I am very pleased to participate in this Symposium in honor of Colin Gray. I first met Colin over four decades ago in the mid-1970s when he had just arrived at the Hudson Institute from England. I also was a younger staff member at Hudson. Over the decades, Colin’s career went off in one direction – strategy and defense policy and posture – and my own in another – nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. We and our families remained friends – and every now and then we saw each other. I decided what better way to remember Colin and show how his writings continue to be worth reading than to take one of his many books and to ask what can someone that does nonproliferation and arms control still learn from Colin’s writings? I chose his book Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy because it both sets out concisely his thinking on many important topics and contains a reprise of his critique of arms control. What are the lessons for an old arms controller? Colin’s critique of arms control is set out as Maxim 35: “Arms Can be Controlled but Not by Arms Control.” In that critique of arms control, he states: “... the feasibility of arms control is determined by its political context... states in conflict, or who anticipate being in conflict, will not agree to limit armaments. In contrast, when states cease to fear the outbreak of war, indeed when some approximation to a political peace emerges, agreements to control arms suddenly become negotiable.” 2 For an arms controller in today’s world, this maxim suggests the futility of arms control. This conclusion would be especially so if arms control is to be understood narrowly as limiting armaments, or as in its most prominent Cold War dimension as reductions of nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion regarding the futility of arms control, moreover, should be deeply unsettling for an arms controller but also for others given several other of Colin’s maxims in Fighting Talk. Specifically, in Maxim 29, entitled “Bad Times Return”, Colin warns us that “... the 2,500 years of accessible strategic history provides an unanswerable record of bad times returning.” 3 Looking around today’s world, bad times do seem to be returning. But bad times are returning with a very different dimension from most of that “accessible strategic history.” To wit, they are returning with the added dimension of nuclear weapons and the danger that their use could escalate out of control. Faced with that prospect of the return of bad times and the risks of use of nuclear weapons, the central focus of U.S. policy today is to ensure robust deterrence, both of conflict and of use of nuclear weapons. I agree completely with the importance of that focus. That said, we should be heedful of Colin’s warnings about deterrence, warnings that run through several of his other maxims. In his Maxim 6: “Not Only Polities, but Societies and Their Cultures Make War and Peace”, Colin writes that this maxim, “... serves as a potent warning to those who claim that nuclear deterrence is reliable, because understanding of the meaning of nuclear weapons is truly multicultural.” And again, with a focus on unique national cultures, Colin warns in Maxim 22 entitled “People Matter Most” that “Western deterrence theory may demonstrate irrefutably why a rationale enemy leader ought to be deterred. But what if that culturally alien leader is rational

China and the US are entering a period of adversarial strategic competition. That competition will have significant risks for both countries, ranging from competitive strategic armament through crisis and conflict escalation, to the threat or even use of nuclear weapons. A cooperative US–China process is urgently needed to mitigate these risks of adversarial strategic competition. Multi-tiered strategic dialogue—official, semi-official, and military-to-military—should form the foundation of such a process. That dialogue should be followed by exploration of more specific risk mitigation approaches and associated measures. Many approaches are possible; the two countries would need to work out the practical details of how to proceed. Parallel and reciprocated unilateral actions offer a means for both countries to signal intentions, exercise restraint, and address strategic concerns of the other country. In addition, particular attention should be given to exploring joint statements or politically-binding agreements, for example, affirming the Reagan–Gorbachev principle, or stabilizing the US–China mutual deterrence relationship, and/or mutual no-first-strategic attacks. Though questions will arise in both China and the US about pursuing a process of cooperative strategic risk mitigation—and doing so would require changes of strategic policy and posture in each country—the type of process outlined here would strongly serve the shared interests of both countries. Successfully pursued, this process could help to rebuild trust and contribute to other efforts to shape a more constructive and less competitive bilateral relationship.

This paper was prepared for the UNIDIR Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Deterrence, and Strategic Arms Control Dialogue exploring the relationships among nuclear disarmament, nuclear deterrence, and strategic arms control communities with a view to identifying options to recraft strategic arms control and revitalize pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It briefly sketches the broad outlines of today’s strategic context. Major trends include heightened tensions among nuclear-armed states and greater multipolarity, and deterioration in the fabric of international institutions, treaties, and norms that, historically, contributed to predictable and more stable relationships among nuclear-armed States. In addition, several current or imminent technological developments are heightening the uncertainties and unpredictability in the strategic relationships among nuclear-armed States. Borrie, John and Lewis A. Dunn. “The Strategic Context for Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control Dialogue”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/DDAC/01

The nuclear agenda, both at the global level and in the Middle East, has figured prominently in public debate since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the discovery of Saddam Hussein's "mini-Manhattan Project." The basic defining feature of the post-war global nuclear order was the US-Soviet nuclear competition. This competition was driven by a number of factors: conflict of interests; ideology; and the US commitment to Europe's defense via a posture of extended deterrence. There are many reasons for thinking that the pressures on Israel's nuclear monopoly would increase rather than decrease. First, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is badly damaged but not eliminated. No more than in 1981, after Israeli aircraft destroyed the Osirak research reactor, has Saddam Hussein given up his desire for nuclear weapons. Yet another reason for being concerned that the Israeli nuclear monopoly is unstable is the risk of proliferation spillovers from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Global nuclear dangers have jumped since President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech affirmed the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Today’s nuclear dangers range from growing US–Russian political–military confrontation and the virtual collapse of bilateral nuclear arms control through the greatest divisions ever within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to North Korea’s coming capability to attack the United States with nuclear-armed missiles. The Donald J. Trump administration has maintained that nuclear weapons are essential to US security, though it has also affirmed the US commitment to the goal of nuclear abolition. Frustrated by lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and energized by concerns about the risk of use of nuclear weapons, nearly 125 countries have now negotiated a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It was signed by fifty countries when it opened for signature in September 2017. None of the nuclear-weapon states will adhere to the treaty and it will not reduce today’s nuclear dangers. The interests of all of the key protagonists—the United States and its allies, the other NPT nuclear-weapon states, and the supporters of the new Prohibition Treaty—would best be served by rebuilding habits of cooperation among them to reduce global nuclear dangers and advance the NPT’s nuclear disarmament goal. One possible rallying point would be a vision of the strategic elimination of nuclear weapons as instruments of strategy, power, and security—not their complete physical elimination—by 2045, one hundred years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Strategic elimination would have specific dimensions in terms of policy, operations, numbers, institutions and planning, and transparency verification. Priorities for action now stand out both to reduce today’s global nuclear dangers and to put in place the building blocks for strategic elimination.

