Shoppers who use the Internet can often find multiple vendors of a single, physically identical product. These vendors may offer very different prices for these identical products. However, different vendors may or may not be certified or rated by third parties, be familiar to the shopper due to advertising, or have offered “free” shipping. This research investigates whether product prices reflect vendor differences. This research shows that consumers do, to some extent, get what they pay for, since higher prices are demanded by vendors who advertise, offer free shipping, or are highly rated.
In this study, an alternative theoretical model for the relationship between pay and performance is developed. Prior research implicitly assumes that increases in compensation will enhance effort and subsequently increase performance via the substitution effect, ignoring the possibility of an income effect. At high levels of pay, there may be a strong income effect, leading to less effort and lower performance, creating a backward bending labor supply function. The empirical evidence provides support for this theoretical construct. The results of this study also illuminate the weak relationship between pay and performance found in prior studies.
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The cycloaromatization of easily-prepared arenediynes is an efficient route to fused aromatic systems, but the requirement of very high temperatures to induce this reaction limits both scalability and generality. We demonstrate that cycloaromatization can be induced by addition of a radical species to an arenediyne unit. Tethering this radical to the enediyne leads to the formation of larger fused systems, such as fluoranthenes and acephenanthrylenes, in a single step.
This paper explores why and how ecommerce firms differentiate their products and services. Consumers who shop online are able to do quick and easy comparison shopping, including shopping in an active market for used goods. Since online product search and price comparisons are faster, easier, and involve fewer shopping costs, firms who sell online must differentiate their products and services to a greater extent than those who do not sell online. These product and service differentiations may be certified and rated by host shopping sites and by outside ratings companies.
Professors in intermediate and advanced microeconomic theory courses often propose a proof that indifference curves cannot intersect that relies on the transitivity and monotonicity of preferences. In the interest of stimulating thought on the topic, we derive an elementary proof that indifference curves cannot intersect which relies on fewer assumptions than the traditional proof. We conclude that transitivity is essential in constructing a theory of rational choice; but transitivity is not essential in showing that indifference curves cannot intersect.
Executive Summary. Researchers have found that firm size is more important than firm performance in determining the compensation of top managers of real estate investment trusts (REITs). In fact, some recent research excludes performance altogether as an explanatory variable in estimating compensation. This research reexamines this issue by using a market-based measure of performance and by segmenting compensation into total and incentive-based components. The results demonstrate that the rewards to performance dominate the rewards to size. This finding indicates that performance is a more important explanatory variable than prior research suggests.
The Bergman cycloaromatization reaction efficiently converts easily prepared acyclic enediynes into aromatic rings. In order to prepare larger, functionalized fused aromatic systems using this reaction, a thorough understanding of how functionalization affects cycloaromatization is necessary. We present here our studies on the influence of substituents at three different functionalization sites on cycloaromatization, and how these functional groups can be tailored to prepare more complex systems.
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The market for interest rate swaps has grown consistently since its inception. Swaps involve “swapping” fixed interest rate debt for variable rate debt. We explain this growth using a game theoretic model. We focus on managerial and owner compensation differences under swaps and open market restructuring. We conclude that swaps occur because the swap market incorporates information about the firm more quickly than the open debt market. Hence, managers of firms whose credit risk has improved may capture the lower default risk premium more quickly in the swap market than they can in the open market. The lower default risk premium benefits owners and managers of firms whose compensation depends on the value of the firm.
How can action research be made more rigorous? We discuss in this paper action research, positivism and some major criticisms of action research by positivists. We then examine issues relating the conduct of IS research in organisations through multiple iterations in the action research cycle proposed by Susman and Evered. We argue that the progress through iterations allows the researcher to gradually broaden the research scope and in consequence add generality to the research findings. A brief illustrative case is provided with a study on groupware introduction in a large civil engineering company. In the light of this illustrative case we contend that effective application of the iterative approach to action research has the potential to bring research rigour up closer to standards acceptable by positivists and yet preserve the elements that characterise action research as such.
Should the enforcers of rules inform potential violators about how likely violations will be detected? In practice, there is some mixture of revelation and secrecy‐police inform potential speeders about new detection technologies, but not about other dimensions of detection. We explain the mix of revelation and secrecy using games of asymmetric information in which the detection level is modeled exogenously. Our analysis applies to various legal and social conflict areas such as terrorism, speeding, and parenting.
ADVERTISEMENT RETURN TO ISSUEPREVArticleNEXTMagnetic stirring devices for use with overhead projectorsRubin Battino , Howard R. DuFour , and John L. Scott Cite this: J. Chem. Educ. 1980, 57, 3, 184Publication Date (Print):March 1, 1980Publication History Received3 August 2009Published online1 March 1980Published inissue 1 March 1980https://doi.org/10.1021/ed057p184RIGHTS & PERMISSIONSArticle Views39Altmetric-Citations-LEARN ABOUT THESE METRICSArticle Views are the COUNTER-compliant sum of full text article downloads since November 2008 (both PDF and HTML) across all institutions and individuals. These metrics are regularly updated to reflect usage leading up to the last few days.Citations are the number of other articles citing this article, calculated by Crossref and updated daily. Find more information about Crossref citation counts.The Altmetric Attention Score is a quantitative measure of the attention that a research article has received online. Clicking on the donut icon will load a page at altmetric.com with additional details about the score and the social media presence for the given article. Find more information on the Altmetric Attention Score and how the score is calculated. Share Add toView InAdd Full Text with ReferenceAdd Description ExportRISCitationCitation and abstractCitation and referencesMore Options Share onFacebookTwitterWechatLinked InReddit PDF (503 KB) Get e-Alertsclose Get e-Alerts
The market for interest rate swaps has grown consistently since its inception. Swaps involve "swapping" fixed interest rate debt for variable rate debt. We explain this growth using a game theoretic model. We focus on managerial and owner compensation differences under swaps and open market restructuring. We conclude that swaps occur because the swap market incorporates information about the firm more quickly than the open debt market. Hence, managers of firms whose credit risk has improved may capture the lower default risk premium more quickly in the swap market than they can in the open market. The lower default risk premium benefits owners and managers of firms whose compensation depends on the value of the firm.