Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) hemagglutinin (HA) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses are now circulating in wild birds and agricultural species (poultry and dairy cows), resulting in multiple human infections. Both preclinical and clinical data for treating A(H5N1) with US Food and Drug Administration-approved anti-influenza drugs are limited. Here, we examined the protection conferred by one, two, or three doses of the newest approved anti-influenza drug, baloxavir, in ferrets lethally challenged with either an avian- or bovine-origin A(H5N1) virus. All dosing regimens improved survival and clinical outcomes with protection ranging from 50 to 100%. Compared with vehicle-only treatment, baloxavir regimens decreased virus shedding, lung pathology, and viremia and eliminated viral spread to the brain. Multidose therapy yielded the best outcomes overall. Single-dose baloxavir prophylaxis with an avian virus challenge resulted in the low-frequency presence of polymerase acidic (PA) protein containing the E23K substitution, whereas all treatment regimens after a bovine-origin virus challenge induced at least one instance of PA containing the I38T substitution. Both PA-E23K and PA-I38T were predicted to decrease potential baloxavir-PA protein interactions, and they phenotypically reduced susceptibility of the virus to baloxavir by 3.8-fold [50% effective concentration (EC50) = 15.13 nanomolar, PA-E23K] and 77.3-fold (EC50 = 307.40 nanomolar, PA-I38T) in polymerase assays. Baloxavir is a single-dose drug for treating seasonal influenza. We show that multidose regimens of baloxavir may be most efficacious against highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in a preclinical ferret model, with effective control of both severe disease and neurological involvement.
While influenza A virus undergoes rapid antigenic drift in humans, at least some subtypes, such as H3, have relatively stable antigenicity in natural waterfowl reservoirs, despite the presence of immune pressure. However, the underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. This study identified and characterized 187 antibodies to H3 hemagglutinin from experimentally infected mallard ducks, 18 of which were further analyzed by cryo-EM. Compared with human H3 antibodies, duck H3 antibodies exhibited higher glycan-binding propensity, more balanced immunodominance hierarchy, and targeted distinct epitopes. Other unique features of duck H3 antibodies included a convergent CDR H3-independent heavy chain-only binding mode and an N-glycosylated CDR H3 as decoy receptor. By annotating duck immunoglobulin germline genes, we also demonstrated the importance of gene conversion in duck H3 antibodies. Overall, our findings provide insights into how millennia of coevolution have shaped the interplay between influenza A virus antigenic drift and antibody responses in the natural reservoir.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus vaccines typically yield lower neutralizing antibody titers in animals than influenza A virus (IAV) vaccines derived from other viral subtypes. To understand these differences, we compared the cellular immune responses in the draining lymph nodes (dLNs) of mice vaccinated with an inactivated whole H5N1 vaccine to those in mice vaccinated with seasonal H1N1pdm09, H7N9, or H9N2 IAV vaccines. H5N1-vaccinated mice exhibited reduced serum neutralizing antibody titers, despite the hemagglutinin-binding immunoglobulin production being similar to that with other IAV vaccines. Although bulk RNA sequencing showed no differences in B-cell populations after H5N1 and H1N1pdm09 vaccination, H5N1 vaccination resulted in fewer, but larger, dLN germinal centers and significantly more extrafollicular B cells, which are known to produce lower neutralizing antibody titers. Furthermore, H5N1-vaccinated mice had significantly more follicular helper and regulatory T cells. Therefore, differences in neutralizing antibody production in mice after IAV vaccination correlate with subtype-dependent germinal center reactions in the dLNs.
