Zusammenfassung Ein wichtiger Zweig der empirischen Kapitalmarktforschung beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Renditen Anleger mit Wertpapieren oder anderen Vermögensgegenständen unter Berücksichtigung von Inflationsrisiken langfristig erzielen können. In dieser Studie werden zum Zwecke der Berechnung von Realrenditen historische Preiszeitreihen für die Edelmetalle Gold, Silber und Platin sowie für die sechs an der London Metal Exchange gehandelten Industriemetalle (Aluminium, Blei, Kupfer, Nickel, Zink, Zinn) aufbereitet, welche zum Teil bis ins 13. Jahrhundert zurückreichen.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique hand-collected data, the authors carry out the first detailed analysis of the German squeeze-out offers from the announcement to the outcome of post-deal litigation, examining also the determinants of the decision to squeeze-out minority investors. Design/methodology/approach Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, the authors analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed companies from 2002 to 2011 to carry out the first detailed analysis of the squeeze-out procedure and the post-deal litigation. The authors employ the event study methodology to assess the stock market reaction around the announcement of the squeeze-out. Findings Large firms with foreign large shareholders are the most likely to be delisted. Positive stock price performance increases the likelihood of a squeeze-out, but operating performance has the opposite effect. Stock prices react positively to squeeze-out announcements, in particular when the squeeze-out does not follow a previous takeover offer. Post-deal litigation is widespread: nearly all squeeze-outs are legally challenged by minority shareholders. Additional cash compensation is larger in appraisal procedures, but actions of avoidance are completed in less time. Overall, the evidence suggests that starting post-deal litigation by challenging the cash compensation offered in a squeeze-out delivers high returns for minority investors. Research limitations/implications The lack of data concerning the identity of minority shareholders in firms undergoing a squeeze-out does not allow a proper investigation of the incentives of the different types of investors. Practical implications The paper provides evidence about the incentives of the different players in a squeeze-out offer. The findings of the paper could be helpful in assessing the impact of the squeeze-out rule. The results also contribute to the understanding of minority investors’ incentives to start post-deal litigation. Originality/value This paper provides new evidence about post-deal litigation, in particular how investors use the procedures that the system provides them to protect themselves against controlling shareholders. The paper examines all the phases of the squeeze-out procedure and challenges.

This paper examines minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, we analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed companies from 2002 to 2011. Large firms with foreign large shareholders are the most likely to be delisted. Positive stock price performance increases the likelihood of a squeeze-out, but operating performance has the opposite effect. Stock prices react positively to squeeze-out announcements, in particular when the squeeze-out does not follow a previous takeover offer. Nearly all squeeze-outs are legally challenged by minority shareholders, either with an action of avoidance or with an appraisal procedure (or both). We find that additional cash compensation is larger in appraisal procedures, but actions of avoidance are completed in less time and offer higher annualized returns. Overall, our evidence suggests that challenging the cash compensation offered in a squeeze-out delivers high returns for minority investors, net of opportunity costs.

In den letzten Jahren wurden einige historische Zeitreihen aufbereitet, die eine Aufzeichnung der Entwicklungen an ausgew hlten Aktienund Rentenm rkten vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart ermçglichen und eine ideale Datenbasis zur Sch tzung langfristiger Renditen darstellen. Dieses Datenmaterial ist eine noch vçllig unzureichend genutzte Quelle f r Out-of-sample-Tests, f r die Analyse von Kapitalmarktkrisen, zur Kalibrierung von Bewertungsmodellen sowie f r zahlreiche andere wissenschaftliche Fragestellungen.

Combining agency-theoretical with organisational population ecology approaches, this article analyses which factors drive the survival probabilities of organisations of the same type – listed stock corporations – facing the same institutional environment over a long period of time. It presents results from a unique hand-collected data set starting with the 51 largest firms in Baden-Württemberg in 1940 and follows their evolution for five time points from 1949 until 2007. Through an econometric survival analysis it is found that (i) the presence of multiple blockholders; (ii) a healthy capital structure (capital gearing); and (iii) the number of subsidiaries all have a positive impact on the probability of survival of the companies in our sample. To complement the findings from the survival analysis three exemplified anecdotal case studies are presented as narratives which are supportive of the general findings.

