This medical epithet seems to offer solid guidance for terrorism researchers and counterterrorism practitioners when thinking about the ethical implications of their work—to rephrase it, whatever you do, just don’t make it worse. It seems an appropriate guiding principle because although terrorism research remains even now largely dominated by theory (which, in pursuit of understanding, can seem removed from reality), the essence of terrorism lies in real-world practice—the actions of terrorists, and the concomitant actions of security, law enforcement and government agencies in response. And however we conceptualize these forces, they are in some measure reciprocally related, either reactively (in a terrorist event, or in responding to a terrorist event) or proactively (in preemptive initiatives). Such responses have consequences that impinge on individuals and society, and as such give rise to essentially moral questions about right and wrong, about harm and the consequences of behavior for others. The practitioner, researcher and terrorist therefore are all in some way participants in and subject to an appreciation of harm in a dynamic and complex moral decisional calculus. Of course, the idea of harm is itself complex; how much harm, and to whom or what? The researcher, society, government, employer, organization, family, tribe or even a concept like democracy, or the future? The idea of choice is also implied in that complex calculus; for whilst with hindsight a logic to choices can be discerned, in reality at the time of choice, there are often a number of possible alternative behavioral avenues to follow. In this Special Issue, we have focused primarily on 2 of the 3 elements in this complex moral calculus—the practitioner and the researcher. The enabling context to both is often government; the practitioner is generally an employee of a government or related agency, while the researcher is often dependent on that same government for access, for information and for funding. Not all researchers or professionals are necessarily dependant on government of course, and access to people and information can be obtained through other channels. But because of the illegal nature of terrorism, such access can be fraught and difficult, placing the researcher in particular in a vulnerable position. We have not sought to engage directly or indirectly with the third element of the moral calculus, the terrorists, in this Special Issue. Their moral perspectives are of course relevant, but such an undertaking although necessary does not really fit within the framework we have adopted. On the other hand, as part of the process of terrorism, the voice of the terrorist is strongly represented in this special issue, as in all work studying terrorism. Brian Jenkins referred to terrorism as “choreographed violence,” an important element of which is attracting attention. This theme was further developed by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her speech to the American Bar Association where she referred to “the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.” In a sense any agency that explores terrorism makes information available and contributes to that process. And by simply making information available, the researcher can attract attention from both the terrorist and the agencies charged with managing terrorism (as Aaron Zelin notes in this volume, for example). This in itself poses a fundamental ethical challenge to the researcher and indeed anyone concerned with the management of public information, including journalists: by undertaking what in other

The paper argues that in order to understand the events of 6 January we must look at events from a range of perspectives, two of which are identified-the narrow focus of a comparison of a linguistic analysis of the speech and its context, and the broader social and cultural context of a changing sense of American National Interest. It suggests that to understand the events of 6 January we need to conceptualise them as the product of a complex process where both aggregate and specific influences seem relevant, but whilst both offer necessary explanations neither in themselves provide a sufficient explanation of the event. The concept of affordance is suggested to perhaps provide the glue that may bind these and other influences together to facilitate the violence.

In this manuscript, we report the pilot results of the Transforming RN Roles in Community Based Integrated Primary Care (TRIP) undergraduate nursing curriculum. Junior nursing students participated in TRIP didactic, simulation and clinical activities and completed a focus group at the midpoint and conclusion of year one. Focus group themes addressed recruitment, understanding or primary care, connections between clinical and didactic, and team based care. TRIP offers the first comprehensive community based integrated primary care training for students in our region. Overall, the TRIP curriculum enhanced student learning and promoted leadership.

Terrorism is a highly irregular form of crime where multiple factors combine to create circumstances that are unique to each case of involvement, or attempted involvement, in terrorist violence. Yet, there are commonalities in the way in which efforts to become involved unfold as processes, reflected as sequential developments where different forces combine to create conditions where individuals seek to plan acts of violence. The best way to frame this involvement is through analytical approaches that highlight these procedural dimensions but are equally sensitive to the nuances of each case. Analysing pre-arrest media usage of convicted terrorists, this paper focuses on the ways in which belief pathways and operational pathways interact in five distinct cases of terrorist involvement in the UK in what are termed ?process narratives.?

