A key piece of the decarbonization challenge is shifting households from fossil-fuel heating systems to zero-emission alternatives such as electric heat pumps. In this study, we characterize the heterogeneity of heating system preferences among Canadian homeowners. Through latent class modelling informed by stated preference data (n = 2099), we identify four classes of homeowners, each differing in their valuation of home heating technology types and attributes, as well as individual socio-demographics. We find that approximately half of households are "air source heat pump-neutral", valuing air source heat pumps and furnaces/boilers similarly when factors like costs are held equal. One quarter of households are "furnace-oriented", displaying strong aversion to heat pumps, with high sensitivity to purchase prices and relatively low valuation of operational energy cost savings. Two other classes express very high valuation for heat pumps. One of these classes favors ground source heat pumps in particular, but interestingly, it is also highly averse to installation hassle. Our findings lead to a range of policy recommendations for promoting heat pump adoption across classes, including targeted incentives and strategic messaging; however, furnace-oriented households appear highly difficult to electrify, potentially requiring regulatory instruments to decarbonize.

This study reviews the history of climate policymaking in British Columbia (BC) and the City of Vancouver, two leaders globally in subnational climate policy. Focusing on the transportation and buildings sectors, the study overviews early policy advancements in BC in the context of subnational leadership and policy transfer. It then discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the province's recent CleanBC and Roadmap plans, touching on relevant Vancouver policies. The analysis identifies key policy gaps and possible solutions for meeting future emissions reduction targets, noting opportunities moving forward for the province and other jurisdictions looking to pursue similarly ambitious climate policy.

Canada and the United States (US) have both committed to reaching net zero emissions by 2050 but neither have implemented policy sufficient to reach this target. Knowledge of the technical steps to deep decarbonization is needed alongside an understanding of how each country might be similarly and uniquely impacted by a transition to net zero emissions, contingent on specific technology advancements or policy decisions. We use the computable general equilibrium model, gTech, to simulate sixteen net zero scenarios for Canada and the US varying by technology and policy assumptions as part of the energy modelling forum 37 (EMF37) study. We find that both economies similarly continue to grow in all scenarios out to 2050 with the rate of growth largely determined by assumptions on negative emissions technology. Sectoral impacts differ between countries as a result of current emissions and GDP profiles in combination with assumed net zero scenario policy and technology advancements. In the US, we find that efficient use of electricity is a slightly more important predictor of economic outcomes, while Canada's economy is marginally more responsive to cost and performance improvements in carbon capture technologies.

Emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries must decarbonize to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C. This study explores how policy stringency and regional variability impact EITE industrial decarbonization. It uses Canada as a case study due to its heterogeneous industrial sector and high regional resource variability. The study has two scenarios: one with global climate action where the world pushes to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, and one where Canada acts to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 and the rest of the world lags. The scenarios differ in three ways: the global price of oil, the pace of technological change for low emission technologies, and domestic climate policy. In the global action scenario, a carbon price of $430USD2020 was needed to achieve 75% decarbonization of EITE industries by 2050. In our global inaction scenario, EITE industries only decarbonize 25%, as domestic climate policy considered international competition and the risk of industrial shutdown. If competitiveness concerns persist as simulated in this scenario, Canada is highly unlikely to achieve deep industrial decarbonization by 2050. The results also show that regional variability plays a significant role in low emissions technology adoption. While all regions will need targeted innovation and commercialization support as well as market uptake mechanisms, we find that relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of resource availability and industrial mix play an important role in how regional decarbonization occurs. For instance, regions with inexpensive local fossil fuels and ready geology suitable for CO2 storage have a high uptake of carbon capture and storage. Regions with access to abundant hydroelectricity rely more on electrification as a decarbonization pathway. Regions with no relative resource advantages are at greater risk for industrial shutdown due to the higher cost of decarbonization.

Many jurisdictions are subject to climate action plans composed of multiple policy instruments. As climate policy landscapes become increasingly crowded, understanding the nature and likelihood of interactions between proposed policies and other instruments that make up a policy mix is a key element of policy design. We introduce a technology-rich computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian energy-economy, gTech, to explore the effectiveness of one such policy called the low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS) at reducing greenhouse gas emissions when implemented alongside other climate policy instruments. We find that the ability of a LCFS to reduce emissions depends on the ‘background’ policy mix it is layered on top of, in addition to its credit market design.

