It is widely recognized that workplace sexual harassment has significant negative psychological and personal consequences, and employees facing harassment suffer reductions in productivity. Our contribution is to propose a novel measure of workplace sexual harassment risk and provide a fuller estimation of the firm value impact of sexual harassment. In contrast to recent studies that focus on short-run market reactions to media announcements of harassment scandals, we use employee job reviews to identify low-profile harassment incidents that better reflect the pervasive, toxic environment pertaining to sexual harassment than do newsworthy scandals, and we measure the longer-term effect on firm value starting from the date when harassment risk affects employee morale. We identify firm harassment risk by analyzing employee job reviews and estimate the sexual harassment score (SH) through textual analysis of online job reviews. Our sample of high-SH firms, or firms with unusually high-SH scores, exhibits significant reductions in future stock performance and profitability. For example, firms with a top 2% SH score earn a value-weighted risk-adjusted stock return of − 17% in the 1-year period after high-SH classification, and this damage is concentrated in firms with higher investor attention. Furthermore, high-SH firms experience a decline in operating profitability and an increase in labor costs during a 5-year period around high-SH classification. Our evidence suggests that sexual harassment can cause greater damages to firm value than previously documented.

We study how social connectedness affected active mutual fund manager trading behavior in the first half of 2020. In the first quarter during which the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak occurred, fund managers located in or socially connected to COVID-19 hotspots sold more stock holdings compared with a control group of unconnected managers. The economic impact of social connectedness on stock holdings was comparable with that of COVID-19 hotspots and was elevated among “epicenter” stocks most susceptible to the pandemic shock. In the second quarter, social interaction had an overall negative effect on fund performance, but this effect depended on manager skill; unskilled managers who were connected to the hotspots underperformed, whereas skillful managers suffered no deleterious effect. Our evidence suggests that social connections can intensify salience bias for all but the most skilled institutional investors, and policy makers should be wary of the destabilizing role of social networks during market downturns. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: This work was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4814 .

We test how market overvaluation affects corporate innovation. Estimated stock overvaluation is strongly associated with measures of innovative inventiveness (novelty, originality, and scope), as well as research and development (R&D) and innovative output (patent and citation counts). Misvaluation affects R&D more via a nonequity channel than via equity issuance. The sensitivity of innovative inventiveness to misvaluation increases with share turnover and overvaluation. The frequency of exceptionally high innovative inputs/outputs increases with overvaluation. This evidence suggests that market overvaluation may generate social value by increasing innovative output and encouraging firms to engage in "moon shots."

We investigate the effects of five weather conditions (sunshine, wind, rain, snow depth, and temperature) on daily index returns of 49 countries from 1973 to 2012. We hypothesize that the effects of the weather on investor behavior depend on climate and season, and examine the relation between weather and daily returns separately for each temperature region (cold, hot, and mild) and each month. We find that the effects of weather on returns are contingent on climate and season and more pervasive than previously documented. A hedge strategy that exploits the daily return predictability of the weather generates up to 25% annualized out-of-sample gross profits during 1993-2012. The patterns of weather effects across climates and seasons suggest that weather influences investor psychology.

Despite the mounting evidence that stock misvaluation affects takeover characteristics and outcomes at the deal level, there remains a prolonged debate over whether mispricing drives aggregate industry-level merger activity. We depart from the extant literature and investigate whether stock misvaluation drives industry-level merger waves by contrasting the effects of acquirer valuation during “stock” and “cash” merger waves, defined using pure stock or cash acquisitions during 1981-2015. Using the timing of stock waves, we find that acquirer valuation peaks during wave periods, and acquirers have low stock performance in the 5-year period after the merger bid, with especially acute underperformance for mergers announced during stock waves. There is little evidence of such patterns around cash merger waves. These results suggest that equity misvaluation drives stock merger waves, and agency costs associated with overvalued equity prevent acquirer shareholders from reaping gains from merger waves.

Firms with workplace sexual harassment risk are reluctant to disclose such information. However, rank-and-file employees may reveal harassment information via anonymous job reviews. We investigate whether a measure of sexual harassment (SH score) constructed by performing textual analysis of online job reviews contains value-relevant information that affects firm performance. We find that SH reveals significant future problems for firms in terms of profitability, labor costs, and stock performance. In our sample firms during 2011-2017, high SH scores are associated with sharp declines in operating profitability and increases in labor costs. Firms in the top quantiles (top 1% to 5%) of the SH score earned lower risk-adjusted stock returns, representing an annual shareholder value loss of $0.8 to $1.4 billion per harassment-prone firm. These results indicate that sexual harassment has a highly detrimental effect on firm value, and employee voluntary reporting can be a valid disclosure mechanism when firms are disincentivized to reveal bad news. This research highlights the value-relevance of information held by rank-and-file employees, including information about possible corporate misconduct.