Our study examines private benefits of control in founding-family owned firms. We do this by analyzing a unique sample of 105 IPOs of family firms from 1970 to 2005 on German stock exchanges. We focus on three research questions. First, we show that substantial private benefits of control exist in these firms and - to our knowledge for the first time - we empirically determine the nature of these private benefits. Second, we verify that the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights via dual-class shares is used to create controlling shareholder structures in order to preserve private benefits. Thereby, we analyze the effect of different types of private benefits on dual-class adoption. Third, we show that the market cares about private benefits of control and find a significant long-run underperformance of dual-class IPO shares.

This paper focuses on the decision to go public when both seller and potential buyers have private benefits of control. The basic model by Zingales (1995) is extended to account for uncertainty of private benefits. This leads to new implications for the sales process, ownership structure, measurement of private benefits and the efficiency of takeover regimes. The optimal way to sell the company differs from the model with perfect information in that the incumbent always choses to go public instead of selling directly to a potential rival whenever the rival is expected to increase cash flow but not necessarily total firm value. IPO price and volume are lower than under perfect information which induces a socially non-optimal solution in takeover transactions. Imperfect information also explains post-IPO underperformance of firms which are not subject to control transfers. To compensate shareholders for potential losses during the sales process, the offering price has to be lower than under perfect information. This provides the basis for a differential stock price performance depending on the buyer taking over or not. Furthermore, an overestimation bias exists in prior estimates of control premiums, because some firms going public are never sold but nevertheless provide private benefits. Finally, mandatory tender offers in the form of a fair price rule and an equal opportunity rule are discussed, which indicate that the social superiority of either rule is strongly dependent on the empirical distribution characteristics of private benefits.

Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Betafaktoren beherrschter Unternehmen bei faktischen und Vertragskonzern-Verhältnissen bis hin zum Squeeze-Out untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen signifikant abnehmende Betafaktoren über verschiedene Konzernstufen. Bei Vertragskonzernen mit Beherrschungs- und Gewinnabführungsvertrag und Squeeze-Out-Unternehmen sinken die Betafaktoren der beherrschten Unternehmen auf Werte nahe Null. Die Ergebnisse sind ein Beleg für einen Marktrisiko-Entkopplungseffekt bei Unternehmen, die einem Konzerneinfluss unterliegen. Die Aktien von Minderheitsaktionären beherrschter Unternehmen haben somit im Durchschnitt eine niedrigere Risikoklasse als Aktien von Unternehmen im Streubesitz. Für die Betaschätzung zur Bewertung von Unternehmen mit einem geringen Streubesitzanteil empfehlen wir deshalb, spezielle Regressionsverfahren für unregelmäßig gehandelte Aktien (z.B. Trade-to-Trade-Verfahren) der Verwendung von Peer-Group-Betas vorzuziehen.

In this study we analyze the evolution of ownership, control, and performance in German founding-family-owned firms over the last century. We employ a hand-collected matched sample of German stock companies founded before World War I and still in existence in 2003. Comparing family-owned and non-family-owned firms over the 100-year time-span, we are able to analyze a variety of variables including ownership, control, industries, bank relationships and performance, as well as the impact of intergenerational control transfers. We find that families are slow to give up ownership, and control of family businesses remains strong even after several generations. Family firms seem to outperform non-family firms in terms of operating performance, but performance declines over the generations.

This paper examines the unification of non-voting preference shares into a one share-one vote structure using a sample of all German dual-class companies from 1987 until 2003. We test several hypotheses with regard to the reasons for the abolition of preference shares. First, as the separation of ownership and control is viewed as a means of keeping control over a firm, a detailed analysis of changes in the ownership structure of firms abolishing their preference shares is performed. Indeed, family firms losing the majority of control by unifying their share classes seem to restrain from this step by selling controlling blocks before the unification. Second, dualclass firms may comprise higher agency costs due to the violation of the one share-one vote rule and, thus, face higher costs of equity capital. We apply two methods for estimating changes in the cost of capital of unifying firms : (i) we perform an event study to examine the market reaction to the announcement of share class unifications and (ii) we investigate bid-ask spreads before and after the unification computed from intraday trading data to analyze liquidity effects on the cost of capital associated with the unification. In sum, the unification of dual -class preference shares into single -class voting shares seems to be strictly shareholder value increasing. Dual-class firms seem to be able to significantly reduce their cost of capital through unification, because of increases in firm value as well as a substantial reduction in bid-ask spreads. JEL Classification: G32, G34

