Early differentiation of startup founders with high success potential remains a central challenge for entrepreneurship research, innovation policy, and capital allocation in high-uncertainty environments. Existing approaches rely largely on broad personality models or intention-based instruments developed primarily to explain entry into entrepreneurship rather than differentiation of founders associated with realized venture success. In this study, we introduce a domain-specific model of founder success characteristics and develop a 31-item Startup Founder Success Scale (SFSS) to differentiate realized success from entrepreneurial intent. The sample (N = 10,007) included startup founders recruited from predefined pools meeting objective funding, revenue, or acquisition benchmarks, as well as corporate managers and aspiring entrepreneurs. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported six distinct dimensions-Relentless Resilience, Value-Creating Opportunism, Intrinsic Curiosity, Courageous Decision-Making, Strategic Innovativeness, and Transformational Leadership-which together accounted for 71% of the common variance in founder-specific latent trait measures within the scale, indicating strong internal coherence. Group comparisons showed that these dimensions reliably distinguished Successful Startup Founders from Corporate Managers and Aspiring Entrepreneurs, with large effect-size separations (Cohen's d = 0.83-1.77) exceeding the small-to-moderate effects (d ≈ 0.2-0.5) typically reported for broad personality traits in entrepreneurship research. Conceptually, these findings are consistent with a multi-level framework in which founder-specific characteristics are closely aligned with decision-making under uncertainty and resource orchestration during early venture execution, helping explain why intent-based and general personality models, while valuable for understanding entrepreneurial entry, may be less closely aligned with realized startup success. Practically, the SFSS provides a validated psychometric tool that may support more structured evaluation of founder-related characteristics, targeted training, and resource allocation across venture capital, angel investing, public investment bodies, accelerators, and entrepreneurial education programs. Prospective longitudinal research is required to establish predictive validity for real-world outcomes.

A fundamental question in visual perception is how the human visual system transforms the rich kinematic information present in observed actions into coherent social meaning. We addressed this by validating a 5-dimensional action space model - defined by Formidableness, Friendliness, Locomotion, Abduction, and Environmental Interaction - as a perceptual representation of avatar-conveyed actions. Using Representational Similarity Analysis, we first demonstrated strong topological correspondence between the model's geometry and the structure of independent perceptual judgements, with cross-validated regression confirming the model as a generative framework that reliably predicts how observers evaluate novel actions. A morphing paradigm further revealed that perceptual ratings scaled approximately linearly with geometric distances along model dimensions, with each dimension selectively predicting its corresponding perceptual quality, satisfying the criteria for a valid psychological metric space. Critically, the 5D model showed substantially stronger alignment with semantic representations of actions than with their raw skeletal kinematics - an association robust to statistical control for kinematic similarity. This dissociation suggests that higher-order social-evaluative dimensions of action perception are largely invariant to low-level motion statistics, consistent with a hierarchical visual processing architecture in which kinematic input is progressively abstracted into a compact, semantically organised representational space optimised for social inference.

Several models have been proposed to explain the cognitive structure underpinning our perception of human actions. These studies have conceptualized this structure as a domain specific ‘action space’ defined by a limited number of important dimensions that describe the meaningful information on which we evaluate actions. However, these different models have disagreed on both the number of dimensions, and what action qualities each dimension represents. To help resolve these differences we retested Vinton et al.’s (2023) 4-D action space model whilst considering additional qualities identified by other models. We combined Vinton’s original dataset where participants rated 240 different controlled actions against 23 action characteristics, with ratings of the same actions against 8 new characteristics derived from other action space model dimensions. We used an EFA-to-CFA approach to determine the optimal model of action space and assess which action qualities define that space. Action space was best modelled by 5-factors. Two substantial dimensions originally identified by Vinton (Friendliness, Formidableness) each explained 18-19% of the variance. Whilst 3 smaller dimensions each explained 10-8% of the variance; these included Abduction (as per Vinton) and Locomotion and Environmental Interaction. We interpret this representation of action space as having 2+3 dimensions. We confirm previous research showing friendliness and formidableness are the two most important action qualities and likely represent action specific signals of the social cognition dimensions of warmth and competence respectively. Differences between earlier studies of action space can be attributed to non-representative samples of actions or the use of static images of actions.

