ObjectiveThis article examines the effect of racial attitudes and sexism on evaluations of Kamala Harris. It also compares the effect of these variables on evaluations of other Democratic politicians: Joe Biden, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton. MethodsData are taken from the 2020 American National Election Studies, using feeling thermometers for Harris, Biden, and Obama, and from the 2016 American National Election Studies for Clinton. Our primary independent variables are racial resentment and three measures of sexism: modern, hostile, and traditional sexism. ResultsRacial resentment, modern sexism, and traditional sexism exerted an effect on evaluations of Kamala Harris above and beyond other explanatory variables, including party identification and ideology. However, these effects did not differ considerably from those found for Biden, Obama, and Clinton. ConclusionsRacial resentment and sexism appear to be related to evaluations of any Democratic presidential or vice presidential nominee, reflecting how they have become salient in defining party identities. We speculate, however, that their effects might be even more visible for black women at the top of a presidential ticket, and provide major headwinds into which Kamala Harris may have to run when contemplating any future presidential candidacy of her own.

President Trump's leadership style departed from any other presidents in the US. Trump's unconventional speeches, offhanded remarks, and unilateral foreign policies raised concerns among politicians and citizens around the world. This article examines perceptions of global citizens of President Trump's leadership from his personality and policy perspectives as well as their damaging effects on US soft power. According to the analysis of the 2017 Pew Research Center's global attitudes project, respondents from the majority of countries in the sample regard Trump's leadership negatively, the effects mostly driven by Trump's own personality traits. Trump's divergent policies concerning critical global issues – the environment, immigration, Iran deal, trade relations, and religion – further curtail the favorability rating of the US and deepen anti-Americanism among citizens in other nations.

ObjectivesThis article examines the role of white racial identity or white racial group consciousness in the vote choice of whites for the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2018 midterm elections.MethodsData from the 2018 American National Election Study (ANES) Pilot Study are analyzed using a logistic regression model.ResultsWhite racial consciousness was a significant predictor of U.S. House vote choice in 2018, even after controlling for other relevant explanatory variables such as racial resentment, party identification, and ideology. The effects were especially evident for two quintessential swing groups: independents and moderates.ConclusionIn the first national election of the Trump era, white racial group consciousness became a relevant electoral cleavage and determinant of white vote choice at the subpresidential level. Given the rhetoric and action of Trump as president, the Republican Party has morphed into a white identity political party, not dissimilar to populist right‐wing parties in Europe. While this might reap electoral benefits for the Republican Party in jurisdictions with smaller minority populations, it is likely to cost the party support where there is greater racial diversity. In the long term, the politics of white identity is likely to be an impediment to the Republican Party's ability to expand its electoral base.

ObjectivesThis article examines the effect of both modern and traditional sexism on vote choice in the 2016 presidential election, and posits that they played a major role in explaining Hillary Clinton's defeat to Donald Trump.MethodsData from the 2016 American National Election Study are analyzed using a logistic regression model.ResultsBoth modern and traditional sexism exerted a statistically significant effect on presidential vote choice in 2016. Indeed, its effect rivaled that of racial resentment and was only exceeded by partisanship.ConclusionWhile a variety of factors may have cost Hillary Clinton the presidency in 2016, sexism needs to be addressed as one of those factors. More broadly, the findings of this article suggest that women candidates continue to face obstacles and are evaluated differently than men, especially when running for the most visible offices in American politics.

The emergence of authoritarianism as a core political value has been emphasized by recent scholarship on the political behavior of the American electorate. This paper adds to this literature by examining the effect of authoritarianism in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Given the campaign style of Trump and the issues that he made salient in his campaign, it is hypothesized that authoritarianism should have a substantial effect on vote choice of whites. Using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), logistic regression models of presidential vote choice of white respondents are estimated to ascertain the effect of authoritarianism in presidential elections from 1992 to 2016, controlling for party identification, ideology and several standard demographic control variables. Findings indicate that authoritarianism had the largest effect on white vote choice in 2016 than in any prior election that was analyzed. The candidacy of Trump appears to have been the triggering mechanism given that authoritarianism was a less salient predictor of U.S. House vote choice in 2016. Moreover, this relationship was true for both college and non-college educated whites. Authoritarianism also seems to have been primed by Trump appealing to racial animus, anti-immigration sentiment, nativism, and anti-Muslim prejudice. Authoritarianism is likely to remain a salient determinant of vote choice during the Trump era. Indeed, a widening and deepening of this cleavage means its effects are likely to be apparent in elections below the presidency.

ObjectiveThis article examines the determinants of perceptions of the United States and of President Obama among global citizens.MethodsThe 2013 Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes surveys covering countries from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the Americas, and Africa with diverse socioeconomic and religious backgrounds are analyzed by using multilevel estimates.ResultsFindings reveal that attitudes toward homosexuality systematically shape opinions toward the United States and toward Obama's handling of foreign affairs. We also find the significant impact of religious and economic variables on perceptions of the United States and of Obama above and beyond other explanatory variables.ConclusionThis research demonstrates the relevance of cleavages regarding social values. It also contributes to larger debates about sources of anti‐Americanism, and, more generally, about the role of ideology and social values in international relations.