The high-pathogenicity avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 b have been detected in domestic poultry and wild birds in Mexico. Vaccination with H5 vaccines has been implemented as a complementary influenza control strategy in poultry in many countries, including Mexico. Continuous reevaluation of the efficacy of licensed vaccines against emerging viruses is required to ensure adequate control of virus transmission and infection. Some commercial poultry H5 vaccines used in Mexico are produced from vaccine seed viruses that are genetically distinct from clade 2.3.4.4 b viruses. Here, we studied the efficacy of four commercial H5 poultry vaccines widely used in the Mexican market and an experimental inactivated, adjuvanted vaccine against a recent North American high-pathogenicity avian influenza A (H5N1) 2.3.4.4 b virus. Chickens in all vaccinated groups developed antibodies to the viral nucleoprotein as detected by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. Although some of the commercial vaccines did not elicit detectable hemagglutination inhibition or microneutralization titers, all vaccines provided 80 %-100 % protection from mortality. Immunophenotyping of the peripheral blood mononuclear cells of vaccinated chickens showed that these vaccines did not elicit peripheral T-cell or other non-B cell responses that could explain the observed protection. Accordingly, we recommend continued evaluation of vaccine efficacy against evolving viruses and further efforts to identify non-neutralizing antibody correlates of protection.
Influenza virological surveillance was conducted in Bangladesh from January to December 2021 in live poultry markets (LPMs) and in Tanguar Haor, a wetland region where domestic ducks have frequent contact with migratory birds. The predominant viruses circulating in LPMs were low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 and clade 2.3.2.1a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses. Additional LPAIs were found in both LPM (H4N6) and Tanguar Haor wetlands (H7N7). Genetic analyses of these LPAIs strongly suggested long-distance movement of viruses along the Central Asian migratory bird flyway. We also detected a novel clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus from ducks in free-range farms in Tanguar Haor that was similar to viruses first detected in October 2020 in The Netherlands but with a different PB2. Identification of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N1 viruses in Tanguar Haor provides continued support of the role of migratory birds in transboundary movement of influenza A viruses (IAV), including HPAI viruses. Domestic ducks in free range farm in wetland areas, like Tangua Haor, serve as a conduit for the introduction of LPAI and HPAI viruses into Bangladesh. Clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have dominated in many regions of the world since mid-2021, and it remains to be seen if these viruses will replace the endemic clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses in Bangladesh.
In March 2024, clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses were first detected in U.S. dairy cattle. Similar viruses have since caused 70 zoonotic human infections. To assess changes to zoonotic potential, we characterized A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses isolated from cows' milk and birds. Bovine-derived viruses are lethal in mice and ferrets and transmit to direct but not airborne contact ferrets. All viruses replicate in human bronchial epithelial cells despite preferentially binding avian virus-like receptors. The bovine-derived viruses remain susceptible to FDA-approved antivirals, and they are inhibited by sera from ferrets vaccinated with WHO-recommended candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) or human sera from clade 2.3.4.4c vaccinees. While 2.3.4.4b viruses induce severe disease in mammalian models, they retain many avian virus-like characteristics. Combined, we conclude that the risk of contemporary bovine-derived viruses to humans not in contact with affected animals is low. However, heightened vigilance remains essential to promptly detect and respond to any changes.
AbstractIn 2017, a novel influenza A virus (IAV) was isolated from an Egyptian fruit bat. In contrast to other bat influenza viruses, the virus was related to avian A(H9N2) viruses and was probably the result of a bird-to-bat transmission event. To determine the cross-species spill-over potential, we biologically characterize features of A/bat/Egypt/381OP/2017(H9N2). The virus has a pH inactivation profile and neuraminidase activity similar to those of human-adapted IAVs. Despite the virus having an avian virus–like preference for α2,3 sialic acid receptors, it is unable to replicate in male mallard ducks; however, it readily infects ex-vivo human respiratory cell cultures and replicates in the lungs of female mice. A/bat/Egypt/381OP/2017 replicates in the upper respiratory tract of experimentally-infected male ferrets featuring direct-contact and airborne transmission. These data suggest that the bat A(H9N2) virus has features associated with increased risk to humans without a shift to a preference for α2,6 sialic acid receptors.