We evaluate the actions of other individuals based upon a variety of movements that reveal critical information to guide decision making and behavioural responses. These signals convey a range of information about the actor, including their goals, intentions and internal mental states. Although progress has been made to identify cortical regions involved in action processing, the organising principles underlying our representation of actions still remains unclear. In this paper we investigated the conceptual space that underlies action perception by assessing which qualities are fundamental to the perception of human actions. We recorded 240 different actions using motion-capture and used these data to animate a volumetric avatar that performed the different actions. 230 participants then viewed these actions and rated the extent to which each action demonstrated 23 different action characteristics (e.g., avoiding-approaching, pulling-pushing, weak-powerful). We analysed these data using Exploratory Factor Analysis to examine the latent factors underlying visual action perception. The best fitting model was a four-dimensional model with oblique rotation. We named the factors: friendly-unfriendly, formidable-feeble, planned-unplanned, and abduction-adduction. The first two factors of friendliness and formidableness explained approximately 22% of the variance each, compared to planned and abduction, which explained approximately 7–8% of the variance each; as such we interpret this representation of action space as having 2 + 2 dimensions. A closer examination of the first two factors suggests a similarity to the principal factors underlying our evaluation of facial traits and emotions, whilst the last two factors of planning and abduction appear unique to actions.

During performances, audiences experience various emotional states, and these are reflected in their ongoing facial expressions. We investigated if audience engagement could be determined by measuring the inter-subject correlation (ISC) of non-invasively recorded audience facial expressions. We filmed the faces of multiple audience members at theatrical performances and determined the intensity of their different facial expressions throughout the performances. Neutral, happy, anger, and disgust expression ISCs accounted for up to 24% of the performance dramaturge's predictions of audience engagement. Expression synchrony was greater between individuals in close proximity, suggesting effects of emotional contagion or cognitive similarities between neighboring individuals, whereas expression synchrony was greatest between individuals who were younger, female, and with greater levels of empathy, showing that individual characteristics impact shared audience experiences. Together, our results show that facial expression synchronization could be used as a real-time non-invasive indicator of engagement in audiences larger than achieved using previous approaches.

The ability to determine whether the actions of other individuals are friendly or formidable are key decisions we need to make to successfully navigate our complex social environment. In this study we measured perceptual performance when discriminating actions that vary in their friendliness or formidableness, and whether performance was related to the autistic traits of individuals. To do this, we developed an action morphing method to generate novel actions that lied along the action quality dimensions of formidableness and friendliness. In Experiment 1 we show that actions that vary along the formidableness or friendliness continua were rated as varying monotonically along the respective quality. In Experiment 2 we measured the ability of individuals with different levels of autistic traits to discriminate action formidableness and friendliness using adaptive 2-AFC procedures. We found considerable variation in perceptual thresholds when discriminating action formidableness (~540% interindividual variation) or action friendliness (~1100% interindividual variation). However, we found no evidence that this variance in action discrimination ability was affected by individuals’ autistic traits. We attribute these findings to the ability of individuals with varying levels of autistic traits and different cognitive styles to achieve similar performance outcomes when attempting to determine action formidableness and friendliness.

