BACKGROUND:COVID-19 vaccination reduces SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission. However, evidence is emerging on the degree of protection across variants and in high-transmission settings. To better understand the protection afforded by vaccination specifically in a high-transmission setting, we examined household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during a period of high community incidence with predominant SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 (Alpha) variant, among vaccinated and unvaccinated contacts. METHODS:We conducted a household transmission investigation in San Diego County, California, and Denver, Colorado, during January-April 2021. Households were enrolled if they had at least one person with documented SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected nasopharyngeal swabs, blood, demographic information, and vaccination history from all consenting household members. We compared infection risks (IRs), RT-PCR cycle threshold values, SARS-CoV-2 culture results, and antibody statuses among vaccinated and unvaccinated household contacts. RESULTS:We enrolled 493 individuals from 138 households. The SARS-CoV-2 variant was identified from 121/138 households (88%). The most common variants were Alpha (75/121, 62%) and Epsilon (19/121, 16%). There were no households with discordant lineages among household members. One fully vaccinated secondary case was symptomatic (13%); the other 5 were asymptomatic (87%). Among unvaccinated secondary cases, 105/108 (97%) were symptomatic. Among 127 households with a single primary case, the IR for household contacts was 45% (146/322; 95% Confidence Interval [CI] 40-51%). The observed IR was higher in unvaccinated (130/257, 49%, 95% CI 45-57%) than fully vaccinated contacts (6/26, 23%, 95% CI 11-42%). A lower proportion of households with a fully vaccinated primary case had secondary cases (1/5, 20%) than households with an unvaccinated primary case (66/108, 62%). CONCLUSIONS:Although SARS-CoV-2 infections in vaccinated household contacts were reported in this high transmission setting, full vaccination protected against SARS-CoV-2 infection. These findings further support the protective effect of COVID-19 vaccination and highlight the need for ongoing vaccination among eligible persons.

IMPORTANCE As self-collected home antigen tests become widely available, a better understanding of their performance during the course of SARS-CoV-2 infection is needed. OBJECTIVE To evaluate the diagnostic performance of home antigen tests compared with reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture by days from illness onset, as well as user acceptability. DESIGN, SETTING. AND PARTICIPANTS This prospective cohort study was conducted from January to May 2021 in San Diego County, California, and metropolitan Denver, Colorado. The convenience sample included adults and children with RT-PCR-confirmed infection who used self collected home antigen tests for 15 days and underwent at least 1 nasopharyngeal swab for RT-PCR, viral culture, and sequencing. EXPOSURES SARS-CoV-2 infection. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was the daily sensitivity of home antigen tests to detect RT-PCR-confirmed cases. Secondary outcomes included the daily percentage of antigen test, RT-PCR, and viral culture results that were positive, and antigen test sensitivity compared with same-day RT-PCR and cultures, Antigen test use errors and acceptability were assessed for a subset of participants. Results This study enrolled 225 persons with RT-PCR-confirmed infection (median [range] age, 29 [1-83] years; 117 female participants [52%]; 10 [4%] Asian, 6 [3%] Black or African American, 50 [22%] Hispanic or Latino, 3 [1%] Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, 145 [64%] White, and 11 [5%] multiracial individuals) who completed 3044 antigen tests and 642 nasopharyngeal swabs. Antigen test sensitivity was 50% (95% CI, 45%-55%) during the infectious period, 64% (95% CI, 56%-70%) compared with same-day RT-PCR, and 84% (95% CI, 75%-90%) compared with same-day cultures. Antigen test sensitivity peaked 4 days after illness onset at 77% (95% CI, 69%-83%). Antigen test sensitivity improved with a second antigen test 1 to 2 days later, particularly early in the infection. Six days after illness onset, antigen test result positivity was 61% (95% CI, 53%-68%). Almost all (216 [96%]) surveyed individuals reported that they would be more likely to get tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection if home antigen tests were available over the counter. Conclusions and Relevance The results of this cohort study of home antigen tests suggest that sensitivity for SARS-CoV-2 was moderate compared with RT-PCR and high compared with viral culture. The results also suggest that symptomatic individuals with an initial negative home antigen test result for SARS-CoV-2 infection should test again 1 to 2 days later because test sensitivity peaked several days after illness onset and improved with repeated testing.