: This paper reviews a select set of past proliferation-related forecasts. These historical forecasts were performed between 1957 and 1990. They addressed nuclear proliferation most prominently but also included forecasts of Soviet strategic forces developments and wider missile proliferation. These forecasts also covered a broad spectrum of sources: declassified U.S. intelligence estimates, official memos, assessments by special commissions, think tank reports, and writings by individual experts. Each forecast sought to project future proliferation-related developments as well as the drivers of those trends. The paper briefly reviews the main features of the forecasts and then presents a series of potential guidelines for future proliferation forecasting efforts based on the record of past forecasts. These guidelines are intended to support ASCO's exploration of options for developing a forecasting capability as part of its threat anticipation mission and in support of the wider threat reduction activities of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Asked shortly before leaving office to identify his “greatest accomplishment” as president, George W. Bush expressed his pride in “keeping America safe.”1 Political commentator Peggy Noonan observe...

: In April, 2009, President Barack Obama affirmed America's intention to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and stated his intention to organize a Global Summit on Nuclear Security within the coming year. Less than a month earlier, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called on the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the so-called P-5 countries, to play a leadership role in implementing the NPT's Article VI obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament. Prime Minister Brown's statement was preceded by other UK initiatives, including a proposal that the P-5 jointly explore the technical issues related to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Still earlier, in March, 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for the P-5 to agree on nuclear transparency measures. All of these statements take place against the backdrop of ongoing discussions among the P-5 on preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference as well as unprecedented global attention to the goal of nuclear abolition. The current moment in international affairs is characterized by a high degree of both nuclear anxiety and nuclear hope, particularly (but not exclusively) among the world's many non-nuclear countries. Nuclear anxiety reflects concern about the spread of nuclear capability to states and nonstate actors, uncertainties (including among the P-5) about the policies and postures of today?s nuclear powers, questions on the part of the non-nuclear states about the commitment of the nuclear states to the NPT's Article VI goal, and concern among a few U.S. allies that renewed emphasis on disarmament could weaken extended deterrence.

Over the past decades, the United States has had wins, losses, and draws in a continuing attempt to prevent a world of many nuclear powers. A review of that record suggests lessons or insights for future efforts to counter proliferation as well as for thinking about the 2016 proliferation future. Those lessons range from a need to adapt to the fact that critical U.S. security guarantees are no longer a nonproliferation “free good,” through the recognition that “buying time” is a good in itself, to the importance of a successful nonproliferation policy that builds partnerships with other countries. Perhaps the most important insight from the proliferation policy past for thinking about the 2016 proliferation future, however, is that, repeatedly, fears of runaway proliferation have energized the United States and other governments to act together to make those fears a self-denying prophecy. With hard work and luck, this may yet happen again.

: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was founded in 1998 to integrate and focus the capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) that address the weapons of mass destruction threat. To assist the Agency in its primary mission, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) develops and maintains an evolving analytical vision of necessary and sufficient capabilities to protect United States and Allied forces and citizens from WMD attack. ASCO is also charged by DoD and by the U.S. Government generally to identify gaps in these capabilities and initiate programs to fill them. It also provides support to the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), and its Panels, with timely, high quality research.

Defining nonproliferation priorities today is an inherently judgmental task. There also are a vari' ety of possible approaches that could help define priorities. On a region-by-region basis, for instance, it is possible to identify today's toughest nonproliferation problem countries—from Iraq and Iran in the Gulf to North Korea in East Asia. Another approach would highlight challenges to the overall set of nonproliferation institutions, organizations, and treaties, and propose possible responses. The danger of a gradual erosion of the three nonproliferation treaties—if not a rapid collapse—due to continuing problems of non-compliance from within stands out in this regard. Taking still another approach, priority might be placed on responding to unexpected developments that have dramatically changed the nonproliferation landscape, typified by the possibility that access to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons expertise, technology, and not least materials from the former Soviet Union would allow a country or subnational group to leapfrog the usual steps to weaponry. Or what may be termed a "pet rock" approach can be taken—in effect, pressing for a long-preferred initiative or course of action based on its potential nonproliferation payoffs. To some Europeans, the Bush administration's emphasis on regime change in Iraq as a means to prevent Saddam Hussein from retaining chemical and biological weapons and from acquiring nuclear weapons appears to have this character. There is one additional approach to defining today's nonproliferation priorities, one in many dimensions fully compatible with any and all of the above approaches. This further approach begins by asking what is the gravest threat to global security from the proliferation of NBC weapons, before then seeking to define a response—not only for today but equally important for the long term. This additional approach, which is advocated in this viewpoint, maintains: First, the gravest current proliferation threat is the use of NBC weaponry, whether by a state or a terrorist group; second, it is necessary to go beyond individual national efforts aimed at dealing with this threat to establish and implement an enforceable international consensus that the first use of NBC weaponry by a state or subnational group, or the aiding or abetting of any such use, cannot and will not be tolerated.