Private information delivery (PID) from coded storage is a problem in delivering a message to a receiver without revealing the locations of servers storing encoded pieces of the message. Vaidya et al. introduced an explicit PID scheme based on maximum distance separable (MDS) codes. However, their scheme still has the limitation of the maximum possible number of servers due to the use of MDS codes. Moreover, it has no security against external adversaries who corrupt and eavesdrop on the data stored on servers. In this paper, we focus on the following two topics to solve the above problems: (1) performance characterization of a PID scheme with an arbitrary linear code; and (2) security of stored messages against the Byzantine servers and the eavesdropping servers. For (1), we first reformulate a PID scheme from coded storage based on a linear code. We also formally define two properties of PID from coded storage: the correctness and the privacy, where the correctness means the recoverability of the original message at the receiver, and the privacy means the confidentiality of locations of servers storing the message. Furthermore, we characterize the conditions of a PID scheme attaining the correctness and privacy in terms of the Hamming weight of the linear code employed in the scheme. For (2), we define new security properties against Byzantine and eavesdropping servers in PID: the t-Byzantine resistance and the & micro;- message confidentiality, where t and & micro; are the maximum capable numbers of Byzantine servers and eavesdropping servers, respectively. Moreover, we also introduce an explicit scheme guaranteeing these properties with no deterioration of the correctness and privacy.

Considering the edge-cloud environment and uploading large amounts of data from IoT devices through the edge node towards the cloud, this paper investigates an aggregation method of data streams compressed by Generalized Deduplication (GD) for the edge node. The simplest way is to decode GD-compressed data streams, aggregate raw streams and re-encode it into a single GD-compressed data stream. However, this involves a large computational complexity for aggregation due to the decoding and re-encoding of linear codes underlain the GD. From the above observation, this paper presents a novel aggregation method, called Aggregable GD (AGD) to aggregate multiple GD streams into a single compressed stream. AGD consists of two main key ideas: The first one is to reduce the computational complexity of elimination of the redundancy among multiple GD streams by partly extracting data from the compressed stream. The second one is to create an additional dictionary corresponding to each leaf node to eliminate redundancy within a single stream from a single leaf node. By applying these, in addition to the reduction of computational complexity, the compression performance is also expected to be improved compared to the ordinary decoding-aggregating-re-encoding method. For this expectation, this paper clarifies that AGD dramatically improves the computational complexity of aggregation by mathematical estimation. Furthermore, by the computer simulation using the Reed-Solomon code as the underlying linear code of GD, we demonstrate that AGD performs better than the ordinary method from the viewpoint of the compression rate.

Cellular networks have become a critical part of our networking infrastructure, enabling ubiquitous communication. However, they are likely to be under threat, and can also be the vehicle through which cellular-connected end-systems can be subject to attacks. This paper introduces our efforts to leverage data plane devices such as programmable network interface cards, switches, and end-hosts to efficiently detect attacks and ensure user privacy at terabit per second speeds. Specifically, our project designs a heterogeneous data plane framework that cohesively combines multiple data plane devices, and designs two security solutions on the framework: security monitoring and privacy protection. This paper briefly introduces the goals and initial results for the two solutions.

Private information delivery (PID) from coded storage is a problem in delivering a message to a receiver without revealing the locations of servers storing encoded pieces of the message. Although existing researches only focus on the method to keep the server locations secret to the receiver, they do not consider other types of security against storage servers; security of stored messages against the Byzantine servers and the eavesdropping servers. In this paper, we first define the security properties against these attackers in PID; 1) the t-Byzantine resistance and 2) the mu-message confidentiality, where t and mu are the maximum capable numbers of Byzantine servers and eavesdropping servers, respectively. We also introduce an explicit scheme guaranteeing these properties with no deterioration of the PID's server locations privacy. The scheme can be viewed as a pre-coding method of messages using the maximum rank distance (MRD) code, and it can be applied to any PID scheme from coded storage. Furthermore, we characterize the maximum possible t and mu in terms of parameters of the underlying MRD code, and clarify the degradation in the transmission rate introduced by these properties.

