Civic humanism is not a new topic, but it is not a small one either. The term was coined by Hans Baron in 1925, writing in German, as Bürgerhumanismus, and it is elaborated in his chief work, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (1955, 1966). The "crisis" was the challenge to republican Florence in 1402 from absolutist Milan, which was resolved or at least met by "civic humanism," a movement of humanist orators, poets, and philosophers, hitherto unpolitical, or if political not thoroughly republican, into "civic" affairs, that is, republican partisanship. Of course the challenge had to be met in politics and on the field of battle by civic Florentines, but a "civic humanist" is, in the usage of historians, always a thinker or a writer who is shaped by, or gives shape to, the civic spirit of the city. Even though Baron tries to draw the closest connections between political or military events and the writers, thus implying that events come first, his interest is in the writers as expressions or interpreters – in those who come second.

Machiavelli is said to be a Renaissance thinker, yet in a notable phrase he invented, 'the effectual truth,' he attacked the high-sounding humanism typical of the Renaissance, while mounting a conspiracy against the classical and Christian values of his time. In Machiavelli's Effectual Truth this overlooked phrase is studied and explained for the first time. The upshot of 'effectual truth' for any individual is to not depend on anyone or anything outside yourself to keep you free and secure. Mansfield argues that this phrase reveals Machiavelli's approach to modern science, with its focus on the efficient cause and concern for fact. He inquires into the effect Machiavelli expected from his own writings, who believed his philosophy would have an effect that future philosophers could not ignore. His plan, according to Mansfield, was to bring about a desired effect and thus to create his own future and ours.

Tocqueville declares himself to be a new kind of liberal, and the most striking feature of his reform is to propose, and to find in America, an alliance, rather than hostility, between religion and liberty. As opposed to an overt foundation in the state of nature, he sets the actual practice of religion in America, which brings moderation and limitation to liberty. Religion also supplies the notion of soul, which validates the prideful free agency of humans as against the determinism and materialism of the state of nature. It helps to secure modern democracy against the evils Tocqueville discerned and so notably described of individualism and mild despotism. And it provides the basis for the art of the legislator, a classical function revived by Tocqueville to use both nature and convention in cooperation, instead of distinct and at odds.

This excellent collection of Burke's letters is based upon the monumental ten-volume edition of Burke's complete correspondence published by the University of Chicago Press (1958-78) under the general editorship of the late Thomas W. Copeland and with the contributions of Burke scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Professor Mansfield has wisely arranged his selected letters by topic or theme American Revolution, Irish Question, etc. prefacing each of the book's ten sections with a brief narration of the circumstances

AbstractHere is a study of what Leo Strauss in his marvelous book,Thoughts on Machiavelli(1958), tells us about Machiavelli'sThe Prince, and how he tells it. The “how” is quite remarkable: his book is unlike any other book that has ever been written on Machiavelli. For the first time Machiavelli's esotericism is not only alluded to or introduced but explained at length. In explaining, Strauss shows how he arrived at his discoveries in Machiavelli's texts, teaching his readers the proper mixture of innocence and savvy. With his book Strauss gives a wholly new picture of an author who set store by being “wholly new.” All scholarly studies on Machiavelli can now be divided into those written before Strauss and those written after him, and the latter between those that take account of him in some fashion and those that willfully, or blithely, ignore him.

In choice of my topic, I unknowingly filched title of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's memoirs. I meant to call upon what is awesome and venerable in as I think good Justice did as well. Majesty is not in our style of democratic informality, in which everything is open to change in hope of reform. But we are still attached to formality of procedure and solemnity of judicial garb designed to maintain respect for law. We do not need regal magnificence in our judges, but we do require republican assurances that public justice is serious business. Above all, any appearance that law can be circumvented by private approach or by interested calculation --and this warning is directed to professors--is to be avoided. What happens behind scenes must stay behind scenes. Against this intimation of majesty practiced in our time is movement of thought known as I will argue in my brief that majesty is good and that legal is inadequate. Legal is not all wrong, but view that it is enough is all wrong. Legal has several modes, but they all declare that something other than, and more powerful than, law is cause of law. The realism consists of seeing through mere appearances and establishing fact of this more powerful force. Once established, that fact must be published, taught, and spread. Legal is expected to bring good to society by its inventors, who quickly become, if they were not from first, its advocates. It asserts that our law will be better if through clear thinking we dispense with its irrational majesty. This is really idealism. In old days, when philosophy was young, pre-Socratic philosophers thought that laws were made for convenience of rulers and nothing good was to be expected from politics. They thought that was realism. In America, advocates of legal have arisen from Progressive tradition, joined now by libertarian conservatives, who claim public good will result from their public unmasking of law. Despite fact (as they maintain) that no one aims for public good, they believe it does exist; Socrates was right about that. The sort of thinking our legal realists recommend can be seen in famous prisoner's dilemma that is essence of game theory, most fashionable mode of legal realism. The prisoner's dilemma posits a situation in which a prisoner must choose between defecting from a fellow prisoner and cooperating with him. We do not know whether prisoner is guilty and should therefore confess his crimes. We do not know whether law he may or may not have violated deserves to be respected. But example is not as neutral as it seems. One's sympathies are unjustifiably enlisted on side of prisoner by adopting his point of view. From standpoint of he is defecting from law instead of cooperating with it by confessing, as is his duty. The example substitutes calculation for duty and is actually about how to evade law if it is advantageous to do so. It is not unreasonable to question coherence of such allegedly neutral strategizing. How is it consistent with respect for law? Shouldn't people believe that two murderers, two rats, should each other? The phrase rat out expresses a noble disdain to which murderers are not entitled. It may be objected that respect for law is due only when law seems good to us. But if this were correct, people would simply do what is good for them, harmony would result, and there would be no need for law. It appears that law needs to seem good even when it may not be; it needs, as we say, legitimacy. Does legitimacy require majesty to give it authority? I have been speaking so far of the law, as if law were one whole. Even we in pluralistic America use that expression. Yet law consists of laws, each of them by itself and not necessarily coherent with other laws. …