Reading the object pronoun him in (1a) as anaphoric to John, (1a) and (1b) are synonymous. Two related questions arise: what makes it possible for infinitivals with too to contain a non-subject gap? And how do sentences like those in (1) get to be synonymous? Chomsky (1977) argued for an approach to the first question in which the non-subject gap in an infinitival with too is a trace left behind by a phonetically null operator that has moved to the edge of its clause to form a predicate of individuals. While Chomsky did not address the second question, he did assume that the infinitival is a complement of too. Under this assumption, a straightforward extension of Chomsky’s proposal would posit two homophonous degree operators too, one that takes a propositional infinitival clause as its complement and one that combines with a property-denoting infinitival. In this paper we will spell out such an analysis, but then show that it is problematic in view of a number of familiar and novel observations. These observations concern the logical scope of degree phrases with too as well as possible antecedents of the non-subject gaps. In particular, we show that nonsubject gaps in infinitivals with too are strikingly similar in distribution to socalled parasitic gaps. To understand this finding, we propose an alternative to the Chomskyan analysis of gapped infinitivals with too. Like Chomsky, we take gapped infinitivals with too to be due to null operator movement. However, we suggest that the null operator moves beyond its infinitival clause, to the edge of the degree phrase. Building on Nissenbaum (2000), we argue that this assumption brings non-subject gaps in infinitivals with too in line with parasitic gaps found in determiner phrases.

This squib presents two puzzles related to an ambiguity found in for-infinitival relative clauses (FIRs). FIRs invariably receive a modal interpretation even in the absence of any overt modal verb. The modal interpretation seems to come in two distinct types, which can be paraphrased by finite relative clauses employing the modal auxiliaries should and could. The two puzzles presented here arise because the availability of the two readings is constrained by factors that are not otherwise known to affect the interpretation of a relative clause. Specifically, we show, first, that “strong” determiners require the FIR to be interpreted as a SHOULD-relative while “weak” determiners allow both interpretations (the Determiner-Modal Generalization). Secondly, we observe that the COULD-interpretation requires a raising (internally headed) structure for the FIR, while the SHOULD-interpretation is compatible with either a raising or a more standard matching (externally headed) structure (the Raising/Matching Generalization).

This paper investigates gaps in degree phrases with too, as in John is too rich [for the monastery to hire ___ ]. We present two curious restrictions on such gapped degree phrases. First, the gaps must ordinarily be anteceded by the subject of the associated gradable adjective. Second, when embedded under intensional verbs, gapped degree phrases are ordinarily restricted to surface scope, unlike their counterparts without gaps. Just as puzzlingly, we show that these restrictions are lifted when there is overt wh-movement in the main clause, revealing a striking similarity between the distribution of gapped degree phrases and so-called parasitic gap constructions. These findings, we argue, suggest that the theory of parasitic gaps needs to accommodate gapped degree phrases. Specifically, they argue that parasitic constituents are null operator structures—and under the right conditions need not be accompanied by matrix wh-movement.

This paper argues that "covert" operations like Quantifier Raising (QR) can precede "overt" operations. Specifically we argue that there are overt operations that must take the output of QR as their input. If this argument is successful there are two interesting consequences for the theory of grammar. First, there cannot be a "covert" (i.e. post-spellout) component of the grammar. That is, what distinguishes operations that affect phonology from those that do not cannot be an arbitrary point in the derivation ("spellout") before which the former apply and after which the latter do; all syntactic operations apply in the same component (henceforth 'single component grammar'). Second, there must be some alternative means for distinguishing "overt" from "covert" operations. One such alternative, which we can call the 'phonological theory of QR', was suggested by Bobaljik (1995), Pesetsky (1998), Groat and O'Neil (1994). These authors proposed that the distinguishing property has to do with principles of the syntaxphonology interface. Assume that movement is a copying operation with phonology targeting one copy in a chain for pronunciation. The distinction between "overt" and "covert" movement, these authors suggest, is this: "overt" movements are the result of phonology targeting the head of a chain for pronunciation, while "covert" movements result from phonology targeting the tail of a chain. We will tentatively adopt this phonological theory of QR (but see footnote 4). The argument that covert operations sometimes precede overt operations is based on extraposition from NP. Specifically, we argue that certain instances of extraposition result not from movement of the extraposed material but rather from QR of an NP and subsequent merger of an

