A better approach is needed to assess potential impact and feasibility of proposals.

The future of climate change and sustainable development will be shaped by future patterns of, among other things, democratic governance. However, while an important factor determining future patterns of mitigation and adaptation, projections of democracy remain largely missing from long-term quantitative projections that are used to inform a wide range of integrated assessment modeling. We introduce projections of long-term levels of democracy across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) in the International Futures model by creating a historical model of electoral democracy from macro-level structural correlates of democracy and then adjusting to meet the SSP narratives. We find that, through the end of the century, worlds of few challenges to adaptation are associated with substantial growth in electoral democracy. Alternatively, worlds of high challenges to both adaptation and mitigation see reductions in the average country level of electoral democracy by the year 2100 to levels last seen in the 1980s.

Climate action is shaped as much by politics as by technology and economics. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), central to mitigation and adaptation assessments, do not yet include a quantitative representation of political development. We outline a research agenda to systematically integrate political dimensions into climate scenario modelling.

The Third Wave of Democratization's international dimension connects domestic democratization processes with the global spread of democracy after 1989. How has democracy promotion, a specific international source, contributed to the Wave of Democratization? And is scholarship well equipped to study the fundamental shifts in democracy promotion caused by the Third Wave of Autocratization? This article answers these questions from two perspectives. First, it assesses the relevance, patterns and effects of international democracy promotion between 1995 and 2024. Second, it takes a meta-perspective and identifies the main characteristics and blind spots of the study of international democracy promotion. Based on these insights, the article makes a conceptual contribution by distinguishing between democracy support and democracy protection. Furthermore, it defines the international scope conditions necessary for effectively promoting democracy during periods of autocratization. Finally, it proposes a new agenda for the study of international democracy promotion after the Third Wave of Democratization.

How do states engaged in international democracy promotion react to current autocratization trends? Research on autocratization so far focuses on its patterns, causes, and consequences. However, governments pursuing democracy promotion abroad had to respond to these challenges. They adjusted projects and diplomatic practices but possibly also overall strategies. While scholars started to analyse individual cases and specific challenges, we lack systematic knowledge on strategic responses: How have governments adapted their foreign and development policies aimed at promoting democracy in a changing global context? This article contributes to filling this gap by analysing how three key states with traditionally different approaches to democracy promotion - Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States - have responded to autocratization at the level of overall foreign and development policy strategy. Based on a qualitative content analysis of official documents, refined by expert interviews, we assess (1) whether and how autocratization as a challenge to democracy promotion is discussed and (2) which responses and (needs for) policy adaptation are identified. In comparing the three cases, we suggest that the perception of autocratization, underlying democracy conceptions and approaches to democracy promotion as well as party-political configurations help explain commonalities and differences in the strategic responses.

Social cohesion is crucial to increasing societies’ resilience to shocks and to enabling sustainable futures. Amidst growing tensions and polarization in all world regions, social cohesion ranks high on the agendas of researchers, decision-makers and international organizations. Despite the strong interest in the topic, there are major constraints to understanding its patterns, causes and effects: the lack of a common conceptualization and measurement of social cohesion. This paper contributes to filling these research gaps in three ways. First, it provides a narrow and operationalizable definition of social cohesion, which is well rooted in the long-standing literature in the social sciences and travels across world regions. According to this definition, social cohesion encompasses three main attributes: inclusive identity, trust and cooperation for the common good. All these attributes operate in a horizontal and a vertical dimension. Second, it proposes a measurement of social cohesion in Africa, relaying on household data from the Afrobarometer surveys and expert data from the V-Dem database. Third, it applies our indicators and provides empirical evidence that social cohesion varies across countries and within countries over time, and shows that overall social cohesion cannot be reduced to just one of such indicators. Our empirical analyses do not only mark the presence of four different constellations of social cohesion in Africa but the overall approach we take provides a first step towards measuring social cohesion at the global level.

