How do immigrants promote exports? To answer this question we propose an empirical framework allowing to disentangle the role of migration networks that operate at a bilateral level from that of productivity channels (knowledge diffusion and increased workforce diversity) that operate at the aggregate level. We find evidence supporting both, at the extensive as well as at the intensive margin. The results are robust to using various IV strategies. While richer countries’ exports tend to benefit more from immigrants’ diversity (especially in sectors characterized by complex production processes), developing countries benefit from knowledge diffusion more.

We propose new ways to measure populism, using the Manifesto Project Database (1960-2019) as main source of data. We characterize the evolution of populism over 60 years and show empirically that it is significantly impacted by the skill-content of globalization. Specifically, imports of goods which are intensive in low-skill labor generate more right-wing populism, and low-skill immigration shifts the distribution of votes to the right, with more votes for right-wing populist parties and less for left-wing populist parties. In contrast, imports of high-skill labor intensive goods, as well as high-skill immigration flows, tend to reduce the volume of populism.

Using provisions to ease the movement of business visitors in trade agreements, we show that removing barriers to the movement of business people promotes trade. We document the increasing complexity of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and develop an algorithm that combines machine learning and text analysis techniques to examine the content of FTAs. We use the algorithm to determine which FTAs include provisions to facilitate the movement of business people and whether these are included in dispute settlement mechanisms. We show that provisions facilitating business travel are effective in promoting them and eventually increase bilateral trade flows. The paper provides (indirect) evidence of the role of face-to-face interaction on aggregate bilateral trade flows.

We investigate the bidirectional relationship between immigration and right-wing populism, which we characterize as a self-reinforcing dynamic process where anti-immigrant rhetoric and populist policies lead to a deterioration in the average education and skill level of immigrants. The deterioration in the ratio of high-skill to low-skill immigrants in turn fuels populist support and anti-immigration attitudes, creating what we call "the vicious circle of xenophobia." We review some historical and contemporary studies that are suggestive of such a vicious circle. In particular, recent cross-country evidence shows that low-skill immigration tends to exacerbate populism, whereas high-skill immigration tends to mitigate it. Conversely, populist policies and xenophobic attitudes have a strong repulsive effect on highly skilled immigrants and result in adverse immigrant selection. We use the empirical results from those studies to inform a theoretical model of joint determination of immigrants' skill ratio and right-wing populism levels. The model displays multiple equilibria, with the inferior equilibrium-corresponding to our vicious circle-characterized by high levels of right-wing populism and a high proportion of low-skill workers among immigrants. In this framework, structural trends such as Internet penetration, economic erosion of the middle class, demographic pressure from poor countries as well as adverse cyclical shocks make the good, efficient equilibrium less likely and the inferior equilibrium of explosive populism and adverse immigrants' selection more likely.

During the early 1990s, Germany offered temporary protection to 700,000 Yugoslavian refugees fleeing war. By 2000, many had been repatriated. We exploit this natural experiment to investigate the role of returning migrants in boosting export performance upon their return. Using confidential German administrative data, we find that industries with 10% more returning refugees exhibit larger exports between the pre- and postwar periods by 1% to 1.6%. We use exogenous allocation rules for asylum seekers within Germany as an instrument to deal with endogeneity concerns. We show evidence pointing to productivity shifts as the main mechanism behind our results. Consistently, we find our results are driven by refugees in occupations more likely to transfer knowledge, technologies, and best practices.

We argue that migrants played a significant role in the diffusion of the demographic transition from France to the rest of Europe in the late 19th century. Employing novel data on French immigration from other European regions from 1850 to 1930, we find that higher immigration to France translated into lower fertility in the region of origin after a few decades - both in cross-region regressions for various periods, and in a panel setting with region fixed effects. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and across multiple specifications. We also find that immigrants who themselves became French citizens achieved lower fertility, particularly those who moved to French regions with the lowest fertility levels. We interpret these findings in terms of cultural remittances, consistently with insights from a theoretical framework where migrants act as vectors of cultural diffusion, spreading new information, social norms and preferences pertaining to modern fertility to their regions of origin.

This article introduces the Labour Economics Special Issue on Immigration Economics. We summarize the twelve papers that were selected for publication and outline their contributions to the broader migration literature. The articles are grouped into four blocks: citizenship and discrimination, the political economy of refugee integration, labour market effects of immigration, and immigration, skills and education.

In the context of a global security framework that mitigates interstate conflicts, nation-states establish a reputation for resolve by supporting foreign insurrections. Our theoretical predictions indicate that states with a greater number of co-ethnic groups abroad are more inclined to endorse foreign uprisings, resulting in higher political inclusion for such groups. With a dataset comprising over 280,000 ethnic group × sponsor state × target state × year observations, our analysis corroborates the role of reputation-building through co-ethnicity narratives as a determinant of sponsor state engagement. We argue that this mechanism engenders political concessions within target states, ultimately benefiting groups associated with reputed potential sponsors.

We propose a novel perspective on migration and cultural change by asking both theoretically and empirically – and from a global viewpoint – whether migration is a source of cultural convergence or divergence between home and host countries. Our theoretical model derives distinctive testable predictions as to the sign and direction ofconvergence for various compositional and cultural diffusion mechanisms. We use the World Value Survey for 1981-2014 to build time-varying measures of cultural similarity for a large number of country pairs and exploit within country-pair variation over time. Our results support migration-based cultural convergence, with cultural remittances as its main driver. In other words and in contrast to the populist narrative, we find that while immigrants do act as vectors of cultural diffusion, this is mostly to export the host country culture back home.

The cultural integration of immigrants conditions their overall socio-economic integration as well as natives' attitudes towards globalisation in general and immigration in particular. At the same time, excessive integration-or assimilation-can be detrimental in that it implies forfeiting one's ties to the origin country and eventually translates into a loss of diversity (from the viewpoint of host countries) and of global connections (from the viewpoint of both host and home countries). Cultural integration can be described using two dimensions: the preservation of links to the origin country and culture, which we call origin attachment, and the creation of new links together with the adoption of cultural traits from the new residence country, which we call destination attachment. In this paper we introduce a means to quantify these two aspects based on Twitter data. We build origin and destination attachment indices and analyse their possible determinants (e.g., language proximity, distance between countries), also in relation to Hofstede's cultural dimension scores. The results stress the importance of language: a common language between origin and destination countries favours origin attachment, as does low proficiency in the host language. Common geographical borders seem to favour both origin and destination attachment. Regarding cultural dimensions, larger differences among origin and destination countries in terms of Individualism, Masculinity and Uncertainty appear to favour destination attachment and lower origin attachment.