Many countries are seeking to accelerate their transitions to a zero‑carbon energy system in line with their commitments under the Paris Agreement. In energy policy analysis, transition progress and policy success are often measured by trends in emissions and renewable energy deployment. While these outcome metrics are important, they provide limited insight into the broader systemic changes, as they overlook the underlying drivers and processes. Moreover, existing evaluation frameworks often lack theoretical grounding, leading to an incoherent set of indicators. Here, we assess transition progress from a system-change perspective by developing a theory-driven evaluation framework and applying it to the electricity sectors of four European transition “leaders”: the UK, Germany, Denmark, and Norway. Unlike existing frameworks, our approach is rooted in sustainability transitions literature, improving interpretability while maintaining a focused set of systemic change indicators. Our analysis reveals significant progress in scaling up renewables and phasing out carbon-intensive technologies. However, persistent challenges—particularly in electricity grid infrastructure and regulatory adaptation—continue to hinder full decarbonization, especially in the UK and Germany, which are not on track towards zero‑carbon power. The Norwegian and especially Danish electricity transitions are progressing well, not only in terms of emissions and technology deployment, but the underlying systemic measures make their transition policies credible. Our findings highlight the importance of including systemic metrics, going beyond emissions and renewables deployment metrics, and illustrate the feasibility of a “policy turn” in transition studies through forward-looking analytical tools.

As the energy transition picks up pace, the side effects of energy policies are gaining political prominence. In recent years, the costs and, especially, the distributive effects of energy policy have climbed the political agenda, with debates increasingly focusing on the justice effects alongside the effectiveness of policy measures. Here, we explore the role of justice arguments in parliamentary energy policy debates and how they have affected legislation even before they affect the population. We do this for two cases of German energy policy by observing how parliamentarians debate the distributive justice effects of energy transition measures and tracing how their arguments affected legislation. We show that parliamentary debates, especially the more intense and controversial ones, featured strong use of justice arguments, and that both laws subsequently changed along the lines of several of those arguments. Simultaneously, we observe that debates were, in part, symbolic, signaling opposition rather than truly seeking to affect the laws. We conclude that justice-based argumentation is common and strong in parliamentary debates on energy policy, and that these arguments do affect legislation.

Carbon taxation is generally viewed as a central climate policy instrument to decrease and eventually eliminate carbon emissions. In many countries, however, carbon taxes are set and are kept too low to strongly reduce emissions, suggesting that climate change mitigation may not be their primary rationale. We analyze the tax design, policy evolution, and governmental justification of each of the 19 initially low national carbon taxes implemented in 1990-2023. We show that several countries followed a within-policy sequencing rationale: an initially low carbon tax set to increase to emission-reducing levels later, but sometimes slowly, up to decades after implementation. Some taxes were designed to fund other climate policies. Most initially low carbon taxes primarily followed fiscal rationales or were implemented to meet international expectations. We conclude that the primary rationale or priority outcome for enacting carbon taxes is not always to reduce emissions.

Citizen's preferences about decarbonised electricity supply are crucial for a successful energy transition, both regarding the direction and the speed at which it can unfold. While preferences about single aspects, like prices and technology, have been assessed before, these preferences cannot be directly translated to preferred energy supply on the system level, for two reasons: First, the individual aspects interact and cannot be assessed in isolation. Varying the technology mix, for example, affects many other aspects of the electricity system such as prices. Second, many aspects have both local and global impacts and cannot be assessed for just a single region. Constraining imports in one region, for example, affects the technology mix in other regions. Therefore, preferences can only be meaningfully analysed within consistent scenarios that incorporate multiple aspects including their interactions, are able to represent the local context, and have a broad spatial scope. Such scenarios are out of scope of pure preference studies. Here, we overcome these limitations by combining preference data with detailed techno-economic scenarios on the national and subnational scale. Building on random utility theory, we fit a discrete choice model to data from a choice experiment conducted in four European countries and use it to predict choices of scenarios. We find that citizens would choose scenarios with high shares of local self-sufficiency and solar power over trade-and wind-power-centered least-cost scenarios, although they are more expensive. Our approach allows to evaluate energy plans not only by technical and economic aspects, but also by citizen preferences.

Wind power accounted for 8% of global electricity generation in 2023 and is one of the cheapest forms of low-carbon electricity. Although fully commercial, many challenges remain in achieving the required scale-up, relating to integrating wind farms into wider technical, economic, social, and natural systems. We review the main challenges, outline existing solutions, and propose future research needed to overcome existing problems. Although the techno-economic challenges of grid and market integration are seen as significant obstacles to scaling up wind power, the field is replete with solutions. In many countries, planning and permitting are immediate barriers to wind-power deployment; although solutions are emerging in the EU and several countries, the effectiveness and long-term acceptance of fast-track permissions and go-to areas remains to be seen. Environmental impacts on wildlife and recycling challenges are rising issues for which tested and scalable solutions are often still lacking, pointing to large remaining research requirements.

