This article examines how populist radical right government reshapes state bureaucracy within a patronage-based administrative system. While patronage and personnel politicization are common features of such systems across governments of different ideological orientations, we argue that populist radical right governments pursue a distinct pattern of bureaucratic control with implications for administrative backsliding. Drawing on longitudinal data on political and bureaucratic turnover across Slovak ministries between 2015 and 2025, we analyze two substantive areas of personnel management, purges and patronage appointments, and the treatment of institutionalized bureaucratic expertise, across temporal and spatial dimensions. The findings show that, compared with previous governments operating in the same patronage context, populist radical right governments sustain exceptionally high and prolonged levels of bureaucratic turnover beyond the initial post-electoral period, expand formal political appointments, and generate extreme levels of personnel replacement in ideologically salient policy areas. More broadly, the analysis suggests that administrative backsliding may unfold across diverse administrative contexts when populist radical right incumbents intensify and repurpose existing mechanisms of bureaucratic control, regardless of whether these originate in merit-based or patronage systems.

Politicians whose political careers appear finished rarely make successful comebacks. Slovakia’s Robert Fico was propelled back to power when his party, Smer-SD, won the 2023 parliamentary elections and was able to form a coalition government. An election victory for Fico, however, seemed unthinkable in 2018 when he resigned as prime minister amid large-scale protests, and even more unlikely in 2020 when his party lost power, suffered a subsequent split, and slipped to single digits in the polls. Organizational and ideational resources provided a platform for recovery for Smer-SD and other parties to bounce back. Moreover, the chaotic nature of the government formed in 2020 and stark challenges posed by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine created conditions propitious for a comeback. Data from a specially commissioned survey conducted in the days after the election show campaign messaging around strong and effective leadership combined with policy pitches towards key demographic groups found a receptive audience. Although Smer-SD won a plurality of the vote, its ability to return to power was dependent on forging a coalition highlighting not just the pivotal nature of one of Smer-SD’s eventual partners in government, but also the mechanics of the electoral system that ensured Smer-SD’s other coalition partner crossed the electoral threshold. The 2023 elections demonstrate not just how divisive politicians like Fico can return to power, but also given the subsequent democratic erosion in Slovakia, they provide lessons for the study of democratic backsliding and resilience.

This article speaks directly to public managers, senior civil servants, HR leaders, and those responsible for safeguarding integrity across bureaucracy. The authors found a worrying pattern: when civil servants expect incoming political leaders to challenge democratic norms or ethical standards, the most motivated and principled staff are the first to consider leaving. These are exactly the people public organizations rely on for professionalism, continuity, and resisting improper pressures. Their potential departure represents a serious organizational risk during turbulent political transitions. Managers should therefore treat value-based concerns, not just policy disagreements, as early warning signs of staff loss. Strengthening internal communication, reinforcing ethical expectations, and offering visible organizational support for integrity can help retain mission-driven employees. More broadly, the findings underline a simple message: protecting democratic values inside public organizations is not an abstract ideal; it is a practical necessity for keeping competent and committed people in public service. When elections threaten to bring authoritarian populists or illiberal politicians to power, bureaucracies face uncertainty and stress that can prompt exit strategies. This article examines anticipatory politicization by analysing career bureaucrats' turnover intentions on the eve of such political events. Drawing on an original survey of Slovak civil servants conducted shortly before the 2023 parliamentary elections, the authors investigated how public service motivation shapes these intentions. Turnover intention was driven primarily by anticipated value and integrity conflicts rather than policy disagreements. Importantly, highly motivated civil servants, who are typically expected to uphold democratic standards, are more likely to consider leaving before attempting voice, sabotage, or any other form of bureaucratic resistance. The results challenge the assumption that strong public service motivation enhances retention or fuels resistance: under illiberal threat, it may instead accelerate disillusionment and pre-emptive exit, weakening the bureaucracy's capacity to act as a guardian of democracy.

We employ a comparative analysis of heads of regional executives in two similar countries with different regional political subsystems. In Slovakia, governors operate under a system of separation of powers, are directly elected through a majoritarian electoral system and are not answerable to regional assemblies. In the Czech Republic, governors are elected by the regional assemblies (therefore indirectly) and can be removed from office by a no-confidence motion. Our results suggest that direct elections tend to produce fewer female governors and empower non-affiliated (non-party) outsiders; the share of regional governors without prior political experience is not affected by the formal institutional rules.