Electric air source heat pumps (ASHPs) appear to be a key technology for decarbonizing space heating in existing residential buildings, yet their current market share in much of North America remains low. To explore how the potential future ASHP market may differ from the present one, we use a subset of data from the Canadian Home Heating Survey (n = 461) to provide a comprehensive characterization of three market segments of British Columbian homeowners: Pioneers (heat pump owners), Potential Early Mainstream buyers (homeowners currently willing to purchase an ASHP), and Late Mainstream buyers (homeowners currently unwilling to purchase an ASHP). We assess variable associations with market segments according to the Attitude-Behavior-Context theory, which posits that pro-environmental behavior is shaped by attitudinal, contextual, and socio-demographic factors. We also compare how market segmentation changes before and after respondents receive technical information on different home heating systems. Relative to Pioneers and the Potential Early Mainstream (PEM), we find that the Late Mainstream (LM) are generally lower income, lower educated, less environmentally- and technologically-oriented in their lifestyles, less open to change, less familiar with heat pumps and home energy efficiency, more negative in their perceptions about heat pumps, and less aware and supportive of policies aimed at reducing residential emissions. We also find that after respondents read technical information about home heating systems, approximately 10% of heat pump non-owners shift from the LM to the PEM; however, within the PEM, there is little growth in high willingness to adopt.

Carbon pricing is widely recognized as the most economically efficient policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, its high-cost visibility creates political challenges for its implementation at a sufficiently stringent level to achieve deep decarbonization. Flexible regulations, such as renewable portfolio standards and low-carbon fuels standards, incorporate flexibility mechanisms similar to carbon pricing, but seem to face lessor political acceptability barriers. Unlike prescriptive (command-and-control) regulations, flexible regulations do not require technologically-specific compliance pathways and allow credit trading to reduce costs and incentivize innovation. Despite their potential for driving the decarbonization transition, there is comparatively little research on the design and impact of flexible regulations implemented to date. This comparative policy analysis examines government policy documents and academic literature to identify flexible climate regulations implemented in OECD countries and evaluates their implementation context, design characteristics, effectiveness, and public support. In total, 61 unique flexible regulations were identified across 11 countries and 42 sub-national jurisdictions that can be classified into six categories. Findings suggest that as jurisdictions seek to strengthen their climate policy portfolios, flexible regulations can provide a relatively cost effective, broadly supported, and complementary tool to achieve deep emissions reductions, so long as policies are well-designed and interaction and equity impacts are considered.

politique, la législation, les documents de planification existants relatifs à l'énergie et au changement climatique d'une juridiction donnée. Nous discutons de la méthode utilisée pour construire le passage pour piétons et partageons les points de vue des praticiens de l'énergie communautaire de la municipalité régionale de Halifax et de la ville d'Oakville qui l'ont utilisée au profit de leurs processus de planification énergétique communautaire. Abstract Community Energy Planning is a still-maturing practice that has great potential to help achieve climate goals, stimulate economic development, and realize health and social benefits. Community Energy Plans (CEPs) in Canada often encounter barriers to implementation that can be mitigated through use of enhanced collaboration and decision support tools. Planning and collaboration tools are needed to help municipal staff improve the quality and quantity of stakeholder engagement during the CEP process, set priorities, and increase inter-departmental collaboration on climate and energy goals. In this paper, we present the “CEP Crosswalk,” a tool designed to support the Community Energy Planning process by identifying points of contact between the principles governing the development of the CEP, and the guiding policy documents, regulations, and existing energy- and climate change-related planning resources of a given jurisdiction. We discuss the method used to construct the CEP Crosswalk and share insights from Community Energy practitioners at the Halifax Regional Municipality and the Town of Oakville who used it to benefit their Community Energy Planning processes.

In community energy planning, a persistent disconnect has been observed between the targets and plans announced by local governments and the application of effective policy to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We use two methods to explore this implementation gap. First, we apply energy-economy modelling tools at the urban level to evaluate the effectiveness of various policy options available to local governments. Our case study for these exercises is the leading jurisdiction of Vancouver, British Columbia. Second, we report and analyze the results of a survey we administered to community energy practitioners in Canada. The modelling results point to jurisdictional reach as an important contributor to the implementation gap. We find that, while Vancouver can make significant progress by implementing policies that are clearly within its jurisdiction, the city is unlikely to meet its ambitious renewable energy and GHG emissions targets without the support of higher levels of government. The survey responses suggest that capacity limitations of local government also have a role in perpetuating the implementation gap.