The literature on partisan change in the American electorate has devoted considerable attention to explaining Republican gains in the South. Less time has been devoted to examining changes outside of the South, where a Democratic majority has persisted-and indeed grown-over the past two decades. This article examines whether the realignment toward the Republican Party in the South has resulted in a move toward the Democratic Party outside the South. Specifically, it is posited that the growing influence of the South within the Republican Party has resulted in a backlash against the GOP. Using data from the American National Election Studies, this article examines affect toward southerners as a determinant of the political behavior of non-southerners. Findings indicate that even after controlling for other explanatory variables, affect toward southerners is a significant predictor of how non-southerners evaluate the political parties, as well as vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. While partisanship and ideology remain the best predictors of vote choice among non-southerners, anti-southern backlash should not be discounted for the GOP's "Northern problem" in recent elections.

ObjectivesThis article addresses a debate among scholars of southern politics concerning the relevance of the distinction between the Deep South and Rim South states. Specifically, it examines the effect of racial resentment on white party identification in both southern subregions.MethodsData from the 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) are analyzed using a multivariate logistic regression model to examine subregional differences in the effect of racial resentment on southern white party identification.ResultsAlthough whites in the Deep South were more likely to identify as Republicans than whites in the Rim South, the effect of racial resentment on party identification in the Deep South was not statistically different from that of whites in the Rim South.ConclusionsWhile it may be premature to completely discard the notion of the “Two Souths” it may behoove scholars of southern politics to also focus on individual state‐by‐state commonalities and differences, rather than be bound exclusively to the Deep/Rim South dichotomy.

The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was initially viewed as signaling a postracial era in American politics. However, since 2008, race and racial attitudes have appeared to pervade American political discourse and shape political attitudes and behavior to an even greater extent. Using data from the American National Election Studies, this article examines the extent to which white racial attitudes have shaped evaluations of perhaps the most visible African American in politics today after the president: the First Lady, Michelle Obama. Findings show that racial resentment played a large role in evaluations of Michelle Obama, even after controlling for other explanatory variables, which include partisanship, ideology, and affect toward Barack Obama.

Partisan change outside of the South has not been studied as extensively as in the 11 states of the Old Confederacy. Given the partisan advantage that the Democratic Party enjoys outside of the South, understanding the dynamics of party support among non-southerners appears to be important to study in its own right – not just as a point of contrast to that of the South. The goal of this article is to update and expand on one of the few pieces of scholarship to probe the reasons for the survival of the Democratic Party outside of the South. Using data from the American National Election Studies, the article concurs with these findings, that the Democratic Party has been successful in maintaining support among low income whites outside the South. However, a class-based explanation offers a partial explanation for the Democratic advantage in party identification. Ideological realignment has also expanded the Democratic base among middle and high income liberals and moderates. Overall, the findings of the article suggest that the electoral prospects of the Democratic Party outside of the South should be favourable for some time to come. The Democratic Party has not just survived outside of the South, it has prospered, and this provides a decided advantage for the party in national elections.

ObjectiveThe effects of racial attitudes on the vote choice of whites in the 2012 U.S. presidential election are examined, with a specific focus on the simultaneous effects of both racial resentment and old‐fashioned racial prejudice.MethodsData are taken from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). Models of vote choice are estimated separately for southern and nonsouthern whites.ResultsFindings show that racial resentment alone affected the vote choice of southern whites, but among nonsouthern whites both racial resentment and old‐fashioned racism exerted independent effects on vote choice. Furthermore, it was among independents that the effects of racial attitudes were most visible.ConclusionsOverall, it is estimated that racial attitudes cost Obama support among white voters, and likely made his victories in a number of swing states a lot closer than they would have been absent the effects of racial attitudes. Consistent with prior literature, findings also demonstrate that the election of the first African‐American president has primed old‐fashioned racial prejudice.

In this note some brief comments are provided on Burmilla and Ryan's Reconsidering The Palin Effect' in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election. Specifically, Burmilla and Ryan's conceptualization of the Palin Effect and their revised model specification are critiqued. Their findings that Palin exerted an effect on vote choice that was typical for any vice-presidential nominee also stands in contrast to several studies that conclude that Palin's effect on vote choice in 2008 was far from typical.

