A common assumption in strategic classification is that the classifier is made public knowledge. However, it remains unclear if, and why, a system would choose to commit to full disclosure. We study a setting in which regulation requires the system to share some, but not all, of the information. This entails a learning task in which the goal is to jointly learn a classifier and the uncertainty surrounding it. Towards this, we adopt from robust mechanism design the notion of ambiguity, which in our setting permits the learner to reveal a set or range of possible classifiers, and choose one to realize. We investigate how ambiguity affects the learning task, propose efficient algorithms for computing best-responses and training, and empirically explore strategic learning and its outcomes in this novel setting and using our approach.

Strategic classification studies learning settings in which individuals can modify their features, at a cost, in order to influence the classifier's decision. A central question is how the sample complexity of the induced (strategic) hypothesis class depends on the complexities of the underlying hypothesis class and the cost structure governing feasible manipulations. Prior work has shown that in several natural settings, such as linear classifiers with norm costs, the induced complexity can be controlled. We begin by showing that such guarantees fail in general - even in simple cases: there exist hypothesis classes of VC dimension 1 on the real line such that, even under the simplest interval neighborhoods, the induced class has infinite VC dimension. Thus, strategic behavior can turn an easy learning problem into a non-learnable one. To overcome this, we introduce structure via a geometric definability assumption: both the hypothesis class and the cost-induced neighborhood relation can be defined by first-order formulas over ℝ_𝚎𝚡𝚙. Intuitively, this means that hypotheses and costs can be described using arithmetic operations, exponentiation, logarithms, and comparisons. This captures a broad range of natural classes and cost functions, including ℓ_p distances, Wasserstein distance, and information-theoretic divergences. Under this assumption, we prove that learnability is preserved, with sample complexity controlled by the complexity of the defining formulas.

In strategic classification, an institution (e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from users who change their features to increase utility in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Since a key challenge is the distribution shift induced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and establish several new results that link causality and strategic classification. First, we show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficiently large adaptation, when the noise is bounded in a certain way. Second, when these assumptions do not hold, we show OOD cross-entropy risk of optimal classifiers decomposes into an OOD bias term and a term arising from not using all observable features, allowing us to understand when causal classifiers have an advantage. Finally, we show that the use of causal features can allow alignment of long-term incentives between institutions and users, contrasting with previous work that highlights social costs of such approaches. We validate our theory empirically on synthetic data, finding that our results predict behavior in practice.

Prediction algorithms are increasingly used to inform decisions about humans, but maximizing accuracy—the standard learning objective—is not necessarily optimal for this purpose. Instead, we propose optimizing social welfare, defined as the average gain users receive from correct predictions. Welfare enables to express, and therefore account for, heterogeneity in how much users benefit from accuracy. But since these valuations are private and users can benefit from overreporting them, learning must simultaneously elicit truthful values and optimize welfare with respect to them. To this end, we propose a novel learning algorithm that incorporates a truthful auction. We show how to compute allocations and prices efficiently, and bound the number of paying users—which surprisingly is independent of the sample size. We conclude with experiments on real and synthetic data that demonstrate our algorithm and explore the connections between welfare and accuracy.

Decades of research in machine learning have given us powerful tools for making accurate predictions. But when used in social settings and on human inputs, better accuracy does not immediately translate to better social outcomes. To effectively promote social well-being through machine learning, this position article advocates for the wide adoption of social welfare as a guiding principle. The field of welfare economics asks: how should we allocate limited resources to self-interested agents in a way that maximizes social benefit? We argue that this perspective applies to many modern applications of machine learning in social contexts. As such, we propose that welfare serves as an additional core criterion in the design, study, and use of learning algorithms, complementing the conventional pillars of optimization, generalization, and expressivity, and as a compass guiding both theory and practice.

When learning is used to inform decisions about humans, such as for loans, hiring, or admissions, this can incentivize users to strategically modify their features, at a cost, to obtain positive predictions. The common assumption is that the function governing costs is exogenous, fixed, and predetermined. We challenge this assumption, and assert that costs emerge as a of deploying a classifier. Our idea is simple: when users seek positive predictions, this creates demand for important features; and if features are available for purchase, then a market will form, and competition will give rise to prices. We extend the strategic classification framework to support this notion, and study learning in a setting where a classifier can induce a market for features. We present an analysis of the learning task, devise an algorithm for computing market prices, propose a differentiable learning framework, and conduct experiments to explore our novel setting and approach.