Accurate perception of the emotional signals conveyed by others is crucial for successful social interaction. Such perception is influenced not only by sensory input, but also by knowledge we have about the others' emotions. This study addresses the issue of whether knowing that the other's emotional state is congruent or incongruent with their displayed emotional expression ("genuine" and "fake", respectively) affects the neural mechanisms underpinning the perception of their facial emotional expressions. We used a visual adaptation paradigm to investigate this question in three experiments employing increasing adaptation durations. The adapting stimuli consisted of photographs of emotional facial expressions of joy and anger, purported to reflect (in-)congruency between felt and expressed emotion, displayed by professional actors. A Validity checking procedure ensured participants had the correct knowledge about the (in-)congruency. Significantly smaller adaptation aftereffects were obtained when participants knew that the displayed expression was incongruent with the felt emotion, following all tested adaptation periods. This study shows that knowledge relating to the congruency between felt and expressed emotion modulates face expression aftereffects. We argue that this reflects that the neural substrate responsible for the perception of facial expressions of emotion incorporates the presumed felt emotion underpinning the expression.

An abundance of studies on emotional experiences in response to music have been published over the past decades, however, most have been carried out in controlled laboratory settings and rely on subjective reports. Facial expressions have been occasionally assessed but measured using intrusive methods such as facial electromyography (fEMG). The present study investigated emotional experiences of fifty participants in a live concert. Our aims were to explore whether automated face analysis could detect facial expressions of emotion in a group of people in an ecologically valid listening context, to determine whether emotions expressed by the music predicted specific facial expressions and examine whether facial expressions of emotion could be used to predict subjective ratings of pleasantness and activation. During the concert, participants were filmed and facial expressions were subsequently analyzed with automated face analysis software. Self-report on participants' subjective experience of pleasantness and activation were collected after the concert for all pieces (two happy, two sad). Our results show that the pieces that expressed sadness resulted in more facial expressions of sadness (compared to happiness), whereas the pieces that expressed happiness resulted in more facial expressions of happiness (compared to sadness). Differences for other facial expression categories (anger, fear, surprise, disgust, and neutral) were not found. Independent of the musical piece or emotion expressed in the music facial expressions of happiness predicted ratings of subjectively felt pleasantness, whilst facial expressions of sadness and disgust predicted low and high ratings of subjectively felt activation, respectively. Together, our results show that non-invasive measurements of audience facial expressions in a naturalistic concert setting are indicative of emotions expressed by the music, and the subjective experiences of the audience members themselves.

Efficient perception in natural environments depends on neural interactions between voluntary processes within cognitive control, such as attention, and those that are automatic and subconscious, such as brain adaptation to predictable input (also called repetition suppression). Although both attention and adaptation have been studied separately and there is considerable knowledge of the neurobiology involved in each of these processes, how attention interacts with adaptation remains equivocal. We examined how attention interacts with visual and auditory adaptation by measuring neuroimaging effects consistent with changes in either neural gain or selectivity. Male and female human participants were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) first while they discriminated repetition of morphed faces or voices and either directed their attention to stimulus identity or spatial location. Attention to face or voice identity, while ignoring stimulus location, solely increased the gain of respectively face- or voice-sensitive cortex. The results were strikingly different in an experiment when participants attended to voice identity versus stimulus loudness. In this case, attention to voice while ignoring sound loudness increased neural selectivity. The combined results show that how attention affects adaptation depends on the level of feature-based competition, reconciling prior conflicting observations. The findings are theoretically important and are discussed in relation to neurobiological interactions between attention and different types of predictive signals. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Adaptation to repeated environmental events is ubiquitous in the animal brain, an automatic typically subconscious, predictive signal. Cognitive influences, such as by attention, powerfully affect sensory processing and can overcome brain adaptation. However, how neural interactions occur between adaptation and attention remains controversial. We conducted fMRI experiments regulating the focus of attention during adaptation to repeated stimuli with perceptually balanced stimulus expectancy. We observed an interaction between attention and adaptation consistent with increased neural selectivity, but only under conditions of feature-based competition, challenging the notion that attention interacts with brain adaptation by only affecting response gain. This demonstrates that attention retains its full complement of mechanistic influences on sensory cortex even as it interacts with more automatic or subconscious predictive processes.