We revisit the survey questions on convertible bond issue motives from the influential study of Graham and Harvey (2001). Our question-conditional analysis connecting survey answers with firm characteristics reveals that the conclusions on two of the four convertible debt theories from the original study need to be revised. More particularly, the delayed equity rationale and the sequential financing rationale on convertible bond issuance do not receive support from the question-conditional tests. Our results indicate that adding a question-conditional analysis is essential in obtaining correct inferences from survey data. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

We estimate the profitability of global index-level trading strategies formed on daily weather conditions across 49 countries. We use pre-market weather conditions (sunshine, wind, rain, snow, and temperature) and the statistical relationship between weather and returns to predict index returns each day. In the out-of-sample test for our 1993-2012 sample, a global weather-based hedge strategy produces a mean annual return of 15.2% compared to a mean world index return of 3.1%, corresponding to a Sharpe ratio of 0.462 relative to 0.005 for the world index. Our findings confirm that multiple weather conditions exert economically important impacts on stock returns around the globe.

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These are the presentation slides for the working paper. We test how market overvaluation affects corporate innovation. Estimated stock overvaluation is very strongly associated with R&D, innovative output, and measures of innovative novelty, originality, and scope. R&D is much more sensitive than capital investment to overvaluation. Misvaluation affects R&D more via a non-equity channel than via equity issuance. We document how the sensitivity of R&D and innovative outcomes to misvaluation depends on growth, overvaluation, and turnover. The frequency of exceptionally high innovative inputs/outputs increases with overvaluation. This evidence suggests that market overvaluation may generate social value by increasing innovative output and by encouraging firms to engage in ‘moon shots.’ The paper is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2878418.

We test how market overvaluation affects corporate innovation. Estimated stock overvaluation is very strongly associated with measures of innovative inventiveness (novelty, originality, and scope), as well as R&D and innovative output (patent and citation counts). Misvaluation affects R&D more via a non-equity channel than via equity issuance. The sensitivity of innovative inventiveness to misvaluation is increasing with share turnover and overvaluation. The frequency of exceptionally high innovative inputs/outputs increases with overvaluation. This evidence suggests that market overvaluation may generate social value by increasing innovative output and by encouraging firms to engage in highly inventive innovation.

We study market timing and pecking order in a sample of debt and equity issues and share repurchases of Canadian firms from 1998 to 2007. We find that only when firms are not financially constrained is there evidence that firms issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued (undervalued) and evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower postannouncement long-run returns. Similarly, we find that only when firms are not overvalued do they prefer debt to equity financing. These findings highlight an interaction between market timing and pecking order effects.

We test whether and how equity overvaluation affects corporate financing decisions using an ex ante misvaluation measure that filters firm scale and growth prospects from market price. We find that equity issuance and total financing increase with equity overvaluation; but only among overvalued stocks; and that equity issuance is more sensitive than debt issuance to misvaluation. Consistent with managers catering to maintain overvaluation and with investment scale economy effects, the sensitivity of equity issuance and total financing to misvaluation is stronger among firms with potential growth opportunities (low book-to-market, high R&D, or small size) and high share turnover.

We examine the relation between an ex ante measure of IPO growth prospects – the industry-level long-term analyst earnings growth forecast – and short- and long-run IPO returns, using a sample of 7,570 IPOs from 1982 to 2007. The use of an industry-level, rather than firm-level growth measure allows the examination of the fullest set of IPOs. We find that before the Internet bubble period (1999-2000), IPOs in industries with high growth prospects earn high first-day and long-run returns up to three years after the IPO. Industry growth has the largest economic impact on IPO long-run performance among all factors we consider, and this effect is strongest among IPOs with sparse firm-level information. However, during the Internet bubble period, the effect of industry growth on long-run performance dramatically reverses so that IPOs in high-growth industries underperform in the long run. For both the short-run and long-run returns in both periods, the industry growth effects are stronger when returns are value-weighted, suggesting that the effects are stronger for larger IPOs which are more representative of their industries.

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long-run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long-run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.

We present evidence from an event study that runs counter to the notion that the momentum and book-to-market (B/M) effects can be fully explained by time-varying risk premia. We minimize the joint hypothesis problem in market-efficiency tests by examining a relatively short (26-day) window that exhibits both momentum and reversal effects. There is return continuation during the first 17 days but sharp reversal during the last 9 days. The co-existence of strong momentum and reversal over this small event window rules out risk premium or chance as possible causes of momentum, leaving investor misvaluation as the only explanation for this anomaly during this period. Furthermore, several patterns of interaction between B/M and momentum also point to a behavioral interpretation of the B/M effect during the period. The general implication of our evidence is that investor behavioral biases are a necessary ingredient for the explanation of both the momentum and B/M anomalies.