This is the Israeli report to the European Tort Law Yearbook. It critically evaluates notable developments which took place in Israeli tort law in 2016. Part A discusses legislation and legislative bills in various areas, including civil wrongs related to credit data collection, retention, and transfer, road accidents, and the impact of insolvency on tort claims. Part B discusses Supreme Court decisions on breach of statutory duty, the interrelation between tort and criminal law, victim compensation in the criminal process, instituting criminal proceedings as defamation, liability in negligence for injuries sustained by invitees, negligent failure to secure liability insurance, and damages without proof of harm in defamation law. Part B also analyzes recent developments in personal injury law, specifically the relation between tort claims and eligibility to national insurance benefits. Part C reviews new Israeli tort law literature.

The colloquial phrase “no harm, no foul” captures one of the most fundamental tenets of negligence law: the tort is incomplete and there can be no legal redress without proof of actual harm. Mere exposure to risk, even when it is foreseeable and unreasonable, is not actionable. The Article dares to challenge this time-honored, deep-rooted, and highly impactful legal axiom. Part I restates the traditional quadripartite structure of the tort of negligence, highlights the implications of the harm requirement, and briefly reviews and characterizes past attempts to circumvent it. The Article then launches a three-pronged attack on this traditional structure:(1) Part II uncovers the internal normative incoherence of existing negligence doctrine (where breach of a legal duty does not in itself have legal repercussions) and offers “negligence without harm” as a coherent alternative. (2) Part III provides a fairness-based case for abolishing the harm requirement, fostering the idea that negligence, defined as exposing another person to foreseeable unreasonable risk, is a moral wrong as between the risk-creator and the risk-bearer irrespective of harm.(3) Part IV presents an economic case for the proposed reform, arguing that if tort law aims to prevent the creation of unacceptable risks, it does not have to await harm and use the indirect, complicated, and seemingly flawed method of ordering some people to pay compensatory damages ex post in order to ensure internalization by others ex ante. Finally, Part V supplements the theoretical analysis with a tentative scheme of legal remedies for negligence without harm.

The Article provides a law-and-economics analysis of the question of liability for online republication. Its main thesis is that liability for republication generates a specter ofmultiple defendants which might dilute the originator's liability and undermine its deterrent effect. The Article concludes that, subject to several exceptions and methodological caveats, only the originator should be liable. This seems to be the American rule, as enunciated in Batzel v. Smith and Barrett v. Rosenthal. It stands in stark contrast to the prevalent rules in other Western jurisdictions and has been challenged by scholars on various grounds since its very inception.Following the Introduction, Part II presents the legal framework. It first discusses the rules applicable to republication of self-created content, focusing on the emergence of the single publication rule, and its natural extension to online republication. It then turns to republication of third-party content. American law makes a clear-cut distinction between offline republication which gives rise to a new cause of action against the republisher (subject to a few limited exceptions), and online republication which enjoys an almost absolute immunity under 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Other Western jurisdictions employ more generous republisher liability regimes, which usually require endorsement, a knowing expansion of exposure or repetition.Part III offers an economic justification for the American model. Law-andeconomics literature has showed that attributing liability for constant indivisible harm to multiple injurers, where each could have single-handedly prevented that harm ("alternative care" settings), leads to dilution of liability. Online republication scenarios often involve multiple tortfeasors. However, they differ from previously analyzed phenomena because they are not alternative care situations, and because the harm increased by the conduct of each tortfeasor is not constant and indivisible. Part III argues that neither feature precludes the dilution argument. It explains that the impact of the multiplicity of injurers in the online republication context on liability and deterrence provides a general justification for the American rule. This rule's relatively low administrative costs afford additional support.Part IV considers the possible limits of the theoretical argument. It maintains that exceptions to the exclusive originator liability rule should be recognized when the originator is unidentifiable orjudgment-proof, and when either the republisher's identity or the republication's audience was unforeseeable. It also explains that the rule does not preclude liability for positive endorsement with a substantial addition, which constitutes a new original publication, or for the dissemination of illegally obtained content, which is an independent wrong. Lastly, Part IV addresses possible challenges to the main argument's underlying assumptions, namely that liability dilution is a real risk and that it is undesirable.

