AbstractIn-transit cold treatment consists of exposing food commodities – generally fresh agricultural products – to temperatures approaching 0 °C for a variable number of days during shipping in purpose-equipped containers in order to manage the risks of quarantine contamination. In this paper, we show that in-transit cold treatment is frequently required in the international trade of apples potentially affected by Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis Capitata), despite the existence of potentially less costly and equally effective alternative means of applying the same treatment, in particular ‘cold storage’. We then try to understand why these alternative methods do not emerge spontaneously or become more widespread. We suggest that technical aspects and their respective costs are not always the most important factors. Transaction costs may also come into play. In accordance with ‘institutional path dependence’ literature, we suggest that the negotiation costs a country has to bear in order to encourage its trading partners to adopt an alternative treatment are high enough for it to be preferable to continue using the current solution, despite its higher adoption cost.

In France, apples are the leading fruit in terms of both consumption and exports. The value chain is under high surveillance from a sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standpoint due to national and European regulations, private residue standards, phytosanitary barriers in certain emerging countries and the sometimes critical perceptions of consumers. The French ANR-funded Sustain'Apple project, the initial findings of which are presented in this paper, aims to shed light on the organizational and institutional solutions that may be implemented at all stages of the national value chains (short and long chains) and at the international level with a focus on certain crucial players (China, Chile, Italy). Priority has been given to improving the sustainability of the organizational and institutional solutions because while they are tightly interlinked with technical solutions, they have yet to receive much attention in the academic and empirical literature. Sustain'Apple also evaluates the impact of certain organizational and institutional solutions on consumer perceptions of the sanitary risk, international trade and environment. The consortium brings together all the capabilities necessary to address these sustainable apple chain issues, with INRA, CIRAD, IRSTEA and Montpellier Supagro involved on the research side examining the following scientific disciplines: organization and institutional economics, international economics, consumer economics, strategic management, international law, agronomy, landscape ecology and life cycle assessments. On the expertise side, the main contributions come from CTIFL on supermarkets, consumers, postharvest technologies and production systems, from GRAB on short organic chains and from ANPP on a detailed and global understanding of the apple production and export industry.

The rising concern of European consumers for pesticides residues left on fruit and of some far distant countries in Asia and Americas for quarantine organisms has turned compliance with SPS requirements into one of the main challenges of the French apple industry. Using transaction cost and cognitive governance theories, we investigate how differences in property rights structures, inter-firm arrangements, and mechanisms of firm governance may impact the modalities of SPS risk management. Our case study of two leading groups of the French fresh apple industry with different property rights structures (cooperative vs. private) and different marketing strategies (customers with more or less stringent SPS requirements) highlight the role of cognitive governance mechanisms (knowledge sharing) in the management of SPS risks. This paved the way for integrating governance structures, cognitive resources, and transaction attributes into a single model.

Biosecurity regulations and standards govern international agricultural inter-firm transactions. Drawing mainly on new institutional economics, our study offers insights into the institutional factors, at both the macro and meso levels, that influence the choice of inter-firm contracts for Chilean apple exports. First and foremost, it examines the influence of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) provisions included in trade agreements signed by Chile with its trade counterparts on the choice of alternative contracts displaying different degrees of completeness. It also focuses on the institutions in the importing countries, the legal institutions enforcing contracts, the efficiency of logistics and the effect of hidden informal rules such as corruption, on the choice between free consignment, minimum guaranteed and sale contracts. We also explore the private institutions, primarily linked to direct imports by supermarkets. The results of our econometric analysis show that less complete contracts, i.e. free consignment and minimum guaranteed arrangements, are chosen when exporting to countries with safe business environments and higher number of SPS provision in international trade agreements. On the contrary, when exporting to non-reliable countries, exporters tend to protect themselves through more complete contracts, i.e. sale contracts. We found evidence that direct exports to supermarkets are more prone to occur under sale contracts which suggest the dual function of contracts, both as a safeguard and as a coordination tool to adopt specific customers' requirements.

