State governments in the United States offer a wide range of tax incentives to encourage the use of green technologies and support the energy transition away from fossil fuels. These tax incentives offer a politically palatable middle ground that subsidizes more environmentally friendly policies while also giving the appearance of reducing taxes. In this paper, we evaluate the extent of climate-related tax expenditures (i.e. the amount of foregone revenue from tax preferences) at the state level by collecting data from U.S. state budget documents and classifying and comparing the different types of tax expenditures across various dimensions. Our analysis yields three key findings: (1) 'climate-friendly' tax expenditures at the state level account for only about 0.1% of aggregate state tax collections and are negligible relative to federal incentives historically, (2) energy subsidies make up more than half of the incentives in dollar terms, and (3) both climate and fossil fuel subsidies exhibit substantial longevity due to the infrequency with which governments revisit or re-evaluate them. While these results suggest that there may be opportunities to better utilize tax incentives for climate policy, tax expenditures must be integrated more strategically into the broader landscape of budget and tax policy to efficiently advance climate goals.

With the world already experiencing dangerous climate change, decarbonization and climate adaptation are urgent challenges. The potential for even more rapid and irreversible changes augments this urgency. To emphasize the need for rapid climate action, some researchers have labeled such potential changes as "tipping points." But the increasingly broad application of this term across biogeophysical and social phenomena muddles its meaning, and its use can conceal the multidimensional complexity of processes that can drive rapid change. The term is better viewed as a metaphor than as describing a technically defined class of processes. This metaphor is not risk-free, however, and should be employed with caution. For example, many people confuse the 1.5 degrees Celsius milestone for global warming established by the Paris Agreement as a physical tipping point, which it is not. That confusion poses risk to the credibility of the scientific community, and it can harm climate action by encouraging both risky "emergency" techno-fixes and despondent doomism.

Decisions about how to respond to coastal flood hazards often involve disagreements over resource allocations. In the United States, large intergovernmental fiscal transfers have enabled rebuilding in areas that experience severe repetitive losses. This case study focuses on Ortley Beach, a barrier island neighborhood in Toms River, New Jersey, to examine the process of rebuilding after Superstorm Sandy in 2012 and competing visions for the future. A decade later, we conducted 32 key-informant interviews-including residents and local, state, and federal officials-to examine how values, worldviews, and beliefs shape preferences for coastal risk reduction strategies. A central debate was whether public resources should support staying or leaving the island. Key concerns included the economic impacts of strategies on household and public finances, the effectiveness of strategies to mitigate future flood damages, and fairness in the distribution of costs and responsibilities. Conflicts emerged in how stakeholders framed their preferences. Local officials tended to hold more individualistic-hierarchical worldviews, weaker beliefs in climate science, and favored actions to protect high-value properties to preserve the tax base while externalizing costs. In contrast, some residents and most state and federal officials held more community-egalitarian worldviews, stronger beliefs in climate science, and preferences for long-term adaptation strategies to reduce risk, including property buyouts. Responding to the primary concern about economic impacts, we recommend enhancing individual and local financial resilience to climate and political shocks by diversifying municipal revenue streams, encouraging proactive risk-based planning, exploring innovative insurance models, and better accounting for the long-term costs of rebuilding.

Harnessing scientific research to address societal challenges requires careful alignment of expertise, resources, and research questions with real‐world needs, timelines, and constraints. In the case of place‐based research, studies can avoid misalignment when grounded in the realities of specific locations and conducted in collaboration with knowledgeable local partners. But literature on best practices for such research is underdeveloped on how to identify appropriate locations and partners. In practice, these research‐design choices are sometimes made based on convenience or prior experience—a strategy labeled opportunism. Here we examine a deliberative and exploratory approach in contrast to default opportunism. We introduce a general framework for scoping place‐based opportunities for research and engagement. We apply the framework to identify climate‐adaptation planning decisions, rooted in specific communities, around which to organize research and engagement in a large project addressing coastal climate risks in the Northeast US. The framework asks project personnel to negotiate explicit project goals, identify corresponding evaluation criteria, and assess opportunities against criteria within an iterative cycle of listening to needs, assessing options, prioritizing actions, and refining goals. In the application, we elicit a broad range of objectives from project personnel. We find that a structured process offers opportunities to collaboratively operationalize notions of equity and justice. We find some objectives in tension—including equity objectives—indicating trade‐offs that other projects may also need to navigate. We reflect on challenges encountered in the application and on near‐term costs and benefits of the exploratory process.