Influenza viruses are a major global health burden with up to 650,000 associated deaths annually. Beyond seasonal illness, influenza A viruses (IAVs) pose a constant pandemic threat due to novel emergent viruses that have evolved the ability to jump from their natural avian hosts to humans. Because of this threat, active surveillance of circulating IAV strains in wild and domestic bird populations is vital to our pandemic preparedness and response strategies. Here, we report on IAV surveillance data collected from 2017 to 2022 from wild and domestic birds in Bangladesh. We note evidence to suggest that male birds show a higher risk of IAV, including highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus, positivity than female birds. The data was stratified to control for selection bias and confounding variables to test the hypothesis that male birds are at a higher risk of IAV positivity relative to female birds. The association of IAV and A(H5) largely held in each stratum, and double stratification suggested that the phenomena was largely specific to ducks. Finally, we show that chickens, male birds, and juvenile birds generally have higher viral loads compared to their counterparts. These observations warrant further validation through active surveillance across various populations. Such efforts could significantly contribute to the enhancement of pandemic prediction and risk assessment models.
Avian influenza outbreaks, including ones caused by highly pathogenic A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, have devastated animal populations and remain a threat to humans. Risk elements assessed for emerging influenza viruses include their susceptibility to approved antivirals. Here, we screened >20,000 neuraminidase (NA) or polymerase acidic (PA) protein sequences of potentially pandemic A(H5Nx), A(H7Nx), and A(H9N2) viruses that circulated globally in 2010-2023. The frequencies of NA or PA substitutions associated with reduced inhibition (RI) or highly reduced inhibition (HRI) by NA inhibitors (NAIs) (oseltamivir, zanamivir) or a cap-dependent endonuclease inhibitor (baloxavir) were low: 0.60% (137/22,713) and 0.62% (126/20,347), respectively. All tested subtypes were susceptible to NAIs and baloxavir at sub-nanomolar concentrations. A(H9N2) viruses were the most susceptible to oseltamivir, with IC50s 3- to 4-fold lower than for other subtypes (median IC50: 0.18 nM; n = 22). NA-I222M conferred RI of A(H5N1) viruses by oseltamivir (with a 26-fold IC50 increase), but NA-S246N did not reduce inhibition. PA-E23G, PA-K34R, PA-I38M/T, and the previously unreported PA-A36T caused RI by baloxavir in all subtypes tested. Avian A(H9N2) viruses endemic in Egyptian poultry predominantly acquired PAI38V, which causes only a <3-fold decrease in the baloxavir EC50 and fails to meet the RI criteria. PA-E199A/D in A(H7Nx) and A(H9N2) viruses caused a 2- to 4-fold decrease in EC50 (close to the borderline for RI) and should be closely monitored. Our data indicate antiviral susceptibility is high among avian influenza A viruses with pandemic potential and present novel markers of resistance to existing antiviral interventions.
The antiviral susceptibility of currently circulating (2022-2023) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses was assessed by genotypic and phenotypic approaches. The frequency was low for neuraminidase (NA) and polymerase acidic (PA) substitutions associated with reduced inhibition by NA inhibitors (21/2698, 0.78%) or the PA inhibitor baloxavir (14/2600, 0.54%). Phenotypic testing of 22 clade 2.3.2.1a and 2.3.4.4b viruses revealed broad susceptibility to NA inhibitors and baloxavir for a conclusion that most contemporary HPAI A(H5N1) viruses retain susceptibility to antiviral drugs. Novel NA-K432E and NA-T438I substitutions (N2 numbering) were identified at elevated frequencies (104/2698, 3.85%) and caused reduced zanamivir and peramivir inhibition.
