Questions with nested wh-phrases like "which book by which author" cannot receive pair-list readings. We propose that this restriction falls out of a general constraint against questions whose answers are all Strawson-equivalent, together with certain independently motivated assumptions about the syntax-semantics of multiple wh-questions. Support for our proposal comes from Bulgarian, a language that has been argued to display key components of the LF of wh-questions overtly. If this is true, the language teaches us that there are two LFs that can in principle be associated with nested wh-questions, only one of which is subject to the restriction observed in English. This distinction is a direct consequence of our proposal.

The literature in semantics and pragmatics provides extensive evidence for the strengthening of linguistic expressions, both in matrix positions and when embedded under various operators. We study the properties of such strengthening using a very simple setting. Specifically, we look at when the expression “crate with a banana” can be understood as a unique crate even though two different crates have a banana in them. By varying the scenarios in which an expression such as “Pick the crate with a banana” is evaluated, we show that the strengthening of “crate with a banana” within the scope of the definite article parallels the entailments of “crate with only a banana” (with an overt exhaustivity operator, ‘only’). We use this observation to argue that strengthening in embedded positions follows the logic of an exhaustivity operator rather than that of rational inference. We then note that a similar pattern obtains in matrix positions.

Some recent publications have made the suggestion that Large Language Models are not just successful engineering tools but also good theories of human linguistic cognition. This note reviews methodological and empirical reasons to reject this suggestion out of hand.

Denić (2018, 2019, To appear) observes that the availability of distributive inferences—for sentences with disjunction embedded in the scope of a universal quantifier—depends on the size of the domain quantified over as it relates to the number of disjuncts. Based on her observations, she argues that probabilistic considerations play a role in the computation of implicatures. In this paper we explore a different possibility. We argue for a modification of Denić’s generalization, and provide an explanation that is based on intricate logical computations but is blind to probabilities. The explanation is based on the observation that when the domain size is no larger than the number of disjuncts, universal and existential alternatives are equivalent if distributive inferences are obtained. We argue that under such conditions a general ban on ‘fatal competition’ (Magri 2009a,b, Spector 2014) is activated, thereby predicting distributive inferences to be unavailable.

In the linguistics literature, the derivation of scalar implicatures has often been handled in a relatively modular way, using computations that are sensitive to logical relations among alternatives such as entailment but are blind to other notions such as the probabilities that participants in a conversation might associate with these alternatives (or with related propositions). In recent years, a family of models that we refer to as iterated rationality models (IRMs) have offered an interestingly different perspective on such alternative-sensitive processes in terms of multiple iterations of (typically probabilistic) reasoning. Our paper investigates what at first sight seems like a very interesting argument for the adequacy of IRMs as models of scalar implicatures, coming from the conjunctive interpretation of disjunctive sentences. We then outline challenges for the argument based on a theoretical comparison with the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures. The comparison focuses on the full distribution of conjunctive interpretation, on the question of sensitivity to priors, and on other results achieved within the grammatical theory that the IRM literature has yet to engage with.

This paper brings a developmental perspective to the discussion of a longstanding issue surrounding the proper characterization of presuppositions. On an influential view (Stalnaker in Synthese 22(1–2):272–289, 1970; Stalnaker, in Milton, Unger (eds) Semantics and philosophy, New York University Press, New York, 1974; Karttunen in Theor Linguist 1:181–194, 1974), formal presuppositions reflect admittance conditions: an utterance of a sentence which presupposes p is admitted by a conversational context c only if p is common ground in c . The theory distinguishes two modes of satisfying this formal requirement: (i) presuppositions may have common ground status prior to utterance, or (ii) they may achieve common ground status post hoc, via accommodation, an adjustment of the common ground by cooperative listeners so as to meet the requirements of an uttered sentence. While intuitive and general, the theory has been criticized (among other things) on methodological grounds (see e.g. Gazdar in Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition and logical form, Academic Press, New York, 1979): the availability of accommodation makes it difficult to empirically examine the notion of presupposition as admittance conditions because a central tenet—pragmatic infelicity results whenever c does not entail p —may be masked due to the pragmatic sophistication of language users. In this paper, we argue that child language presents an opportunity to avoid this intrinsic difficulty. In a series of behavioral experiments, we show that young children generate a default expectation that the presuppositions of an asserted sentence have common ground status prior to utterance. Furthermore and more tellingly, we also find that even when accommodation is the preferred option for adults, children fail to accommodate presuppositions in an adult-like manner. This pattern of behavior, we argue, is expected under the admittance theory: in a population where the interference from accommodation is reduced, the impact of failing to satisfy the formal admittance conditions becomes directly observable.

