The Higher Education (HE) systems of Chile and the UK are compared in terms of the ‘massification’ (Altbach, 1989) and the relevance and adequacy of the private-public provision mix. Dissimilar, each country has tried to build social inclusion into HE outreach at the same time as allowing participation of the private sector. Also included in the research are a) the role of social capital as a positive contribution for the social and economic development; b) the current state of social inequality in access to HE; and c) an in-depth analysis of the implications of both state and private roles over social inclusion in HE. Outreach programmes from each country, the Propedeutico in Chile and Aimhigher in the UK, are also analysed for lessons learned.
In 2007, on the cusp of the economic crisis, a paper was published in Growth and Change (June 2007) entitled “Shadow Europe: alternative European financial geographies,” which began to tackle the idea of shadow finance in Europe and the size and inseparability of what was regarded as “shadow” from “normal” financial flows. A number of the observations made have proved remarkably prescient and one particular phrase stands out in the light of the recent revelations about the so‐called Panama Papers in 2016: “Strategically important flows of capital derived from complex underground production systems that have seldom been analyzed in detail move through the European financial networks that connect to offshore tax havens (Christensen, 2003). These havens are not a separate and distinct entity from the financial networks that connect world cities but rather a vital counterpart on which the functioning of the cities connected via those networks depends” (2007, p. 319). The revelation of the Panama Papers constitutes a new critical juncture from which to re‐visit that 2007 paper and to re‐examine the state of knowledge on shadow and formal financial flows.
In 2007, on the cusp of the economic crisis, a paper was published in Growth and Change (June 2007) entitled “Shadow Europe: alternative European financial geographies,” which began to tackle the idea of shadow finance in Europe and the size and inseparability of what was regarded as “shadow” from “normal” financial flows. A number of the observations made have proved remarkably prescient and one particular phrase stands out in the light of the recent revelations about the so-called Panama Papers in 2016: “Strategically important flows of capital derived from complex underground production systems that have seldom been analyzed in detail move through the European financial networks that connect to offshore tax havens (Christensen, 2003). These havens are not a separate and distinct entity from the financial networks that connect world cities but rather a vital counterpart on which the functioning of the cities connected via those networks depends” (2007, p. 319). The revelation of the Panama Papers constitutes a new critical juncture from which to re-visit that 2007 paper and to re-examine the state of knowledge on shadow and formal financial flows.
The UK is already a major player in terms of research and innovation into low carbon transitions within the countries of the developing world. However, there are significant opportunities for the UK to enhance its presence within these markets whilst also making a major contribution to meeting international development targets and climate commitments. At the core of the research analysed in the report is that it reflects disparate, research initiatives funded with different research/innovation targets in mind; much latent strength in UK research for low carbon energy for development therefore is implicit in linkage possibilities enhancing systemic effectiveness, particularly by cross-fertilizing innovations taking place in the private sector. Gaps and weaknesses are reflected as much in the lack of collaborative initiatives and ‘siloization’ as in the absence of actual research/funding. The Low Carbon Energy for Development Network (LCEDN) is currently taking the initiative in one aspect of this through the provision of a programme of capacity building and partnership activities to support the development of DfID’s Transforming Energy Access research initiative. What is required of UK energy for development research for the purposes of building a functional system, however, is that the discrete areas of research outlined in this report be re-assembled as coherent, overall research narratives addressing the apparent contradiction of increasing energy access whilst transitioning to the low-carbon economy. Part of this work involves identifying the state and dynamics of UK research capacity in this sector, facilitating greater integration between research funders active in this area, evaluating gaps and key research needs and mapping potential future directions for research interventions and collaborations that build on, and develop, existing UK research capacity. It is expected that this will lead to a range of UK-led energy innovations developed, tested and scaled across developing countries by 2020. The much-needed harmonization of energy access and low carbon transition as a UK research theme however has ultimately to be created out of rethinking research fields from a combination of existing research, plus demand known to be ‘out there’ but which has yet to enter the field of vision of research-funders. This report presents the first part of this work with an overview of current UK research and innovation capacity in a widely defined ‘Energy and International Development’ research area. It identifies key institutions and research centres, thematic areas of excellence, research funding trends over the last decade, emerging research themes plus an overview of grant funding for innovation on the ground. A number of key areas/questions for potential further development of UK research and innovation capacity have been identified and are up for discussion and consultation. The work has been undertaken by LCEDN in partnership with the Knowledge Transfer Network, Energy 4 Impact and IOD PARC .