Abstract This article examines the possible uses of comparative tort law in practice and theory. It takes the view that comparative law is always a means, never an end in itself, explains how it can be utilized by judges, legislatures, and legal scholars, and puts forward important caveats and qualifications. Part 2 demonstrates the traditional role of comparative law in interpreting and implementing shared or similar tort doctrines and in providing ideas for domestic tort law gap-filling and reform. It highlights the challenges that such utilization might present. Part 3 maintains that comparative research is the cornerstone of unification endeavors. Starting with coordinated projects, Part 3 argues that unification is in itself an instrument (making comparative law a second-order instrument) and that it cannot be pursued without taking into account some concerns about its desirability and practicability. Part 3 then discusses uncoordinated unification processes, whereby lawmakers in one jurisdiction identify a “global consensus” and decide to join it, and elaborates on the normative and positive components of these strategies. Part 4 acknowledges that comparative analysis usually uncovers trans-jurisdictional diversity and argues that such findings can underlie normative and positive theories of tort law. A comparison can offer a systematic taxonomy of possible legal solutions to a particular problem, enabling scholars to critically evaluate and compare the alternatives from their preferred theoretical perspective. Moreover, any hypothesis about the impact of cultural, economic, political, technological, and other conditions and changes on the law can be substantiated or refuted through comparative analyses that seek out legal differences (or similarities) among systems with different (or similar) underlying backgrounds. Through this analysis, the article aims to reignite and enrich the debate and inspire tort-law makers and scholars to integrate comparative research into their work.

Human society is facing its worst nightmare—a global pandemic caused by a highly infectious, resilient, and enigmatic virus. Questions that have occupied moral philosophers for ages transform into urgent practical predicaments for doctors, ethicists, and healthcare policymakers facing impossible situations. Societies, grown accustomed to the notion of plentifulness, are forced to grapple with the prospect of scarcity, particularly that of life-saving resources, such as ventilators, ICU beds, health human resources, medication, and vaccines. Leading health ethicists and other professionals have already penned articles addressing the reemerging dilemmas regarding the allocation of scarce life-saving resources. Although several papers discussing these matters have been published in the most prominent medical journals, they lacked a broader interdisciplinary perspective. In this Article, we illuminate the difficult questions ahead from a somewhat different angle – that of legal experience and scholarship. After reviewing previously proposed recommendations, the Article calls on the policy and health community to reconsider some of them, while accounting for existing legal literature and critical thinking about allocation methods and benefiting from their accumulated wisdom.Part I presents the primary medical allocation principles, explains their limits, and outlines possible solutions, such as the use of "non-conventional" methods for the allocation of scarce life-saving resources among equally situated candidates. Part II closely examines and challenges the recent recommendations to opt for allocation via lotteries when patients are relatively equal, explaining why applying queues is often preferable from a fairness perspective. Part III compares the two methods (lotteries and queues) from an efficiency perspective. Part IV addresses key exceptions to the application of non-conventional allocation models - consent, merit, and skill - and argues that these exceptions should be applied carefully and narrowly. Part V examines the feasibility, utility, and fairness of reallocating scarce life-saving resources after their initial allocation. It focuses on "sharing" ventilators and medical staff among patients in critical condition over time. In doing so, it frames the policy discussion regarding these matters within the broader legal and policy debates on reallocating resources ("time-sharing") and explains how relying on this paradigm can prove fruitful to the analysis.