This paper contributes to a body of research using parasitic gaps (PGs; Engdahl 1983, Culicover and Postal 2001, a.o.) to explore the nature of movement (Nissenbaum 2000, Legate 2003, Overfelt 2015b, Bondarenko and Davis 2019, Davis 2020, a.o.). In particular, this paper examines the implications of a particular variety of PG for the hypothesis that movement paths often involve several successive-cyclic steps:

We propose a modification of the exhaustivity operator from Fox (in: Sauerland and Stateva (eds) Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 71–120, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230210752_4 ) that on top of negating all the Innocently Excludable alternatives affirms all the ‘Innocently Includable’ ones. The main result of supplementing the notion of Innocent Exclusion with that of Innocent Inclusion is that it allows the exhaustivity operator to identify cells in the partition induced by the set of alternatives (assign a truth value to every alternative) whenever possible. We argue for this property of ‘cell identification’ based on the simplification of disjunctive antecedents and the effects on free choice that arise as the result of the introduction of universal quantifiers. We further argue for our proposal based on the interaction of only with free choice disjunction.

I develop a new approach to universal free choice which does not prescribe universal force, but rather ensures this result through the use of a scalar particle. ‘Even’ associatingwith awh-indefinite in a conditional clausewill ensure that themodal/temporal operator restricted by the conditional has universal force. A pronoun referring to a referent described by this conditional will thus have wide-scope universal force, parasitic on the modal/temporal quantification. Evidence for such an approach for free choice comes from the overt morphology of universal free choice items in Tibetan, as well as similar expressions in Japanese and Dravidian languages.

Building on previous works which argued that scalar implicatures can be computed in embedded positions, this paper proposes a constraint on exhaustification (an economy condition) which restricts the conditions under which an exhaustivity operator can be licensed. We show that this economy condition allows us to derive a number of generalizations, such as, in particular, the ‘Implicature Focus Generalization’: scalar implicatures can be embedded under a downward-entailing operator only if the (relevant) scalar term bears pitch accent. Our economy condition also derives specific predictions regarding the licensing of so-called Hurford disjunctions.

In this paper I argue for a new constraint on questions, namely that a questiondenotation (a set of propositions) must map to a partition of a Stalnakerian Context-Set bypoint-wise exhaustification (point-wise application of the function Exh). The presuppositionthat Dayal attributes to an Answer operator follows from this constraint, if we assume a fairlystandard definition of Exh (Krifka, 1995). But the constraint is more restrictive therebyderiving the sensitivity of higher order quantification to negative islands (Spector, 2008).Moreover, when combined with recent proposals about the nature of Exh – designedprimarily to account for the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction (e.g. Bar-Lev and Fox,2017) – Dayal’s presupposition follows only in certain environments. This observationallows for an account of the “mention-some” interpretation of questions that makes specificdistributional predictions.Keywords: exhaustivity, Free Choice, maximality, higher-order quantification, mentionsome,negative-islands, partition, scalar implicatures, uniqueness.

