The part manufacturer's organizational quality system practices and policies affect the quality and integrity of electronic parts, which in turn affect the level of risk inherent in the use of the parts in the equipment suppliers' systems. An effective parts selection and management process may be followed to reduce the risk inherent in part use. One step in a parts selection and management process is part manufacturer assessment. The results of part manufacturer assessment allow an informed parts selection decision to be made by the equipment supplier. This paper presents guidelines and criteria for conducting part manufacturer assessment and quantifying the findings of the assessment process. The paper also identifies the type of part manufacturer information equipment suppliers must collect and assess, prior to part use, in order to reduce the risks associated with part use. The information may be collected via questionnaires, surveys, site visits, telephone, accredited third-party surveillance organizations, or any other method chosen by the equipment supplier and found to be effective. The information-gathering method will be a function of the supplier's resources, potential volume of business with the part manufacturer, criticality of parts under assessment, and historic experience with the part manufacturer. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper presents an overview of a ‘risk-informed’ methodology for electronic parts selection and management, which addresses both application-independent processes (part availability, part cost, part manufacturer quality, distributor quality and part family quality and integrity) and application-specific processes (determination of the local environment, part performance, part reliability, assembly and life cycle obsolescence). Risk management activities, which follow the parts selection activities, are also addressed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

As avionic systems become more complex, realistic qualification requirements for the flight-critical systems becomes more important, but more difficult to define. Requirements developed to establish acceptable levels of performance must be verifiable if they are to have any meaning. This article shows that both the current FAA requirements of flight-critical systems and the FAA recommended methods for probabilistic assessment are flawed, and result in "required" safety assessments which are misleading. Alternatives are then explored.