The evidence generated and used in development cooperation has changed remarkably over the last decades. When it comes to the field of democracy support, these developments have been less significant. Routinised, evidence-based programming is far from a reality here. Compared to other fields, the goals of the interventions and assumed theories of change remain underspecified. Under these circumstances, evaluating and learning is difficult, and as a result, evidence gaps remain large and the translation of evidence into action often unsuccessful. This is particularly dramatic at a time when this field is regaining attention amid global autocratisation trends. In this article, we analyse the specific barriers and challenges democracy support faces to generate and use evidence. Furthermore, we identify evidence gaps and propose impact-oriented accompanying research as an evaluation approach that can make a significant contribution towards advancing the evidence agenda in this field.

The integrated and indivisible nature of the SDGs is facing implementation challenges due to the silo approaches. We present the three interconnected foci (SDG interactions, modeling, and tools) at the science-policy interface to address these challenges. Accounting for them will support accelerated SDG progress, operationalizing the integration and indivisibility principles.

Increased policy coherence and integrated implementation are necessary to address pressing develop-ment problems that cut across different sectors. Meeting these demands, as called for by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, requires institutional innovation. Based on the comparative analy-sis of 137 countries, this paper investigates how governments have responded to this call and which con-textual factors shape their institutional responses. We propose a four-dimensional typology to analyse the institutional set-ups for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), focusing on polit-ical leadership, horizontal integration across policy sectors, vertical integration across levels of govern-ment, and integration of societal stakeholders. We apply this framework to the descriptions of national SDG-implementation bodies provided by governments in their Voluntary National Review (VNRs) and use qualitative directed content analysis and regression modelling to investigate different driving factors of institutional design choices, including socio-economic development and political regime. Besides a strong commitment from the Centre of Government in most cases, our results show that ministries of the exterior and the environment have a dominant role, indicating that sustainability is not yet perceived holistically. Further, we find that the integration of subnational governments and societal actors is often under-institutionalised: while countries with higher levels of socio-economic development appear more likely to set up mechanisms suited to achieving cross-sectoral integration, political regime type seems to have little impact on institutional design choices for SDG implementation. Conceptually, this study offers a theory-led investigation of the institutional mechanisms for integrated SDG-implementation and the factors that drive institutional innovation or inertia. Empirically, by compiling the information in an orig-inal dataset, our study paves the way for future cross-national analysis on effective integrated SDG imple-mentation and identifies entry points for inter-and transnational support of integrated SDG implementation in the context of development cooperation.& COPY; 2023 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

This chapter provides an introduction to the study of international democracy promotion, which links two subdisciplines of political science: comparative politics and international relations. For students of comparative politics, understanding and explaining processes of democratization and autocratization requires an analysis of both domestic and international factors, notably the impact of external actors that attempt to support and protect democracy from the outside. The chapter thus introduces the concepts of democracy promotion and protection and discusses the dynamics in the face of global autocratization trends. The main part of the chapter makes students familiar with the motivations, functions, and effects of democracy promotion as well as conflicting objectives that often arise in foreign policy. It continues with a critical reflection on why and how the legitimacy for democracy promotion has been shrinking recently, but ends with new trends that might strengthen it, such as transnational social movements.

The article addresses the question of whether international democracy aid helps to protect presidential term limits - a commonly accepted but increasingly challenged safeguard for democracy. According to our analysis, democracy aid is effective in countering attempts to circumvent term limits, thus, it contributed towards protecting democratic standards in African and Latin American countries between 1990 and 2014. Democracy aid helps to fend off term-limit circumventions, but it is not as effective in deterring presidents from trying to circumvent presidential term limits. Our analysis furthermore suggests that there is double the risk of an attempt to circumvent term limits in Latin American than in African states. Although our results confirm prior findings that "targeted aid" such as democracy aid makes a difference for maintaining democratic institutions, it challenges studies that argue democracy assistance has become "tame." Our findings furthermore support previous indications that more refined theories on the effects of democracy aid in different phases of domestic processes are necessary, in particular in the face of global autocratization trends.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

While there is substantial evidence of the effect of social protection on poverty and vulnerability, limited research has focused on societal outcomes. This paper serves as introduction to a special issue (SI) examining the relationship between social protection and social cohesion in low- and middle-income countries. Over the last years, social cohesion has emerged as a central goal of development policy. The introduction and the papers in the SI use a common definition of social cohesion as a multi-faceted phenomenon, comprising three attributes: cooperation, trust and inclusive identity. This introductory article provides a conceptual framework linking social protection to social cohesion, shows the current empirical evidence for the bi-directional linkages, and highlights how the papers in the SI contribute to filling existing research gaps. In addition to this introduction, the SI encompasses seven papers, covering different world regions and social protection schemes, and using different quantitative and qualitative methods.