Dans cet article, les auteurs illustrent le concept de dépendance de sentier avec le cas d’un dispositif de traitement au froid utilisé pendant le transit maritime dans le commerce international des pommes pour empêcher l’introduction ou la dissémination d’organismes de quarantaine dans les pays importateurs. Ils montrent que ce dispositif est aujourd’hui systématiquement requis et fonctionne comme une norme de facto malgré l’existence de modalités de traitement alternatives potentiellement moins onéreuses et tout aussi efficaces. Conformément au cadre théorique mobilisé, les auteurs indiquent les coûts de négociation qu’un pays exportateur devrait supporter pour faire accepter à ses partenaires commerciaux un dispositif alternatif plus efficient, peuvent s’avérer si élevés qu’il devient préférable de continuer à utiliser le dispositif en usage malgré son coût d’adoption supérieur.

The Sustain'Apple project deals with phytosanitary regulations in international trade and the institutional devices to comply with those regulations. Phytosanitary regulations are issued by new destination countries (mostly in Asia and North and South America) to avoid importing and disseminating quarantine organisms (in particular pests) and limit the economic effects of regulated non-quarantine organisms. Our report focuses on public and private devices which formulate, negotiate and implement the phytosanitary protocols that exporting countries must comply with, to get access to targeted markets. By comparing France with Italy and Chile, we have been able to identify strengths and weaknesses of the French system. The interest for such a comparison arouses from the two following questions : first how can we explain the contrasted market positioning between France and Italy on one hand and Chile on the other hand, Chile having by far the largest market share in destinations with phytosanitary constraints; second, how can we explain low institutional efficacy in preparing and negotiating phytosanitary protocols as revealed by professional leaders who regret lack of information from and weak cooperation with plant protection services. The institutional devices comparison has been conducted after having positioned the markets of the three countries and identified, for each of them, issues of quarantine pests and phytosanitary constraints imposed by main customer countries.

This article analyzes the choice of export contracts of perishable goods. It draws on the Transactional Cost Theory, and particularly the literature of incomplete contracts. Using a 2014 database of 177,296 transactions and corresponding contracts performed by Chilean fruit exporters, together with qualitative information gathered from a field survey, we show through a binomial logit that the choice between firm sale and consignment is a function of the environmental uncertainty of the importing country, the temporal specificity of the transacted product and the frequency of transactions.

This study investigates how interfirm contracts are influenced by the SPS provisions within Trade Agreements and by the relational BtoB context in which transactions occur. Drawing on transaction cost theory and international trade research, we analyze the case of Chilean exports of apples. We measure the degree of completeness of SPS provisions of Trade Agreements signed by Chile and the share of direct exports to supermarkets. We found evidence of the double function of contracts: As a safeguard to protect transactions in uncertain institutional environments and as a coordination tool to adapt to changing market conditions and specific sanitary requirements.

Dans le commerce longue distance, le developpement des contrats a prix ferme (prix negocie avant l'embarquement) est relativement nouveau. Beaucoup de pays exportateurs pratiquent traditionnellement la libre consignation (l'exportateur envoie les marchandises a l'importateur qui est en charge de les vendre sur le marche de destination au meilleur prix possible). La libre consignation a des avantages lorsque les operateurs travaillent en confiance mais elle n'est pas sans inconvenients pour les producteurs des pays exportateurs (Pavez & Codron, 2018). Notre analyse des exportations de pommes chiliennes dans les differents pays du monde montre que les contrats a prix ferme se developpent lorsque les institutions publiques du pays hote sont defaillantes. En revanche, de bonnes institutions et de bons accords bilateraux eu egard aux aspects sanitaires et phytosanitaires (mecanismes de coordination, de suivi et d'arbitrage en cas d'eventuels problemes), favorisent le maintien de la libre consignation car les transactions sont mieux encadrees et peuvent ainsi etre executees avec moins de risques. Nous montrons par ailleurs que le developpement des contrats a prix ferme peut egalement avoir lieu dans des environnements commerciaux de bonne qualite et notamment lorsque la grande distribution importe directement du pays exportateur.

Managing the pesticide safety risk to provide end markets with safe fruit and vegetables raises complex issues due to the diversity and stringent nature of public and private safety requirements and the high cost of controlling the product and the production process. More often than not, this leads to the development of diversified and more integrated relationships between growers and their buyers. Our paper is a case study of the hybrid forms underlying such relationships. It begins by developing the analytical framework, drawing on transaction cost, positive agency, and property rights theories with a special focus on the model proposed by Menard (The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton, 1066-1108, 2013), positioning the hybrid forms along the two dimensions of decision rights and strategic resources. It then presents a selection of quantitative and qualitative findings obtained from data collected through face-to-face interviews with managers of fresh produce shipping firms in France and Chile. Both case studies confirm that the level of centralization increases with the buyer's commercial reputation, the level of customer safety requirements (a key component in the marketing strategy of the buyer), and the level of asset specificity which is mostly embedded in the technical assistance and training provided by the buyer to the growers. Moreover, our paper establishes a clear divide between firms that only control product safety at the delivery stage and firms that also control safety throughout the production process and may take decisions on behalf of the grower before harvesting.