This paper was accepted for publication in the journal Progress in Development Studies and the definitive published version is available at https://doi.org/10.1177/1464993416688790
Rural community energy projects in the Global South have too frequently been framed within a top-down technologically-driven framework that limits their ability to provide sustainable solutions to energy poverty and improving livelihoods. This framing is linked to how energy interventions are being imagined and constructed by key actors in the sector, via particular sociotechnical imaginaries through which a set of increasingly universalised energy futures for rural communities is prescribed. Projects are too frequently reverse-engineered through the lens of particular combinations of technologies, financial models and delivery mechanisms, rather than by attending to the particular energy needs/aspirations of individual communities. Assumptions over the association between energy access and livelihood enhancement have also reinforced a technocratic determination of appropriate system scale and a search for universalised ‘scaleable’ delivery models. There is, however, no necessary causation between scaleability and outcomes – appropriate implementation scales are not purely determined by technical or financial considerations, rather it is the social scale via which optimum forms of local participation and ownership can be achieved. To operationalise this concern for social space we propose a Social Energy Systems (SES) approach that is advanced via exploration of the interactions between three distinct but mutually edifying variants of energy literacy – energy systems literacy, project community literacy and political literacy.
Bringing economic development and light to those not on the bottom rung of the ladder [abstract]
This article examines recent institutional thinking on the green economy and the implications of official understandings and structuration of a green economy for the global South. Assertions about the transformative potential of a green economy by many international actors conceals a complexity of problems, including the degree to which the green economy is still based on old fossil economies and technical fixes, and the processes through which the green economy ideation remains subject to Northern economic and technical dominance. The article places the intellectual roots of the green economy within a broader historical context and suggests some ways the strategic economic and ideological interests of the global North remain key drivers of green-economy thinking. The analysis is substantiated through two illustrative Latin American examples: the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor and green economy initiatives in Brazil. These suggest that, if the green economy is to address global challenges effectively, it must be conceptualized as more than a bolt-on to existing globalizing capitalism and encompass more critical understandings of the complex socio-economic processes through which poverty is produced and reproduced and through which the global environment is being transformed, a critique which also applies to mainstream discourses of sustainable development.
Purpose - This introductory paper aims to serve a dual purpose. First, it seeks to trace some of the key elements of this emerging agenda in critical corruption studies and the major directions in which the field has moved since 2006, exploring some of the connections between dominant discourses of corruption and anti-corruption and the upheavals which have occurred in the global economy during this period along the way. Second, this discussion also aims to serve as a contextual introduction to this special issue by embracing some of the common themes elaborated in the other papers collected here.Design/methodology/approach - The paper presents a brief personal reflection on developments in the field of critical corruption studies.Findings - The paper reveals some of the limitations of the mainstream approach towards corruption.Originality/value - The paper summarises recent developments in the field and provides a context-setting narrative within which the other papers that comprise this special issue can be situated.
PurposeThe concept of corruption is frequently represented as relating to social practices that violate established rules and norms. This paper, however, seeks to demonstrate that corrupt practices are often only possible because they in fact draw on existing institutional mechanisms and cultural dispositions that grant them a certain social approval and legitimacy. The paper aims to explore these issues through a detailed exploration of corruption in Nicaragua, which outlines how competing élite groups have been able to use different discourses to appropriate resources from the state in quite different ways, reflecting the use of contrasting mechanisms for justifying and legitimizing corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe paper focuses on two key periods of recent Nicaraguan political history: that which occurred during the administration of ex‐President Arnoldo Alemán and the events that unfurled in the aftermath of a chain of bank bankruptcies that occurred in Nicaragua during 2001. These events are explored in the context of David Harvey's ideas of “accumulation by dispossession.”FindingsIn contrast with more classic practices of corruption in Nicaragua that have openly violated existing formal rules and norms but appealed to an ethos of redistribution and a historically‐specific concept of “the public” in order to imbue their actions with legitimacy, the corrupt practices related to recent banking bankruptcies engaged in an extensive instrumentalization of formal state institutions in order to protect élite parochial interests and to achieve “accumulation by dispossession” through appealing to the legitimating support granted by multilateral financial institutions.Originality/valueThe paper illustrates sharply the inadvisability of perspectives that narrowly define corruption in legalistic terms. Such perspectives focus exclusively on the state as the location of corruption, whereas clearly, in Nicaragua as elsewhere, corruption is a far more complicated phenomenon which crosses the artificial boundaries between private and public sectors. It also evolves and takes a myriad different forms which are intimately connected with the ongoing struggles for control of accumulation processes, suggesting a much more integral role for corruption within accumulation strategies than often allowed for in both orthodox economic and Marxist literatures on capital accumulation.