Cassirer conceives his philosophy of symbolic forms as a phenomenological investigation in the Hegelian sense. However, Cassirer's critical idealism is clearly distinct from Hegel'sabsolute idealism. In this paper, the differences between these two forms of idealism will be highlighted.

This paper presents an interpretation of the connection between Natorp’s early and late philosophy. An analysis of two versions of Natorp’s deduction of categories shows the consistent development of Natorp’s thought. Each deduction expresses, in Natorp’s words, a direction of movement between the centre and the periphery. The early deduction moves from the periphery to the centre by means of the transcendental method. The critical investigation of the conditions of possibility of mathematical-physical science reveals the structure of thought itself. The late deduction is oriented in the opposite direction, from the centre to the periphery. Thought now develops freely and establishes the systematic character of philosophy. We argue that the two deductions complement each other in a single coherent position that accounts for the relationship between critique and system. Philosophical systematics is conceived as the necessary sequel and culmination of an inquiry, the first part of which is developed according to the transcendental method.

Cassirer conceives his philosophy of symbolic forms as a phenomenological investigation in the Hegelian sense. However, Cassirer's critical idealism is clearly distinct from Hegel's absolute idealism. In this paper, the differences between these two forms of idealism will be highlighted.

En este trabajo comparamos la interpretación del cálculo diferencial que Hegel propone en la Ciencia de la lógica con la que Cohen desarrolla en El principio del método infinitesimal y su historia y en la segunda edición de la Teoría kantiana de la experiencia. Si bien ambos filósofos encuentran en el cálculo el principio cualitativo fundante de lo cuantitativo, Cohen sostiene que Hegel no resuelve el problema de la relación entre matemática y ciencia natural.

In this paper we compare the interpretation of the differential calculus that Hegel proposes in the Science of Logic with that which Cohen develops in The Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History and in the second edition of the Kantian Theory of Experience. Although both philosophers find in the calculus the founding qualitative principle of the quantitative, Cohen argues that Hegel does not solve the problem of the relation between mathematics and natural science.

Salomon Maimon and Hermann Cohen propose a profound modification of Kantian philosophy through a transcendental interpretation of differential calculus. This paper presents both theories and discusses their implications for the possibility of metaphysics.

In this paper I will put forward an account of quantum objectivity along Kantian and Bohrian lines. Quantum objectivity will be distinguished from classical objectivity both regarding the objective validity and the objective reality of the concept of an object. While classical concepts enable the constitution of empirical data as objective experimental results, the concept of a quantum object plays rather a regulative role guaranteeing the systematic unity of classically described complementary phenomena. Based on this distinction, I will analyze the possibility of providing quantum theory with metaphysical principles in a Kantian sense.

The aim of this paper is to analyze Dimitry Gawronsky's doctrine of actual infinitesimals. I examine the peculiar connection that his critical idealism establishes between transcendental philosophy and mathematics. In particular, I reconstruct the relationship between Gawronsky's differentials, Cantor's transfinite numbers, Veronese's trans-Archimedean numbers and Robinson's hyperreal numbers. I argue that by means of his doctrine of actual infinitesimals, Gawronsky aims to provide an interpretation of calculus that eliminates any alleged given element in knowledge.

This paper analyses Cassirer's characterization of critical philosophy as the philosophy of freedom. This amounts to a claim not only regarding morality but concerning the theory of knowledge in the first place. Even though Cassirer insists on the close relation that holds between his philosophy and Kantian idealism, Cassirer's viewpoint is not so easily compatible with Kant's doctrine. In this paper, I will show that Cassirer's stance is in fact based on a deep criticism of the Kantian distinction between sensibility, understanding and reason, which is revealed by Cassirer's account of the Kantian concept of the thing in itself.

La crítica kantiana de la razón tiene como principal propósito determinar la posibilidad de la metafísica como ciencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es presentar un panorama de aquella metafísica cuya posibilidad resulta finalmente establecida. Distinguiremos tres tipos de conocimiento metafísico posible: la metafísica de la experiencia, la metafísica de las costumbres y la metafísica práctico-dogmática. Posteriormente, discutiremos el modo en el que estas metafísicas se ordenan en un sistema.

Kant acute accent s critique of reason has the main goal of determining the possibility of Metaphysics as a science. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the critical Metaphysics (i.e. the Metaphysics, the possibility of which is finally established by the critique of reason). We shall distinguish three kinds of metaphysical knowledge: the metaphysics of experience, the Metaphysics of Morals and the practical-dogmatic Metaphysics. We shall then discuss the way in which these Metaphysics make up a single system.

En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar uno de los aspectos centrales de la filosofía de Hermann Cohen: la relación que su Lógica del conocimiento puro establece entre el pensar puro y el cálculo infinitesimal. Mostraremos que la interpretación coheniana del cálculo se orienta a fundamentar en el pensar puro todos los elementos que Kant distingue en la intuición empírica: tanto su materia (la sensación), como su forma (el tiempo y el espacio). De tal modo, mediante el cálculo infinitesimal, Cohen buscará dar cuenta del conocimiento sin recurrir a ninguna receptividad.

In this paper we analyze the historical roots of the Bohrian concept of symbol. More precisely, we argue that Bohr takes Kantian elements from Høffding´s philosophy in order to develop his own concept of symbol. For this purpose, firstly, we focus on the two different senses that Bohr gives to the concept of symbol. Then, we study how each of these senses is related to different aspects of Høffding’s philosophy and we show the connection between the Bohrian and the Kantian concept of symbol by means of Høffding’s mediation.

This paper compares Cohen's Logic of Pure Knowledge and Cassirer's Substance and Function in order to evaluate how in these works Cohen and Cassirer go beyond the limits established by Kantian philosophy. In his Logic, Cohen seeks to ground in pure thought all the elements which Kant distinguishes in empirical intuition: its matter (sensation) as well as its form (time and space). In this way, Cohen tries to provide an account of knowledge without appealing to any receptivity. In accordance with Cohen's project of reformulating the Kantian theory of sensibility, Cassirer undertakes in Substance and Function the task of developing an alternative doctrine of pure and empirical manifolds. But whereas Cohen analyzes the laws of pure thought, Cassirer aims to highlight the functional character of concepts in the development of modern mathematics and physics. I will discuss these two different approaches to the problems raised by Kantian philosophy and I will argue that Cassirer went further than Cohen in the project of critical idealism.

AbstractThis paper compares Cohen’sLogic of Pure Knowledgeand Cassirer’sSubstance and Functionin order to evaluate how in these works Cohen and Cassirer go beyond the limits established by Kantian philosophy. In hisLogic, Cohen seeks to ground in pure thought all the elements which Kant distinguishes in empirical intuition: its matter (sensation) as well as its form (time and space). In this way, Cohen tries to provide an account of knowledge without appealing to any receptivity. In accordance with Cohen’s project of reformulating the Kantian theory of sensibility, Cassirer undertakes inSubstance and Functionthe task of developing an alternative doctrine of pure and empirical manifolds. But whereas Cohen analyzes the laws of pure thought, Cassirer aims to highlight the functional character of concepts in the development of modern mathematics and physics. I will discuss these two different approaches to the problems raised by Kantian philosophy and I will argue that Cassirer went further than Cohen in the project of critical idealism.