Adversarial training aims to defend against *adversaries*: malicious opponents whose sole aim is to harm predictive performance in any way possible. This presents a rather harsh perspective, which we assert results in unnecessarily conservative training. As an alternative, we propose to model opponents as simply pursuing their own goals—rather than working directly against the classifier. Employing tools from strategic modeling, our approach enables knowledge or beliefs regarding the opponent's possible incentives to be used as inductive bias for learning. Accordingly, our method of *strategic training* is designed to defend against all opponents within an `incentive uncertainty set'. This resorts to adversarial learning when the set is maximal, but offers potential gains when the set can be appropriately reduced. We conduct a series of experiments that show how even mild knowledge regarding the opponent's incentives can be useful, and that the degree of potential gains depends on how these incentives relate to the structure of the learning task.

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning creates a feedback loop that shapes both the model and the population of its users. In this work, we introduce evolutionary prediction games, a framework grounded in evolutionary game theory which models such feedback loops as natural-selection processes among groups of users. Our theoretical analysis reveals a gap between idealized and real-world learning settings: In idealized settings with unlimited data and computational power, repeated learning creates competition and promotes competitive exclusion across a broad class of behavioral dynamics. However, under realistic constraints such as finite data, limited compute, or risk of overfitting, we show that stable coexistence and mutualistic symbiosis between groups becomes possible. We analyze these possibilities in terms of their stability and feasibility, present mechanisms that can sustain their existence, and empirically demonstrate our findings.

Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each other for consumers. Our work aims to study learning in this market setting, as it affects providers, consumers, and the market itself. We begin by analyzing such markets through the lens of the learning objective, and show that accuracy cannot be the only consideration. We then propose a method for classification under competition, so that a learner can maximize market share in the presence of competitors. We show that our approach benefits the providers as well as the consumers, and find that the timing of market entry and model updates can be crucial. We display the effectiveness of our approach across a range of domains, from simple distributions to noisy datasets, and show that the market as a whole remains stable by converging quickly to an equilibrium.

In strategic classification, the standard supervised learning setting is extended to support the notion of strategic user behavior in the form of costly feature manipulations made in response to a classifier. While standard learning supports a broad range of model classes, the study of strategic classification has, so far, been dedicated mostly to linear classifiers. This work aims to expand the horizon by exploring how strategic behavior manifests under non-linear classifiers and what this implies for learning. We take a bottom-up approach showing how non-linearity affects decision boundary points, classifier expressivity, and model class complexity. Our results show how, unlike the linear case, strategic behavior may either increase or decrease effective class complexity, and that the complexity decrease may be arbitrarily large. Another key finding is that universal approximators (e.g., neural nets) are no longer universal once the environment is strategic. We demonstrate empirically how this can create performance gaps even on an unrestricted model class.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning (IT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can help align models with human objectives and generate high-quality text, not much is known about their potential adverse effects. In this work, we investigate the effect of IT and RLHF on decision making and reasoning in LMs, focusing on three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models from the GPT-3, Mistral, and T5 families. Notably, we find a stronger presence of biases in models that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, Mistral-Instruct, GPT3.5, and GPT4. Our work constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

The goal of strategic classification is to learn decision rules which are robust to strategic input manipulation. Earlier works assume that these responses are known; while some recent works handle unknown responses, they exclusively study online settings with repeated model deployments. But there are many domains$\unicode{x2014}$particularly in public policy, a common motivating use case$\unicode{x2014}$where multiple deployments are infeasible, or where even one bad round is unacceptable. To address this gap, we initiate the formal study of one-shot strategic classification under unknown responses, which requires committing to a single classifier once. Focusing on uncertainty in the users' cost function, we begin by proving that for a broad class of costs, even a small mis-estimation of the true cost can entail trivial accuracy in the worst case. In light of this, we frame the task as a minimax problem, aiming to minimize worst-case risk over an uncertainty set of costs. We design efficient algorithms for both the full-batch and stochastic settings, which we prove converge (offline) to the minimax solution at the rate of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{-\frac{1}{2}})$. Our analysis reveals important structure stemming from strategic responses, particularly the value of dual norm regularization with respect to the cost function.