Linear secret sharing schemes protect secret information from leakage and destruction by encoding secret information into multiple shares, where the secret information can be reconstructed by collecting a certain subsets of shares. Perfect Security, alpha -strong Security, and Individual Security (IS) have been given as security measures of linear secret sharing schemes. Consider the threshold for each security measure, which is defined as the maximum allowable size of the set of leaked shares. Kurihara et al. have revealed that thresholds for Perfect Security and alpha -strong Security are characterized in terms of a relative code parameter Relative Generalized Hamming Weight (RGHW). However, the threshold for IS is not yet characterized. In this paper, we focus on individual elements of secret information and give the threshold for IS (Individual Security Threshold IST) as a new security measure, where each element of secret information cannot be uniquely determined from subsets of shares with size less than or equal to the IST. We show that the IST can be characterized in terms of RGHW as well as Perfect Security and alpha-strong Security. We also give a precoding method for secret information that can guarantee IST above a certain value in any existing linear secret sharing schemes. Moreover, we extend the notion of the IST to universal secure network coding (USNC) and present the Universal IST. We also show that the Universal IST can be represented by the code parameter Relative Generalized Rank Weight (RGRW) similarly to the IST of the linear secret sharing schemes.

The authors have previously confirmed that the flow of OAuth, a traditional authorization method on the Internet, can be managed appropriately by applying it to allocating computational resources in edge computing. In addition, in recent years, the concept of self-sovereign identity (SSI), which respects the rights of individuals, and technologies for this purpose have been studied in examining digital identities responsible for authentication and authorization. In this paper, we report on a study of the suitability and security of introducing the concept of SSI as an extension of resource authorization for edge computing.

The traditional Domain Name System (DNS) lacks fundamental security and privacy features in its design. As privacy concerns increased on the Internet, security and privacy enhancements of DNS have been actively investigated. Specifically, in the context of user privacy in DNS queries, several relay-based anonymization schemes have been recently introduced. However, these schemes are vulnerable to collusion between relays and full-service resolvers, which means user identities cannot be hidden from resolvers. This paper introduces a new concept for achieving user anonymity in DNS queries through a multiple-relay-based approach, called μODNS (Mutualized Oblivious DNS), by extending the concept of existing relay-based schemes. μODNS introduces a reasonable assumption that each user has at least one trusted or dedicated relay within the network and mutually shares the relay with other users. The user simply sets his trusted relay as the next-hop relay to convey his queries to the resolver and randomly chooses its zero or more subsequent relays shared by other entities. Under this assumption, the user’s identity remains concealed from the target resolver in μODNS even if an unknown subset of relays colludes with the resolver. Namely, in μODNS, users can preserve their anonymity by paying a small cost of sharing their resources. Additionally, we extend existing protocols, Anonymized DNSCrypt and Oblivious DoH, to provide practical Proof-of-Concept specifications and implementations as instances of μODNS. These implementations are publicly available on the Internet as open-source software and public services. Furthermore, we demonstrate, through measurements of round-trip times for DNS messages, that our implementation can minimize the performance degradation resulting from its privacy enhancements, achieving performance levels that maintain the positive user experiences observed in existing schemes.

One of the use cases of mobile networks that can be considered for use in Beyond 5G is a massive IoT environment where many IoT (Internet of Things) terminals with low power consumption and computing power are connected. In order to efficiently use network resources in this environment, it is necessary to compress and reduce the amount of data uploaded by a large number of IoT terminals. In this study, we consider data compression in a Massive IoT environment using edge servers, assuming a Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) scenario. In particular, we consider the application of "Generalized Deduplication (GD)", a stream data compression method based on duplicate deletion, which has been attracting attention in recent years for its lightweight and efficient compression of IoT sensing data. The basic GD algorithm assumes one-to-one stream transmission and reception. In this report, we propose an extension of the GD algorithm that is suitable for one-to-multi (edge server and IoT terminals) MEC environments and has more efficient performance. Specifically, we investigate dictionary construction for the GD utilization in a one-to-multi environment and show a basic evaluation of the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.

