in which participants exhibited a significantly greater bias towards expecting food CSs to be paired with obese rather than thin body shape UCSs. These findings have implications for our understanding of eating disorders, and, in particular, how conditioned shifts in the affective valences of foodstuffs can occur through their pairing with particular types of negatively valenced body images.

This commentary attempts to clarify the nature of contemporary associative accounts of phobias, and to describe how they might contribute to the explanation of the diversity of phobic aetiologies. It is argued that conditioning-equivalent associations underpin all phobic conditions, and that the role of experimental psychopathology research is to determine how these associations are acquired. The commentary then proceeds to discuss some of the theoretical problems with the nonassociative account of phobias as it is currently described by Poulton and Menzies, and to suggest that some interpretations of their retrospective and prospective data may not be incompatible with contemporary associative accounts. The outcome of this is that it may be more suitable to describe the fourth pathway to phobia acquisition described by Poulton and Menzies as a 'nonspecific' rather than a 'nonassociative' pathway.

This paper reports two studies investigating the role of mood and arousal on the development of UCS expectancy biases to fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant stimuli. Experiment 1 found that, compared with a neutral control condition, individuals in both experimentally-induced positive and negative moods significantly overestimated the possibility of aversive outcomes following all types of stimuli in a hypothetical thought' conditioning experiment. Experiment 2 found that this UCS expectancy bias produced by both positive and negative mood could not be explained by the effect that these mood states might have on arousal independently of the valency of the mood. The findings appear to be explained best by emotional response categorisation theory (Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 337-361), which predicts that individuals would be more likely to view emotionally valenced stimuli as similar when in an emotional state. It is argued that, while negative mood may be a genuine vulnerability factor for the development of anxiety-relevant threat-outcome expectancies, the effects found with positive mood in the current studies may have less ecological relevance to real-world aetiologies.

The authors describe 3 experiments investigating a "mood-as-input" approach to understanding catastrophic worrying. Experiment 1 found that induced negative mood increased the number of steps emitted in both a catastrophizing interview procedure and a positive iteration task. Experiment 2 found that the number of items that worriers emitted in an iterative item generation task was dependent on the stop rules specified by the procedure. Experiment 3 found that manipulating the stop rules for catastrophizing had differential effects on worriers and nonworriers, depending on the nature of the stop rules specified. These results suggest that mood provides information about continuing or terminating the catastrophizing process that is interpreted in the context of the stop rules for the task. It is argued that the mood-as-input hypothesis accounts for the facts of exacerbated catastrophizing in worriers better than explanations couched in terms of either mood congruency effects or worriers possessing a generalized perseverative iterative style.

This study uses a multidimensional scaling approach to investigate the hypothesis that spider fearful individuals give priority to a threat-safety dimension when making judgments. The results show that when making judgments about stimuli, spider fearful individuals (1) placed significantly greater comparative weighting on a threat-relevant dimension than on a non-emotive dimension (colour), and (2) tended to rate threatening pairs of stimuli and safe pairs of stimuli as more similar than did the nonfearful group. This prioritised dimensional processing suggests a mechanism by which phobics can exhibit what initially appear to be paradoxical tendencies to give priority to both threat and safety information.

This paper reports the results of two studies investigating judgements made by spider phobics about the potential threatening consequences (unconditioned stimulus, UCS, expectancies) associated with their phobic stimulus, fear-relevant (FR) stimuli, and fear-irrelevant (FI) stimuli. Using a 'thought experiment' UCS expectancy paradigm, the studies reported found that (1) spider phobics reported significantly higher UCS expectancies to spider stimuli than nonphobics, (2) spider phobics consistently underestimated the probability of aversive consequences following FI stimuli and (3) this underestimation of UCS expectancies to FI stimuli in phobics was not the result of a contrast effect resulting from sequential FR and FI judgements. This differential effect may have important implications for the kind of mechanism which mediates judgements about phobic consequences. These findings suggest that the dimensions on which phobic stimuli are categorised may be 'stretched' in the case of phobics and that this gives rise to the comparative underestimation of threat associated with FI stimuli but also makes phobics more vulnerable to acquiring other phobias.

Three studies are described which investigate the kinds of strategies that individuals use to devalue the threatening meaning of a stressor (cognitive neutralising strategies, CNS). These studies identified seven factorially independent constructs corresponding to Downward Comparison, Positive Reappraisal, Cognitive Disengagement, Optimism, Faith in Social Support, Denial and Life Perspective. The use of CNS was highly correlated with the use of problem-focused coping strategies regardless of stressor type, but associated with the use of avoidance coping and emotion-focused coping only in the case of certain stressor types. The role of CNS in the coping process is discussed in the light of the present results.

A proper evaluation of the biological significance of Pavlovian conditioning requires consideration of performance mechanisms. Domjan et al.'s definition of net benefit is simplistic, and their model promotes convergence in behaviour, ignoring the possibility of innovation.

In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether evaluative conditioning (EC) is an associative phenomenon. Experiment 1 compared a standard EC paradigm with nonpaired and no-treatment control conditions. EC effects were obtained only when the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) were rated as perceptually similar. However, similar EC effects were obtained in both control groups. An earlier failure to obtain EC effects was reanalyzed in Experiment 2. Conditioning-like effects were found when comparing a CS with the most perceptually similar UCSs used in the procedure but not when analyzing a CS rating with respect to the UCS with which it was paired during conditioning. The implications are that EC effects found in many studies are not due to associative learning and that the special characteristics of EC (conditioning without awareness and resistance to extinction) are probably nonassociative artifacts of the EC paradigm.

Baeyenset al.(1998) claim that Field and Davey's (1997) controversial study of conceptual conditioning offers little threat to current conceptions of evaluative conditioning. This article addresses some of the questions posed by Baeyenset al.First, some criticisms of the conceptual conditioning study appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the procedure. Second, we address the issues surrounding the so-called Type-X procedure. Specifically, we begin by reviewing the status of studies that have used a procedure different from the Type-X procedure. It is then argued that, although the Type-X procedure has been used in only a portion of EC research, it has been used primarily in those studies whose outcome has been used to argue that evaluative conditioning (EC) is functionally distinct from autonomic conditioning. We then review the evidence from non-Type-X procedures that EC is a distinct form of learning. Finally, an attempt is made to explain why between-subject controls should be used as a matter of course in this field of research.

The present study represents a cross-cultural study of animal fears in which subjects from seven Western and Asian countries were asked to rate their fear of a range of familiar animals. Factor analyses of these ratings in all samples revealed a coherent three factor solution in which animals fell into a fear-irrelevant, fear-relevant (fierce) or disgust-relevant category. The core group of animals making up the disgust-relevant category were similar across cultures. Some views on how a universal disgust-relevant category of feared animals may have developed are discussed.