The article examines the proposition that the characteristics of ministerial advisers are shaped by specific settings of the politicization of ministerial administration. Four types of politicization settings are identified, resulting from variation in the scope of formal political appointments and appointments into bureaucracy. Using data from an original expert survey and semi-structured expert interviews, the contribution analyses eleven cases from Central and Eastern Europe. It documents that the functional differentiation of advisers from other administrative actors, and their political and policymaking roles, are conditioned by the politicization settings in which they operate. The political roles of advisers are most pronounced where they do not face other formal political appointees, and appointments into bureaucracy are low. Policymaking roles are strongest where formal political appointees manage high politics, and bureaucratic appointments are limited. The article also identifies "invisible" advisers as a new type of player unknown in established Western bureaucracies.

The chapter explores arrangements for the provision of political advice across eleven central and eastern European countries that are also members of the European Union. It is argued that there is an inverse relationship between the extent of the politicisation of formally meritocratic bureaucracies and the existence of ministerial advisers as a functionally specific form of executive actors. Where ministers influence hiring and firing within civil service hierarchy, politicised civil servants serve as direct transmission belts of political preferences into the state administration: consequently, advisers play multiple roles, often mirroring the idiosyncrasies of each ministry and the short-term preferences of governing parties. Conversely, in countries with greater autonomy and technocratic bureaucracies, the functional boundaries between civil servants and political advisers are observed in practice. In countries with medium levels of politicisation, boundaries between civil servants and advisers are observed but political advisers may be appointed to various positions in public administration towards the end of their tenure. Finally, and relatedly, in the most politicized countries even basic information about ministerial advisers is not provided, which ensures there are ample opportunities for the deployment of ‘invisible’ advisers. In short, the issue of politicisation provides an important addition to the established determinants of the role and influence of advisers.

Party politics across Central and Eastern Europe has become less structured. Many of the divides that anchored political competition have waned in recent years, weakening the attachment of voters to the existing palette of parties and making them more likely to be attracted to new and non-traditional electoral vehicles. But for such parties to succeed at the ballot box, they need to be able to frame elections and campaign effectively. Drawing on data from a specially commissioned survey, we find that the success of Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) led by Igor Matovič in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia owed much to the crafting of an anti-corruption appeal combined with an effective campaign. Both mobilization and conversion of voters, particularly through television and the leaders’ debates, in the months leading up to election day ensured OĽaNO won a quarter of the vote. OĽaNO stands in stark contrast to other parties whose leaders failed to craft as effective a message, miscalculated the impact of electoral rules and in some cases were unable to distance themselves enough from their past actions. The success of OĽaNO underlines that themes related to anti-corruption and good governance have become central to party politics and political contestation. More broadly, the election and its aftermath continued a general trend of forward movement of voters from old parties to new to newer still, indicating the churn of party politics in Slovakia is likely to continue.

Patronage is typically studied following government terminations when political parties appoint their nominees into the state administration. However, patronage is understudied in cases when a change of minister takes place without government termination. Taking individual government ministers as the units of analysis, we identify four modalities of ministerial alterations: replacing, successive, incumbent, and switching ministers. We show that politicization occurs under "replacing ministers" following government termination, but the bureaucratic turnover is equally high under "successive ministers." That suggests that patronage can be seen as an individualized power resource of autonomous ministers who exercise influence independently of their political parties.

Despite spells outside parliament, with its blend of nationalist and populist appeals the Slovak National Party (SNS) has been a prominent fixture on Slovakia’s political scene for three decades. Unlike some of the newer parties in Slovakia and across the region, partly as a product of the point of its (re-)creation, SNS has a comparable organizational density to most established parties in the country and has invested in party branches and recruiting members. Although ordinary members exercised some power and influence during the fissiparous era of the early 2000s, SNS has been notable for the role played by its leader in decision-making and steering the party. Each leader placed their stamp on the projection, pitch and functioning of the party, both as a decision-making organization and an electoral vehicle. Ordinary members have been largely—but not exclusively—relegated to the role of cheerleaders and campaigners for the party’s tribunes; a situation which has not changed significantly in the era of social media. The pre-eminent position of the leader and the limited options for “voice” has led unsuccessful contenders for top posts and their supporters to opt instead for “exit.” Despite having some of the traits of the mass party and having engaged in some of the activities common for mass parties, especially in the earlier years of its existence, in more recent times in particular, SNS falls short of the mass party model both in aspiration and reality.