To realize the distribution of processing load and prompt response, the concept of edge computing is drawing attention. Under the edge computing environment, server processing is carried out on an edge node located near various devices with a communication module instead of on a central server. These edge nodes can be provided by another entity other than service providers such as network operators. The edge nodes have fewer computing resources than a central server has. Therefore, appropriate dynamic resource management is required to avoid resource exhaustion. For this purpose, authorization techniques, e.g., OAuth, can be applied. In this paper, we consider applying the OAuth protocol for a privilege delegation on edge computing. Firstly, we clarify the authentication flows differ depending on the relationship of edge computing players (edge provider, user, service provider). We then describe the unique problems of resource authorization on edge computing.

The traditional Domain Name System (DNS) lacks fundamental features of security and privacy in its design. As concerns of privacy increased on the Internet, security and privacy enhancements of DNS have been actively investigated and deployed. Specially for user's privacy in DNS queries, several relay-based anonymization schemes have been recently introduced, however, they are vulnerable to the collusion of a relay with a full-service resolver, i.e., identities of users cannot be hidden to the resolver. This paper introduces a new concept of a multiple-relay-based DNS for user anonymity in DNS queries, called the mutualized oblivious DNS ($μ$ODNS), by extending the concept of existing relay-based schemes. The $μ$ODNS introduces a small and reasonable assumption that each user has at least one trusted/dedicated relay in a network and mutually shares the dedicated one with others. The user just sets the dedicated one as his next-hop, first relay, conveying his queries to the resolver, and randomly chooses its $0$ or more subsequent relays shared by other entities. Under this small assumption, the user's identity is concealed to a target resolver in the $μ$ODNS even if a certain (unknown) subset of relays collude with the resolver. That is, in $μ$ODNS, users can preserve their privacy and anonymity just by paying a small cost of sharing its resource. Moreover, we present a PoC implementation of $μ$ODNS that is publicly available on the Internet. We also show that by measurement of round-trip-time for queries, and our PoC implementation of $μ$ODNS achieves the performance comparable to existing relay-based schemes.

Due to the legal reform on the protection of personal information in US/Japan and the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe, service providers are obliged to more securely manage the sensitive data stored in their server. In order to protect this kind of data, they generally employ a cryptographic encryption scheme and secure key management schemes such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM) and Trusted Platform Module (TPM). In this paper, we take a different approach based on the space-hard cipher. The space-hard cipher has an interesting property called the space hardness. Space hardness guarantees sufficient security against the adversary who gains a part of key data, e.g., 1/4 of key data. Combined with a simple network monitoring technique, we develop a practical leakage resilient scheme Virtual Vault, which is secure against the snapshot adversary who has full access to the memory in the server for a short period. Importantly, Virtual Vault is deployable by only a low-price device for network monitoring, e.g. L2 switch, and software of space-hard ciphers and packet analyzer, while typical solutions require a dedicated hardware for secure key managements such as HSM and TPM. Thus, Virtual Vault is easily added on the existing servers which do not have such dedicated hardware.

This paper investigates an adversarial model in the scenario of private information retrieval (PIR) from n coded storage servers, called Byzantine adversary. The Byzantine adversary is defined as the one altering b server responses and erasing u server responses to a user's query. In this paper, two types of Byzantine adversaries are considered; 1) the classic omniscient type that has the full knowledge on n servers as considered in existing literature, and 2) the reasonable limited-knowledge type that has information on only b+u servers, i.e., servers under the adversary's control. For these two types, this paper reveals that the resistance of a PIR scheme, i.e., the condition of b and u to correctly obtain the desired message, can be expressed in terms of a code parameter called the coset distance of linear codes employed in the scheme. For the omniscient type, the derived condition expressed by the coset distance is tighter and more precise than the estimation of the resistance by the minimum Hamming weight of the codes considered in existing researches. Furthermore, this paper also clarifies that if the adversary is limited-knowledge, the resistance of a PIR scheme could exceed that for the case of the omniscient type. Namely, PIR schemes can increase their resistance to Byzantine adversaries by allowing the limitation on adversary's knowledge.