BackgroundThe Animal Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced (ABSL-3+) laboratory at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital has a long history of influenza pandemic preparedness. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and subsequent expansion into a pandemic has put new and unanticipated demands on laboratory operations since April 2020. Administrative changes, investigative methods requiring increased demand for inactivation and validation of sample removal, and the adoption of a new animal model into the space required all arms of our Biorisk Management System (BMS) to respond with speed and innovation.ResultsIn this report, we describe the outcomes of three major operational changes that were implemented to adapt the ABSL-3+ select agent space into a multipathogen laboratory. First were administrative controls that were revised and developed with new Institutional Biosafety Committee protocols, laboratory space segregation, training of staff, and occupational health changes for potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 inside the laboratory. Second were extensive inactivation and validation experiments performed for both highly pathogenic avian influenza and SARS-CoV-2 to meet the demands for sample removal to a lower biosafety level. Third was the establishment of a new caging system to house Syrian Golden hamsters for SARS-CoV-2 risk assessment modeling.SummaryThe demands placed on biocontainment laboratories for response to SARS-CoV-2 has highlighted the importance of a robust BMS. In a relatively short time, the ABSL-3+ was able to adapt from a single select agent space to a multipathogen laboratory and expand our pandemic response capacity.
The recent emergence of B.1.1.529, the Omicron variant 1,2 , has raised concerns of escape from protection by vaccines and therapeutic antibodies. A key test for potential countermeasures against B.1.1.529 is their activity in preclinical rodent models of respiratory tract disease. Here, using the collaborative network of the SARS-CoV-2 Assessment of Viral Evolution (SAVE) programme of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), we evaluated the ability of several B.1.1.529 isolates to cause infection and disease in immunocompetent and human ACE2 (hACE2)-expressing mice and hamsters. Despite modelling data indicating that B.1.1.529 spike can bind more avidly to mouse ACE2 (refs. 3,4 ), we observed less infection by B.1.1.529 in 129, C57BL/6, BALB/c and K18-hACE2 transgenic mice than by previous SARS-CoV-2 variants, with limited weight loss and lower viral burden in the upper and lower respiratory tracts. In wild-type and hACE2 transgenic hamsters, lung infection, clinical disease and pathology with B.1.1.529 were also milder than with historical isolates or other SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. Overall, experiments from the SAVE/NIAID network with several B.1.1.529 isolates demonstrate attenuated lung disease in rodents, which parallels preliminary human clinical data.
From April 2018 to October 2019, we continued active surveillance for influenza viruses in Bangladeshi live poultry markets (LPMs) and in Tanguar Haor, a wetland region of Bangladesh where domestic ducks have frequent contact with migratory birds. The predominant virus subtypes circulating in the LPMs were low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 and clade 2.3.2.1a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses of the H5N1-R1 genotype, like those found in previous years. Viruses of the H5N1-R2 genotype, which were previously reported as co-circulating with H5N1-R1 genotype viruses in LPM, were not detected. In addition to H9N2 viruses, which were primarily found in chicken and quail, H2N2, H3N8 and H11N3 LPAI viruses were detected in LPMs, exclusively in ducks. Viruses in domestic ducks and/or wild birds in Tanguar Haor were more diverse, with H1N1, H4N6, H7N1, H7N3, H7N4, H7N6, H8N4, H10N3, H10N4 and H11N3 detected. Phylogenetic analyses of these LPAI viruses suggested that some were new to Bangladesh (H2N2, H7N6, H8N4, H10N3 and H10N4), likely introduced by migratory birds of the Central Asian flyway. Our results show a complex dynamic of viral evolution and diversity in Bangladesh based on factors such as host populations and geography. The LPM environment was characterised by maintenance of viruses with demonstrated zoonotic potential and H5N1 genotype turnover. The wetland environment was characterised by greater viral gene pool diversity but a lower overall influenza virus detection rate. The genetic similarity of H11N3 viruses in both environments demonstrates that LPM and wetlands are connected despite their having distinct influenza ecologies.