Previous research suggests that Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) might be associated with impairments on implicit but not explicit mentalizing tasks. However, such comparisons are made difficult by the heterogeneity of stimuli and the techniques used to measure mentalizing capabilities. We tested the abilities of 34 individuals (17 with ASD) to derive intentions from others' actions during both explicit and implicit tasks and tracked their eye-movements. Adults with ASD displayed explicit but not implicit mentalizing deficits. Adults with ASD displayed typical fixation patterns during both implicit and explicit tasks. These results illustrate an explicit mentalizing deficit in adults with ASD, which cannot be attributed to differences in fixation patterns.

The mentalizing system and mirror system are thought to play important roles in inferring the internal mental states of others - a process known as mentalizing. Autism spectrum condition (ASC) is associated with difficulties in mentalizing. The aim of this study was to determine whether the behavioural difficulties in mentalizing associated with ASC can be explained by changes in functional connectivity between the mentalizing and mirror system. We recruited 40 adult participants (20 with ASC and 20 typically-developing). Brain activity was monitored using functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants watched videos in which actors performed hand actions. The videos were shown in separate mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks. During mentalizing blocks, participants were asked to indicate whether hand actions were clumsy or spiteful (i.e. to judge the intent of the action). During non-mentalizing blocks, participants indicated whether the actions were successful or unsuccessful (i.e. to judge the outcome of the action). Higher activity during the mentalizing blocks compared to non-mentalizing blocks was found in regions associated with the mentalizing system: the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), as well as in regions typically associated with the mirror system: the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL). Next, functional connectivity between regions was evaluated as a function of task. During mentalizing blocks, there was increased functional connectivity between the dmPFC and the mirror system in typically developing participants. In contrast, there was no increase in functional connectivity between these regions in ASC participants. Connectivity between the dmPFC and IFG was negatively correlated with autistic traits. The reduced connectivity in ASC participants was consistent with behavioural performance on the mentalizing task, which was also negatively correlated with the level of autistic traits. Together, these data emphasise the importance of functional connectivity between the mentalizing and mirror systems when inferring social intentions and show that reduced connectivity between these systems_may_explain some of the_behavioural difficulties experienced by adults with ASC.

Neuroimaging studies have shown mirror system (MS) activation when participants infer internal states e.g. emotions, intentions or beliefs (known as 'mentalizing') from others' actions. However, the exact role of the MS in mentalizing tasks is unknown. Dysfunctional MS activation may underlie mentalizing deficits experienced by adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This study investigated the timing of MS activity when inferring intentions in order to delineate between existing models of MS involvement. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied to the primary motor cortex at different time points during the observation of hand actions whilst participants inferred intentions (mentalizing task) and performed a non-mentalizing task. Electromyographic activity in the contralateral hand was used as an indirect measure of MS activity. Greater corticospinal activity was found during the mentalizing task than the non-mentalizing task, but only at the end of observed actions, suggesting late MS involvement in processing intentions. Enhanced corticospinal activity was not related to autistic traits or behavioural performance suggesting the MS has a more automatic role in processing others' intentions, irrespective of mentalizing ability. Our results extend current knowledge of MS activation when mentalizing, allowing initial delineation between different models of MS involvement in mentalizing.

ASD is associated with mentalizing deficits that may correspond with atypical mirror system (MS) activation. We investigated MS activity in adults with and without ASD when inferring others' intentions using TMS-induced motor evoked potentials (MEPs) and mu suppression measured by EEG. Autistic traits were measured for all participants. Our EEG data show, high levels of autistic traits predicted reduced right mu (8-10 Hz) suppression when mentalizing. Higher left mu (8-10 Hz) suppression was associated with superior mentalizing performances. Eye-tracking and TMS data showed no differences associated with autistic traits. Our data suggest ASD is associated with reduced right MS activity when mentalizing, TMS-induced MEPs and mu suppression measure different aspects of MS functioning and the MS is directly involved in inferring intentions.

