This article undertakes an analysis of the main concepts used in Kant's metaphysics of nature, applying an approach inspired by the Critique of Pure Reason, where the topic is synthesized through the guiding thread (Leitfaden) of the categories. In the present case, the leading thread is provided by Latin terms and structures incorporated into the text and has a cultural meaning. Translating Kant involves recovering these common roots, creating a cultural bridge to other European languages. In order to support this idea, two translations of Kant's metaphysics of nature - by Michael Friedman and Arnaut Pelletier (into English and French, respectively) - are considered and compared with my own Romanian translation. This brings to light, first, the relationship between what is general, or European, and what results from the evolution of the target language, and second, the way in which the three translators conceive of the relation between Kant's message and its rendering in the target language. Through such analyses, the personality of the translated author can be better understood, framed in an evolution of ideas. At the same time, the connection between the development of Kant's philosophical concepts and the development of his transcendental idealism is highlighted.
Abstract Immanuel Kant studied at the Albertina University in Königsberg from 1740 onwards. This account outlines the three-step academic process he underwent: testimonium initiationis , matriculation, and specification. The testimonium initiationis was a prerequisite examination conducted by the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty, certifying the completion of prior education. Following this, Kant was matriculated by the current rector. The specification lists, created biannually, document the composition of the student body and confirm Kant’s continuous affiliation with the Philosophical Faculty. Notably, Kant was always enrolled in the Philosophical Faculty and never officially enrolled as a theology student. A significant and unique discovery is a printed certificate signed by Kant himself as Dean, attesting to the admission of a student into the academic community. Kant’s early works, including his first publication in 1749, reflect his deep engagement with the natural sciences, mathematics, and physics. Although he was listed as a philosophy student, his interests extended beyond traditional philosophical disciplines to include the emerging field of physics. This article provides a comprehensive view of Kant’s academic environment, faculty members, and the structure of Albertina University during his time as a university student.
Abstract There is substantial scholarship concerning the origin and use of the question “ quid facti ” in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. There is also substantial scholarship concerning the question in the work of Salomon Maimon, the skeptical critic of Kant. The pictures of the “ quid facti ” question that emerge from these two bodies of literature, however, are rather different, and there has been no attempt to reconcile them. The goal of this paper is thus to compare Kant’s and Maimon’s understandings of the quaestio facti in order to understand how and why they differ. Part I begins by summarizing the legal context of the quaestio facti and identifying three sub-questions within it. Part II lays out Kant’s understanding of the quid facti as concerning the question of the empirical origin of a judgment. Part III shows how Maimon’s skeptical use of the quid facti question was made possible by his focus on a different aspect of the legal question: the question of whether a judgment has been made. Finally, using these results, Part IV argues, against the usual interpretation, that Maimon’s skeptical use of the quaestio facti can stand alone, separate from the quaestio juris .
When working on the Prolegomena, Kant remarked that there was a "striking similarity" between the central problem of his transcendental philosophy and that of moral philosophy, adding that he would present the solution to the latter shortly. Given that the Prolegomena deals with transcendental philosophy and his next book, the Groundwork, deals with moral philosophy, one might reasonably expect striking parallels between the two. At first glance, however, they appear quite dissimilar, and in the literature, they are not treated as closely related. In this essay, I argue that there are, in fact, remarkable similarities between the two works. They concern not only their central problems but also the method Kant uses to solve them, the types of arguments he develops in doing so, and even the terminology he uses to mark his steps. These similarities highlight both that Kant's transcendental philosophy in the Prolegomena lays the groundwork for a metaphysics of nature and that his Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals is the moral counterpart to his transcendental philosophy. Moreover, they shed new light on crucial arguments of the Groundwork, especially on the beginning of the second section and the aim and argument of the third, thereby illuminating the structure of the argument of the book as a whole.
Abstract In this article, I argue that Newton’s influence on Kant’s Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels is primarily reflected in Kant’s employment of analogy. To this end, I first frame Newton’s second rule of philosophizing in terms of an inference ticket for analogical arguments and explain Newton’s reference to the “analogy of nature” in terms of a metaphysical principle authorizing transductive inferences. Secondly, I argue that several crucial arguments in Kant’s essay exhibit the argumentative scheme warranted by Newton’s second rule and/or implicitly appeal to Newton’s analogy of nature. In doing so, I both challenge studies on Kant’s pre-critical commitment to Newton and expand on existing literature concerning 18 th -century Newtonianism.
Recent scholarship on Kant often asserts that he was keenly aware of the problem of self-deception and considered it to be systematically necessary, for example, as a means of illuminating the possibility of acting against the moral law. It is also suggested that Kant's preferred term for self-deception is the ,inner lie'. However, this paper argues that, while Kant's notion of the ,inner lie' does indeed identify a fundamental problem in moral philosophy, it bears little relation to common intuitions and interpretations of self-deception, or to diverse and often conflicting scholarly readings of Kant's conception of it. Furthermore, this paper explains why Kant can legitimately attribute systematic significance to the ,inner lie' when clarifying the possibility of violating one's duty, and why he considers the phenomenon to entail a profound ,Wegwerfung' (rejection) of human dignity.