Economists have a strong preference for a carbon tax because this is the most economically efficient climate policy. But a carbon tax is also the most politically difficult policy because it makes it easier for climate-insincere politicians to defeat climate-sincere politicians. Opponents of climate action find it quite easy to fool some percentage of voters that a carbon tax is punative to them, harmful to the economy, and ineffective anyway. Economists also feel that regulations will be highly inefficient, but this ignores emerging evidence about the cost of using flexible regulations for significant decarbonization. Examples are the low carbon fuel standard and the renewable portfolio standard. Economists need to work with policy science, sociology, and social psychology experts to provide useful information to climate–sincere politicians about the trade-offs between economic efficiency and poltiical acceptability.

Even when most of the public accept climate science and elect climate–sincere politicians, the fossil fuel industry and supporters have many rationalizations to delude politicians and citizens that a certain fossil fuel project is needed and consistent with national or global greenhouse gas reduction commitments. Those who see through these myths must develop “connect–the–dot” techniques to show other citizens how fossil fuel expansion in a given jurisdiction is inconsistent with global and national commitments. Success against expanding global fossil fuel supply depends especially, however, on national efforts to decarbonize electricity, transport, and other sectors that are not trade-exposed. Experts should be helping the public, media, and climate-sincere politicians with exposing the myth that “this fossil fuel project is essential.”

The fossil fuel industry has repeated the earlier strategy of the tobacco industry by undermining climate science and devoting public advertising and political lobbying resources to delay greenhouse gas reducing policies. Scientists can improve their techniques of communicating to non–experts. But the evidence from anecdotal experience and academic research suggests that some myths are difficult to dispell. This is especially the case if the beliefs are affected by competing worldviews in partisan politics.

It is widely assumed that the extra purchase cost of a high–efficiency car or furnace or other device is more than compensated by the operating cost savings, making energy efficiency profitable. This view is common to physicists, engineers, and many environmentalists. But research, mostly by economists, shows that newer, more efficient technologies that require longer periods of successful operation to pay off the extra purchase cost also pose higher risks, which can negate their profitability. And, even when these technologies are successful, they may be used more because of their lower operating costs – what is known as the rebound effect. While advocates should not abandon their pursuit of energy efficiency, they need to also advocate for carbon pricing and regulations since these policies are essential to cause fuel switching, and in turn will improve the economics of energy efficiency.

Climate–sincere citizens are frustrated with three decades of global and national failures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and this makes them increasingly receptive to other agendas that people present as essential for success with the climate–energy challenge. Examples include the argument that humans cannot succeed without radical lifestyle change or global equity or car-free cities or universal vegetarianism or stopping economic growth or abolishing capitalism. This chapter focuses on the argument of Naomi Klein in her book, This Changes Everything, that we must dismantle capitalism for climate success, showing that her arguments are inconsistent with considerable evidence from jurisdictions that are decarbonizing without abolishing capitalism, such as Scandinavia and California. Attaching non-essential, but extremely ambitious agendas reduces our chances of success.

Success with the climate energy challenge requires more citizens who strategically focus on a few key actions and a few key policies, and on identifying, electing, and supporting climate–sincere politicians who make this happen. Coal–fired power must be phased out quickly in developed countries and supported by carbon tariffs to make this happen globally. Likewise, gasoline and diesel must be phased out in transportation. Flexible regulations and perhaps carbon pricing will be the lead policies. Climate-sincere politicians will focus on these sectors and these policies. Climate–concerned citizens must be willing to adopt a wide range of strategies, including the personal discomfort of civil disobedience if necessary.

Climate–sincere citizens are frustrated with three decades of global and national failures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, so they are receptive to arguments that they can make a difference by various means, one of which is to make an offset payment to someone else to reduce emissions while they continue to cause emissions when, for example, flying in an airplane. Unfortunately, research shows that a significant percentage of so–called offsets do not reduce emissions from what they otherwise would have been. Instead, offset payments are made to someone for doing something they would have done without the payment. Climate-concerned citizens would have greater impact if they instead made their offset payments to help elect climate–sincere politicians and to make sure that these politicians implement policies that require ezveryone to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, not just the people who buy offsets.

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is a global collective action problem but humanity lacks a global government. A global government would create a mandatory compliance mechanism because this is the only way to incentivize a successful global effort. For almost three years, national governments have instead tried to reach a voluntary agreement in which countries agree on a fair allocation of the emissions reduction and the burden of costs. This has predictably failed and will continue to fail. The only hope for success is if some leading countries take domestic actions and apply carbon tariffs on imports from high-emission countries. These leading countries should try to join forces in “climate clubs” which, as they grow in economic importance, would motivate more countries to join, eventually reaching a tipping point for the development of a global compliance mechanism.