Assessing adaptation is one of the critical roles of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this Perspective, we focus on the what and the how that can guide this assessment for AR7: what knowledge is and should be assessed and how it is assessed. We then propose several opportunities for improvement, including accelerating adaptation assessment method innovation, increasing linkages between IPCC efforts and UNFCCC dialogues, and how author and data diversity can support a more decision- and policy-relevant assessment.

At the recent international negotiations on climate change in Dubai in 2023, the potential for artificial intelligence (AI) to play a critical role in addressing climate challenges was recognized through the initiative “AI for Climate Action (#AI4ClimateAction).” Launched by the Technology Mechanism—established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—this initiative is focused on accelerating the implementation of the Paris Agreement with the focus on ensuring that the use is responsible, and benefits are shared equitably. While exploring promising applications like integrating AI to improve early warning systems and enhancing agricultural yields, there is also a need to minimize the carbon footprint of AI applications. More information can be found at: https://unfccc.int/ttclear/artificial_intelligence

Publications are only as strong as the people who make them work. As part of this new chapter in IEEE Technology and Society Magazine (TSM), this is the first in a series of pieces to introduce the new associate editors who represent a powerhouse of knowledge on the social implications of technology and are leaders from across the many varied disciplines that the IEEE Society for the Social Implications of Technology (IEEE SSIT) encompasses. We hope the answers below highlight the ways in which the associate editors are both scholars and engaged citizens whose work aims to make positive change as it addresses (or transforms) harms related to social–technical relationships. Reading through the answers from the associate editors’ work and interests, what becomes clear is that seriously engaging with technology and society concepts leads to richer research projects and more meaningful ways in which to address technological and social problems.

While migration is often conceptualized as an adaptive response to climate hazards, migration can also present severe risks to people on the move. In this paper, we attempt to operationalize the Representative Key Risks (RKR) framework of the Sixth Assessment Report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for human mobility. First, we provide a framework for understanding how mobility risks emerge by engaging with the concept of habitability. We argue that uninhabitability occurs where the physical environment loses suitability and where there is a loss of agency in local populations. The severity of the risk from the loss of habitability is then represented by the high potential for human suffering. When climate hazards affect physical suitability and agency, the forms of migration that occur undermine human wellbeing and the right to self-determination: forced displacement, community relocation/resettlement, and involuntary immobility. Second, we show how such forms of mobility are more or less likely along different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). This paper asserts a central concern around human suffering to recentre scenario discourse on where, and how, adaptation, changes to development patterns, and government policies can reduce this suffering. Proactive governance at local, national, and international levels that attends to people’s adaptation and mobility needs can avert the more frequent emergence of severe risks related to mobility in a changing climate.

Recent research highlights how the same vulnerabilities that lead to disasters also condition the impact of hazards on violent conflict. Yet it is common practice in the literature to proxy rapid-onset hazards with disaster impacts when studying political violence. This can bias upward estimates of hazard-conflict relationships and obscure heterogeneous effects, with implications for forecasting as well as disaster risk reduction and peace-building activities. To overcome this, we implement an approach that measures and models the separate components of a tropical cyclone event: the hazard, the exposure, and the impacts. We then estimate a set of models that quantify how the incidence and intensity of organized violence respond to hazard exposure. We find little evidence that the average tropical cyclone enhances or diminishes violent conflict at the country level over a two-year time horizon. Yet rather than signaling that storms do not matter for political violence, unpacking this average result reveals two countervailing effects within countries. Conflict, and especially one-sided violence against civilians, tends to escalate in regions directly exposed to the tropical cyclone. In contrast, areas outside the path of the storm may experience a decrease in conflict. These results are heterogeneous with tropical cyclone intensity, and conflict escalation is more likely to occur in settings with less effective governments. Our results underscore the importance of ex-ante efforts targeting government capacity and effective disaster risk reduction to moderate the risk of violent conflict in the wake of tropical cyclones.

The integrated and indivisible nature of the SDGs is facing implementation challenges due to the silo approaches. We present the three interconnected foci (SDG interactions, modeling, and tools) at the science-policy interface to address these challenges. Accounting for them will support accelerated SDG progress, operationalizing the integration and indivisibility principles.