CSP Data is a free web application for data discovery of all commercial Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) plants. CSP data is fed with CSP.guru data, an open source dataset of all Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) plants. This paper introduces and explains the tools and information provided by CSP Data to potential users so they can use it efficiently together with the ongoing work being performed to release new features. It also presents the CSP.guru dataset, how the original idea was developed, its key features and how this dataset is used by industry and academia.

Solar photovoltaic and wind power generation is expanding fast globally, fuelled by technological progress and rapid cost reductions. Other renewable power technologies fare much worse: deployment stagnates despite substantial technological progress. Here, we explore why these technologies fall off political agendas although they are improving, proposing that negative cross-technology feedback from more dynamic, faster deployed technologies reduce the legitimacy of laggard technologies. This generates political pressure to cancel or adapt support schemes, which in turn may push the laggard technology to change and become more complementary to the dynamic technologies. We illustrate our propositions with a case study of concentrating solar power (CSP) policy and deployment in three countries. We show how negative legitimacy feedback from the dynamic diffusion of photovoltaics and wind power in the 2010s led to both policy termination and technological adaptation towards complementarity, changing CSP from a generation to a storage and balancing technology.

As climate targets tighten, all countries must transition toward a renewable electricity system, but conflicts about generation and infrastructure deployment impede transition progress. Although the triggers of opposition are well studied, what people want remains understudied. We survey citizen preferences for a renewable electricity future through a conjoint analysis among 4,103 individuals in Denmark, Portugal, Poland, and Germany. With our study we go beyond the Likert scale survey approach specifically seeking trade-offs and contextualized preferences for regional electricity system designs. We show the importance of identifying both the “least preferred” and “most preferred” solutions and highlighting the possibility of identifying very different systems with identical utility. Lastly, our research actively bridges the divide between social aspects and techno-economic modeling, promoting their integration. We show that the most preferred system design in all four countries is a predominantly regional one, based on rooftop solar, communally owned, and not relying on transmission expansion.

A rapid and full decarbonisation of both energy and industry is essential to meet the targets in the Paris agreement, which brings coal- and carbon-intensive regions under significant pressure. Some regions have advanced in their transition and can provide insights in the system change processes. In this paper, we investigate the socio-economic transition processes of Essen and Duisburg as part of the wider structural change in the Ruhr Region/ Germany. We explore causes and effects of their trajectories in the last 30 + years and identify differences in outcome as a function of the interventions and/or contextual differences, while investigating whether either city crossed a tipping point in their transition process (yet). Therefore, we specifically evaluate the cities' development trajectories by seeking evidence for "no", "incremental" or "radical or tipping" changes in sets of qualitative and quantitative indicators. Our analysis shows that both cities experienced incremental changes in their demographic, economic and political trajectories but we found no evidence for either city to have crossed a tipping point in their transition process yet. However, distinct developments in the cities' policy narratives and visions indicate qualitative changes while putting them on different development trajectories potentially leading to tipping points in the future. Our study shows that the sequence of interventions and timing are important factors for the trajectory of a region determining the quality of societal change. It also suggests that radical change and tipping are the exception rather than the rule, especially in the highly complex social systems of cities.

AbstractThis chapter introduces an interdisciplinary perspective to investigate the transition process and to identify empirical evidence of social-ecological tipping points (SETPs) in the case studies on coal and carbon intensive regions (CCIRs) analyzed in the project TIPPING+. The interdisciplinary lens considers different modes of thought, frameworks, and multiple perspectives and interests from diverse stakeholders, a systems’ understanding, and different culture considerations across the CCIRs. Within this interdisciplinary process, we applied various lenses to study the potential for SETPs by combining insights from human geography, social psychology, regional socio-technical systems, and political economy perspectives on the phases of low carbon transitions and on the justice component of the transitions. Subsequently, this chapter gives an overview of how the eight CCIRs case studies in this book have applied various interdisciplinary lenses to investigate the regional transition and the emergence of SETPs.

The tipping point concept, widely recognized within the natural sciences, is experiencing a resurgence in social studies. The emerging field sees growing insights about characteristics and mechanisms of social system tipping; however, much disagreement remains. This includes whether social tipping points can be anticipated - determining its political relevance, as anticipation is essential for actions to intentionally trigger tipping. We address this disagreement and propose a framework which operationalises socio-technical tipping across subsystems and elements to anticipate tipping points, illustrated in two case comparisons. We show that whereas the transition to electric cars in Germany has started but is not about to tip, especially not regarding normative and regulatory regime factors, the same transition in Norway is about to tip, but still requires international car markets to tip before the sectoral transition is tipped and complete. Similarly, we show that the transition to a PV-based renewable power system in Germany has progressed strongly, both regarding technology and regime factors, but the system has not yet tipped: further efforts reforming infrastructure and regulation are essential. Hence, our findings emphasise the notion that while technological progress holds significance, it represents only one facet among several that must align for a system to undergo a tipping point.