This paper examines the unification of non-voting preference shares into a one share-one vote structure using a sample of all German dual-class companies from 1987 until 2003. We test several hypotheses with regard to the reasons for the abolition of preference shares. First, as the separation of ownership and control is viewed as a means of keeping control over a firm, a detailed analysis of changes in the ownership structure of firms abolishing their preference shares is performed. Indeed, family firms losing the majority of control by unifying their share classes seem to restrain from this step by selling controlling blocks before the unification. Second, dualclass firms may comprise higher agency costs due to the violation of the one share-one vote rule and, thus, face higher costs of equity capital. We apply two methods for estimating changes in the cost of capital of unifying firms : (i) we perform an event study to examine the market reaction to the announcement of share class unifications and (ii) we investigate bid-ask spreads before and after the unification computed from intraday trading data to analyze liquidity effects on the cost of capital associated with the unification. In sum, the unification of dual-class preference shares into single-class voting shares seems to be strictly shareholder value increasing. Dual-class firms seem to be able to significantly reduce their cost of capital through unification, because of increases in firm value as well as a substantial reduction in bid-ask spreads.

This Version: January 15, 2005 Abstract: This paper examines the unification of non-voting preference shares into a one share-one vote structure using a sample of all German dual-class companies from 1987 until 2003. We test several hypotheses with regard to the reasons for the abolition of preference shares. First, as the separation of ownership and control is viewed as a means of keeping control over a firm, a detailed analysis of changes in the ownership structure of firms abolishing their preference shares is performed. Indeed, family firms losing the majority of control by unifying their share classes seem to restrain from this step by selling controlling blocks before the unification. Second, dual class firms may comprise higher agency costs due to the violation of the one-share-one-vote rule and thus face higher costs of equity capital. The unification could then be seen as a means to reduce the cost of equity. Therefore, we apply two methods for estimating changes in the cost of capital of unifying firms: (i) we perform an event study analysis to examine the market reaction to the announcement of share class unifications and (ii) we investigate bid-ask spreads before and after the unification computed from intraday trading data to analyze liquidity effects on the cost of capital associated with the unification. In sum, the unification of dual -class preference shares into single -class voting shares seems to be strictly shareholder-value increasing. Dual-class firms seem to be able to significantly reduce their cost of capital through unification, because of increases in firm value as well as a substantial reduction in bid-ask spreads.

Our study examines private benefits of control in founding-family owned firms, by analyzing a unique sample of 105 IPOs of family firms on German stock exchanges from 1970 to 2011. First, we show that substantial private benefits of control exist in these firms and we empirically determine the nature of these private benefits. Second, we confirm that the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights via dual-class shares is used to create controlling shareholder structures in order to preserve private benefits of the family. In doing so, we analyze the effect of different types of private benefits on dual-class adoption. Third, we show that the market cares about private benefits of control and find a significant long-run underperformance by dual-class IPO shares.