In an investigation involving 127 households with 322 household contacts, household secondary infection risks were similar for persons with Alpha and non-Alpha lineages of SARS-CoV-2. Avoiding close contact within households may reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission for all lineages among household members. Background In Spring 2021, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.1.7 (Alpha) became the predominant variant in the United States. Research suggests that Alpha has increased transmissibility compared with non-Alpha lineages. We estimated household secondary infection risk (SIR), assessed characteristics associated with transmission, and compared symptoms of persons with Alpha and non-Alpha infections. Methods We followed households with SARS-CoV-2 infection for 2 weeks in San Diego County and metropolitan Denver, January to April 2021. We collected epidemiologic information and biospecimens for serology, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and whole-genome sequencing. We stratified SIR and symptoms by lineage and identified characteristics associated with transmission using generalized estimating equations. Results We investigated 127 households with 322 household contacts; 72 households (56.7%) had member(s) with secondary infections. SIRs were not significantly higher for Alpha (61.0% [95% confidence interval, 52.4-69.0%]) than non-Alpha (55.6% [44.7-65.9%], P = .49). In households with Alpha, persons who identified as Asian or Hispanic/Latino had significantly higher SIRs than those who identified as White (P = .01 and .03, respectively). Close contact (eg, kissing, hugging) with primary cases was associated with increased transmission for all lineages. Persons with Alpha infection were more likely to report constitutional symptoms than persons with non-Alpha (86.9% vs 76.8%, P = .05). Conclusions Household SIRs were similar for Alpha and non-Alpha. Comparable SIRs may be due to saturation of transmission risk in households due to extensive close contact, or true lack of difference in transmission rates. Avoiding close contact within households may reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission for all lineages among household members.

Objective To assess the household secondary infection risk (SIR) of B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and non-Alpha lineages of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children. Study design During January to April 2021, we prospectively followed households with a SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected questionnaires, serial nasopharyngeal swabs for reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing and whole genome sequencing, and serial blood samples for serology testing. We calculated SIRs by primary case age (pediatric vs adult), household contact age, and viral lineage. We evaluated risk factors associated with transmission and described symptom profiles among children. Results Among 36 households with pediatric primary cases, 21 (58%) had secondary infections. Among 91 households with adult primary cases, 51 (56%) had secondary infections. SIRs among pediatric and adult primary cases were 45% and 54%, respectively (OR, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.41-1.54). SIRs among pediatric primary cases with Alpha and non-Alpha lineage were 55% and 46%, respectively (OR, 1.52; 95% CI, 0.51-4.53). SIRs among pediatric and adult household contacts were 55% and 49%, respectively (OR, 1.01; 95% CI, 0.68-1.50). Among pediatric contacts, no significant differences in the odds of acquiring infection by demographic or household characteristics were observed. Conclusions Household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from children and adult primary cases to household members was frequent. The risk of secondary infection was similar among child and adult household contacts. Among children, household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the risk of secondary infection was not influenced by lineage. Continued mitigation strategies (eg, masking, physical distancing, vaccination) are needed to protect at-risk groups regardless of virus lineage circulating in communities.

Coccidioidomycosis, also known as Valley fever, is caused by inhalation of spores of the soil-dwelling fungi Coccidioides spp.Although most illness is mild, coccidioidomycosis can cause severe disease resulting in hospitalization or death.On July 28, 2021, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) notified the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) of seven wildland firefighters from two crews who had respiratory illness.Crew A (19 members) and crew B (21 members) had worked on wildfires in late June 2021 near the Tehachapi Mountains, a California region with historically high coccidioidomycosis incidence.*Among the seven symptomatic firefighters, three cases of coccidioidomycosis were laboratory-confirmed; two patients developed severe disease.All three firefighters with confirmed coccidioidomycosis reported working in dusty conditions without wearing respiratory protection.Because no vaccine for coccidioidomycosis currently exists, correct use of respiratory protection is important for preventing coccidioidomycosis, especially in regions with high disease incidence.During July 17-August 4, 2021, the seven ill firefighters each visited an emergency department two or three times with cough, chest pain, or shortness of breath; all received negative test results for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.Three of the seven firefighters were hospitalized, had serologic test results that were positive for coccidioidomycosis, and were treated with antifungal medication.CDPH interviewed these three patients and reviewed their medical records.Coccidioidomycosis serologic test results for the other four firefighters were negative; however, repeat serology is often suggested if coccidioidomycosis is suspected.† Two of these four were retested and results remained negative and were managed in ambulatory clinics, and two were lost to follow-up.All confirmed cases occurred in patients who worked on crew B, resulting in an attack rate for confirmed cases of 14.3% (three of 21).The three confirmed cases occurred in men aged 25-34 years, none of whom had any remarkable past medical history.Two patients reported Hispanic or Latino race or ethnicity, and * https://www.cdph.ca.