Introduction: Some neuroimaging studies have provided evidence for mirror neuron system (MNS) involvement in mentalizing tasks including inferring others’ intentions. Therefore, dysfunctional MNS activity in adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may underlie their difficulties on these tasks. However, MNS activation during mentalizing tasks may be due to stimuli depicting biological motion. This study investigated whether MNS activity was higher when mentalizing than a control task when the same stimuli were used. We also examined whether MNS functioning was atypical in adults with ASD.

So far, action recognition has been mainly examined with small point-light human stimuli presented alone within a narrow central area of the observer’s visual field. Yet, we need to recognize the actions of life-size humans viewed alone or surrounded by bystanders, whether they are seen in central or peripheral vision. Here, we examined the mechanisms in central vision and far periphery (40° eccentricity) involved in the recognition of the actions of a life-size actor (target) and their sensitivity to the presence of a crowd surrounding the target. In Experiment 1, we used an action adaptation paradigm to probe whether static or idly moving crowds might interfere with the recognition of a target’s action (hug or clap). We found that this type of crowds whose movements were dissimilar to the target action hardly affected action recognition in central and peripheral vision. In Experiment 2, we examined whether crowd actions that were more similar to the target actions affected action recognition. Indeed, the presence of that crowd diminished adaptation aftereffects in central vision as wells as in the periphery. We replicated Experiment 2 using a recognition task instead of an adaptation paradigm. With this task, we found evidence of decreased action recognition accuracy, but this was significant in peripheral vision only. Our results suggest that the presence of a crowd carrying out actions similar to that of the target affects its recognition. We outline how these results can be understood in terms of high-level crowding effects that operate on action-sensitive perceptual channels.

Prolonged exposure, or adaptation, to a stimulus in 1 modality can bias, but also enhance, perception of a subsequent stimulus presented within the same modality. However, recent research has also found that adaptation in 1 modality can bias perception in another modality. Here, we show a novel crossmodal adaptation effect, where adaptation to a visual stimulus enhances subsequent auditory perception. We found that when compared to no adaptation, prior adaptation to visual, auditory, or audiovisual hand actions enhanced discrimination between 2 subsequently presented hand action sounds. Discrimination was most enhanced when the visual action "matched" the auditory action. In addition, prior adaptation to a visual, auditory, or audiovisual action caused subsequent ambiguous action sounds to be perceived as less like the adaptor. In contrast, these crossmodal action aftereffects were not generated by adaptation to the names of actions. Enhanced crossmodal discrimination and crossmodal perceptual aftereffects may result from separate mechanisms operating in audiovisual action sensitive neurons within perceptual systems. Adaptation-induced crossmodal enhancements cannot be explained by postperceptual responses or decisions. More generally, these results together indicate that adaptation is a ubiquitous mechanism for optimizing perceptual processing of multisensory stimuli.

When observing another individual's actions, we can both recognize their actions and infer their beliefs concerning the physical and social environment. The extent to which visual adaptation influences action recognition and conceptually later stages of processing involved in deriving the belief state of the actor remains unknown. To explore this we used virtual reality (life-size photorealistic actors presented in stereoscopic three dimensions) to see how visual adaptation influences the perception of individuals in naturally unfolding social scenes at increasingly higher levels of action understanding. We presented scenes in which one actor picked up boxes (of varying number and weight), after which a second actor picked up a single box. Adaptation to the first actor's behavior systematically changed perception of the second actor. Aftereffects increased with the duration of the first actor's behavior, declined exponentially over time, and were independent of view direction. Inferences about the second actor's expectation of box weight were also distorted by adaptation to the first actor. Distortions in action recognition and actor expectations did not, however, extend across different actions, indicating that adaptation is not acting at an action-independent abstract level but rather at an action-dependent level. We conclude that although adaptation influences more complex inferences about belief states of individuals, this is likely to be a result of adaptation at an earlier action recognition stage rather than adaptation operating at a higher, more abstract level in mentalizing or simulation systems.