In this paper, we perform an analysis of sequence risk in a portfolio (defined here as the risk of a one-time 20% market loss from an enemy we call Mr. Market) with a Monte Carlo simulation of many different "fixed" lifetime returns. The worst possible case is if you have a market loss right at or near retirement (that is when you have the most money to lose). Interestingly, bonds are a poor hedge against this, unless of course you knew exactly when the loss was going to occur. Bonds can actually increase your probability of running out of money because of their poor return, at least with the assumptions that we have made. Taken in homeopathic amounts, bonds can limit the worst-case scenario, however.

Mobility and terrain are two sides of the same coin. We cannot speak to our mobility unless we describe the terrain's ability to thwart our maneuver. Game theory describes the interactions of rational players who behave strategically. In previous work(1) we described the interactions between a mobility player, who is trying to maximize the chances that he makes it from point A to point B with one chance to refuel, and a terrain player who is trying to minimize that probability by placing an obstacle somewhere along the path from A to B. This relates to the literature of games of incomplete information, and can be thought of as a more realistic model of this interaction. In this paper, we generalize the game of timing studied in the previous paper to include the possibility that both players have imperfect ability to detect his adversary.

Mobility and terrain are two sides of the same coin. I cannot speak to my mobility unless I describe the terrain's ability to thwart my maneuver. Game theory describes the interactions of rational players who behave strategically. In previous work we described the interactions between a mobility player, who is trying to maximize the chances that he makes it from point A to point B with one chance to refuel, and a terrain player who is trying to minimize that probability by placing an obstacle somewhere along the path from A to B. In this paper, we add the twist that the mobility player cannot use their resource until they detect the terrain player. This relates to the literature of games of incomplete information, and can be thought of as a more realistic model of this interaction. In this paper we generalize the game of timing studied in the previous paper to include the possibility that one of the players has imperfect ability to detect his adversary.