Clinical efficacy of the influenza antiviral baloxavir marboxil (baloxavir) is compromised by treatment-emergent variants harboring a polymerase acidic protein I38T (isoleucine-38-threonine) substitution. However, the fitness of I38T-containing influenza B viruses (IBVs) remains inadequately defined. After the pharmacokinetics of the compound were confirmed in ferrets, animals were injected subcutaneously with 8 mg/kg of baloxavir acid (BXA) at 24 h postinoculation with recombinant BXA-sensitive (BXA-Sen, I38) or BXA-resistant (BXA-Res, I38T) B/Brisbane/60/2008 (Victoria lineage) virus. BXA treatment of donor ferrets reduced virus replication and delayed transmission of the BXA-Sen but not the BXA-Res IBV. The I38 genotype remained dominant in the BXA-Sen-infected animals, even with BXA treatment. In competitive-mixture experiments, no transmission to aerosol contacts was seen from BXA-treated donors coinfected with the BXA-Sen and BXA-Res B/Brisbane/60/2008 viruses. However, in parallel mixed infections with the B/Phuket/3073/2013 (Yamagata lineage) virus background, BXA treatment failed to block airborne transmission of the BXA-Res virus, and the I38T genotype generally predominated. Therefore, the relative fitness of BXA-Res IBVs is complex and dependent on the virus backbone and within-host virus competition. BXA treatment of single-virus-infected ferrets hampers aerosol transmission of the BXA-Sen virus and does not readily generate BXA-Res variants, whereas mixed infections may result in propagation of BXA-Res IBVs of the Yamagata lineage. Our findings confirm the antiviral potency of baloxavir against IBVs, while supporting optimization of the dosing regimen to maximize clinical benefit.
Background The 2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 outbreak in upper midwestern U.S. poultry operations was not detected in wild birds to any great degree during the outbreak, despite wild waterfowl being implicated in the introduction, reassortment, and movement of the virus into North America from Asia. This outbreak led to the demise of over 50 million domestic birds and occurred mainly during the northward spring migration of adult avian populations. Objectives There have been no experimental examinations of the pathogenesis, transmission, and population impacts of this virus in adult wild waterfowl with varying exposure histories—the most relevant age class. Methods We captured, housed, and challenged adult wild mallards ( Anas platyrhynchos ) with HPAIV H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 and measured viral infection, viral excretion, and transmission to other mallards. Results All inoculated birds became infected and excreted moderate amounts of virus, primarily orally, for up to 14 days. Cohoused, uninoculated birds also all became infected. Serological status had no effect on susceptibility. There were no obvious clinical signs of disease, and all birds survived to the end of the study (14 days). Conclusions Based on these results, adult mallards are viable hosts of HPAIV H5N2 regardless of prior exposure history and are capable of transporting the virus over short and long distances. These findings have implications for surveillance efforts. The capture and sampling of wild waterfowl in the spring, when most surveillance programs are not operating, are important to consider in the design of future HPAIV surveillance programs.
Migratory birds play a major role in spreading influenza viruses over long distances. We report highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) viruses in migratory and resident ducks in Bangladesh. The viruses were genetically similar to viruses detected in wild birds in China and Mongolia, suggesting migration-associated dissemination of these zoonotic pathogens.
Despite the development and deployment of antibody and vaccine countermeasures, rapidly-spreading SARS-CoV-2 variants with mutations at key antigenic sites in the spike protein jeopardize their efficacy. The recent emergence of B.1.1.529, the Omicron variant1,2, which has more than 30 mutations in the spike protein, has raised concerns for escape from protection by vaccines and therapeutic antibodies. A key test for potential countermeasures against B.1.1.529 is their activity in pre-clinical rodent models of respiratory tract disease. Here, using the collaborative network of the SARS-CoV-2 Assessment of Viral Evolution (SAVE) program of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), we evaluated the ability of multiple B.1.1.529 Omicron isolates to cause infection and disease in immunocompetent and human ACE2 (hACE2) expressing mice and hamsters. Despite modeling and binding data suggesting that B.1.1.529 spike can bind more avidly to murine ACE2, we observed attenuation of infection in 129, C57BL/6, and BALB/c mice as compared with previous SARS-CoV-2 variants, with limited weight loss and lower viral burden in the upper and lower respiratory tracts. Although K18-hACE2 transgenic mice sustained infection in the lungs, these animals did not lose weight. In wild-type and hACE2 transgenic hamsters, lung infection, clinical disease, and pathology with B.1.1.529 also were milder compared to historical isolates or other SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. Overall, experiments from multiple independent laboratories of the SAVE/NIAID network with several different B.1.1.529 isolates demonstrate attenuated lung disease in rodents, which parallels preliminary human clinical data.