This article analyses the conditions under which international democracy support contributes to protecting presidential term limits. As autocratisation has become an unwelcome global trend, researchers turned to the study of the toolboxes of would-be autocrats, including their attempts to circumvent term limits. Through a paired comparison of failed attempts in Malawi (2002) and Senegal (2012), we find that external democracy support can assist domestic actors and institutions in deflecting challenges to term limits. We offer a novel qualitative analysis that posits that international democracy support can only be effective if sustained by popular democratic attitudes and behaviours of actors in the recipient state. On the one hand, a mix of conditioning relations with the incumbent government while capacitating pro-democratic opposition is a successful strategy in aid-dependent political regimes with a minimum democratic quality. On the other, societal attitudes factor into decision-making at domestic and international levels. Our results suggest that popular pro-democratic attitudes encouraged international democracy support during critical junctures in the two countries, ie when incumbents attempted to circumvent term limitation. Donor investments had positive results when donors had directed resources towards building up civil society organisations long before any attempts at circumventing term limits were made. Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.2000855 .

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00981-9.

Die Frage, ob und wie sich Demokratie durch internationale Unterstutzung fordern und schutzen lasst, hat jungst an Relevanz gewonnen. Zum einen hat der Abzug der NATO-Truppen aus Afghanistan eine offentliche Debatte uber die Grenzen von Demokratieforderung neu entfacht. Zum anderen wachst der Bedarf an internationalem Demokratieschutz angesichts zunehmender Autokratisierungstrends weltweit. Forschungsergebnisse des DIE zeigen: Wirksame Unterstutzung von Demokratie ist moglich. Dabei sind sowohl der Schutz von zentralen demokratischen Institutionen wie Amtszeitbeschrankungen von Machthabern als auch die Forderung von demokratischen Kraften, die sich Autokratisierungsversuchen proaktiv widersetzen, zentral. Seit 2010 zeichnen sich Autokratisierungstrends dadurch aus, dass sie bereits erreichte Demokratisierungserfolge oft schleichend erodieren und Autokratien festigen. Umgehungen und Aufhebungen prasidentieller Amtszeitbeschrankungen durch amtierende Prasidenten gehoren zum typischen 'Autokratisierungsbaukasten'. Amtszeitverlangerungen schranken demokratische Kontrolle ein und weiten die prasidentielle Macht aus. Demokratieforderung und -schutz spielen eine relevante Rolle fur den Erhalt prasidentieller Amtszeitbeschrankungen und damit fur den Schutz von Demokratie. Sie tragen dazu bei, 'Uberlebenschancen' von Amtszeitbeschrankungen zu verbessern. Je mehr internationale Demokratieforderung bereitgestellt wird, desto geringer das Risiko, dass Amtszeitbeschrankungen umgangen werden. Eine DIE-Analyse ergab z. B., dass eine moderat hohe Demokratieforderung von durchschnittlich US$ 2,50 pro Kopf uber vier Jahre hinweg das Risiko der Umgehung einer prasidentiellen Amtszeitbeschrankung im Schnitt halbiert. Basierend auf einer quantitativen Analyse und Fallstudien ergeben sich die folgenden Empfehlungen fur internationale Demokratieforderer: Demokratieforderung und -schutz komplementar einsetzen. Einerseits gilt es, Demokratie stetig zu fordern, da die Organisations- und Oppositionsfahigkeit politischer und zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure nur langfristig aufgebaut werden konnen. Anderseits mussen Demokratieschutzer in politischen Krisen auch mit Ad-hoc-Masnahmen und diplomatischen Mitteln kurzfristig reagieren. Demokratieforderung ist eine Risikoinvestition, die sich lohnt. Ob es gelingt, Demokratie langfristig zu fordern und vor Autokratisierung zu schutzen, hangt vor allem von heimischen Kraften und Institutionen ab. Auch fur sie sind politische Krisen ergebnisoffen. Wahrend Untatigkeit Autokraten eher in die Hande spielt, birgt kontextsensibles Engagement immerhin die Moglichkeit, einen Beitrag zum Erhalt von Demokratie zu leisten. Demokratieschutz durch regionale Organisationen starken. Regionalorganisationen wie die ECOWAS oder AU bieten regionalpolitische Strukturen, die helfen konnen, deeskalierend zu wirken und glaubwurdige Verpflichtungen vonseiten der Amtsinhaber zu gewahrleisten. Internationale Geber konnten sich daher in demokratiekritischen Situationen mit Regionalorganisationen wirksam abstimmen.