In welcoming the recognition that victimization through terrorism is a significant factor in our thinking about terrorism, a case is made for greater engagement of Civil Society, through nongovernmental organizations, in the development of policy in this area. It argues for a rebalancing of policy toward the passive victims of terrorist activity, and a recognition that the lived experience of harm done by terrorism is not mitigated by either context or alleged justification. A case is also made for using the study of victimization as a focus for interdisciplinary work on terrorism, recognizing that expertise in this area lies both within and outwith government.

Using the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as a case study, we explore the process by which children evolve from novice recruits to fully fledged members of a violent extremist movement. From currently available data, we propose six stages of child socialization to ISIS—Seduction, Schooling, Selection, Subjugation, Specialization, and Stationing. Furthermore, we explore this process in the context of “Community of Practice” (COP) as developed by Wenger and Lave. COP models highlight how newcomers learn and pass through degrees of involvement from the periphery of an organization to the inside. In subsequent research, Hundeide highlighted how “contracts of deep commitment” and “conversion” constitute important social and psychological elements of communities of practice. We regard such qualities as intrinsic to children's involvement in ISIS. We conclude with implications drawn from the disengagement and reintegration experiences of former child soldiers in other contexts.

This book explores the evolutionary context of terrorism and political violence. While evolutionary thinking has come to permeate both biological and social-science theorising, it has not yet been applied systematically to the areas of terrorism and political violence. This volume seeks to do this for the first time. It presents a collection of essays on evolutionary psychology and terrorism, which encourage the reader to approach terrorism from a non-traditional perspective, by developing new approaches to understanding it and those who commit such acts of violence. The book identifies evolutionary thought as heuristically important in the understanding of terrorism, explores the key conceptual themes, and provides an evolutionary (and cross-species) understanding of the community-wide effects of terrorist attacks. The contributors bring forward innovative ideas and concepts to assist the practitioner, analyst and academic to better understand and respond to the threat of terrorism. In doing so this book challenges existing assumptions about terrorism and those who carry out such acts, in order to move the debate into new areas characterized by an emphasis on intellectual quality and rigour, an interdisciplinary approach, and a drawing together of theory and practice. The intention is to provide a sufficient discussion to enable the reader to both understand the relevance of evolutionary thinking to terrorism and political violence, and to appreciate the practical implications of conceptualising problems in this way. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and political violence, psychology, criminology and security studies.

This article presents a case study of one individual's trajectory through violent right-wing extremism in the USA. Drawing on an in-depth in-person interview conducted with 'Sarah', we trace the influences affecting the nature and extent of her involvement, engagement and disengagement. We focus on delineating the complexity of Sarah's disengagement from violent extremism. Her account supports several claims in the literature. First, there is rarely any single cause associated with individual disengagement. Rather, the phenomenon is a dynamic process shaped by a multitude of interacting push/pull factors, sunk costs and the perceived availability of alternatives outside the group. Second, as this case illustrates, prison affords physical separation from the violent extremist group and with it, time to reflect which may be critical to sustaining disengagement. Third, this account illustrates how de-radicalization may be a long-term process, and may in some cases supersede rather than precede one's exit, even where disillusionment precedes disengagement. Finally, Sarah's case suggests the successful adoption of a new social role and sense of identity as a potentially important protective factor in reducing the risk of re-engagement.

This paper initially identifies a number of critical distinctions that might help our understanding of the relationship between Internet use and terrorism. It then develops the notion of complex global microstructures as a useful conceptual aid to understanding how people interact with the Internet in general, and to terrorism in particular. Parallels are identified between various inappropriate, risky and dangerous uses of the Internet which are argued to point to a degree of commonality of effect. The paper concludes by suggesting that some forms of user interaction with the Internet suggest the Internet may have criminogenic qualities.