The Article addresses the untheorized and under-researched problem of strong unidentifiability in tort law, namely the victim’s occasional inability to identify the direct wrongdoer, or even an ascertainable group to which the wrongdoer belongs, and bring an action against him or her. This Article offers a systematic analysis and a general theoretical framework for the appraisal of possible solutions to strong unidentifiability problems, which undermine liability and frustrate its goals.Part I presents the main legal models developed and used to overcome these problems in different contexts and various legal systems: adherence to direct liability with creative procedural identification tools, indirect liability of a third party with some control over the unidentified wrongdoer’s conduct, residual indirect liability, and no causation-based liability.Part II turns to an economic appraisal of the competing models. It argues that in tailoring solutions to strong unidentifiability problems lawmakers should focus on four types of costs: (1) the cost for the victim of identifying the unknown wrongdoer using advanced procedural tools, (2) the cost for a third party of obtaining and retaining information about the wrongdoer’s identity, (3) the cost (and expected impact) of precautions a third party could take to reduce the likelihood of the wrongdoing, and (4) the cost of non-enforcement.Part II then outlines the selection principle, explains that its application is context, jurisdiction, and time-specific, and applies it to four common cases of strong unidentifiability: intentional violations of bodily integrity, life, or liberty by unknown perpetrators, injuries caused by defective products whose manufacturers are unidentified, anonymous online wrongdoing, and hit-and-run accidents.

This is the Israeli report to the European Tort Law Yearbook. It critically evaluates notable developments which took place in Israeli tort law in 2013. Part A discusses legislation and legislative bills on liability for sexual harassment and road accidents. Part B discusses Supreme Court decisions on the structure of the tort of negligence, alienation of affections, liability for failure to prevent third-party crime, mitigation of damages, and assignment of a cause of action in tort. Part C reviews new Israeli tort law literature.

Jerry publishes unlawful content about Newman on Facebook, Elaine shares Jerry’s post, the share automatically turns into a tweet because her Facebook and Twitter accounts are linked, and George immediately retweets it. Should Elaine and George be liable for these republications? The question is neither theoretical nor idiosyncratic. On occasion, it reaches the headlines, as when Jennifer Lawrence’s representatives announced she would sue every person involved in the dissemination, through various online platforms, of her illegally obtained nude pictures. Yet this is only the tip of the iceberg. Numerous potentially offensive items are reposted daily, their exposure expands in widening circles, and they sometimes “go viral.” This Article is the first to provide a law and economics analysis of the question of liability for online republication. Its main thesis is that liability for republication generates a specter of multiple defendants which might dilute the originator’s liability and undermine its deterrent effect. The Article concludes that, subject to several exceptions and methodological caveats, only the originator should be liable. This seems to be the American rule, as enunciated in Batzel v. Smith and Barrett v. Rosenthal. It stands in stark contrast to the prevalent rules in other Western jurisdictions and has been challenged by scholars on various grounds since its very inception. The Article unfolds in three Parts. Part I presents the legal framework. It first discusses the rules applicable to republication of self-created content, focusing on the emergence of the single publication rule and its natural extension to online republication. It then turns to republication of third-party content. American law makes a clear-cut distinction between offline republication which gives rise to a new cause of action against the republisher (subject to a few limited exceptions), and online republication which enjoys an almost absolute immunity under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Other Western jurisdictions employ more generous republisher liability regimes, which usually require endorsement, a knowing expansion of exposure or repetition. Part II offers an economic justification for the American model. Law and economics literature has showed that attributing liability for constant indivisible harm to multiple injurers, where each could have single-handedly prevented that harm (“alternative care” settings), leads to dilution of liability. Online republication scenarios often involve multiple tortfeasors. However, they differ from previously analyzed phenomena because they are not alternative care situations, and because the harm—increased by the conduct of each tortfeasor—is not constant and indivisible. Part II argues that neither feature precludes the dilution argument. It explains that the impact of the multiplicity of injurers in the online republication context on liability and deterrence provides a general justification for the American rule. This rule’s relatively low administrative costs afford additional support. Part III considers the possible limits of the theoretical argument. It maintains that exceptions to the exclusive originator liability rule should be recognized when the originator is unidentifiable or judgment-proof, and when either the republisher’s identity or the republication’s audience was unforeseeable. It also explains that the rule does not preclude liability for positive endorsement with a substantial addition, which constitutes a new original publication, or for the dissemination of illegally obtained content, which is an independent wrong. Lastly, Part III addresses possible challenges to the main argument’s underlying assumptions, namely that liability dilution is a real risk and that it is undesirable.