Ambitious climate policies, as well as economic development, education, technological progress and less resource-intensive lifestyles, are crucial elements for progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, using an integrated modelling framework covering 56 indicators or proxies across all 17 SDGs, we show that they are insufficient to reach the targets. An additional sustainable development package, including international climate finance, progressive redistribution of carbon pricing revenues, sufficient and healthy nutrition and improved access to modern energy, enables a more comprehensive sustainable development pathway. We quantify climate and SDG outcomes, showing that these interventions substantially boost progress towards many aspects of the UN Agenda 2030 and simultaneously facilitate reaching ambitious climate targets. Nonetheless, several important gaps remain; for example, with respect to the eradication of extreme poverty (180 million people remaining in 2030). These gaps can be closed by 2050 for many SDGs while also respecting the 1.5 °C target and several other planetary boundaries. Current action is insufficient to meet both the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. Integrated model-based analysis shows that strong interventions across many dimensions, together with ambitious lifestyle change, are needed to enable real progress towards the UN Agenda 2030.

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda will require strong accountable institutions. Since no global compliance mechanisms are in place, member states need to establish or use their own institutions to be held accountable for SDG implementation. In July 2021, governments, civil society and the private sector will gather at the annual UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) to take stock of progress on the 17 SDGs. The event provides an opportunity to assess progress made in the establishment of national-level accountability frameworks for the SDGs. As representatives of the people, parliaments should play a key role in localising the 2030 Agenda and holding governments accountable to their commitments. Over recent years, some progress has been made in enabling parliaments around the world to fulfil their accountability functions. Most notably, almost half of the countries that presented Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) between 2016 and 2019 reported that capacity-building events took place to inform members of parliament about the SDGs, and parliaments are being increasingly consulted by governments in the process of preparing the VNRs. However, in addition to a lack of awareness about the 2030 Agenda, several factors constrain parliaments' SDG accountability function. In many countries, parliamentarians lack access to the data needed to assess governments' SDG performance, and only few governments have committed to regularly report on SDG progress beyond the VNRs. Furthermore, only in a quarter of countries has responsibility for the SDGs been clearly assigned within the structures of parliament itself. In addition, thus far, parliaments have only been weakly involved in processes of localising the SDGs through the adoption of national SDG implementation strategies and the development of national priority goals and indicators. In general, legislatures' ability to hold governments accountable has decreased amidst recent autocratisation trends. Good practices to overcome these obstacles include the use of digital tools to increase the transparency of governments' fiscal behaviour vis-a-vis parliament and the creation of discursive formats to foster parliament-government dialogues about sustainability transformation. Peer learning will play an important role in disseminating information about such empowering practices among parliamentarians worldwide. More importantly, however, national governments need to recognise parliaments as critical actors in the SDG process. Amidst current autocratisation trends worldwide, peer pressure by the international community, pressure by independent media and NGOs, and the support of UN agencies will be necessary to strengthen the role of parliaments in promoting SDG accountability. Parliaments themselves should seek to establish dedicated SDG committees with formal powers to undertake in-depth examinations of government action as well as legislation. This will also contribute to the continuity of parliamentary SDG activities beyond electoral cycles.