When users stand to gain from certain predictions, they are prone to act strategically to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. Whereas most works on strategic classification consider user actions that manifest as feature modifications, we study a novel setting in which users decide -- in response to the learned classifier -- whether to at all participate (or not). For learning approaches of increasing strategic awareness, we study the effects of self-selection on learning, and the implications of learning on the composition of the self-selected population. We then propose a differentiable framework for learning under self-selective behavior, which can be optimized effectively. We conclude with experiments on real data and simulated behavior that both complement our analysis and demonstrate the utility of our approach.

The success of machine learning across a wide array of tasks and applications has made it appealing to use it also in the social domain. Indeed, learned models now form the backbone of recommendation systems, social media platforms, online markets, and e-commerce services, where they are routinely used to inform decisions by, for, and about their human users. But humans are not your conventional input--they have goals, beliefs, and aspirations, and take action to promote their own interests. Given that standard learning methods are not designed to handle inputs that 'behave', a natural question is: how should we design learning systems when we know they will be deployed and used in social settings? This tutorial introduces strategic machine learning, a new and emerging subfield of machine learning that aims to develop a disciplined framework for learning under strategic user behavior. The working hypothesis of strategic ML is simple: users want things, and act to achieve them. Surprisingly, this basic truism is difficult to address within the conventional learning framework. The key challenge is that how users behave often depends on the learned decision rule itself; thus, strategic learning seeks to devise methods which are able to anticipate and accommodate such responsive behavior. Towards this, strategic ML offers a formalism for reasoning about strategic responses, for designing appropriate learning objectives, and for developing practical tools for learning in strategic environments. The tutorial will survey recent and ongoing work in this new domain, present key theoretical and empirical results, provide practical tools, and discuss open questions and landmark challenges.

Strategic classification studies learning in settings where users can modify their features to obtain favorable predictions. Most current works focus on simple classifiers that trigger independent user responses. Here we examine the implications of learning with more elaborate models that break the independence assumption. Motivated by the idea that applications of strategic classification are often social in nature, we focus on \emph{graph neural networks}, which make use of social relations between users to improve predictions. Using a graph for learning introduces inter-user dependencies in prediction; our key point is that strategic users can exploit these to promote their goals. As we show through analysis and simulation, this can work either against the system -- or for it. Based on this, we propose a differentiable framework for strategically-robust learning of graph-based classifiers. Experiments on several real networked datasets demonstrate the utility of our approach.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning tasks. We model delegation as a principal-agent game, in which accurate learning can be incentivized by the principal using performance-based contracts. Adapting the economic theory of contract design to this setting, we define budget-optimal contracts and prove they take a simple threshold form under reasonable assumptions. In the binary-action case, the optimality of such contracts is shown to be equivalent to the classic Neyman-Pearson lemma, establishing a formal connection between contract design and statistical hypothesis testing. Empirically, we demonstrate that budget-optimal contracts can be constructed using small-scale data, leveraging recent advances in the study of learning curves and scaling laws. Performance and economic outcomes are evaluated using synthetic and real-world classification tasks.

Optimizing user engagement is a key goal for modern recommendation systems, but blindly pushing users towards increased consumption risks burn-out, churn, or even addictive habits. To promote digital well-being, most platforms now offer a service that periodically prompts users to take breaks. These, however, must be set up manually, and so may be suboptimal for both users and the system. In this paper, we study the role of breaks in recommendation, and propose a framework for learning optimal breaking policies that promote and sustain long-term engagement. Based on the notion that recommendation dynamics are susceptible to both positive and negative feedback, we cast recommendation as a Lotka-Volterra dynamical system, where breaking reduces to a problem of optimal control. We then give an efficient learning algorithm, provide theoretical guarantees, and empirically demonstrate the utility of our approach on semi-synthetic data.

Strategic classification studies learning in settings where users can modify their features to obtain favorable predictions. Most current works focus on simple classifiers that trigger independent user responses. Here we examine the implications of learning with more elaborate models that break the independence assumption. Motivated by the idea that applications of strategic classification are often social in nature, we focus on graph neural networks, which make use of social relations between users to improve predictions. Using a graph for learning introduces inter-user dependencies in prediction; our key point is that strategic users can exploit these to promote their goals. As we show through analysis and simulation, this can work either against the system---or for it. Based on this, we propose a differentiable framework for strategically-robust learning of graph-based classifiers. Experiments on several real networked datasets demonstrate the utility of our approach.