The Article systematically and critically evaluates the potential liability of various “suspects” for the physical, emotional, and economic losses arising from the COVID-19 pandemic: the country-of-origin (the People’s Republic of China), international organizations (particularly the World Health Organization), federal, state, and local governments and officers, businesses, and healthcare providers. It concludes that existing legal frameworks fail to provide an appropriate solution for victims, primarily because each of the potential defendants can easily evade liability. The Article then proposes a new hybrid (international-domestic) regime, inspired by the international framework for the compensation of victims of nuclear incidents and by the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.

Cyberbullying has become a notorious epidemic, culminating in widely publicized suicides. Whether a new and distinct problem or an old one in a new guise, the technological setting has undoubtedly generated new challenges and, at the same time, new opportunities for legal response. Regrettably, while delegation of power to educational institutions and criminalization of cyber-misconduct are relatively common, at least in public discourse, the potential impact of civil liability has been downplayed. This Article puts the underexplored regulatory tool under the spotlight. It provides systematic legal and economic analyses of civil liability for cyberbullying, based on a trichotomy of potential defendants—primary wrongdoers, real-life supervisors (parents, schools), and virtual supervisors (mostly online platform operators). Ultimately, the Article lays the foundations for an efficiency-oriented model which integrates technological features to reduce supervisors’ information costs. In order to incentivize parents to reasonably use advanced surveillance applications, the proposed model imposes liability when failure to employ such tools results in juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, in addition to standard liability for not taking reasonable precautions upon learning about the risk. The model also imposes liability on schools for cyberbullying through school devices if they failed to: (1) enforce reliable identification of users, (2) employ advanced surveillance tools, or (3) take reasonable measures to prevent harm upon notification of possible misconduct. Finally, the model holds a virtual supervisor liable if the victim has insufficient information to identify the wrongdoer, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the virtual supervisor did not properly respond.

The Report offers a global ranking of academic legal publications, covering more than 900 outlets, and using a four-tier categorization. The ranking is based on a combined quantitative and qualitative methodology. The Report was composed in the context of the Israeli academic system, but the methodology and the results are not jurisdiction-specific.Evaluating academic publications is a never-ending challenge. Such evaluation is an integral part of internal hiring, promotion, and tenure procedures, and of external funding decisions and institutional rankings. The proper way to evaluate academic publications has been the subject of fierce debate. The traditional method for academic evaluation is specific review of each publication, assessing its originality, rigor, and significance. This method, known as "peer-review", is often difficult to perform and might be subjective and biased. These concerns have generated an increased interest in the use of quantitative indicators in research evaluation. However, notwithstanding its scientific allure, the use of quantitative measures to assess research has been heavily criticized by the academic community for losing sight of the intrinsic value of academic work, for ignoring distinct "citation communities" in various fields, and for creating perverse incentives that could actually undermine scientific innovation and reward mediocre work.Evaluation of legal scholarship faces particular challenges due to the absence of comprehensive, universally endorsed, quantitative rankings of law journals and the fundamental bifurcation into peer-reviewed and student-edited journals. The challenges are further complicated in non-English speaking jurisdictions, such as Israel, where scholars publish in both their local language and English, in domestic and foreign journals.The current Report aims to respond to some of the criticism of quantitative measures and to address the distinctive characteristics of the academic legal domain by proposing a ranking of legal publications that integrates various qualitative and quantitative measures. The Report is the product of more than two years of work, initiated by the Deans of four Israeli law schools operating within public universities. It presents the background to the Committee's work, outlines general principles, and explains the scope of the current project and the ranking methodology. The Appendix (pp. 21-54 [pp. 791-824 in the published volume]) contains the proposed ranking.The report is in English, but an Introduction in Hebrew is appended on pp. 55-59.

