Building on the automatic fiscal stabilisers literature, this paper assesses how automatic stabilisers have evolved over the past two decades by analysing changes in the personal income tax and social benefit systems. In three-quarters of the 35 OECD countries analysed, indicators of the strength of automatic stabilisers (aggregate elasticities of household income after tax with respect to the cycle and aggregate net replacement rates) changed little or moderately over the past two decades, suggesting broadly stable automatic stabilisers of household disposable income. The paper discusses pros and cons of several policy options to strengthen automatic stabilisers in the current environment. The effectiveness and possible side effects, particularly related to disincentives to work, vary across policy options. Consequently, policy reform proposals should be carefully assessed in a country-specific context and take into account other important policy objectives of tax and benefit systems.

Building on the automatic fiscal stabilisers literature, this paper assesses how automatic stabilisers have evolved over the past two decades by analysing changes in the personal income tax and social benefit systems. In three-quarters of the 35 OECD countries analysed, indicators of the strength of automatic stabilisers (aggregate elasticities of household income after tax with respect to the cycle and aggregate net replacement rates) changed little or moderately over the past two decades, suggesting broadly stable automatic stabilisers of household disposable income. The paper discusses pros and cons of several policy options to strengthen automatic stabilisers in the current environment. The effectiveness and possible side effects, particularly related to disincentives to work, vary across policy options. Consequently, policy reform proposals should be carefully assessed in a country-specific context and take into account other important policy objectives of tax and benefit systems.

This paper proposes an approach to assess the extent of automatic fiscal stabilisation of aggregate household disposable income after a specific shock. The approach is based on the national account identity of household disposable income and elements of the OECD methodology to cyclically adjust budget balances. In a stylised scenario assuming a decline in household market income, automatic stabilisers in 23 OECD countries are found to offset on average around 60% of the shock on impact. Direct taxes provide larger stabilisation than social benefits and social security contributions. There are important differences in the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers across the OECD countries. They mainly reflect non-linear interactions among the size of a specific automatic stabiliser, the elasticity of the automatic stabiliser with respect to a relevant economic variable and the specific shock scenario analysed.

As discussed in the latest OECD Economic Outlook, the prolonged undershooting of inflation targets, despite massive monetary policy stimulus and stronger economic growth and lower unemployment, raises issues about the appropriateness of current inflation targeting frameworks in advanced economies. While the frameworks differ in detail and implementation, they are principally based on medium-term inflation objectives of 2%.

We estimate dynamic factor models for two sub-samples between 1995 and 2017 for up to 42 advanced and emerging-market economies to investigate changes in the contribution of global and regional factors to fluctuations in real GDP per capita growth, inflation, 10-year government bond yields and equity prices. The combined average contribution of global and regional factors in explaining fluctuations of GDP growth and inflation increased between 1995-2006 and 2007-17. In contrast, for financial variables, the role of country-specific factors strengthened between these two periods. The general findings are robust to alternative specifications of the lag structure, data frequency and the country composition of the largest region. Country-specific factors explain a higher share of variation of financial variables in emerging-market economies compared with advanced economies. For all variables, there is large cross-country heterogeneity regarding the level of contributions of specific factors and their evolution over time.

This paper analyses the effects of monetary policy on inequality over the business cycle via its impacts on returns on assets, the cost of debt servicing, and asset prices in selected advanced economies. Monetary policy easing has a priori ambiguous effects on income and net wealth inequality via financial channels. Effects depend in a complex way on the relative size and distributions of assets, liabilities, and income. In practice, these effects are estimated to be small. A house price increase generally reduces net wealth inequality, while the opposite is true for increases in stock and bond prices. As monetary policy has the potential to affect inequality, monetary authorities face communication challenges. The available research on interactions between monetary policy and inequality does not justify targeting inequality by central banks.

The set of monetary policy instruments has expanded since the start of the global financial crisis in the many OECD economies. Against this background, this paper analyses whether some of the new instruments should be retained in the long term when broader financial stability objectives are likely to feature more prominently as monetary policy goals than prior to the crisis. It also assesses if these new instruments should be used during the transition to this situation and when countries are stuck in persistent stagnation. In the post recovery situation, central banks could ultimately revert to targeting short-term market rates with small balance sheets. This might, however, require changes to monetary policy implementation due to new liquidity requirements. The transition to this situation will be lengthy and will require a mixture of liquidity draining instruments. Alternatively, they could adopt a floor system, which may benefit financial stability. The use of unconventional measures as a substitute for policy rate cuts will no longer be needed unless countries remain in persistent stagnation. Nevertheless, in the post-recovery normal, extended collateral and counterparty eligibility could be sustained, and currency swap lines among central banks could be expanded.

Europe has put in place a new system of complex fiscal rules. These include the so-called “six pack” to upgrade the Stability and Growth Pact and a new Treaty incorporating the “fiscal compact”. Much of the discussion about the new rules has been procedural or theoretical. This paper shows what the rules will mean in practice under a medium-term scenario developed by the OECD. So far, fiscal consolidation has largely been driven by the recent wave of Excessive Deficit Procedures. Only once these commitments have been fulfilled will the new system of rules come into action. Its pillar will be the requirement to balance budgets in structural terms. The rules imply a tight fiscal stance over the coming years for many European countries by historical standards. Almost all countries will have to be as disciplined as the few countries that managed to make meaningful progress in tackling high debt levels in the past. Over the very long term, the rules imply extremely low levels of debt. Thus, the requirements are not likely to be permanent. The rules are complex. The methodology to calculate the structural balance has a number of weaknesses and discretion will be needed in implementing the rules.