The victory of Barack Obama over John McCain in the 2008 presidential election marked a historic and pivotal moment in American politics. Many observers interpreted the election as heralding a new “post racial” politics. However, others noted that even though short‐term forces were overwhelmingly pro‐Democratic in 2008, Obama's overall vote among white voters barely increased on the share received by John Kerry in 2004. This study uses data from the American National Election Study to examine the effect of the racial attitudes—specifically racial resentment—of whites on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. Findings show that racial resentment exerted a large influence on vote choice, one that was only exceeded by party identification. Furthermore, the effect of racial resentment was greater than in any prior election for which data on racial resentment is available.La victoria de Barack Obama sobre John McCain en las elecciones presidenciales del2008 marcó un momento histórico y sustancial en la política americana. Muchos observadores interpretaron el resultado de la elección como el inicio de una nueva etapa “post‐racial” en la política. Sin embargo, hay quienes señalan que aunque hubo fuerzas a favor de los demócratas durante el 2008, la popularidad de Obama entre los votantes blancos aumentó ligeramente con respecto a la proporción recibida por John Kerry en el 2004. Este artículo usa datos tomados del American National Election Study para examinar los efectos de la actitud racial‐específicamente el resentimiento racial‐ de votantes blancos en la elección presidencial del 2008. Los resultados muestran que el resentimiento racial ejerció un efecto significativo en la elección electoral, siendo superado sólo por la afiliación partidaria. Además, el impacto del resentimiento racial fue mayor que cualquier otra elección para la cual se tiene información al respecto.

Using data from the American National Election Studies, this article addresses whether the Sarah Palin affected vote choice in 2008. Findings indicate not only that evaluations of Palin were a strong predictor of vote choice-even when controlling for confounding variables-but also that Palin's effect on vote choice was the largest of any vice presidential candidate in elections examined dating back to 1980. Theoretically, the article offers support for the proposition that a running mate is an important short-term force affecting voting behavior. Substantively, the article suggests that Palin may have contributed to a loss of support among "swing voters.".

In 2007, Bobby Jindal became the first nonwhite governor to be elected in Louisiana, and only the second nonwhite governor of a southern state. Jindal's election is interesting in that Louisiana has been afflicted by what many observers describe as racial backlash voting. Indeed, some have argued that such racial backlash explained Jindal's defeat in the 2003 gubernatorial election. This article utilizes aggregate-level data to examine whether racial backlash cost Jindal the 2003 election, and if so whether Jindal's victory in 2007 was attributable to the absence of such racial backlash. The findings suggest that racial backlash exerted a significant effect on Jindal's parish-by-parish vote in both the 2003 and 2007 gubernatorial contests. However, the findings also indicate that racial backlash alone was neither a sufficient explanation for Jindal's defeat in 2003 nor enough to deny him victory in 2007.

The modern election campaign that attempts to brand and market political parties and candidates has in many respects been a product of the American election campaign. Indeed the term the ‘Americanization’ of elections is often used as a short-hand way of referring to the professionalization of political campaigns, with all that that entails: polling, television ads, focus groups, segmentation and targeting of voters, direct-mailing, and the hiring of a plethora of campaign consultants. Despite the fact that American campaigns pioneered many of the techniques that are essential to a marketing strategy, the application of a comprehensive political marketing framework to American political parties and candidates has been somewhat limited. At the same time, the evidence to support the notion that American parties have become market-oriented is, at best, mixed. This chapter will examine the political and structural factors that both contribute to and limit the applicability of market-oriented parties in the United States. It then assesses the nature and degree of political marketing in recent presidential elections and concludes by examining the future scope of political market-orientation in American elections. The chapter is primarily based on observations of the political parties and candidates and their campaigning, accounts in the news media and on the Internet, the National Election Studies, and an analysis of others’ research.

This article focuses on partisan change in a region that has become a Democratic stronghold: the Northeast. Using data from the American National Election Studies, the article conceptualizes realignment as changes in the social group composition and ideological and issue bases of party support. Findings suggest that an ideological realignment has transformed the party coalitions in the Northeast in a way that suggests a widespread and durable Democratic advantage. Furthermore, this realignment was produced by both party conversion and generational replacement of the electorate. The article finds little signs that a competitive Republican electoral coalition can be forged, and that a solid Democratic Northeast will likely be a feature of American politics and a regional pillar of any emerging national Democratic majority.Este artículo se enfoca en el cambio partidista en una región que se ha convertido en un bastión Demócrata: el Noreste. Utilizando información de los Estudios Americanos Nacionales de Elecciones (ANES, por sus siglas en inglés), este artículo conceptualiza la realineación como cambios en la composición de los grupos sociales y sus bases ideológicas y de las bases de apoyo partidista por asunto. Los resultados sugieren que una realineación ideológica ha transformado las coaliciones partidistas en el Noreste de una forma que sugiere una ventaja Demócrata extendida y durable. Además, esta realineación fue producida tanto por la transformación del partido como por un remplazo generacional del electorado. El artículo encuentra pocas señales que una coalición electoral competitiva Republicana pueda ser forjada, y que un sólido Noreste Demócrata será probablemente un rasgo de la política Americana y un pilar regional emergente de cualquier mayoría nacional Demócrata.