תקציר בעברית: בפרשת שמואלי דן בית המשפט העליון בשאלת היחס בין חוזר מזכירות הפיקוד העליון לבין הוראת הפיקוד העליון. לכאורה, מדובר בשאלה פשוטה, שהוכרעה באופן חד משמעי בסעיף 3(ב) לחוק השיפוט הצבאי. אלא שבית המשפט סבר אחרת: הנה כי כן, מעמדו של חוזר מפע הוא כשל פקודה כללית אחרת, וככזה אין הוא יכול לסתור פקודת מטכל או הפע, זולת אם הוא בא 'לתת פרסום מוקדם ותוקף, במידת הצורך, לפקודות הצבא העתידות להתפרסם'. כי אז אין סתירה מהותית בין השניים, ויש לראות את חוזר מפע כבא לקבוע זמנית, ובנוהל מזורז, נורמה אחרת מזו שבהפע, ובלבד שתהא כפופה להחלטת הרמטכל ואישור שר הבטחון.מסקנתו העיקרית של בית המשפט העליון בעניין שמואלי, שלפיה יש בכוחם של חוזרי מזכירות הפיקוד העליון לגבור על הוראות הפיקוד העליון אינה מתיישבת עם הוראתו המפורשת של סעיף 3(ב) לחוק השיפוט הצבאי, הקובע את ההיררכיה בין פקודות הצבא השונות. הדרישה לאישור של שר הבטחון להוצאת חוזר מזכירות הפיקוד העליון (שבית המשפט נזקק לה בעקבות הקביעה הבעייתית הראשונה) נטולת כל בסיס בחוק או בהוראת הפיקוד העליון 1.0105, המפרטת את סוגי הפקודות הכלליות האחרות וקובעת מי מוסמך להוציאן.