Tipping points have gained substantial traction in climate change discourses. Here we critique the ‘tipping point’ framing for oversimplifying the diverse dynamics of complex natural and human systems and for conveying urgency without fostering a meaningful basis for climate action. Multiple social scientific frameworks suggest that the deep uncertainty and perceived abstractness of climate tipping points render them ineffective for triggering action and setting governance goals. The framing also promotes confusion between temperature-based policy benchmarks and properties of the climate system. In both natural and human systems, we advocate for clearer, more specific language to describe the phenomena labelled as tipping points and for critical evaluation of whether, how and why different framings can support scientific understanding and climate risk management. The tipping points framing is widely used in climate discussions but receives mixed feedback. This Perspective critiques it for oversimplifying the complexities of natural and social systems and failing to drive effective action, and offers recommendations for future improvements.

As a vulnerable population, immigrants can be disproportionately affected by disasters. Because of their legal and migratory status, immigrants may have different challenges, needs, and possibilities when facing a disaster. Yet, within disaster studies, immigrants are rarely studied alone. Instead, they are often considered part of the large heterogeneous group of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. This racial classification points to a gap in the literature and in our understanding of how disadvantaged groups may cope with disasters. To address this gap, the current study hypothesizes that: (1) Immigrants have unique experiences and disaster impacts compared to the broader aggregated category of racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. and (2) There are variations in disaster experiences and impacts across different types of immigrant subgroups beyond refugees. To explore these hypotheses, a study of the literature across six databases from 2018 to 2023was conducted. The review identified a total of 17 articles discussing immigrant experiences during disasters. Major cross-cutting themes on immigrant disaster experiences include fear of deportation, restrictive immigration status, excessive economic burden and labor exploitation, employment rigidity, adverse health outcomes, limited informational resources and limited social capital, selective disaster relief measures, and infrastructural challenges as regards to housing and transportation. Many of the themes identified are unique to immigrants, such as the fear of deportation, restrictive immigration status and visa policies, and selective disaster relief measures.

The escalating impacts of climate change on the movement and immobility of people, coupled with false but influential narratives of mobility, highlight an urgent need for nuanced and synthetic research around climate mobility. Synthesis of evidence and gaps across the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report highlight a need to clarify the understanding of what conditions make human mobility an effective adaptation option and its nuanced outcomes, including simultaneous losses, damages, and benefits. Priorities include integration of adaptation and development planning; involuntary immobility and vulnerability; gender; data for cities; risk from responses and maladaptation; public understanding of climate risk; transboundary, compound, and cascading risks; nature-based approaches; and planned retreat, relocation, and heritage. Cutting across these priorities, research modalities need to better position climate mobility as type of mobility, as process, and as praxis. Policies and practices need to reflect the diverse needs, priorities, and experiences of climate mobility, emphasizing capability, choice, and freedom of movement.

When Greta Thunberg addressed world leaders at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s 24th Conference of Parties (COP24), it highlighted how young people including Indigenous youth are seeking to influence international climate change negotiations. However, young people face barriers to effectively engaging in the COP processes with few opportunities to learn about the structure and practices for COP Observers. In this paper, we describe and evaluate a structured learning experience developed to support students conducting research related to climate change and their engagement with international climate negotiations. Before attending the COP24, students were given in-person and online training about the UNFCCC, its processes, and major issues under negotiation. They also developed and presented their work during a COP side event. Through pre- and post-surveys and in-depth interviews, we asked students about their expectations and degree of engagement and agency at the COP and more broadly on climate action. Students reported that the academic scaffolding before and during the COP provided most of the students with tools for navigating the complexities of the COP. For all of the students, learning through engagement with the COP24 process supported greater self-efficacy and literacy in relation to climate change action.

Armed conflict and economic growth are inherently coupled; armed conflict substantially reduces economic growth, while economic growth is strongly correlated with a reduction in the propensity of armed conflict. Here, we simulate the incidence of armed conflict and its effect on economic growth simultaneously along the economic pathways defined by the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs). We argue that gross domestic product per capita projections through the 21st century currently in use are too optimistic since they disregard the harm to growth caused by conflict. Our analysis indicates that the correction required to account for this is substantial—expected income is 25% lower on average across countries when taking conflict into account. The correction is particularly strong for the more pessimistic SSP3 and SSP4 where expected future incidence of armed conflict is high. There are strong regional patterns with countries with contemporaneous conflicts experiencing much higher conflict burdens and reduced economic growth by the end of the century. The implications of this research indicate that today’s most marginalized societies will be substantially more vulnerable to the impact of climate change than indicated by existing income projections.