In many OECD countries debt has soared to levels threatening fiscal sustainability, necessitating its reduction over the medium to longer term. This paper uses stylised simulations in a small, calibrated macroeconomic model which features endogenous interactions between fiscal policy, growth and financial markets. Simulations are done for a hypothetical economy, reflecting key characteristics of fiscally stressed OECD countries. Given the assumed objective to stabilise debt at a 60% of GDP target within 20 years, a consolidation path is chosen by maximising cumulative GDP growth and minimising cumulative squared output gaps. The simulations highlight four issues. First, lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio within a finite horizon requires big initial consolidation which can be largely unwound if debt is to be stabilised at a lower level. Second, some frontloading of the adjustment turns out to be optimal in case of an interest rate shock. Third, debt reduction with high fiscal multipliers, hysteresis effects and adverse market reactions involves protracted large negative output gaps and deflation. This stresses the importance of selecting reasonable fiscal targets consistent with market conditions. Fourth, delaying the attainment of the debt target by two years has generally little implications for initial consolidation, though under adverse conditions this would result in much higher debt and slower growth. Choisir le rythme de l'assainissement budgetaire Dans de nombreux pays de l'OCDE, la dette a atteint des niveaux menacant la viabilite budgetaire, necessitant sa reduction a moyen et a long terme. Ce document utilise des simulations stylisees mises en oeuvre avec un petit modele macroeconomique calibre qui tient compte des interactions endogenes entre la politique budgetaire, la croissance et les marches financiers. Les simulations sont realisees pour une economie fictive refletant les principales caracteristiques des pays de l'OCDE en difficulte budgetaire. Compte tenu de l'objectif de stabiliser la dette a 60% du PIB a horizon de 20 ans, le chemin de l’assainissement est choisi par la maximisation de la croissance cumulee du PIB et par la minimisation des carres des ecarts de production. Les simulations mettent en evidence quatre problemes. Tout d'abord, l'abaissement du ratio dette sur PIB a horizon fini exige une grande consolidation initiale qui peut etre largement annulee par la suite si la dette doit etre stabilisee a un niveau inferieur. Deuxiemement, une montee en charge plus rapide de l’assainissement est optimale en cas de chocs de taux d'interet. Troisiemement, en cas de multiplicateurs fiscaux eleves, de phenomenes d'hysterese et de reactions defavorables des marches, la reduction de la dette implique des periodes prolongees d’ecarts de production negatifs importants et de deflation. Cela souligne l'importance de choisir des objectifs budgetaires raisonnables et compatibles avec les conditions de marche. Quatriemement, reporter l'assainissement et l’atteinte des objectifs de dette de deux ans a generalement des repercussions legeres sur la consolidation initiale, mais dans des conditions defavorables, il en resulte une dette beaucoup plus elevee et une croissance beaucoup plus lente.

This paper describes developments in real long-term interest rates in the main OECD economies and surveys their various determinants. Real long-term government bond yields declined from the 1980s to very low levels in the recent period, though they have not reached the historical lows of the 1970s. The decline in real interest rates has been driven by a combination of factors whose importance has varied over time. In the 1990s, the decline in inflation levels and in volatility was key. In the 2000s, purchases of US government bonds by official investors in emerging market economies, played an important role. More recently, quantitative easing and other unconventional monetary policy action, and possibly the Basel-III-induced increase in bank demand for safe assets, have been main drivers. Higher perceptions of risks after the last crisis do not seem to have put lasting downward pressures on government bond yields.

The management of government debt and assets has important implications for fiscal positions. Debt managers aim to secure non-interrupted funding at lowest medium-term costs subject to risks. Massive crisis-related increases in government debt in most OECD countries and increased risks on the asset side of government balance sheets may imply attaching a larger weight to avoiding risk than prior to the crisis, suggesting to extend debt maturities, possibly above pre-crisis levels. There are a number of trade-offs. Choices on the debt maturity structure interact with unconventional monetary policies. By driving down longer-term yields, the latter increase incentives to extend debt maturities which could counteract the initial monetary policy goal. High debt raises the temptation for eroding it via inflation, but the effectiveness of such policy seems to be limited and might be costly in the long run. Moreover, debt management needs to contribute to ensuring appropriate liquidity and functioning of government bond markets. Building financial assets can be appropriate for some purposes, such as prefunding future temporary spending or transferring wealth to future generations, but the risks are that accumulated funds might be used for current spending or tax reductions. In addition, assets might do little to hedge risks associated with debt servicing costs. Non-financial asset sales can help improve the fiscal situation, but purely revenue-driven privatisations without appropriate regulatory provisions addressing potential market failures should be avoided. Successful balance sheet management requires transparent, accurate and comprehensive measures of not only current but also future assets and liabilities.