: In private information retrieval (PIR) from coded storage servers, consider the case where some of servers are Byzantine adversaries and unresponsive. There have been proposed several specialized schemes guaranteeing that the user can correctly obtain the desired message even in the adversarial situation. However, to the best of our knowledge, such resistance to the adversaries in PIR schemes based on arbitrary codes have been not precisely characterized. In this paper, we reveal that the exact resistance to Byzantine and unresponsive servers is expressed in terms of the coset distance of linear codes in linear PIR schemes based on arbitrary storage code.

Information-Centric Networking (ICN) can offer rich functionalities to the network, e.g, in-network caching, and name-based forwarding. Incremental deployment of ICN is a key challenge that enable smooth migration from current IP network to ICN. We can say that Network Function Virtualization (NFV) must be one of the key technologies to achieve this deployment because of its flexibility to support new network functions. However, when we consider the ICN deployment with NFV, there exist two performance issues, processing delay of name-based forwarding and computational overhead of virtual machine. In this paper we proposed a NFV infrastructure-assisted ICN packet forwarding by integrating the name look-up to the Open vSwitch. The contributions are twofold: 1) First, we provide the novel name look-up scheme that can forward ICN packets without costly longest prefix match searching. 2) Second, we design the ICN packet forwarding scheme that integrates the partial name look-up into the virtualization infrastructure to mitigate computation overhead.

Information Centric Networking (ICN), the security, privacy and access control mechanisms are deployed directly in the network layer. However, the gap between security in the network and application layers creates a vulnerable space for cyber attacks from inside a device. We adopt a proxy reencryption technique to facilitate a flexible ICN access control specific to applications. Unlike the existing work in which the proxy re-encryption is done in the network, we propose an In-device Proxy Re-Encryption Service (IPRES) for filling this security gap and for efficiency in both access control management and resource usage. We present the architecture and protocol of IPRES incorporating principles from security management specific to each application. Our evaluation shows that IPRES improves the state of the art by closing the security gap while it introduces acceptable operational and memory overheads at the device level.

A key paradigm of Information Centric Networking (ICN) is that the content-based security, privacy and access control are deployed directly in the network layer. However, there is a gap between security in the network and application layers. This creates a vulnerable space for cyber attacks from inside a device. To address this problem, we discuss and present a guideline on ICN access control. Since a semi-trusted proxy has been seen as an advantageous solution for access control and efficiency in content sharing services, we introduce the proxy in a consumer's device and propose an in-device proxy re-encryption service (IPRES) architecture for efficiency in both access control management and resource usage.

Content-centric networking (CCN) is an emerging networking architecture that is being actively investigated in both the research and industrial communities. In the latest version of CCN, a large number of interests have to be issued when large content is retrieved. Since CCN routers have to search several tables for each incoming interest, this could cause a serious problem of router workload. In order to solve this problem, this paper introduces a novel strategy of grouping multiple interests with common information and packing them to a special interest called the list interest. Our list interest is designed to co-operate with the manifest of CCN as its dual. This paper demonstrates that by skipping and terminating several search steps using the common information in the list interest, the router can search its tables for the list interest-based request with dramatically smaller complexity than the case of the standard interest-based request. Furthermore, we also consider the deployment of list interests and design a novel TCP-like congestion control method for list interests to employ them just like standard interests.

Content-centric networking (CCN) realizes the efficient communication by leveraging content name-based routing and named data objects. However, the explicitly-given names of content makes the censorship easily enforceable, and hence the censorship circumvention is a challenging problem in CCN. For the problem, this paper introduces an anonymization framework to circumvent the censorship under the novel concept of consumer-driven access control to interest names and opportunities of cache recycling at network nodes. Our framework leverages an arbitrary type of encryption-based access control and enables us to recycle the CCN-specific content cache at intermediate nodes in path of the anonymized communication. Furthermore, by combining CCNx manifests and nameless objects with our anonymization framework, we can maximize the benefit of CCN-specific in-network caching simultaneously with minimizing the computational overhead and circumventing the censorship. We claim this is the first anonymization framework for censorship circumvention, which is designed by the CCN-specific approach.