Preamble. How much structure is there inside a VP? To what extent does semantically complex event structure map onto articulated syntactic structures? (1) Max boiled some potatoes. (2) • Max is the agent of a volitional act. • There is an event of some potatoes boiling. • The potatoes are cooked. (3) a. b. VP DP subject V V DP object vP DP subject v v VP V DP object c. vP DP subject v v VP DP object V V

Sentences like (1), which have been called Anankastic (from the Greek word for necessity), have the outward form of conditionals. But their meanings differ from those of ordinary indicative conditionals in interesting respects—apart from the curious fact that the if-clause can be replaced by an infinitival rationale-clause. It is odd, for example, for a conditional sentence like (1a) to imply (3). Why would a sentence of the form (4a) mean the same thing as one of the form (4b)?

July 01 2004 Condition A and Scope Reconstruction In Special Collection: CogNet Danny Fox, Danny Fox MIT Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Jon Nissenbaum Jon Nissenbaum McGill University Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Danny Fox MIT Jon Nissenbaum McGill University Online ISSN: 1530-9150 Print ISSN: 0024-3892 © 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2004 Linguistic Inquiry (2004) 35 (3): 475–485. https://doi.org/10.1162/ling.2004.35.3.475 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Danny Fox, Jon Nissenbaum; Condition A and Scope Reconstruction. Linguistic Inquiry 2004; 35 (3): 475–485. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/ling.2004.35.3.475 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsLinguistic Inquiry Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

This paper argues that “covert” operations like Quantifier Raising (QR) can precede “overt” operations. Specifically we argue that there are overt operations that must take the output of QR as their input. If this argument is successful there are two interesting consequences for the theory of grammar. First, there cannot be a “covert” (i.e. post-spellout) component of the grammar. That is, what distinguishes operations that affect phonology from those that do not cannot be an arbitrary point in the derivation (“spellout”) before which the former apply and after which the latter do; all syntactic operations apply in the same component (henceforth ‘single component grammar’). Second, there must be some alternative means for distinguishing “overt” from “covert” operations. One such alternative, which we can call the ‘phonological theory of QR’, was suggested by Bobaljik (1995), Pesetsky (1998), Groat and O’Neil (1994). These authors proposed that the distinguishing property has to do with principles of the syntax-phonology interface. Assume that movement is a copying operation with phonology targeting one copy in a chain for pronunciation. The distinction between “overt” and “covert” movement, these authors suggest, is this: “overt” movements are the result of phonology targeting the head of a chain for

Reading the object pronoun him in (1a) as anaphoric to John, (1a) and (1b) are synonymous. Two related questions arise: what makes it possible for infinitivals with too to contain a non-subject gap? And how do sentences like those in (1) get to be synonymous? Chomsky (1977) argued for an approach to the first question in which the non-subject gap in an infinitival with too is a trace left behind by a phonetically null operator that has moved to the edge of its clause to form a predicate of individuals. While Chomsky did not address the second question, he did assume that the infinitival is a complement of too. Under this assumption, a straightforward extension of Chomsky’s proposal would posit two homophonous degree operators too, one that takes a propositional infinitival clause as its complement and one that takes a property-denoting infinitival. In this paper we will spell out such an analysis, but then present two types of surprising observations that it fails to predict, both having to do with the interpretation of too when it appears under intensional verbs. We argue that the first of these appears to be a restriction on the logical scope of the degree operator, while the second appears to be a restriction on the binding of world variables.