תקציר בעברית: מאמר זה בוחן את הגדרתו של יסוד ההתרשלות בעוולת הרשלנות נוסח ישראל מפרספקטיבה היסטורית-תיאורית ומפרספקטיבה עיונית-נורמטיבית. פרק א מראה, כי למרות שבית המשפט העליון מעולם לא אימץ באורח פסקני הגדרה עיונית אקסקלוסיבית למושג ההתרשלות, התפיסה הדומיננטית של מונח זה בפסיקה הישראלית הייתה ועודנה תפיסה כלכלית. הגדרה אחת שנתקבלה אצלנו כבר בשלהי שנות החמישים מקבילה, פחות או יותר, לנוסחה האלגברית הידועה שטבע השופט האמריקני לרנד-הנד, לפיה התרשלות משמעה אי-נקיטה באמצעי זהירות שעלותו נמוכה מתוחלת הנזק שיש בכוחו למנוע. הגדרה שנייה, ותיקה ונפוצה אף היא, בוחנת את תוחלת הנזק, עלות מניעתו והתועלת שניתן להפיק מהפעילות יוצרת הסיכון. במרוצת השנים בית המשפט העליון אף עידן ועדכן את הנוסחאות המסורתיות על בסיס תובנות כלכליות. לזמן מה נדמה היה כי נוצרים בקיעים בתפיסה המסורתית. שתי הגדרות חדשות, לא-כלכליות, למושג ההתרשלות הוצעו בפסיקה הישראלית. האחת מבקשת להחדיר שיקולים לא-כלכליים אל תוך הנוסחה האלגברית של לרנד-הנד, אשר הופכת בכך לפורמולה תוצאתנית חובקת-כל. השנייה מכירה ברלוונטיות של שיקולים לא-כלכליים לצד השיקולים הכלכליים, אך אינה קובעת נוסחה לאיזון ביניהם. המאמר מציג את הקשיים שמעוררות הגדרות אלה ומדגיש כי אף אחת מהן לא קנתה לה אחיזה של ממש בשיח השיפוטי, כך שמעמדן הדומיננטי של ההגדרות המסורתיות נשמר. פרק ב מסביר כי אף אם ניתן להציע ליסוד ההתרשלות הגדרה כלכלית, הרי שמבחינה מעשית אין זה אפשרי להגשים את התכלית העומדת בבסיסה של הגדרה כזו, לאמור – יעילות כלכלית. את הקשיים המעשיים ניתן לסווג לפי זהותו של הגורם שהתנהגותו, החלטתו או הערכתו פוגעת באפקטיבית של ההגדרה הכלכלית: בית המשפט, המזיק או הניזוק. בראש ובראשונה, יישום ההגדרה הכלכלית על ידי בתי המשפט מעורר קשיים משמעותיים בשל בעיות מידע והטיות שונות. במקרים רבים הנתבע עלול להימצא אחראי בהעדר התרשלות, ובאחרים הוא עלול לצאת פטור חרף התרשלותו. תוצאה זו אינה ראויה לא רק מבחינה משפטית-פורמלית, אלא גם מבחינה כלכלית. אף מרבית המזיקים הפוטנציאליים אינם יכולים – בשל בעיות מידע, הטיות קוגניטיביות, או מגבלות אנוש אחרות, לבחור באופן מודע בין התרשלות לאי-התרשלות על פי ההגדרה הכלכלית; ומכל מקום, האפקטיביות של התמריץ שנוצר על ידי הגדרה זו נפגעת על ידי תמריצי נגד שמקורם בכשלים שאינם ניתנים לתיקון במנגנוני ביטוח האחריות ובתופעת הנתבע חסין-האחריות. לבסוף, קיימת בעיה קשה ובלתי פתירה של אכיפת-חסר בידי ניזוקים בפועל, הפוגעת אנושות באפקטיביות של התמריץ אותו אמורה ההגדרה הכלכלית לספק למזיקים בכוח. פרק ג טוען, כי ראוי היה לבחון ביתר רצינות את האלטרנטיבה העיקרית לתפיסה הכלכלית של מושג ההתרשלות, היא התפיסה הדאונטולוגית-הקאנטיאנית. בהתאם לתפיסה זו האדם כבעל רצון חופשי הוא בעל ערך נשגב. הוא איננו רק אמצעי להגשמת תכלית כזו או אחרת, שלו או של אחרים. פירוש הדבר הוא שלא ניתן להטיל על פלוני אחריות אך ורק כדי להרתיע אחרים מהתנהגות מסוימת. הנחה נוספת במשנה הקאנטיאנית, אשר נובעת מן ההנחה הראשונה, היא שכל בני האדם שווים בחירותם. השוויון המוחלט בא לידי ביטוי בעקרון הזכות של קאנט, שלפיו אדם נדרש לכוון את פעילות החיצונית כך שמימוש חירותו יוכל להתיישב עם חירותו של כל אחד אחר על פי חוק אוניברסלי. עקרון זה יכול לעמוד ביסודה של הגדרה חלופית למושג ההתרשלות. הטלת חובה להימנע לחלוטין מיצירת סיכונים תשלול מן הבריות את חירותן ולכן לא ניתן להטיל חובה גורפת כזו. בה בעת, הענקת חסינות למבצע בגין כל סיכון שנוצר על ידו פירושה התעלמות מחירותם של הניזוקים הפוטנציאליים. התניית האחריות בכך שהנתבע חשף את התובע לסיכון ממשי צפוי מהווה שביל-זהב בין שני הקצוות, ומבטאת את השוויון הקאנטיאני בין הצדדים. הפרק מציג ומפריך טענות ביקורת חזקות שניתן לכאורה להפנות כנגד ההגדרה הקאנטיאנית, מנסה להסביר את ההתעלמות השיפוטית מהגדרה זו וקורא לבתי המשפט לבחון מחדש את מחוייבותם לתפיסה שבה האדם אינו אלא אמצעי וחירותו היא לעולם בת-ערובה של טובת הכלל. English Abstract: This Article examines the definition of negligent-conduct (also referred to as breach of the duty of care) in the Israeli law of negligence from historical-descriptive and theoretical-normative perspectives. Part A shows that although the Supreme Court has never conclusively adopted an exclusive definition of negligent-conduct, the dominant perception of this term in Israeli case law has been utilitarian-economic in nature. One commonly used definition, applied since the 1950s, is more or less equivalent to the celebrated algebraic Hand formula: negligent-conduct is the failure to take precautions the cost of which is lower than the reduction in expected harm. Another common definition considers the expected harm, the cost of precautions, and the social utility accrued by the risk-creating activity. Along the years the Supreme Court has refined and modified the traditional formulas on the basis of economic insights. For a while it seemed that the traditional stance may have given way for two non-economic definitions. One of them injects non-economic values into the Hand formula, turning it into an all-inclusive consequentialist test. The other recognizes the relevance of non-economic alongside economic considerations, but does not determine how to balance or weight the various concerns. The Article discusses the shortcomings of these definitions and shows that none has gained much support in the Israeli case law thus far. Part B explains that while it may be possible to formulate an economic definition of negligent-conduct, it is practically impossible to achieve efficiency through its application. The practical problems may be classified in accordance with the role of the person whose conduct, decision or evaluation impairs the effectiveness of the economic definition: the fact-finder, the injurer, or the victim. Part B first addresses the difficulties faced by fact-finders in implementing the economic definition, and their implications. Next it discusses potential injurers’ inability to choose between negligence and non-negligence, and the impact of counter-incentives on their conduct. Lastly, it elaborates on the problem of under-enforcement by actual victims. These factors substantially impair the efficiency of the incentive that tort law may provide to potential injurers. In view of all this, it is highly doubtful that an economic definition of negligence is actually capable of realizing its underlying goal.