Journal of Small Business ManagementVolume 41, Issue 2 p. 222-232 Full Access The Effect of IPOs on German Family–Owned Firms: Governance Changes, Ownership Structure, and Performance Olaf Ehrhardt, Olaf Ehrhardt Humboldt University, Berlin,Search for more papers by this authorEric Nowak, Eric Nowak Goethe University–FrankfurtSearch for more papers by this author Olaf Ehrhardt, Olaf Ehrhardt Humboldt University, Berlin,Search for more papers by this authorEric Nowak, Eric Nowak Goethe University–FrankfurtSearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 February 2003 https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-627X.00078Citations: 58AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Allen, Franklin, and Andrew Winton (1995). " Corporate Financial Structure, Incentives, and Optimal Contracting", in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 9. Ed. R. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic, and W. Ziemba. Elsevier North-Holland , 693–720. Bebchuk Lucian A. (1999). " A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control", Working Paper, Harvard University. Bhattacharya, Utpal, and B. Ravikumar (2001). "Capital Markets and the Evolution of Family Businesses", Journal of Business 74(2), 187–220. Böhmer, Ekkehard (1993). "The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings: A Critical Analysis of the Ownership-Retention Signalling Model", International Review of Financial Analysis 2(2), 77–95. Chemmanur Thomas J. (1993). "The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with Information Production", Journal of Finance 48(1), 285–304. Demsetz, Harold (1983). "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics 16(6), 375–390. Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn (1985). "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences", Journal of Political Economy 93(6), 1155–1177. Field Laura C. (1999). " Control Considerations of Newly Public Firms: The Implementation of Antitakeover Provisions and Dual Class Shares before the IPO", Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University. Franks, Julian, and Colin Mayer (2001). " Ownership, Control, and the Performance of German Corporations", Working Paper, London Business School, University of Oxford. Gompers, Paul (1996). "Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry", Journal of Financial Economics 42(1), 133–156. Goergen, Marc (1998). " Insider Retention and Long-Run Performance in German and U.K. IPOs", Working Paper, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology. Goergen, Marc, and Luc Renneboog (2001). " Prediction of Ownership and Control Concentration in German and U.K. Initial Public Offerings", in Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes and Capital Markets. Ed. L. Renneboog, J. McCahery, P. Moerland, and T. Raaijmakers. Oxford University Press. Holmén, Martin, and Peter Högfeldt (2000). " A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings", Workingv Paper, Stockholm School of Economics. Jensen Michael C., and William H. Meckling (1976). "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305–360. Kang David L. (2000). " Family Ownership and Performance in Public Corporations: A Study of the U.S. Fortune 500, 1982–1994", Working Paper 00–051, Harvard Business School. Krinsky, Itzhak, and Wendy Rotenberg (1988). "The Valuation of Initial Public Offerings", Contemporary Accounting Research 5(2), 501–515. Leland Hayne E., and David Pyle (1977). "Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance 32(2), 737–748. McConaughy Daniel L., Charles H. Matthews, and Anne S. Fialko (2001). "Founding Family Controlled Firms: Efficiency, Risk, and Value", Journal of Small Business Management 39(1), 31–49. Pagano Marco, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales (1998). "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis", Journal of Finance 53(1), 27–64. Rydqvist, Kristian, and Kenneth Högholm (1995). "Going Public in the 1980s: Evidence from Sweden", European Financial Management 1(3), 287–316. Schürmann Walter, and Kurt Körfgen (1997). Familienunternehmen auf dem Weg zur Börse. München , Germany : Beck. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny (1997). "A Survey of Corporate Governance", Journal of Finance 52(2), 737–783. Zingales, Luigi (1995). "Insider Ownership and the Decision to Going Public", Review of Economic Studies 62(3), 425–448. Citing Literature Volume41, Issue2April 2003Pages 222-232 ReferencesRelatedInformation

In der vorliegenden Untersuchung betrachten wir die Grundgesamtheit der deutschen Unternehmen, von denen im Zeitraum 1956 bis 1998 Stamm- und stimmrechtslose Vorzugsaktien borsennotiert waren. Zwischen beiden Aktiengattungen besteht mit durchschnittlich 17,2 Prozentpunkten ein okonomisch und statistisch signifikanter Kursunterschied, und zwar fur alle Marktsegmente und betrachteten Teilperioden. Der durchschnittliche Kursunterschied unterliegt im Zeitablauf aber starken Schwankungen, die in hohem Mase mit einer Veranderung des Anteils von Familienunternehmen korrelieren und damit mit der Hohe privater Kontrollrenten in Verbindung stehen. Unternehmensspezifische Unterschiede in der Hohe des Kursaufschlages sind nach unseren Ergebnissen auserdem mit unterschiedlichen Konzentrationen des Anteilsbesitzes verbunden. Positive Stimmrechtspramien am deutschen Markt konnen trotz nahezu fehlender feindlicher Ubernahmen auch durch mogliche Koalitionsbildungen zur Ausubung von Vetorechten erklart werden. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen ferner, dass sich die Aktienrenditen fur Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien haltende Minderheitsaktionare nicht signifikant unterscheiden; der tatsachliche Dividendenvorteil der Vorzugsaktien ist relativ gering.