Wild aquatic birds are the primary natural reservoir for influenza A viruses (IAVs). In this study, an A(H9N9) influenza A virus (A/duck/Bangladesh/44493/2020) was identified via routine surveillance in free-range domestic ducks in Bangladesh. Phylogenetic analysis of hemagglutinin showed that the H9N9 virus belonged to the Y439-like lineage. The HA gene had the highest nucleotide identity to A/Bean Goose (Anser fabalis)/South Korea/KNU 2019-16/2019 (H9N2). The other seven gene segments clustered within the Eurasian lineage.
To optimize the public health response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), we must first understand the antibody response to individual proteins on the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the antibody’s cross reactivity to other coronaviruses. Using a panel of 37 convalescent COVID-19 human serum samples, we showed that the magnitude and specificity of responses varied across individuals, independent of their reactivity to seasonal human coronaviruses (HCoVs). These data suggest that COVID-19 vaccines will elicit primary humoral immune responses in naïve individuals and variable responses in those previously exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Unlike the limited cross-coronavirus reactivities in humans, serum samples from 96 dogs and 10 cats showed SARS-CoV-2 protein-specific responses focused on non–S1 proteins. The correlation of this response with those to other coronaviruses suggests that the antibodies are cross-reactive and generated to endemic viruses within these hosts, which must be considered in seroepidemiologic studies. We conclude that substantial variation in antibody generation against coronavirus proteins will influence interpretations of serologic data in the clinical and veterinary settings.
The genesis of novel influenza viruses through reassortment poses a continuing risk to public health. This is of particular concern in Bangladesh, where highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the A(H5N1) subtype are endemic and cocirculate with other influenza viruses. Active surveillance of avian influenza viruses in Bangladeshi live poultry markets detected three A(H5) genotypes, designated H5N1-R1, H5N1-R2, and H5N2-R3, that arose from reassortment of A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1a viruses. The H5N1-R1 and H5N1-R2 viruses contained HA, NA, and M genes from the A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1a viruses and PB2, PB1, PA, NP, and NS genes from other Eurasian influenza viruses. H5N2-R3 viruses contained the HA gene from circulating A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1a viruses, NA and M genes from concurrently circulating A(H9N2) influenza viruses, and PB2, PB1, PA, NP, and NS genes from other Eurasian influenza viruses. Representative viruses of all three genotypes and a parental clade 2.3.2.1a strain (H5N1-R0) infected and replicated in mice without prior adaptation; the H5N2-R3 virus replicated to the highest titers in the lung. All viruses efficiently infected and killed chickens. All viruses replicated in inoculated ferrets, but no airborne transmission was detected, and only H5N2-R3 showed limited direct-contact transmission. Our findings demonstrate that although the A(H5N1) viruses circulating in Bangladesh have the capacity to infect and replicate in mammals, they show very limited capacity for transmission. However, reassortment does generate viruses of distinct phenotypes. IMPORTANCE Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have circulated continuously in Bangladesh since 2007, and active surveillance has detected viral evolution driven by mutation and reassortment. Recently, three genetically distinct A(H5N1) reassortant viruses were detected in live poultry markets in Bangladesh. Currently, we cannot assign pandemic risk by only sequencing viruses; it must be conducted empirically. We found that the H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses exhibited high virulence in mice and chickens, and one virus had limited capacity to transmit between ferrets, a property considered consistent with a higher zoonotic risk.