AbstractA crucial task to accelerate global decarbonisation is to understand how to enable fast, equitable, low-carbon transformations in Coal and Carbon Intensive Regions (CCIRs). In this early literature review we underlined the relevance of the boundary concept of social-ecological tipping points (SETPs) and showed that the research and policy usage of SETPs applied to accelerate structural regional sustainability transformations faces three key challenges: (I) integrating theoretical and empirical contributions from diverse social and ecological sciences, together with complexity theory (II) designing open transdisciplinary assessment processes able to represent multiple qualities of systemic change and enable regionally situated transformative capacities, and (III) moving away from one-directional metaphors of social change, or static or homogeneous conceptions of individual agency and single equilibrium in energy transitions; and instead, focus on understanding the conditions and capacities for the emergence of systemic transformations and regenerative processes across multiple levels and forms of agency. We refer to these complex and place-situated processes as learning to enable regional transformative emergence.

Background The COVID-19 pandemic affected stakeholder engagement in sustainability research projects in many ways. But which effects appear permanent today, after the pandemic ended? Methods To address this, we interviewed researchers and stakeholders and carried out a survey among European sustainability research projects in 2022. Results We find that the pandemic years disrupted stakeholder-based research, also with lasting effects. The forced shift to online modes showed how digital engagement can bring benefits in terms of easier and more efficient stakeholder engagement, but also that important aspects are lost, particularly regarding intensity of collaboration and depth of insights. Whether to go online or stay offline depends largely on the research objective, which stakeholders to involve, and how well researchers and stakeholders already know each other. Most researchers and stakeholders want to continue online collaboration in the long term, especially those with positive online collaboration experiences from the pandemic years. Conclusions The pandemic has a long-term impact on stakeholder engagement in research; online engagement cannot replace all benefit of previous in-person interactions with stakeholders, but it has led to digital innovations and expanded the engagement portfolio. Our research has provided qualitative insights into the impact of the pandemic on stakeholder engagement in various sustainability research projects and the implications for the long-term future that are relevant to researchers and funding agencies.

Direct air capture (DAC) is increasingly recognized as a necessary puzzle piece to achieve the Paris climate targets. However, the current high cost and energy intensity of DAC act as a barrier. Short-term strategies for initial deployment, technology improvement, and cost reduction are needed to enable large-scale deployment. We assess and compare two near-term pathways leading to the same installed DAC capacity and thus yielding the same cost reductions: its combination with CO _2 storage as direct air carbon capture and storage, or its deployment for CO _2 utilization as direct air carbon capture and utilization e.g. for synthetic fuels, chemicals, and materials; we characterize these as Direct and Spillover pathways. Drawing on the Multi-level Perspective on Technological Transition as a heuristic, we examine both technical and immaterial factors needed to scale up DAC under the two pathways, in order to assess the pathways’ relative advantages and to identify possible short-term bottlenecks. We find neither pathway to be clearly better: the Direct pathway offers technical advantages but faces regulatory barriers that need to be resolved before deployment, while the Spillover pathway offers market and governance advantages but faces challenges related to hydrogen production and increasing resource needs as it scales up. There may be reasons for policymakers to therefore pursue both approaches in a dynamic manner. This could involve prioritizing the Spillover pathway in the short term due to possibly fewer short-term regulatory barriers and its ability to produce net-zero emission products for existing and accessible markets. Once short-term governance obstacles have been addressed, however, the Direct pathway may allow for more efficient scaling of DAC capacity and cost reductions, especially if by then the needed infrastructure and institutions are in place.

Background:The COVID-19 pandemic affected stakeholder engagement in sustainability research projects in many ways. But which effects appear permanent today, after the pandemic ended? Methods:To address this, we interviewed researchers and stakeholders and carried out a survey among European sustainability research projects in 2022. Results:We find that the pandemic years disrupted stakeholder-based research, also with lasting effects. The forced shift to online modes showed how digital engagement can bring benefits in terms of easier and more efficient stakeholder engagement, but also that important aspects are lost, particularly regarding intensity of collaboration and depth of insights. Whether to go online or stay offline depends largely on the research objective, which stakeholders to involve, and how well researchers and stakeholders already know each other. Most researchers and stakeholders want to continue online collaboration in the long term, especially those with positive online collaboration experiences from the pandemic years. Conclusions:The pandemic has a long-term impact on stakeholder engagement in research; online engagement cannot replace all benefit of previous in-person interactions with stakeholders, but it has led to digital innovations and expanded the engagement portfolio. Our research has provided qualitative insights into the impact of the pandemic on stakeholder engagement in various sustainability research projects and the implications for the long-term future that are relevant to researchers and funding agencies.