Three influences can be identified that have shaped this chapter. The first is an unscripted speech given by Mary Robinson as part of the 150 years famine commemorations in 1995 at University College, Cork, Ireland, whilst she was president of the Irish Republic. No record of this speech exists, but in a powerful account of the influence of the famine on Irish thinking, Robinson made a number of important points about the practice of Irish foreign policy, and the way a small country like Ireland has to manoeuvre and compromise to achieve its foreign policy goals, in contrast to the way large powers can, through the exercise of power, shape more benign environments for themselves. These themes have been developed and extended since that speech, particularly linking the emergence of a distinctive Irish role to changes in the sense of Irish national identity. In essence Robinson drew attention to the significance of context and what in modern parlance we might refer to as the ‘ecology’1 of foreign relations. To put the point in other terms, as Schelling (1971) noted ‘People need to do the right things at the right times in relation to what others are doing’ (p. 62) to achieve desired ends, and they don’t achieve those ends if they fail to do that.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments The views expressed here are those of the author, and are not representative of the Editorial Board of Terrorism and Political Violence. Notes In the UK CEOP Police Command, civilians seconded by NGOs and commercial organisations and police work together to jointly investigate and seek to understand child sexual exploitation. It might also be added that recently intelligence appears increasingly to have been selectively used to bolster particular political choices, rather than provide objective evidence: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/where-politicized-intelligence-comes-8987. Drawing on a fundamental distinction offered by R. V. Clarke and M. Felson, M. Taylor and J. Horgan distinguished between “involvement” and “event” decisional processes (see R. V. Clarke and M. Felson, eds., Routine Activity and Rational Choice: Advances in Criminological Theory, Vol. 5 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1993); and M. Taylor and J. A. Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006): 585–601). Involvement decisions are characteristically multistage and extend over substantial periods of time and are essentially the result of past events that cannot be changed; event decisions, on the other hand, are frequently shorter processes, utilising more circumscribed information largely relating to immediate circumstances and situations which can be influenced and changed. The “causes” of social problems are typically best characterised as involvement as distinct from event decisions, and as such do not necessarily determine the expression of a particular behaviour. See M. Taylor, “The Future of National Interest: An Ecologically-Grounded Analysis,” in R. Porter, J. Gaskarth, and T. Edmunds, eds., British Foreign Policy and the National Interest (Palgrave, in press). A term used by a famous UK political journalist, Robin Day, in an interview with a British politician, John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence in 1982: “But why should the public, on this issue … believe you, a transient, here-today and, if I may say so, gone-tomorrow politician.” See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ln3SpXXYTHY. Nott's autobiography was titled Here Today, Gone Tomorrow, an appropriate title as this is probably all he will be remembered for. R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958). A. Sayer, “For Postdisciplinary Studies: Sociology and the Curse of Disciplinary Parochialism/Imperialism,” in J. Eldridge, J. MacInnes, S. Scott, C. Warhurst, and A. Witz, eds., For Sociology: Legacies and Prospects (Durham: Sociology Press, 2001), 83–91. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMax Taylor Max Taylor is a Visiting Professor in the Department of Security and Crime Sciences, University College, and is an Editor of Terrorism and Political Violence.

This article focuses on the development and application of methodological tools to measure and to “grade” the content of ideological material seen to promote violence and extremism. Our premise is that variation in such content suggests that the formulation of a substantive grading tool will provide analysts with an empirical foundation to detect the nature of these differences and highlight important distinctions. The paper argues that such an approach will offer ways in which to construct an evidence-based picture of what constitutes different layers of extremist fringes, as well as understanding how and when output from particular sources has changed over time. Initial shortcuts to understanding content, it is argued, fail to reflect these nuances, thus necessitating a more systematic approach. The paper develops a two-pronged approach to grading ideological material, presenting examples of Islamist extremist discourse to illustrate how the process might work in practice.

In this article we offer a first attempt at providing a set of universal grading criteria for determining on what basis, and how far, an item of discursive content can be considered “terroristic.” In doing so, we draw loosely on the existing COPINE scale for child abuse images. The scale described in the article is not intended to reflect actual risk of engagement in terrorist violence, nor is it intended to have evidential validity in relation to offenses in certain jurisdictions relating to “terrorist publications.” Rather, by formalising assumptions which seem already to be latent in the literature on terrorist use of the Internet, it aspires to serve as a starting point for a more methodologically coherent approach to relationships between content—particularly online content—and terrorism.