In most competitive fresh fruit and vegetables chains, growers are faced with the need to comply with the requirements of increasingly safety demanding customers. Integrated Pest Management (IPM) practices have become a reliable solution for small-scale growers that cannot afford the cost of a Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certificate. While the literature on farmer adoption of IPM practices focuses on farmer and farm characteristics, only a few authors underline the importance of technology and marketing. Moreover, only a few papers have studied IPM adoption in developing or emerging countries. Our paper aims to fill this gap by focusing on Turkey, an emerging country with dominant small-scale growers, where diffusion of IPM is still in its infancy. It also takes into account factors that go beyond the farmers and farm characteristics that are usually addressed by literature. 186 tomato growers have been surveyed in the province of Antalya, a region of Turkey supplying 85% of the national production of tomato grown under greenhouse. A counter of the eleven most salient IPM practices is used to model IPM adoption. The analysis confirms most of the predictions and highlights the key role of marketing and technology as determinants of IPM adoption.

Chemical contamination of fresh produce through pesticide spraying is considered a minor risk for consumer health. As a result, significant responsibility in food safety may be shifted to the private sector by public agencies. The involvement of the private sector is even greater when fresh produce is sold to safety-conscious consumers, given the high exposure of retailers' commercial reputation. This chapter focuses on public and private management of food safety risks, and the determinants thereof in the fresh produce industry of two contrasting Mediterranean countries: Morocco and Turkey. Based on expert surveys and face-to-face interviews with a large number of tomato growers, it provides insight into how and why different players are managing and controlling safety risks. A clear distinction is made between firm-scale factors at growing and shipping levels and country-wide factors, especially recent developments in markets and regulatory institutions. Both significantly influence the level of safety management in greenhouses, the adoption of good agricultural practices and integrated pest management. All factors should be taken into consideration simultaneously to understand the respective contributions of public and private operators in the safety risk management of the fresh produce chain.

Fresh produce growers are the main source of food contamination by chemical pesticides. In their choice of farming practices, producers are influenced by market forces as well as public and private safety regulations – or “macro-drivers” – as opposed to farm-level micro-drivers. Growers respond to their business and regulatory environment by implementing integrated pest management (IPM) and other good agricultural practices (GAP), where profitable through certification schemes. Our paper attempts to analyse the adoption of sustainable farming practices beyond farm and farmer characteristics, focusing on the role of structural and institutional macro-drivers. The empirical research is based on the comparison between Turkey and Morocco, two Mediterranean countries with high export activity in the fresh tomato sector but with contrasting features in terms of both sustainable farming practices and micro/macro-drivers. With regard to the latter, we simultaneously consider supply-side and demand-side aspects (i.e. the requirements of buyers in importing countries). The analysis draws on the literature examining both IPM/GAP adoption and the impact of food safety regulation on firms’ strategies. We call on face-to-face interviews with a relatively large number of tomato growers in the main production areas (N = 86 in Morocco and N = 186 in Turkey). Our findings show that the average level of sustainable practices is greatly affected by national market and institutional particularities, in particular on the demand side. Moreover the surveys confirm the initial assumption of the major role played by private actors in managing safety risk when there are high business stakes, as in export chains oriented towards rich Western countries.

Abstract This paper is an original empirical attempt to explain the outcome of collective action in the domain of food safety. We examine conditions and institutions that influence pesticide residue levels in vegetables using econometric analysis on data gathered from 60 farmer organisations in Vietnam. Findings suggest that collective action affects safety in that it provides members with technical assistance and monitoring for pest management at the farming level. They confirm the U-shape hypothesis of the effect of group size on safety performance which derives from the trade-off that exists between economies of scale and free-riding. The contribution of public authorities and ecological conditions to food safety remains controversial, while market forces do not yet seem able to drive the production of safer vegetables.