Abstract When Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg addressed world leaders at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s 24th Conference of Parties (COP24), it was clear that young people are interested in and aware of their potential to influence international climate change negotiations. Young people also face barriers to effectively engaging in the COP processes with few opportunities to learn about the structure and practices for COP Observers. In this paper, we describe and evaluate a structured learning experience developed to support students conducting research related to climate change and their engagement with international climate negotiations. Before attending the COP24, students were given in-person and online training about the UNFCCC, its processes, and major issues under negotiation. They also developed and presented their work during a side event. Through pre- and post-surveys and in-depth interviews, we asked students about their expectations and degree of engagement and agency at the COP and more broadly on climate action. Students reported that the academic scaffolding before and during the COP provided them with tools for navigating the complexities of the COP. Despite the disengagement of some students, findings reveal that this learning experience supported self-efficacy and engagement in climate change action.

This paper investigates the energy mix and welfare implication of deep decarbonization pathways with net negative emission technologies for North America and globally to 2050 in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. The analysis uses an integrated assessment model (IAM), the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), to develop three bounding emission scenarios: i) A business as usual pathway (BAU), ii) A pathway bounded by the Nationally Determined Contributions and attaining a 2 degrees C end of century target (NDC-2 degrees C), and iii) An increasing ambition pathway that attains a 1.5 degrees C end of century target (NDC-1.5 degrees C). The energy mix and economic impacts of these emissions pathways are then evaluated using Environment Canada's Multi-Sector, Multi-Regional (EC-MSMR) CGE model. When bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air capture (DAC) are available, they play an important role in achieving emission reductions. Allowing the use of DAC preserves an additional 5% to 20% of the share of fossil fuels in North America. Including DAC in deep decarbonization pathways lowers the welfare loss by up to similar to 1% globally compared to those without DAC in 2050. This finding is robust to both the estimated price of and constraints on DAC deployment. Increasing the potential for fuel switching in the CGE model further reduces the welfare effects for deep decarbonization.

Anthropogenic climate change is commonly characterized as a threat to human security. However, the extent to which and under what conditions climate impacts and responses may produce severe risks to peace have seen less systematically assessment to date. This essay provides a conceptual discussion of what risks to peace entail and how such risks might be considered severe, acknowledging that perceptions, values, and social scale must be grappled with in the identification of severity. Informed by available empirical research, the essay then explores the conditions under which climate-related risks could become severe during this century. Three illustrative scenarios based on different assumptions about climate-driven risks and risks related to social responses to climate change serve to illustrate how alternative warming and adaptation trajectories will have distinct implications for the prospect of future peace. The essay ends by reflecting on some implications for future research needs.

This paper presents the overall and distributional welfare effects of alternative multi-regional emissions trading coalitions relative to unilateral action. It focusses on meeting Paris Agreement pledges and more emissions reduction targets consistent with 2 ∘ C and 1.5 ∘ C temperature pathways in 2030. The results from seven computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are compared. Across all models, welfare gains are highest with a global market and increase with the stringency of targets. All regional coalitions also show overall welfare gains, although lower gains than the global market. The models show more variability in the gains by a participant. Depending on the model, participants may benefit more from some regional arrangements than from a global market or face modest losses compared to the domestic reductions alone, due to interactions between carbon targets and fossil fuel markets. The scenario with a joint China–European Union emissions trading system in all sectors is consistently favorable for participants and provides the highest economic gains per unit of emissions abated.

An emerging risk is characterized by scant published data, rapidly changing information, and an absence of existing models that can be directly used for prediction. Analysis may be further complicated by quickly evolving decision-maker priorities and the potential need to make decisions quickly as new information comes available. To provide a forum to discuss these challenges, a virtual conference, "Decision Making for Emerging Risks," was held on June 22-23, 2021, sponsored jointly by the Decision Analysis Society of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences and the Decision Analysis and Risk specialty group in the Society for Risk Analysis. Speakers reflected on the work to support decision-makers related to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as experiences in emerging risks across domains from cybersecurity, infrastructure, transportation, energy, food safety, national security, and climate change. Here, we distill the key findings to propose a set of best practice principles for a "decision-first" approach for emerging risks. These discussions underscore the importance of scoping the decision context and the shared responsibility for the development and implementation of the analysis between the analyst and the decision-maker when the context can evolve rapidly. Emerging risks may also favor simpler analytical approaches that increase transparency, ease of explanation, and ability to conduct new analyses quickly. Continued dialogue by the decision and risk analysis communities on the use and development of models for emerging risks will enhance the credibility and usefulness of these approaches.