Background and objectiveKnowledge gap theory posits that individuals with better education have better opportunities to obtain, understand and utilise available information. In a health-related context, this insight could lead to a more effective disease prevention. The aim of our study was to test the hypothesis that knowledge gap underlies differences in behaviour aimed at maintaining brain health.MethodsWe conducted an online survey investigating Slovenian public view on brain, brain research, and science-based recommendations for brain health. The survey was filled out by a total of 2,568 respondents, of whom 2,450 completed it in full. They were divided into two subgroups based on their self-reported brain-related education, i.e., the lay subgroup (n = 1,012) and a topically educated group (n = 1,438), i.e., the educated subgroup. Among the latter, 728 participants reported to have a Bachelor’s degree or higher education. We analysed the views of this sample subgroup on brain, neuroscience, and science-based brain health recommendations, and compared them with age- and education-matched lay subgroup (n = 565) from the same survey.ResultsEducated individuals showed greater awareness and adherence to science-based recommendations compared to the lay respondents, specifically in the perceived importance of following a healthy diet, exercising, ensuring time for rest, relaxation and maintenance of social contacts, acquiring new knowledge and skills and using supplements that are considered to improve mental abilities (all p < 0.005), but not in the perceived importance of getting enough sleep, avoiding drugs and alcohol or injuries and performing mentally-challenging activities or cognitive training (all p > 0.10). Educated individuals more frequently reported following a healthy diet, engaging in physical activity and socialising, acquiring new knowledge and skills, performing mental challenges and cognitive training, and using supplements (all p < 0.005), but not getting sufficient sleep, avoiding drugs, alcohol or injury, or ensuring time for rest and relaxation (all p > 0.08). A larger proportion of lay than educated participants (32 and 17%, respectively) identified lack of information as a reason for not engaging in healthy practices (p < 0.001). Educated participants outperformed lay individuals in identifying diseases amenable to lifestyle modification.ConclusionUnderstanding the differences in brain health perceptions between educated and lay individuals is crucial for developing effective public health strategies. Our results highlight a substantial knowledge gap in the Slovenian population and the need for targeted educational interventions that account for varying degrees of knowledge in different population segments which could lead to better adherence to healthy lifestyle practices.

Epistemology has recently taken a zetetic turn: a shift in emphasis from the study of norms of belief to norms of inquiry. In this paper, I argue that a non-ideal approach to zetetic normativity can provide norms of inquiry for bounded, psychologically realistic agents. I introduce the concepts of non-ideal epistemology and bounded epistemic rationality and provide a brief overview of inquiry epistemology. I continue with proposing some features that should be included in the norms of inquiry for bounded agents. I argue that such norms should recognize our cognitive, environmental, and practical limitations. They should direct bounded agents to inquire about relevant problems, and they should be satisficing in nature, meaning that they allow for good enough reaching of epistemic goals. I argue that rational inquiry is not determined by a priori normative criteria, but is defined as the fit of the strategy with the environment. Inquiry epistemology for bounded agents should provide concrete, fine-grained zetetic norms that are achievable for ordinary inquirers and can serve as epistemic guidance. The study of norms of inquiry for bounded agents explores both normative and descriptive parts of inquiry, is ameliorative, partly empirical, and requires collaboration between philosophy and empirical disciplines such as psychology and cognitive science.

The aim of the article is to propose bounded epistemic rationality as a concept that blurs the divide between normative and descriptive approaches to the study of rationality. I illustrate the contrast between philosophy as a normative discipline and psychology as the empirical study of cognition and show that unattainable standards and the arbitration problem pose a challenge for normative theories of rationality. I then outline three possible types of relations between normative and descriptive theories of rationality, the third being the proposal for hybrid concepts, such as bounded epistemic rationality, that include both normative and descriptive elements. I continue by describing Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality and Gerd Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality, and consider the role of bounded rationality in epistemology. I reflect on the relationship between norms of epistemic and bounded rationality and finally, drawing on the work of David Thorstad, I suggest some features that I believe should be included in an account of bounded epistemic rationality. I aim to show that an understanding of epistemic rationality that is compatible with bounded rationality can help to avoid overly strict, idealized, as-if theories of rationality, narrow the gap between the normative and the descriptive, and bring us closer to a comprehensive understanding of epistemic rationality.

