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D ISCRIMINATION based upon religious beliefs and expressions forms the basis for some of the most serious deprivations of civil and political rights.' The religious beliefs and expressions that are commonly the ground for discrimination include all of the traditional faiths and justifications from which norms of responsible conductthat is, judgments about right and wrong-are derived. These beliefs may be theological in the sense that they refer to a personalized transempirical source of an unchallengeable message or metaphysical in the sense that they are grounded upon nonpersonalized transempirical conceptions; sometimes they are more empirical, based upon varying conceptions of science or fundamental humanity.2 Deprivations may be imposed upon an individual because he refuses to accept the established belief system, adheres to a belief system different from the established one, attempts to create a new set of beliefs, expresses doubt about existing belief systems, or explicitly challenges the valid-

As the United Nations commemorates 1975 as “International Women's Year,” in a concerted effort to “promote equality between men and women“ and to “ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort,” the concern of the larger global community for outlawing sex-based discrimination is being articulated with increasing vigor. This concern both builds upon and expresses a more general norm of nondiscrimination which seeks to ban all generic differentiations among people in access to value shaping and sharing for reasons irrelevant to individual capabilities and contribution. The particular norm against sex-based discrimination finds expression in many authoritative communications, at both international and national levels, and is rapidly being defined in a way to condemn all the great historic deprivations imposed upon women as a group.

Annals of the New York Academy of SciencesVolume 261, Issue 1 p. 253-254 PRIORITIES FOR IMPROVING THE WORLD STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ORDER: GROUP REPORT 5 Myers S. McDougal, Myers S. McDougal Chairperson.Search for more papers by this authorJan Schneider, Jan Schneider Rapporteur.Search for more papers by this authorWalter Isard, Walter IsardSearch for more papers by this authorKarl Deutsch, Karl DeutschSearch for more papers by this authorRobert Triffin, Robert TriffinSearch for more papers by this authorRichard H. Nolte, Richard H. NolteSearch for more papers by this authorMichael Reisman, Michael ReismanSearch for more papers by this authorSir George Catlin, Sir George CatlinSearch for more papers by this authorPeter S. Thacher, Peter S. ThacherSearch for more papers by this author Myers S. McDougal, Myers S. McDougal Chairperson.Search for more papers by this authorJan Schneider, Jan Schneider Rapporteur.Search for more papers by this authorWalter Isard, Walter IsardSearch for more papers by this authorKarl Deutsch, Karl DeutschSearch for more papers by this authorRobert Triffin, Robert TriffinSearch for more papers by this authorRichard H. Nolte, Richard H. NolteSearch for more papers by this authorMichael Reisman, Michael ReismanSearch for more papers by this authorSir George Catlin, Sir George CatlinSearch for more papers by this authorPeter S. Thacher, Peter S. ThacherSearch for more papers by this author First published: September 1975 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1975.tb43326.x AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL No abstract is available for this article. Volume261, Issue1Environment and Society in Transition: World PrioritiesSeptember 1975Pages 253-254 RelatedInformation

Annals of the New York Academy of SciencesVolume 261, Issue 1 p. 255-260 PRIORITIES FOR PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT* Myres S. McDougal, Myres S. McDougal Yale Law School Yale University New Haven, Connecticut 06520Search for more papers by this authorJan Schneider, Jan Schneider Yale Law School Yale University New Haven, Connecticut 06520Search for more papers by this author Myres S. McDougal, Myres S. McDougal Yale Law School Yale University New Haven, Connecticut 06520Search for more papers by this authorJan Schneider, Jan Schneider Yale Law School Yale University New Haven, Connecticut 06520Search for more papers by this author First published: September 1975 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1975.tb43327.x * Addendum to Group Report 5. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume261, Issue1Environment and Society in Transition: World PrioritiesSeptember 1975Pages 255-260 RelatedInformation

* This article is excerpted from a book which the authors have in progress. The authors are indebted to their colleagues, W. Michael Reisman and Arie David, for suggestions and critical assistance in the preparation of this article. The Ralph E. Ogden Foundation has been generous in its support of the studies from which this article is drawn. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. *** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Emeritus, Yale Law School. *.** Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School.

It may appear ungracious to respond questioningly to an appraisal so extensive and generous as that offered by Professor Young. The intellectual issues his statement raises transcend, however, ordinary considerations of reciprocal graciousness and generosity: innocent bystanders might be confused and misled. Professor Young purports to criticize our recommended policy-oriented jurisprudence without making explicit his own jurisprudence or the premises and assumptions which underlie his criticisms. Many of the difficulties and obscurities he finds in our work would appear to derive either from the inherent difficulties of inquiry and decision or from obscurities and incomplete notions in his own framework of inquiry. His conceptions, in particular, of “law,” “international law,” “world public order,” “values and norms,” “jurisprudence,” and “social science” are less than clear. We briefly illustrate

* Copyright retained by Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal. This article is excerpted from a larger study which the authors have in progress. For an earlier portion of this study, see Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971). ** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Emeritus, Yale Law School; Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law and History, Temple University. *** Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 1. The conception of constitutive process here employed is summarized as follows: In the terms we find convenient, the "constitutive process" of a community may be described as the decisions which identify and characterize the different authoritative decision-makers, specify and clarify basic community policies, establish appropriate structures of authority, allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures for making the different kinds of decisions, and secure the continuous performance of all the different kinds of decision functions (intelligence, promotion, prescription, etc.) necessary to making and administering general community policy. Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362, 386 (1971). The different kinds of decision functions, or outcomes of constitutive process, are specified as: Intelligence: Obtaining information about the past, making estimates of the future, planning. Promoting: Urging proposals.