Background: Wastewater represents a composite biological sample from the entire contributing population. People infected with monkeypox virus (MPXV) may excrete viral DNA into wastewater via multiple ways such as in feces, urine, skin lesions, and/or saliva. We describe results from rapid establishment of wastewater surveillance in selected regions in California within a month of the first reported case of monkeypox in the United States. Methods: PCR assays targeting genomic DNA from MPXV were deployed in an ongoing wastewater surveillance program in California. MPXV DNA concentrations were measured daily in settled solids samples from nine wastewater plants. Results over a four-week period were validated across different MPXV assays, compared using influent and solids samples, and correlated using non-parametric methods (Kendall's tau) with the number of monkeypox cases reported from each sewershed. Results: MPXV DNA was detected at all nine sites between June 19 and August 1, 2022; 5 of 9 sites detected MPXV DNA prior to or within a day of the first case identified in the source sewershed. At the four sites with >10 positive detections, we observed a positive, statistically significant correlation (p <0.001) between MPXV DNA in wastewater solids and incidence rate of reported cases. Conclusions: Our findings suggest wastewater can be used to effectively detect the introduction of MPXV and monitor its circulation in the community to inform public health and clinical response. This flexible wastewater surveillance infrastructure may be rapidly leveraged to monitor other pathogens of public health importance that are shed into wastewater.

Vector-borne diseases are among the most burdensome infectious diseases worldwide with high burden to health systems in developing regions in the tropics. For many of these diseases, vector control to reduce human biting rates or arthropod populations remains the primary strategy for prevention. New vector control interventions intended to be marketed through public health channels must be assessed by the World Health Organization for public health value using data generated from large-scale trials integrating epidemiological endpoints of human health impact. Such phase III trials typically follow large numbers of study subjects to meet necessary power requirements for detecting significant differences between treatment arms, thereby generating substantive and complex datasets. Data is often gathered directly in the field, in resource-poor settings, leading to challenges in efficient data reporting and/or quality assurance. With advancing technology, mobile data collection (MDC) systems have been implemented in many studies to overcome these challenges. Here we describe the development and implementation of a MDC system during a randomized-cluster, placebo-controlled clinical trial evaluating the protective efficacy of a spatial repellent intervention in reducing human infection with Aedes-borne viruses (ABV) in the urban setting of Iquitos, Peru, as well as the data management system that supported it. We discuss the benefits, remaining capacity gaps and the key lessons learned from using a MDC system in this context in detail.

While risk of fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is considered low, there is limited environmental data within households. This January-April 2021 investigation describes frequency and types of surfaces positive for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) among residences with ≥1 SARS-CoV-2 infection, and associations of household characteristics with surface RT-PCR and viable virus positivity. Of 1232 samples from 124 households, 27.8% (n = 342) were RT-PCR positive with nightstands (44.1%) and pillows (40.9%) most frequently positive. SARS-CoV-2 lineage, documented household transmission, greater number of infected persons, shorter interval between illness onset and sampling, total household symptoms, proportion of infected persons ≤12 years old, and persons exhibiting upper respiratory symptoms or diarrhea were associated with more positive surfaces. Viable virus was isolated from 0.2% (n = 3 samples from one household) of all samples. This investigation suggests that while SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces is common, fomite transmission risk in households is low.