תקציר בעברית: בפרשת זייצוב הכיר בית המשפט העליון ברוב-דעות בעילה של חיים בעוולה, המאפשרת לילד בעל מוגבלות לתבוע את מי שהתרשלותו גרמה להולדת התובע, אך לא למוגבלות עצמה. ברם, שופטי הרוב לא הגיעו להסכמה בדבר גבולותיה של העילה והותירו שתי שאלות יסודיות בלא מענה קונקלוסיבי. הייתה זו תולדה מובנת של הניסיון לדון בזכויות הילד במסגרת המושגית המסורתית של דיני הנזיקין. בנוסף לכך הכיר בית המשפט פה-אחד בעילת התביעה של ההורים בגין הולדה בעוולה באותן הנסיבות. קביעת הרכב מורחב לדיון מחודש בשני סוגי התביעות והקמת ועדת מומחים רב-תחומית לגיבוש המלצות בנושא יצרו ציפייה לרפורמה. ואמנם, בפסק הדין בעניין המר קבע בית המשפט העליון כללי משחק חדשים: העילה של חיים בעוולה בוטלה, והעילה של הולדה בעוולה אושררה והורחבה. רשימה זו בוחנת מזווית ביקורתית את עיקרי פסק-הדין בעניין המר. פרק א מציג את הרקע להחלטה ובכך מדגיש את חשיבותה: הוא מזכיר את המחלוקת בין שופטי הרוב בפרשת זייצוב ומסביר את הכשלים העיוניים בכל אחת מהגישות ואת ההשלכות המעשיות של אי-ההכרעה ביניהן. פרק ב מתאר את ההליך וההחלטה בעניין המר. פרק ג מנתח את ההכרעות הנוגעות לשתי עילות התביעה: היעדר הדיון בשאלת קיומה של חובת זהירות מושגית כלפי ההורים, בחינת יסוד הנזק בשתי התביעות ואופן הוכחת הקשר הסיבתי העובדתי. פרק ד בוחן את החידושים המרכזיים במישור התרופתי: ההחלטה לספק את צורכי הילד באמצעות הרחבת הפיצוי להורים ואופן הערכת הפיצוי בראשי הנזק הממוניים. פרק ה מברר את היקף השינוי שחולל פסק-הדין מבחינת ההתיישנות. לבסוף, פרק ו מתמקד בטענה שלפיה בהכרעה משפטית יש להתחשב בקונצנזוס גלובלי לגבי השאלה שבמחלוקת, ככל שישנו. אחדות מטענות הביקורת נוגעות להנמקה, ולפיכך תרומתן עיונית גרידא, לפחות בכל הנוגע לתוצאה הספציפית. אחרות נוגעות לליקויים בני-תיקון במודל הנזיקי שאימץ בית המשפט. לצד אלה ואלה תעבור ברשימה כחוט השני התפיסה, שלפיה מוטב היה שבית המשפט יגביל את תביעת הנזיקין של ההורים לפגיעה באוטונומיה (להבדיל מנזקים אחרים) ויפעל להבטחת צרכיו המיוחדים של הילד באמצעות הסדרים אלטרנטיביים, לבר-נזיקיים.