What drives ordinary citizens to want their country to join or stay in the European Union (EU)? Whilst scholarship addressed value-based dispositions as drivers of pro-EU positions, material benefits dominate explanations of support for EU accession and membership. New research suggests that it is precisely the growing import of being an adherent of liberal democratic values that drove citizens in countries as disparate as Ukraine, Poland and Belarus to support EU accession and remained the key driver for those already in the Union wanting to stay in. Employing national surveys and regression analyses, this article shows that (a) not only is a shift to supporting EU accession accompanied by citizens also moving towards supporting democracy in Ukraine; (b) this EU democratic pull phenomenon can also be identified amongst citizens of other EU neighbourhood countries, as well as in EU member states.

How can and should we analyze mass mobilization and its outcomes in authoritarian (and potentially democratizing) states as social scientists? Are there any distinctive features to the study of mass mobilization and its outcomes in Eastern Europe? And how much should we focus on comparative analyses versus context and country specificities? The case of the 2020 mass mobilization in Belarus offers an opportunity to engage with and answer these questions in a reciprocal dialogue between scholars of protest and activism, politics of competitive authoritarian and democratizing contexts, and regional and country experts. This symposium brings together a diverse set of scholars and combines comparative and case-specific analyses and empirically driven and interpretive analyses that focus on different political, social, and cultural angles of this episode of mass mobilization and its aftermath.

Is there evidence of significant ethno-linguistic/ethno-national rallying around the nation in Ukraine-as social science would have us expect in times of conflict? And, if so, might we expect this ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity to rise with the prolongation of war? Or instead, is Ukrainian "civic-ness" the primary rally call that shaped and shapes collective identity in Ukraine? And if this collective identity is not ethno-linguistic in orientation then what values and political dispositions are bringing Ukrainians together in a time of crisis and war? Whilst political science might suggest that violence and extended periods of war can produce rallying to ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity-original panel survey data collected among the Ukrainian population in March/April 2019, January/February 2021, and 2 December 2021/16 February 2022 coupled with a cross-sectional nationally representative survey collected 19-24 May 2022 provide evidence that ongoing regional war, crises, and now all-out invasion by Russia have shored up civic and not ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identities. Moreover, this civic identity is bounded to pro-European pro-democratic orientations.

Abstract This chapter examines the experience of the "independence generation," the first generation coming of age after Ukraine gained independence from the USSR, through the 2004–5 Orange Revolution. It describes the formation of the ideas and ideals of the Ukrainian civic nation as pre-dating 1991. The chapter looks at Zelensky's childhood in the hardscrabble city of Kryvyy Rih in a southeastern Ukrainian context that was an important, if little known, source of dissident activity. The chapter traces the experiences of the independence generation that Zelensky is part of through the economic and social turmoil of the 1990s under Kravchuk and Kuchma. It addresses the challenges they faced while making their livelihoods as the generation before them produced the oligarchs that came to dominate much of Ukrainian politics and the economy through to 2022 while the masses remained impoverished. This period also featured the blooming of Ukrainian civic national identity, as it came to be less about ancestry and ethnicity and more about attachment to the newly independent state.

Abstract This chapter introduces the book's topic, summarizes the argument, and discusses its importance. It begins with the onset of Russia's all-out invasion on February 24, 2022, and documents Zelensky's initial reactions and actions to mobilize the nation and the world to save Ukraine. At the same time, it shows how Zelensky's actions were just one part of a larger Ukrainian mobilization. It is shown that much of this came as a surprise to the world due to a number of misconceptions about Ukraine and Ukrainians, most of which could have been avoided had people paid attention to social scientific research on Ukraine. The chapter then explains key social science concepts that shed light on the story, including civic national identity (which we argue underpinned this mass resistance), rallying-around-the-flag, generational effects, and patronalism. The concept of "the Zelensky Effect" is summarized as referring to how Zelensky has both reflected and amplified Ukrainians' senses of civic national identity and civic duty.

AbstractWho are the people who, in the face of extreme repression, unexpectedly take to the streets en masse in an authoritarian state? This article aims to answer this question with reference to the case of the Belarusian anti-Lukashenka mass mobilization of 2020. It employs unique data from an original online protest survey among citizens of Belarus who were 18 or older and residing in the country at the time of the protests (Onuch et. al.; MOBILISE 2020 & 2021; n = 17,174), fielded August 18, 2020–January 29, 2021.2 This survey was designed to: (a) capture as many protesters as possible; and (b) capture a large enough sample of non-protesters as a comparative reference group enabling us to better understand how different anti-Lukashenka protesters (n = 11,719) were from non-protesters (n = 5,455). Guided by theoretical and empirical expectations of contentious politics scholarship, we first provide descriptive statistics about the socio-demographic characteristics of the protesters, self-reported protest grievances and claims, and median protester preferences on a range of attitudes and policies. This portrait of the protesters is followed up by regression analysis to test whether these patterns hold at a statistically significant level when comparing protesters and non-protesters.