On May 17, 2022, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory confirmed the presence of orthopoxvirus DNA via real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from lesion swabs obtained from a Massachusetts resident. Orthopoxviruses include Monkeypox virus, the causative agent of monkeypox. Subsequent real-time PCR testing at CDC on May 18 confirmed that the patient was infected with the West African clade of Monkeypox virus. Since then, confirmed cases* have been reported by nine states. In addition, 28 countries and territories,† none of which has endemic monkeypox, have reported laboratory-confirmed cases. On May 17, CDC, in coordination with state and local jurisdictions, initiated an emergency response to identify, monitor, and investigate additional monkeypox cases in the United States. This response has included releasing a Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory, developing interim public health and clinical recommendations, releasing guidance for LRN testing, hosting clinician and public health partner outreach calls, disseminating health communication messages to the public, developing protocols for use and release of medical countermeasures, and facilitating delivery of vaccine postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) and antivirals that have been stockpiled by the U.S. government for preparedness and response purposes. On May 19, a call center was established to provide guidance to states for the evaluation of possible cases of monkeypox, including recommendations for clinical diagnosis and orthopoxvirus testing. The call center also gathers information about possible cases to identify interjurisdictional linkages. As of May 31, this investigation has identified 17§ cases in the United States; most cases (16) were diagnosed in persons who identify as gay, bisexual, or men who have sex with men (MSM). Ongoing investigation suggests person-to-person community transmission, and CDC urges health departments, clinicians, and the public to remain vigilant, institute appropriate infection prevention and control measures, and notify public health authorities of suspected cases to reduce disease spread. Public health authorities are identifying cases and conducting investigations to determine possible sources and prevent further spread. This activity was reviewed by CDC and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.¶.

Introduction:Mitigation behaviors are key to preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission. We identified the behaviors associated with secondary transmission from confirmed SARS-CoV-2 primary cases to household contacts and described the characteristics associated with reporting these behaviors.Methods:Households with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections were recruited in California and Colorado from January to April 2021. Self-reported behaviors and demographics were collected through interviews. We investigated behaviors associated with transmission and individual and household characteristics associated with behaviors using univariable and multivariable logistic regression with generalized estimating equations to account for household clustering.Results:Among household contacts of primary cases, 43.3% (133 of 307) became infected with SARS-CoV-2. When an adjusted analysis was conducted, household contacts who slept in the same bedroom with the primary case (AOR=2.19; 95% CI=1.25, 3.84) and ate food prepared by the primary case (AOR=1.98; 95% CI=1.02, 3.87) had increased odds of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Household contacts in homes ≤2,000 square feet had increased odds of sleeping in the same bedroom as the primary case compared with those in homes >2,000 square feet (AOR=3.97; 95% CI=1.73, 9.10). Parents, siblings, and other relationships (extended family, friends, or roommates) of the primary case had decreased odds of eating food prepared by the primary case compared with partners.Conclusions:Sleeping in the same bedroom as the primary case and eating food prepared by the primary case were associated with secondary transmission. Household dimension and relationship to the primary case were associated with these behaviors. Our findings encourage innovative means to promote adherence to mitigation measures that reduce household transmission.