This contribution seeks to answer the question whether the new civil service legislation that entered into force in 2015 in the Czech Republic led to the depoliticization of the country's ministerial bureaucracy. To that end, we compare the career backgrounds of top civil servants before and after the entry into force of the new Civil Service Act. The article examines the career backgrounds of the persons appointed as ministerial deputies between 2013 and 2018, focusing on their last "pre-deputy" jobs and considering a broader set of their career attributes. A focus on the previous job reveals that even before the law was introduced, bureaucrats constituted the largest share of appointees, and their share even increased with the new legislation. The incidence of deputies appointed directly from party-related jobs dropped considerably. However, when a broader set of career attributes is considered, the share of partisans among the pre-2015 deputies nearly matches that of the career bureaucrats. Ostensibly political careers among the post-2015 deputies declined but remain significant. Hence, there has been a decline in the open politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy after 2015. Party political effects also matter, as the new ANO party, after entering the executive, has taken a different approach to top bureaucratic appointments than the other major governing Czech parties. Typically, deputies appointed into the positions under the ANO's control would not have links to the party itself but would be recruited via non-party channels, e.g. from pre-political networks of the ANO ministers and leaders. Consequently, though less politicized by party agents, the current Czech system is more a product of choices made by government ministers of the day than a stable arrangement resulting from firmly established norms and rules.

The existing research suggests that socially rooted new political parties are more likely to be reelected to parliaments than parties emerging without links to preexisting social groups. It is argued that the two groups face different prospects of institutionalization: Rooted parties are more viable because their links to preexisting societal groups contribute to a higher sustainability of their electoral support and stronger institutionalization. We assess the link between the origin of parties, their level of institutionalization, and their electoral performance in the context of Slovakia, a new Eastern European democracy. We add to the existing state of knowledge in three ways. First, we empirically assess the link between the social origin of parties and their level of institutionalization. We also provide rich empirical material on the intraparty processes resulting in various levels of institutionalization. Subsequently, we assess whether rooted parties record better electoral performance than political entrepreneur parties. Second, we provide some illustration of the fact that agential factors, especially the decisions and activities related to leadership contestation, directly impact both party institutionalization and electoral performance. Third, we show that developing the links to a sociostructurally well-defined electorate may be a viable strategy to secure a parliamentary relevance for a prolonged period of time for some political entrepreneurs. Our findings suggest that parties with different levels of institutionalization are able to secure reelection, and that their electoral performance is not directly linked to their social origins.

This book assesses the quality of Czech democracy relative to both its postcommunist peers and older EU members. Motivated by the authoritarian tendencies and illiberal outcomes in the postcommunist region, it explores the extent to which the Czech Republic is genuinely an outlier within the region and why. The book elaborates on an original conception of democratic quality that emphasizes three aspects of governance: citizen rule, political equality, and good citizenship. The authors show that while the Czech Republic falls short of Western democracies on these standards, it does perform better than most of its peers. The book includes original data on campaign promises, dual mandates, legislative productivity, the wealth of MPs, the opinions of millionaires, women’s representation, and the stability of public preferences along with comparative analyses of a host of other indicators. The book will appeal to those interested in the politics of Eastern Europe and new democracies, those working in the rapidly growing fields of democratic quality and populism, and NGOs concerned with the development of new democracies around the world.

Michal Klíma: INFORMAL POLITICS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: POLITICAL PARTIES, CLIENTELISM AND STATE CAPTURE. London: Routledge. 2020. 222 pages.

Government parties suffered defeat in the November 2017 regional elections in Slovakia. The Direction-Social Democracy (Smer), the senior coalition partner, managed to remain the party with the largest share of elected regional deputies. However, its strength was significantly reduced, both when compared to the 2016 national elections and the 2013 regional contests. The democratic center-right opposition managed to coordinate and compete effectively against the governing parties. Its success was apparent in the gubernatorial contests, where its candidates defeated most of the Smer-backed incumbents. The democratic opposition was less successful in elections to regional assemblies. Their most significant result is a dramatic increase in the share of independent deputies who constitute the largest virtual group of deputies.

For the very first time in EU history, the 2014 EP elections provided citizens with the opportunity to influence the nomination of the Commission President by casting a vote for the main Europarties' lead candidates'. By subjecting the position of the Commission President to an open political contest, many experts have formulated the expectation that heightened political competition would strengthen the weak electoral connection between EU citizens and EU legislators, which some consider a root cause for the EU's lack of public support. In particular, this contest was on display in the so-called Eurovision Debate', a televised debate between the main contenders for the Commission President broadcasted live across Europe. Drawing on a quasi-experimental study conducted in 24 EU countries, we find that debate exposure led to increased cognitive and political involvement and EU support among young citizens. Unfortunately, the debate has only reached a very small audience.

An analysis of national and regional elections reveals that elections are highly nationalized in Slovakia. However, the nationalization of regional elections does not translate into second-order election effects. Due to radically different electoral systems used for regional and national elections, political parties are induced to form alliances in regional but not in national elections and electoral alliances crossing the government-opposition divide are abundant in regional elections. Another notable and important regional election dynamic is the growing success of independent candidates. This trend can be interpreted as 'departyisation' of regional politics rather than regionalization. Regional elections may be conceived as 'barometer elections' whereby voters do not use their vote to punish parties in national government. Rather, the regional vote indicates the electoral prospects of parties in the upcoming national election.