Kant claims that his moral arguments for faith in God's existence secure faith in a being with traditional divine properties including omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. However, it is unclear how Kant's moral arguments attain this result. This paper presents a new interpretation of Kant's moral arguments, the 'grounding interpretation,' which shows why moral faith concerns a being with the traditional divine omni-properties. It argues for a connection between moral faith and a metaphysical conception of God as the ground of possibility. While that conception has previously been associated with Kant's theoretical philosophy, Kant's moral arguments supply it with both a practical justification and a practical interpretation. Recognizing this point enables us to understand why Kant holds that the God of moral faith has the traditional divine properties.
This newly discovered autograph by Kant dates from his second term as rector (summer 1788). In this brief document from the archives of the University of K & ouml;nigsberg, Kant notes the Academic Senate's decision to reject an application submitted by the Academic Secretary, Friedrich Wattmann. It seems that Wattmann had taken out a loan from the estate of the K & ouml;nigsberg Orientalist Georg David Kypke (1724-1779), the administration of which had been entrusted to the Senate in order to establish a charity foundation for destitute students. In his application, Wattmann requested an extension of the deadline to repay the money he had presumably taken unauthorized. Further historical context on this incident is provided.
In section two of the Ideal of Pure Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant provides an intricate attempt to ground possibility in the idea of "all of reality" (omnitudo realitiatis). The section begins with two principles, 1) the principle of determinability and 2) the principle of thoroughgoing determination. How the two principles work and relate to each other has been a matter of scholarly debate. The paper contributes to this debate first by outlining Kant's different senses of 'determination'. It then uses the senses to suggest a distinction between thoroughgoing determination and complete determination. The distinction enables a reading of the first moves of Kant's argument in the section. Then the paper places Kant's use of complete determination in the context of his theory of cognition and criticism of the Leibnizian rationalist tradition.
Despite his academic position and contributions to one of the most respected German encyclopedias, Ludwig Emil Cichorius (1770-1829) remains an unknown figure in German intellectual history. This article explores Cichorius' publications on the topic of race, highlighting Kant's influence on 19th-century thought through Cichorius' contributions to the Conversations-Lexikon of Renatus Gotthelf L & ouml;bel (1767-1799), Christian Wilhelm Franke (1765-1831), and Friedrich Arnold Brockhaus (1772-1823). These contributions to the lexicon included distinct entries on the "races of human beings" and "races of animals," where he engaged with Kantian ideas. He underscored the significance of unfailingly inherited traits over superficial characteristics in classifying races.
This article seeks to demonstrate that Kant throughout the Critique of Pure Reason employs a type of analogical reasoning that belongs to the methodical backbone of the work. More specifically, I take him to draw on disciplines such as mathematics, general logic, and empirical psychology to expose the a priori features of human cognition at stake in his analyses. After examining Kant’s own comments on the use of analogies in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Prolegomena, the Critique of Judgment and relevant lecture transcripts, I outline the predicative type of analogical reasoning I take to be employed in the Critique of Pure Reason itself. Turning from theory to practice, I analyze Kant’s use of (1) metaphors, (2) analogical inferences intended to clarify concepts such as transcendental illusion, and (3) analogical inferences that inform key arguments, namely, the metaphysical deduction and the so-called subjective deduction contained in the 1781 edition of the Critique. In each case, I argue, Kant’s sustained attempt to illuminate the a priori dimension of the human mind by means of analogical inferences is akin to the use of analogical inferences in former natural theology to obtain cognitions of God.
This article investigates a puzzling episode in Immanuel Kant’s later life: his repeated references to „air electricity“ and the mysterious mass death of cats (‚Katzentod‘) as potential causes of his chronic neurological ailments. Contrary to long-standing assumptions that interpret these remarks as symptoms of senility, this study reconstructs Kant’s statements within the context of scientific discourse on animal electricity, epidemiology, and atmospheric phenomena. Drawing on overlooked primary sources – including reviews from the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung and the Erlangen Litteratur-Zeitung – the article identifies Kant’s references to Scandinavian medical reports on feline epidemics likely caused by electrical imbalances in the air. Special attention is given to a hitherto unidentified text by Elof Wäström, which Kant appears to paraphrase in his late writings through two reviews. The article shows that Kant’s reflections were part of a broader attempt at scientifically informed self-diagnosis, situated within the ongoing medical and meteorological debates of the late 18th century. The so-called ‚cat plague‘ thus emerges not as an eccentric obsession, but as a meaningful indicator of Kant’s engagement with the medical theories of his time.