Abstract Background In December 2020, B.1.1.7 lineage of SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in the United States and has since become the dominant lineage. Previous investigations involving B.1.1.7 suggested higher rates of transmission relative to non-B.1.1.7 lineages. We conducted a household transmission investigation to determine the secondary infection rates (SIR) of B.1.1.7 and non-B.1.1.7 SARS-CoV-2 lineages. Methods From January–April 2021, we enrolled members of households in San Diego County, CA, and Denver, CO metropolitan area (Tri-County), with a confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection in a household member with illness onset date in the previous 10 days. CDC investigators visited households at enrollment and 14 days later at closeout to obtain demographic and clinical data and nasopharyngeal (NP) samples on all consenting household members. Interim visits, with collection of NP swabs, occurred if a participant became symptomatic during follow-up. NP samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using TaqPath™ RT-PCR test, where failure to amplify the spike protein results in S-Gene target failure (SGTF) may indicate B.1.1.7 lineage. Demographic characteristics and SIR were compared among SGTF and non-SGTF households using two-sided p-values with chi-square tests; 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated with Wilson score intervals. Results 552 persons from 151 households were enrolled. 91 (60%) households were classified as SGTF, 57 (38%) non-SGTF, and 3 (2%) indeterminant. SGTF and non-SGTF households had similar sex distribution (49% female and 52% female, respectively; P=0.54) and age (median 30 years, interquartile range (IQR 14–47) and 31 years (IQR 15–45), respectively). Hispanic people accounted for 24% and 32% of enrolled members of SGTF and non-SGTF households, respectively (p=0.04). At least one secondary case occurred in 61% of SGTF and 58% of non-SGTF households (P=0.66). SIR was 52% (95%[CI] 46%-59%) for SGTF and 45% (95% CI 37%-53%) for non-SGTF households (P=0.18). Conclusion SIRs were high in both SGTF and non-SGTF households; our findings did not support an increase in SIR for SGTF relative to non-SGTF households in this setting. Sequence confirmed SARS-CoV-2 samples will provide further information on lineage specific SIRs. Disclosures All Authors: No reported disclosures

The spread of Aedes aegypti in California and other regions of the U.S. has increased the need to understand the potential for local chains of Ae. aegypti-borne virus transmission, particularly in arid regions where the ecology of these mosquitoes is less understood. For public health and vector control programs, it is helpful to know whether variation in risk of local transmission can be attributed to socio-demographic factors that could help to target surveillance and control programs. Socio-demographic factors have been shown to influence transmission risk of dengue virus outside the U.S. by modifying biting rates and vector abundance. In regions of the U.S. where Ae. aegypti have recently invaded and where residential areas are structured differently than those in the tropics where Ae. aegypti are endemic, it is unclear how socio-demographic factors modify the abundance of Ae. aegypti populations. Understanding heterogeneities among households in Ae. aegypti abundance will provide a better understanding of local vectorial capacity and is an important component of understanding risk of local Ae. aegypti-borne virus transmission. We conducted a cross-sectional study in Los Angeles County, California during summer 2017 to understand the causes of variation in relative abundance of Ae. aegypti among households. We surveyed 161 houses, representing a wide range of incomes. Surveys consisted of systematic adult mosquito collections, inspections of households and properties, and administration of a questionnaire in English or Spanish. Adult Ae. aegypti were detected at 72% of households overall and were found indoors at 12% of households. An average of 3.1 Ae. aegypti were collected per household. Ae. aegypti abundance outdoors was higher in lower-income neighborhoods and around older households with larger outdoor areas, greater densities of containers with standing water, less frequent yard maintenance, and greater air-conditioner use. We also found that Ae. aegypti abundance indoors was higher in households that had less window and door screening, less air-conditioner usage, more potted plants indoors, more rain-exposed containers around the home, and lower neighborhood human population densities. Our results indicate that, in the areas of southern California studied, there are behavioral and socio-demographic determinants of Ae. aegypti abundance, and that low-income households could be at higher risk for exposure to Ae. aegypti biting and potentially greater risk for Zika, dengue, and chikungunya virus transmission if a local outbreak were to occur.

The ongoing spread of the mosquitoes, Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus, in the continental United States leaves new areas at risk for local transmission of dengue, chikungunya, and Zika viruses. All three viruses have caused major disease outbreaks in the Americas with infected travelers returning regularly to the U.S. The expanding range of these mosquitoes raises questions about whether recent spread has been enabled by climate change or other anthropogenic influences. In this analysis, we used downscaled climate scenarios from the NASA Earth Exchange Global Daily Downscaled Projections (NEX GDDP) dataset to model Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus population growth rates across the United States. We used a stage-structured matrix population model to understand past and present climatic suitability for these vectors, and to project future suitability under CMIP5 climate change scenarios. Our results indicate that much of the southern U.S. is suitable for both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus year-round. In addition, a large proportion of the U.S. is seasonally suitable for mosquito population growth, creating the potential for periodic incursions into new areas. Changes in climatic suitability in recent decades for Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus have occurred already in many regions of the U.S., and model projections of future climate suggest that climate change will continue to reshape the range of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus in the U.S., and potentially the risk of the viruses they transmit.