Background Advances in genetics and digital phenotyping in psychiatry have given rise to testing services targeting young people, which claim to predict psychiatric outcomes before difficulties emerge. These services raise several ethical challenges surrounding data sharing and information privacy. Objectives This study aimed to investigate young people's interest in predictive testing for mental health challenges and their attitudes towards sharing biological, psychosocial and digital data for such purpose. Methods Eighty UK adolescents aged 16-18 years took part in a digital role-play where they played the role of clients of a fictional predictive psychiatry company and chose what sources of personal data they wished to provide for a risk assessment. After the role-play, participants reflected on their choices during a peer-led interview. Findings Participants saw multiple benefits in predictive testing services, but were highly selective with regard to the type of data they were willing to share. Largely due to privacy concerns, digital data sources such as social media or Google search history were less likely to be shared than psychosocial and biological data, including school grades and one's DNA. Participants were particularly reluctant to share social media data with schools (but less so with health systems). Conclusions Emerging predictive psychiatric services are valued by young people; however, these services must consider privacy versus utility trade-offs from the perspective of different stakeholders, including adolescents. Clinical implications Respecting adolescents' need for transparency, privacy and choice in the age of digital phenotyping is critical to the responsible implementation of predictive psychiatric services.

Background: Brain health is one of the cornerstones of a long and full life. Active care for brain health and reduction of lifestyle-related risks for brain disorders may be a key strategy in tackling the growing prevalence of mental and neurological illnesses. Public knowledge, perception, and preventive behavior need to be considered in the planning of effective strategies for brain health promotion. Our research is the first effort aimed at assessing Slovenian lay public knowledge, search and use of scientific information about the brain, and care for brain health.Methods: An online survey was used to gather data for descriptive and associative statistical analyses of a sample of the Slovenian public (n = 2568) in August 2017. Participants with formal brain-related education were excluded, leaving the remaining sample of the lay public (n = 1012). Demographic characteristics and information regarding the perceived importance and knowledge of brain health and engagement in preventive behaviors of participants were collected, and key associative analyses were carried out.Results: The majority of respondents (89%) considered brain health to be important. Over one-third (39%) considered their knowledge of the brain as sufficient relative to their needs. Most of the respondents identified science-recommended practices to be important for brain health. No recommendation was followed daily by the majority of the respondents, primarily due to declared lack of time (59%), and lack of information (32%). Information was obtained primarily from television (38%), followed by newspapers and magazines (31%), the Internet (31%), and direct conversations (27%). However, the highest-rated, preferred source of information was lectured by experts. One-third of our sample struggled with the trustworthiness of information sources. Female gender and older age were associated with a higher frequency of healthy practices. Personal or familial diagnoses of brain disorders were not associated with a higher frequency of the behavior in favor of brain health, but did affect available time and perceived value of preventive practices.Conclusions: Our research provides an initial insight into the perceptions, knowledge, and brain health-promoting behavior of the Slovenian lay public. Our findings can inform future strategies for science communication, public education and engagement, and policy-making to improve lifelong active care for brain health.

Prospect theory is among the most influential frameworks in behavioural science, specifically in research on decision-making under risk. Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 study tested financial choices under risk, concluding that such judgements deviate significantly from the assumptions of expected utility theory, which had remarkable impacts on science, policy and industry. Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. In a sample of over 4,000 participants from 19 countries, the core patterns from a highly influential study on behaviour and decision-making broadly replicate, with only minor exceptions and somewhat smaller effect sizes.

Research in bioethics largely relies on interviews and surveys, which engage participants with scenarios that are distal in time and place to an actual situation. However, context and embodiment are relevant to moral decision-making. Due to the potential to immerse participants in a simulated environment, purpose-built games and scenarios might prove valuable as empirical tools. As a case study of gamifying bioethics, we describe the co-design and implementation of "What Lies Ahead?", a digital role-play scenario for research with adolescents. "What Lies Ahead?" engages young people with ethical issues related to predictive technologies in psychiatry. As preliminary evidence of the validity of this gamified approach, we report qualitative results suggesting that the role-play was immersive, and elicited authentic responses and reflective thinking in adolescent participants. Even though application of game-play mechanics is rare in bioethics, we find digital role-play to be a powerful tool that collects data through real-time, realistic scenarios.

Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 article on Prospect Theory is one of the most influential papers across all of the behavioural sciences. The study tested a series of binary financial (risky) choices, ultimately concluding that judgments formed under uncertainty deviate significantly from those presumed by expected utility theory, which was the prevailing theoretical construct at the time. In the forty years since publication, this study has had a remarkable impact on science, policy, and other real-world applications. At the same time, a number of critiques have been raised about its conclusions and subsequent constructs that were founded on it, such as loss aversion. In an era where such presumed canonical theories have increasingly drawn scrutiny for inability to replicate, we attempted a multinational study of N = 4,099 participants from 19 countries and 13 languages. The same methods and procedures were used as in the original paper, adjusting only currencies to make them relative to current values, and requiring all participants to respond to all items. Overall, we found that results replicated for 94% of the 17 choice items tested. At most, results from the 1979 study were attenuated in our findings, which is most likely due to a more robust sample. Twelve of the 13 theoretical contrasts presented by Kahneman and Tversky also replicated, with a further 89% replication rate of the total contrasts possible when separating by location, up to 100% replication in some countries. We conclude that the principles of Prospect Theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds, and provide a number of important insights about replications, attenuation, and implications for the study of human decision-making at population-level.