Abstract This chapter covers the history of Ukraine from the 2004 Orange Revolution through the start of the Euromaidan mass mobilization in 2013. It examines how some members of the independence generation rallied to the civic nation while others like Zelensky did not yet join in. The hopes of the Orange Revolution were soon dashed as "politics as usual" returned in Ukraine, resulting in incessant and corrupt political battles among rival political-economic networks rather than true people power. Ukraine's masses grew increasingly disillusioned and even voted the Orange Revolution's chief villain, Viktor Yanukovych, into the presidency in a free and fair election. It was during this time, after working in Moscow, that Zelensky returned to Ukraine, founded his famous Kvartal 95 studio, and rose to prominence both as a performer and a media mogul. This position gave him major managerial experience, but also put him in the uncomfortable position of overseeing highly biased news coverage on the country's leading TV channel while simultaneously producing biting satire that lambasted Ukraine's political establishment, reflected the struggles of ordinary Ukrainians, and gained him considerable fame. His rise coincides with that of the independence generation and the continued strengthening of Ukraine's civic national identity.

Abstract This chapter covers the history of Ukraine from the 2004 Orange Revolution through the start of the Euromaidan mass mobilization in 2013. It examines how some members of the independence generation rallied to the civic nation while others like Zelensky did not yet join in. The hopes of the Orange Revolution were soon dashed as "politics as usual" returned in Ukraine, resulting in incessant and corrupt political battles among rival political-economic networks rather than true people power. Ukraine's masses grew increasingly disillusioned and even voted the Orange Revolution's chief villain, Viktor Yanukovych, into the presidency in a free and fair election. It was during this time, after working in Moscow, that Zelensky returned to Ukraine, founded his famous Kvartal 95 studio, and rose to prominence both as a performer and a media mogul. This position gave him major managerial experience, but also put him in the uncomfortable position of overseeing highly biased news coverage on the country's leading TV channel while simultaneously producing biting satire that lambasted Ukraine's political establishment, reflected the struggles of ordinary Ukrainians, and gained him considerable fame. His rise coincides with that of the independence generation and the continued strengthening of Ukraine's civic national identity.

Abstract How was Ukraine able to stand up and defend its independence against Russia's all-out invasion in 2022? One cannot understand these historic events without understanding Zelensky, the country and its people. What makes Zelensky most extraordinary in war is his very ordinariness as a Ukrainian, though he is "ordinary" in a way that not everyone could be, in part because of skills honed in a long career at the intersection of entertainment, media, and politics. The Zelensky Effect unpacks this paradox, exploring Ukraine's national history to show how its now-iconic president reflects the hopes and frustrations of the country's first 'independence generation.' Interweaving compelling episodes from Zelensky's life and career with data analysis and an informative history of independence-era Ukraine, it documents how Zelensky reflects and amplifies what social scientists call Ukraine's strong "civic" form of national identity. This is the inclusive sense of nationhood that led not only Zelensky but millions of Ukrainians to take huge personal risks to defeat the invading army. The book is structured around several critical junctures in Ukraine's and Zelensky's history, including Ukraine's appearance as an independent state in 1991, the Orange Revolution of 2004–5, the Euromaidan mass mobilization of 2013–14, the war with Russia after its 2014 annexation of Crimea, Zelensky's highly unusual 2019 election campaign, his presidency prior to 2022, and his rise to become the iconic wartime president he is today after Russia's February 24, 2022, assault. A concluding chapter examines prospects for a postwar Ukraine.

His symposium employs established social science theory to frame and place into comparative perspective the case of Belarusian mass mobilization that began in August 2020. We not only argue and explain how this is a case of mass mobilization that occurred in a competitive authoritarian context, but also that is a far more "typical" example (rather than an outlier) of protest mobilization occurring in political repressive contexts. We propose both empirical and methodological guidance for the study and analysis of such cases, whilst warning against accepting initial reports of mass protest phenomena at face value. Examining how each study presented in this special issue makes a measured and innovative empirical and conceptual contribution, correcting or revisiting accepted "truths," providing a new framing and/or analyzing original data. The case of Belarus before and after August 2020 underlines the importance and the empirical and ethical challenges of studying stability and change in public opinion and state-society relations in authoritarian settings.