The goal of this paper is to provide a global account of universal Free Choice (FC) inferences (argued to be needed in Chemla 2009b). We propose a stronger exhaustivity operator than proposed in Fox (2007), one that doesn’t only negate all the Innocently Excludable (IE) alternatives but also asserts all the ``Innocently Includable'' (II) ones, and subsequently can derive universal FC inferences globally. We further show that Innocent Inclusion is independently motivated by considerations that come from the semantics of only (data from Alxatib 2014). Finally, the distinction between Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion allows us to capture differences between FC inferences and other scalar implicatures.

We present evidence that preschool children oftentimes understand disjunctive sentences as if they were conjunctive. The result holds for matrix disjunctions as well as disjunctions embedded under every. At the same time, there is evidence in the literature that children understand or as inclusive disjunction in downward-entailing contexts. We propose to explain this seemingly conflicting pattern of results by assuming that the child knows the inclusive disjunction semantics of or, and that the conjunctive inference is a scalar implicature. We make two assumptions about implicature computation in the child: (i) that children access only a proper subset of the adult alternatives (specifically, they do not access the lexicon when generating alternatives), and (ii) that children possess the adult capacity to strengthen sentences with implicatures. As a consequence, children are expected to sometimes not compute any implicatures at all, but in other cases they are expected to compute an implicature that is different from the adult implicature. We argue that the child’s conjunctive strengthening of disjunctive sentences realizes the latter possibility: the adult infers that the conjunction is false but the child infers that the conjunction is true. This behaviour is predicted when our assumptions about child development are coupled with the assumption that a covert exhaustive operator is responsible for strengthening in both the child and the adult. Specifically, children’s conjunctive strengthening is predicted to follow from the same mechanism used by adults to compute conjunctive free choice implicatures in response to disjunctive permission sentences (recursive exhaustification). We furthermore argue that this parallel between the child and the adult extends to disambiguation preferences. In particular, we present evidence that children prefer to strengthen disjunctions to conjunctions, in matrix and embedded positions (under every); this result mirrors previous findings that adults prefer to compute free choice, at the root and under every. We propose a disambiguation strategy that explains the preference for conjunctive strengthening – by both the child and the adult – even though there is no general preference for exhaustification. Specifically, we propose that the preference for a conjunctive strengthening follows from a pragmatic preference for a complete answer to the Question Under Discussion.

Sentences with disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier, Every A is P or Q, tend to give rise to distributive inferences that each of the disjuncts holds of at least one individual in the domain of the quantifier, Some A is P & Some A is Q. These inferences are standardly derived as an entailment of the meaning of the sentence together with the scalar implicature that it is not the case that either disjunct holds of every individual in the domain of the quantifier, Every A is P & Every A is Q (plain negated inferences). As we show, this derivation faces a challenge in that distributive inferences may obtain in the absence of plain negated inferences. We address this challenge by showing that on particular assumptions about alternatives, a derivation of distributive inferences as scalar implicatures can be maintained without in fact necessitating plain negated inferences. These assumptions accord naturally with the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures. We also present experimental data that suggest that plain negated inferences are not only unnecessary for deriving distributive inferences, but might in fact be unavailable.

Hurford’s Constraint, which bans disjunctions in which one disjunct entails the other, has been central to the debate between the pragmatic and the grammatical view on Scalar Implicatures. We provide evidence that Hurford’s Constraint should be derived from more basic principles, and we propose such a derivation using a pragmatic prohibition against redundant constituents. In a first, more conservative version, the redundancy is specific to disjunctions. In a second, more general version, redundancy is banned regardless of constituent type. Both versions make new predictions about the emergence of oddness in cases that are not covered by Hurford’s Constraint. The first version is too restricted. The second one is incorrect. We explore a revised architecture in which the relevant redundancy principle applies locally in the semantic computation. This perspective makes different predictions about oddness than the first two and has a potentially interesting extension to oddness in quantificational constructions, which we discuss. All our attempts to generalize Hurford’s Constraint require the grammatical theory of Scalar Implicatures.