Crises may act as tipping points for decarbonization pathways by triggering structural economic change or offering windows of opportunity for policy change. We investigate both types of effects of the global financial and COVID-19 crises on decarbonization in Spain and Germany through a quantitative Kaya-decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions and through a qualitative review of climate and energy policy changes. We show that the global financial crisis resulted in a critical juncture for Spanish CO2 emissions due to the combined effects of the deep economic recession and crisis-induced structural change, resulting in reductions in carbon and energy intensities and shifts in the economic structure. However, the crisis also resulted in a rollback of renewable energy policy, halting progress in the transition to green electricity. The impacts were less pronounced in Germany, where pre-existing decarbonization and policy trends continued after the crisis. Recovery packages had modest effects, primarily due to their temporary nature and the limited share of climate-related spending. The direct short-term impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on CO2 emissions were more substantial in Spain than in Germany. The policy responses in both countries sought to align short-term economic recovery with the long-term climate change goals of decarbonization, but it is too soon to observe their lasting effects. Our findings show that crises can affect structural change and support decarbonization but suggest that such effects depend on pre-existing trends, the severity of the crisis and political manoeuvring during the crisis. The short-term effects of the Global Financial and COVID-19 crises on CO2 emission drivers were larger in Spain than in Germany because of pre-existing trends and the crises ' magnitudeThe Global Financial Crisis represented a tipping point for emissions in Spain, affecting the structural drivers of emissions. However, renewable energy policy was temporarily negatively affected by the crisis.Both countries' policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis sought to align short-term economic recovery with long-term decarbonization goals, moving beyond the 'environment vs economic recovery' dichotomy that prevailed during the Global Financial Crisis.Green recovery packages should prioritize measures with a higher potential to support structural change consistent with deep decarbonization.It is crucial to adapt energy and climate policy ex-ante to make them more resilient to political and fiscal pressures which may emerge in the wake of crises.

This chapter reviews how the European Union has fared in enabling a green recovery in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis, drawing comparisons to developments after the financial crisis. The chapter focuses on the European Commission and its evolving role in promoting decarbonisation efforts in its Member States, paying particular attention to its role in financing investments in low-carbon assets. It considers both the direct effects of green stimulus policies on decarbonisation in the EU and how these actions have shaped the capacities of the Commission as an actor in the field of climate and energy policy. The analysis reveals a significant expansion of the Commission’s role compared to the period following the financial crisis. EU-level measures have provided incentives for Member States to direct large volumes of financing towards investments in climate-friendly assets. Nevertheless, the ultimate impact will largely be shaped by implementation at the national level.

The NFDI4Energy consortium aims to establish new services filling a variety of needs for the energy system research community, from making FAIR research data easily accessible to promoting collaboration among community entities. Seven Task Areas (TAs) have been defined to achieve the consortium’s objectives, each with a specific focus. Task Area 4 (TA4): FAIR Data for Energy System Research shall develop ontologies, metadata standards, and services to promote semantic consistency and improve interoperability of energy research projects, thereby supporting the harmonization of data management among various institutions and research fields.

As the climate targets tighten and countries are impacted by several crises, understanding how and under which conditions carbon dioxide emissions peak and start declining is gaining importance. We assess the timing of emissions peaks in all major emitters (1965-2019) and the extent to which past economic crises have impacted structural drivers of emissions contributing to emission peaks. We show that in 26 of 28 countries that have peaked emissions, the peak occurred just before or during a recession through the combined effect of lower economic growth (1.5 median percentage points per year) and decreasing energy and/or carbon intensity (0.7) during and after the crisis. In peak-and-decline countries, crises have typically magnified pre-existing improvements in structural change. In non-peaking countries, economic growth was less affected, and structural change effects were weaker or increased emissions. Crises do not automatically trigger peaks but may strengthen ongoing decarbonisation trends through several mechanisms.

Today, energy system models are becoming increasingly powerful and detailed regarding techno-economic parameters. However, current models rarely include social and political factors, although these factors constitute important determinants for the design of energy systems. In Task Area 2 of the nfdi4energy research project, we therefore explore social and political drivers and constraints of the energy transition, generate and link the relevant data, and prepare it for incorporation on a data sharing platform. The aim of this task area is to co-design a scientific energy data and research sharing platform that can feed into new or existing energy models to help inform the public and political decision makers to determine socially acceptable energy pathways of the future. In addition, we will involve citizens during the project lifetime in the development of a platform that enables and incentivizes the active participation of public stakeholders in energy system research.Consequentially, the intention of this abstract within the “Linking RDM Track” is to provide an overview of the platform engagement design process for society and policy.