Do geopolitical orientations distinguish anti-Lukashenka protesters from non-protesters in Belarus? Employing data from an original online protest survey among 18+year-old citizens of Belarus residing in the country (MOBILISE 2020, n= 17,174) fielded 18August2020-29January2021, this paper compares protesters (n = 11,719) to non-protesters (n = 5,455) to better understand the dispositions that distinguish them. First, our logistic regression analysis finds robust evidence of polarization along geopolitical lines (with protesters preferring apro-EU and an anti-Russia orientation). Second, we show that pro-EU foreign policy preferences of protesters are neither temporally determined nor driven by the crisis, and are thus foundational among the positions held by anti-regime protesters. Third, we find that pro-EU and anti-Russia attitudes align with liberal democratic dispositions. Our study calls for the more systematic integration of foreign policy preferences into the comparative study of mobilization.

In democratizing countries it seems to make sense that any prolonged crisis will turn citizens away from democracy, from its "rules of the game," and from the institutions tasked with upholding them. If ever there was such a country, surely it is Ukraine. Long beset by political instability and corruption, it has in recent years seen its crises become biblical: pestilence (in the form of covid-19) and war (in the form of Russian aggression and later the all-out Russian invasion launched on 24 February 2022). Instead of losing confidence in democracy as the best form of government, however, Ukrainian citizens have done the opposite, survey research from the MOBILISE Project reveals a staggering 35 percentage-point rise in Ukrainians' support for democracy over just three years. Ukrainians moved toward greater support for democracy between 2019 and 2022 precisely because ordinary citizens were able to observe democracy in action and working even in the face of major compounding crises.

When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally representative panel survey in Ukraine ( Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014 ) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014 EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test hypotheses, prominent in current protest literature, related to the influence of “new” (social media and online news) and “old” media (television) on protest behavior and attitudes. Making use of the significance of 2014 Ukraine as a testing ground for Russian disinformation tactics, we also specifically test for consumption of Russian-owned television. Our findings indicate that frequent consumption of “old” media, specifically Russian-owned television, is significantly associated with both mobilization in and positive perceptions of protest and is a better predictor of believing “fake news” than consuming “new” media sources.

While it is common wisdom that “identity matters” in Ukrainian politics, we still lack a robust understanding of precisely when and how it matters. Reflecting challenges facing the broader interdis...

Building on past survey-based studies of ethnic identity, we employ the case of Ukraine to demonstrate the importance of taking seriously the multidimensionality of ethnicity, even in a country that is regarded as deeply divided. Drawing on relational theory, we identify four dimensions of ethnicity that are each important in distinctive ways in Ukraine: individual language preference, language embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality. Using original survey data collected in May 2014, we show that the choice of one over the other can be highly consequential for the conclusions one draws about ethnicity's role in shaping attitudes (e.g. to NATO membership), actions (e.g. participation in the Euromaidan protests), and the anticipation of outgroups' behavior (e.g. expectations of a Russian invasion). Moreover, we call attention to the importance of including the right control variables for precisely interpreting any posited effects of ethnicity, making specific recommendations for future survey research on ethnic identity in Ukraine.

The MOBILISE project plans to study the relationship between protest behaviour and migration. It focuses on two puzzles 1) what accounts for choosing one type of behavior over the other; and 2) how does prior exposure to migration and/or protest affect this choice. The purpose of this scoping study is to collect information on existing datasets that cover protest and/or migration and explore to what extent they are suitable for addressing our questions. Before providing an overview of the datasets we have uncovered, we will first summarise the major challenges in measuring migration and protest.

How do people form beliefs about the factual content of major events when established geopolitical orders are violently challenged? Here, we address the tragic events of 2 May 2014, in Odesa, Ukraine. There, Euromaidan protest movement supporters and opponents clashed following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the onset of the Donbas conflict, culminating in the worst civilian death toll the city had seen since World War II. Shortly after, we surveyed Ukraine's population about who they thought had actually perpetrated the killings and relate people's answers to alternative narratives (frames) that an original content analysis finds were available to Ukrainian citizens through different media. We find evidence, consistent with theories of hot cognition and motivated reasoning, that the Odesa violence triggered emotional responses linked to ethnic, regional, and partisan identity, which then activated attitudes associated with these identities that, in turn, led people to adopt very different (sometimes highly improbable) beliefs about who carried out the killings. Ethnic identity in particular is found to have strongly moderated the effects of television, with Ukrainian television greatly influencing Ukrainians but backfiring among Russians, and Russian television mainly impacting non-Ukrainians. Education and local information are found to reduce susceptibility to televised factual narratives.